Complaint,Petition: CELIA MARGISON VS FREMONT BANK

Case Number: 23AHCV01644 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT SARAH LOPEZ , Plaintiff(s), vs. GLEN JOHN APRAMIAN, M.D., INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV01644 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS FORM INTERROGATORIES EMPLOYMENT LAW Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 15 , 2024 ) This motion was filed on March 7, 2024, by plaintiff Sarah Lopez (Plaintiff). Plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendant Glen John Apramian, M.D., Inc. (Defendant) to serve further responses to the following from Form Interrogatories Employment Law (Set One): Form Interrogatory (FROG) Nos. 200.1, 200.3, 200.4, 204.3, 204.6, 204.7, 214.1, 214.2, 217.1. This set of discovery requests was served on August 8, 2023. Defendant served objections on October 2, 2023, before serving supplemental responses on December 20, 2023. Plaintiff argues that further responses are necessary because the supplemental responses are not complete and do not address each subpart. Plaintiff requests that the Court sanction Defendant and defense counsel in the amount of $2,400. Defendant filed an opposition brief on July 1, 2024. Defendant states that by the time of the hearing, Plaintiff will have received its second supplemental response. Defendant argues that the motion should be denied as moot because of its intent to serve further responses. This prospect of compliance is insufficient to moot Defendants motion and the Court notes that Defendant does not contend that further responses are not warranted. Defendant only claims that it was unable to serve further supplemental responses due to further development in the case, including the filing of an amended complaint and answer, and the deposition of defendant Glen John Apramian, M.D. These events took place in December 2023 and January 2024, and are insufficient excuses for Defendants failure to comply with its discovery obligations or, at the very least, meaningfully engage with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the valid deficiencies of these responses in the following months. There is certainly no reason for why responses have not yet been served before the hearing date, which is nearly 11 months after the interrogatories were served. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for further responses is GRANTED. With respect to Plaintiffs request for sanctions, Defendant argues sanctions are not only barred by case law interpreting the Civil Discovery Act, but that the amount demanded by Plaintiff is excessive. The Court disagrees with both points. First, Defendant argues that the decision in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 466, 504 prevents any sanctions award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030 and 2023.010. However, the court in PWC held that those sections do not independently authorize the court to impose sanctions and specifically noted that the party requesting sanctions relied on no other underlying discovery statute authorizing sanctions. ( Id ., p. 504.) In contrast, Plaintiff makes this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300 and identifies an underlying statute which authorizes the court to impose sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).) In light of this statute, the Court concludes it is authorized to impose sanctions in connection with this motion. However, Plaintiffs request for sanctions is excessive in amount. Plaintiffs counsel states that her reasonable hourly rate is $300 and that she has spent 2 hours meeting and conferring with counsel over emails, four hours preparing the motion and declaration, and anticipates spending three hours preparing for and attending the hearing on this motion, for a total of 8 hours. The Court declines to award any sanctions in connection with Plaintiffs attempts to meet and confer. Also, Plaintiffs reply brief and supporting declaration is nearly identical to the five other discovery motions which remain pending. Therefore, the Court reduces the request for sanctions to $900, consisting of 3 hours at an hourly rate of $300. The Court does not impose sanctions against Defendants counsel, who was not identified by name in the notice of motion. No filing fees were requested. In conclusion, Plaintiffs motion for further responses is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to serve further supplemental responses within 10 days of the date of this order. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is GRANTED and imposed against Defendant in the reduced amount of $900, to be paid within 10 days of the date of this Order. Dated this 15th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 21STCV27304 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles BLANCA CALDERON, Plaintiff, vs. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV27304 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] ORDER Action Filed: 07/26/21 Trial Date: 12/02/24 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Party: Defendant Regents of the University of California (erroneously sued as Regents of the University of California DBA UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center and UCLA Health) Responding Party: Plaintiff Blanca Calderon Motion for Protective Order The court has considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. The court DENIES Defendants motion for protective order. The court DENIES Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. Background On July 26, 2021, plaintiff Blanca Calderon (Plaintiff) initiated this action against defendant Regents of the University of California (erroneously sued as Regents of the University of California DBA UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center and UCLA Health) (Defendant), alleging causes of action for (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940(a); (2) Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in Violation of Government Code § 12945.2; (3) Failure to Provide Medical Leave in Violation of Government Code § 12945.2; (4) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code § 12940(n); (5) Failure to Maintain a Workplace Free from Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(k); (6) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; and (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of FEHA. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff worked as a housekeeper at Defendants ULCA Santa Monica Medical Center from 2007 to May 14, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff sustained an initial workplace injury to her back on April 13, 2009, and she was referred to doctors under Defendants workers compensation insurance. ( Id. at ¶¶ 16.) When Plaintiff attempted to return to work with restrictions, Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and this behavior continued after Plaintiff returned from various durations of medical leave. ( Id . at ¶¶ 17-20.) On May 15, 2010, Plaintiff sustained a second workplace injury to her right thumb and hand, and despite reporting the injury to her direct supervisor, she was instructed to keep working. ( Id. at ¶ 21.) After four days, Plaintiff approached a different supervisor who referred her to a workers compensation doctor, and this injury was also categorized as a permanent injury. ( Ibid. ) By December 18, 2015, Plaintiff received a final orthopedic evaluation on both of her injuries, and it was determined that Plaintiffs physical condition had stabilized and her medical conditions were permanent. ( Id. at ¶ 23.) Thus, Plaintiffs had several work restrictions needing to be accommodated. ( Ibid. ) On December 13, 2019, defendant Michael E. Pfau (hereinafter, Defendant) filed this motion for protective order. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 29, 2020. No reply was received. However, her supervisors did not make any good faith attempts to accommodate Plaintiffs work restrictions, and as a result, Plaintiff was forced to perform her full duties. ( Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff repeatedly complained of the lack of accommodations from December 2015 through March 2017. By never being accommodated for her injuries, they worsened, and Plaintiff sought further treatment in March 2017 due to ongoing back and shoulder pain. ( Id. at ¶ 26.) Because of her injuries, Plaintiff was placed on the most restrictive restrictions available, but Defendant ignored Plaintiffs request for reasonable accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 27.) In January 2018, Plaintiff experienced pain in the same hand that had been injured in 2010, and when she informed her direct supervisor of this injury, no action was taken. ( Id. at ¶ 28.) By June 15, 2018, Plaintiff sustained another workplace injury to her knee because of Defendants refusal to provide reasonable accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 29-30.) It is alleged that Defendant continued to fail to accommodate Plaintiff for her work restrictions, and her knee and hand injuries worsened. ( Id. at ¶¶ 31-37.) Because of the worsening condition in her hand, Plaintiff had to have surgery, and she was placed on medical leave from November 9, 2018 through December 3, 2018. ( Id. at ¶ 37.) Upon returning to work, Plaintiff informed Defendant of her most recent work restrictions, but Defendant insisted that Plaintiff return to full duties without any accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 38.) Because Plaintiffs injuries were worsening, she was placed on medical leave for three days in February 7, 2017 and released with work restrictions. ( Id. ¶ 40.) Again, Defendants did not provide reasonable accommodations when Plaintiff returned to work on February 10, 2019. ( Id. at ¶ 41.) By March 6, 2019, Plaintiffs restrictions were reverted back to permanent restrictions for her knee injury. ( Id. at ¶ 42.) On May 13, 2019, Defendants terminated Plaintiff on the ground that they could no longer accommodate Plaintiffs restrictions as they were permanent, despite having been designated as permanent since December 2015. ( Id. at ¶ 43.) On May 20, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for protective order in relation to Plaintiffs attempt to take the deposition of sixteen third party lay witnesses. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition to the instant motion. On July 2, 2024, Defendant filed its reply. Legal Standard Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. (CCP § 2025.420(a).) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (CCP § 2025.420(b).) This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions set forth in CCP §§ 2025.420(b)(1)-(16). Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (b), provides a nonexclusive list of permissible directions that may be included in a protective order. ( Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.) If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the deponent provide or permit the discovery against which protection was sought on those terms and conditions that are just. (CCP § 2025.420(g).) [T]he issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary. [Citation.] ( Nativi , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at 316.) The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2025.420(h).) Furthermore, CCP §2017.020(a) provides, as follows: The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. Also, under CCP § 2019.030(a)(1), the court may restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method if [t]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Evidentiary Objections Defendant objects to various portions of the Declaration of Brennan S. Kahn, which was submitted in support of Plaintiffs opposition. These objections are overruled in their entirety. Discussion As a preliminary matter, the court finds that Defendant has sufficiently met and conferred on the issue of the protective order. (See Afshar Decl. ¶¶ 11-13, Exhs. G-I.) Merits of the Motion Defendant moves for a protective order pursuant to CCP §§ 2025.420, 2017.010, and 2019.030 to bar and limit Plaintiff from taking the depositions of additional third-party lay witnesses. Defendant first contends that there is good cause to issue the requested protective orders because, in past depositions of other lay witnesses, Plaintiffs counsel has improperly asked questions relating to legal conclusions and that require the lay witnesses to interpret medical records and opine on the performance of work duties under medical conditions. (Motion at pp. 8-9.) Effectively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is seeking the lay witnesses to speculate based on various hypotheticals. ( Id. at pp. 9-10.) Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff seeks duplicative testimony because, in the previous eight depositions of lay witnesses, Plaintiff has nearly identical questions that concerned her specific work restrictions, the accommodations offered and provided, modified work duties, the work actual performed, and hypotheticals relating to work restrictions. ( Id. at pg. 11; Afshar Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Exh. C.) Defendant also argues that it would suffer irreparable harm if the court declines to intervene in this instance because the third-party witnesses will continue to be harassed to answer questions that they lack personal knowledge about. ( Id. at pg. 12.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is deficient because Defendant fails to argue why any specific witness should not be deposed or why any specific question should not be asked. (Opposition at pg. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff reasons that Defendant is improperly requesting the court to issue an blanket prohibition without a specific factual basis. ( Id. , relying on Meritplan Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241-242.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant should not be allowed to arbitrarily limit her ability to conduct necessary depositions or even to curtail certain line of questionings without further information. ( Id. at pg. 10.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the witnesses that she intends to depose are relevant to her claims because they were Plaintiffs direct supervisors, direct co-workers, executives over Plaintiffs department, or personnel associated with accommodation requests. ( Id. at pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff further contends that she should be permitted to question the deponents without restrictions because Defendants objections are premised on the lack of relevance of the testimony elicited, but they can be later contested on admissibility grounds. ( Id. at pp. 14-15.) In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs reliance on Mertiplan Insurance Co. is misplaced because the protective order issued there did not establish whether the depositions were harassing, duplicative or burdensome, and it did not address any potentially proper questioning. ( Mertiplan Insurance Co., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at 241-242.) Defendant maintains that there is good cause for the protective order on the ground that the line of improper questioning amounts to harassment and annoyance and that the testimony that Plaintiff seeks to elicit is duplicative of prior deposition testimony. (Reply at pp. 6-8.) As an initial matter, the court is not inclined to issue a broad sweeping order that bars the taking of further third-party witness depositions. After all, the scope of discovery is broad. ( Childrens Hosp. of Central CA v. Blue Cross of CA (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1276.) While the court is concerned that Plaintiff is repeatedly seeking to elicit testimony of legal conclusions from third-party lay witnesses, the court does not find the questioning generally complained of warrants the prohibition of those questions from being asked when they could be within the proposed third-party witnesses personal knowledge. Primarily, the court finds that Defendant has failed to show how allowing Plaintiff to proceed with additional proposed third-party lay witness depositions would result in unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (CCP § 2025.420(b).) The only irreparable harm that Defendant identifies is that the third-party witnesses will be harassed and made to feel uncomfortable. However, this is not persuasive because, if these third-party lay witnesses lack personal knowledge to answer the questions that Plaintiff seeks to ask, then they may merely testify in the negative. Additionally, considering that Plaintiff has already deposed eight third-party lay witnesses, there is no declaration from them to suggest that any of them felt harassed during their depositions. Moreover, to the extent that Defendant seeks to restrict the use of deposition because Plaintiff is seeking duplicative information, the Court is not persuaded by this information because Defendant has failed to show that the proposed third-party lay witnesses lack the personal knowledge needed to answer Plaintiffs questions. The court therefore DENIES Defendants motion for protective order. Requests for Monetary Sanctions Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant in the total amount of $7,000 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.420(h) for unsuccessfully making the instant motion. However, the Court does not find that Defendant acted without substantial justification in moving for the requested protective order. As stated above, one concern was Plaintiffs repeated questions to lay witnesses about legal conclusions, and another was that Plaintiff had already deposed eight witnesses asking similar questions. Thus, it appeared to Defendant that further depositions without court intervention would prove duplicative and unnecessarily protracted. On this ground, Defendant acted with substantial justification in moving for the requested protective order. The court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. It is so ordered. Dated: July 10, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the

Case Number: 22TRCV01130 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B BRITTANY HARMAN, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22TRCV01130 vs. [Tentative] RULING KALEO MARKETING, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendants Kaleo Marketing, LLC and Michael Oberlander Responding Party: Plaintiff Brittany Harman Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff (filed on February 23, 2024) The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The motion is DENIED as moot. The request for sanctions is DENIED as plaintiff acted with substantial justification. BACKGROUND On November 7, 2022, plaintiff Brittany Harman filed a complaint against Kaleo Marketing, LLC and Michael Oberlander for (1) pregnancy discrimination, (2) retaliation for taking pregnancy leave, (3) violation of Family Rights Act, (4) violation of pregnancy disability leave, (5) disability discrimination, (6) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, (7) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (8) retaliation for reasonable complaint to employer, and (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. On December 14, 2022, defendants filed an amended answer. On February 23, 2023, the court sustained with leave to amend plaintiffs demurrer to the FAA. On March 27, 2023, the court granted plaintiffs motion for protective order re her deposition, ordering that plaintiffs deposition was to be conducted after defendant served its further responses and produced responsive documents. The court also granted plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to interrogatories and requests for production and ordered defendant to pay sanctions in the amount of $3338. On July 14, 2023, the court granted defendants motion for protective order that plaintiff must view requested documents provided to plaintiff in response to plaintiffs request for production of documents, set two, Nos. 56-63 in the presence of her counsel, in person, or via video conferencing and shall not make copies or take possession of any of the Confidential Materials. On August 9, 2023, the parties stipulated and the court ordered a protective order confidential designation only. On October 5, 2023, the court granted plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories Employment, Nos. 209.2, 211.1, 214.1, 214.2, and 216.1, Special Interrogatories, Nos. 18, 30, 36, 42, and 48, and Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 22-27 and 29-34, within fifteen days and ordered sanctions in the amount of $2538. On April 15, 2024, the parties stipulated and the court ordered a protective order addendum re highly confidential designation. LEGAL AUTHORITY CCP §2025.450(a) provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, . . , without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document . . . described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document . . . described in the deposition notice. CCP §2025.450(b) provides, A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following: (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. CCP §2025.230 states: If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the deponent shall designate and produce at the deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent. DISCUSSION Defendants Kaleo Marketing, LLC and Michael Oberlander requests that the Court compel plaintiff to appear for deposition and requests sanctions in the amount of $5,522.50. Defendants explain that on December 6, 2022, defendants noticed the deposition of plaintiff for January 19, 2023. After plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel that she would not be attending on that date, defense counsel sought other dates. On January 18, 2023, defendant served a deposition notice for January 31, 2023. Over the course of 2023, defendant served other deposition notices as to plaintiff, including June 12, 2023 and October 5, 2023. On March 27, 2023, the Court granted plaintiffs motion for a protective order that plaintiffs deposition was to be conducted after defendant had served its further responses and produced responsive documents. On April 5, 2024, at an IDC, the minute order indicates that the parties have agreed to a date for plaintiffs deposition on May 7, 2024. In the opposition, plaintiff contends that the motion is moot because she appeared for a full-day deposition on June 4, 2024. She also argues that sanctions are not warranted because the Court had ordered defendants to wait to take plaintiffs deposition until they served responses to plaintiffs first set of discovery, and they still have not finished. Further, plaintiff asserts, she tried repeatedly to cooperate with defendants to create a global deposition schedule that worked for all parties, and that defendants variously ignored plaintiff or changed positions. Additionally, plaintiff contends, she resisted giving her deposition first because she felt that against these defendants and defense counsel, they would take her deposition and then refuse to give their depositions. In reply, defendant argues that sanctions are warranted based on plaintiffs refusal to engage in the discovery process in good faith. The Court finds that the motion is MOOT and thus DENIED as plaintiff has appeared for her deposition. As for sanctions, plaintiff acted with substantial justification. The Court had granted a protective order in that before plaintiffs deposition was taken, defendant had to have served further responses and produced documents. Thus, the Court denies defendants request for sanctions. ORDER The motion is DENIED as MOOT. Defendants request for sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX BRITTANY HARMAN, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22TRCV01130 vs. [Tentative] RULING KALEO MARKETING, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Kaleo Marketing Responding Party: Plaintiff Brittany Harman Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories General Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories Employment Law Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents Motino to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The motions are DENIED as MOOT. The requests for sanctions are DENIED . BACKGROUND On November 7, 2022, plaintiff Brittany Harman filed a complaint against Kaleo Marketing, LLC and Michael Oberlander for (1) pregnancy discrimination, (2) retaliation for taking pregnancy leave, (3) violation of Family Rights Act, (4) violation of pregnancy disability leave, (5) disability discrimination, (6) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, (7) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (8) retaliation for reasonable complaint to employer, and (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. On December 14, 2022, defendants filed an amended answer. On February 23, 2023, the court sustained with leave to amend plaintiffs demurrer to the FAA. On March 27, 2023, the court granted plaintiffs motion for protective order re her deposition, ordering that plaintiffs deposition was to be conducted after defendant served its further responses and produced responsive documents. The court also granted plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to interrogatories and requests for production and ordered defendant to pay sanctions in the amount of $3338. On July 14, 2023, the court granted defendants motion for protective order that plaintiff must view requested documents provided to plaintiff in response to plaintiffs request for production of documents, set two, Nos. 56-63 in the presence of her counsel, in person, or via video conferencing and shall not make copies or take possession of any of the Confidential Materials. On August 9, 2023, the parties stipulated and the court ordered a protective order confidential designation only. On October 5, 2023, the court granted plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories Employment, Nos. 209.2, 211.1, 214.1, 214.2, and 216.1, Special Interrogatories, Nos. 18, 30, 36, 42, and 48, and Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 22-27 and 29-34, within fifteen days and ordered sanctions in the amount of $2538. On April 15, 2024, the parties stipulated and the court ordered a protective order addendum re highly confidential designation. LEGAL AUTHORITY 45-Day Rule : This motion must be served within 45 days after service of the response in question (extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, or fax; see CCP §1013); otherwise, the demanding party waives the right to compel any further response to the CCP §2031.010 demand. CCP §§2031.310(c), 2016.050; see Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745. The 45-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1410. The parties, however, can also agree in writing on a specific later date by which to file the motion to compel. CCP §2031.310(c). Meet-and-Confer Requirement : The motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues outside of court (so-called meet and confer). CCP §§2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2). Separate Statement : Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). Interrogatories CCP §2030.300 states: (a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. . . . (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. . . . Request for Production of Documents On receipt of a response to an inspection demand, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. CCP §2031.310(a). A statement of compliance shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. CCP §2031.220. A representation of inability to comply with [a] particular demand for inspection . . . shall affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. This statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. CCP §2031.230. A motion to compel further response to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to show both: [1] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [2] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing good cause for inspection. But it is not essential in every case. Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial , 8:1495.6 (citations omitted). Declarations are generally used to show the requisite good cause for an order to compel inspection. The declarations must contain specific facts rather than mere conclusions. Id. at 8:1495.7 (citation omitted). The declarations may be on information and belief, if necessary. However, in such cases, the specific facts supporting such information and belief (the sources of the information) must also be alleged. Id. at 8:1495.8 (citation omitted). Most declarations are made by the attorney for the moving party, who is usually more familiar with the relevancy and specific facts constituting good cause for inspection. Id. at 8:1495.9. DISCUSSION Defendants Kaleo Marketing and Michael Oberlander request an order compelling plaintiff to respond further to defendants Form Interrogatories General, Form Interrogatories Employment, Special Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, and Request for Admissions. Defendants explain that on October 3, 2023, defendants served written discovery on plaintiff. Responses were due by November 2, 2023. On November 15, 2023, plaintiff served objections and plaintiffs counsel sent an email to defense counsel that plaintiffs counsel needed an additional two weeks to provide a fuller response shortly. On January 11, 2024, defense counsel sent an email to plaintiffs counsel requesting substantive responses. On January 12, 2024, plaintiffs counsel responded that the deadline to file motions to compel further responses was January 4, 2024 and that although the discovery was excessive, plaintiff expected to give you all relevant documents, relevant information and answers and so on and that plaintiffs counsel had been working on the requests with plaintiff. On January 16, 2024, defense counsel sent an email to plaintiffs counsel requesting a date for when plaintiff would send us your responses to the discovery requests. In opposition, plaintiff asserts that she served further discovery responses on March 29, April 10, and April 18, 2024. Plaintiff also contends that the motions were untimely filed after the 45-day deadline, explaining that plaintiff served objections on November 15, 2023 by email, the deadline to file was January 4, 2024, and the motions were not filed until February 26, 2024. In reply, defendants acknowledge that plaintiff served further responses but still requests sanctions. The Court rules as follows: The motions were untimely filed as notice of the motion was not given within 45 days of the service of the response. Plaintiff served responses, albeit objections only, which do not need to be verified. See CCP §2030.250(a) (The party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.). Objections are considered responses. See CCP §2030.2310(a), which states, The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: . . . . (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory. Under CCP §2030.300(a), On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: . . . . (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. In any event, it appears that the motions are MOOT because plaintiff served supplemental responses. The motions are DENIED. Sanctions Under CCP § 2023.030(a), [t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, an example of the misuse of the discovery process is (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel further responses against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. CCP § §2030.300(d), 2031.310(h). Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a) states: The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. Defendants request $2024.50 ($575/hr x 3.4 hrs., $595/hr. x 10 min.) as to each motion. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the motions are untimely and that she acted with substantial justification and requests sanctions against defendant and defense counsel. The Court finds that because the motions were untimely filed, sanctions are not warranted. Further, the Court denies plaintiffs request for sanctions as defendants acted with substantial justification. ORDER The motions are DENIED as MOOT. The requests for sanctions are DENIED. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 24STCV02961 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT BLAKE GRABOWSKI, Plaintiff, vs. BETTER EARTH, INC., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 24STCV02961; 24STCV02800 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff Blake Grabowski filed this action against Defendants Better Earth Inc. and others. On April 23, 2024, this case and other cases were consolidated with Nicholas Leinbach v. Better Earth, Inc., et al. (Case No. 24STCV02800), with Leinbach designated as the lead case. The Court ordered that all future documents be filed under Case No. 24STCV02800, and case numbers on all subsequent filings should be reflected under the lead case. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for order to appoint Amanda Grabowski as successor-in-interest for Plaintiff, who is now deceased. (Defendants evidentiary objections are overruled.) The motion was properly filed in Case No. 24STCV02800, but the hearing reservation was made in Case No. 24STCV02961. All future documents and hearing reservations must be in Case No. 24STCV02800 or else the Court will strike the filings or take the motions off calendar. A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedents successor in interest . . . and an action may be commenced by the decedents personal representatives or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30.) After the death of a plaintiff, the court, on motion, shall allow a pending action that does not abate to be continued by the decedents personal representative or successor-in-interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31.) The person who seeks to commence or continue a pending action as the decedents successor in interest shall execute and file an affidavit or declaration that includes (1) the decedents name; (2) the date and place of decedents death; (3) No proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedents estate; (4) a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedents cause of action to the successor-in-interest, if the decedents estate was administered; (5) either the declarant is the decedents successor in interest or the declarant is authorized to act on behalf of the decedents successor in interest, with facts in support thereof; (6) No other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding; and (7) that the statements are true, under penalty of perjury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (a).) The affidavit or declaration must attach a certified copy of the decedents death certificate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (c).) Amanda Eve Grabowski declares that Plaintiff was pronounced dead on May 4, 2024, in Detroit, Michigan. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff had no significant other and no children. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 3.) He lived with Amanda for nine months after returning to Michigan, and they remained close until his passing. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff had no living will. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 4.) His immediate family consists of his father (Andrew Grabowski), brother (Andrew Grabowski), and Amanda. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 4.) According to Amanda, Decedents family has appointed me as successor in interest due to my close relationship with Blake throughout his life. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 4.) She declares that she is the decedents successor in interest and succeeds to the decedents interest in the action or proceeding, and she is authorized to handle, manage, and dispose of any and all property belonging to the estate of the decedent. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶ 3 [sic].) According to Amanda, [n]o other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding, and [n]o proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedents estate. (Amanda Grabowski Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiffs father understand[s] that as Blakes father [he] would be the decedents successor in interest in this action or proceeding following Californias intestate laws. (Andrew Grabowski Decl. ¶ 4.) However, he declares that Decedents family, including myself, have instead appointed Amanda Grabowski as successor in interest due to her close relationship with Blake throughout his life. (Andrew Grabowski Decl. ¶ 4 [sic].) Plaintiffs father accordingly denounce[s] [his] claim as successor in interest, and instead appoint[s] Amanda Grabowski in [his] place. (Andrew Grabowski Decl. ¶ 3 [sic].) The declarants provide a certified copy of Plaintiffs Certificate of Death from Wayne County, Michigan. (Andrew Grabowski Decl., Ex. A.) The disposition of a decedents intangible personal property is controlled by the law of the domicile. ( In re Moores Estate (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 833, 843; see Civ. Code, § 946.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs estate administration is governed by Michigan, not California, law. The motion cites no Michigan law about intestate succession and who is Plaintiffs rightful heir under Michigan law. Regardless of the intestacy state law that is applied, the motion does not comply with the requirements for substituting a successor-in-interest in this case under California law. Plaintiffs sister and father both declare that Plaintiff had no living will. Generally, a living will documents a persons desire to not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. (See, e.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 961, 966.) The declarations therefore do not establish that Plaintiff died without a testamentary will and do not establish who has inherited Plaintiffs claims in this action. The motion states that the administration of the estate has closed. If Plaintiff did have an estate that was administered, the motion must include a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedents cause of action to the successor-in-interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (c).) Under California law, Plaintiffs father would be Plaintiffs heir. (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (b).) Plaintiffs father may disclaim his interest in Plaintiffs estate. (See Prob. Code, § 282.) If he did so, then Plaintiffs estate would pass to Plaintiffs siblings. (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (c).) There is no declaration from Plaintiffs brother. Plaintiffs father and sister cannot alone appoint Amanda to be Plaintiffs successor-in-interest. Accordingly, under California law, it is not true that [n]o other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding. Although not cited in the motion, this appears to also be the order of succession under Michigan law. (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.2103, subds. (b)-(c).) Due to these deficiencies, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV16156 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 73 07/12/24 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding CARTER v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF LOS ANGELES ( 23STCV16156 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Orlando Cabanday (Cabanday Law Group) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Nicole Sheth (Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE ( filed 05/06/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Special Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $1,590 . Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order. I. BACKGROUND On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff Moieshai Carter (Plaintiff) filed this employment action against Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services of Los Angeles County, a California Corporation, doing business as NHS LA County (NHS or Defendant). Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: C/A 1: Disability Discrimination C/A 2: Racial Discrimination C/A 3: Sexual Discrimination C/A 4: Retaliation C/A 5: Wrongful Termination in violation of Public Policy C/A 6: Hostile Work Environment Harassment C/A 7: Failure to Provide Employment File C/A 8: Unpaid Wages C/A 9: Failure to Pay Overtime C/A 10: Failure to Provide Rest Periods C/A 11: Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Period C/A 12: Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements C/A 13: Waiting Time Penalties The Complaint alleges that in October 2012, NHS hired Plaintiff as a lending specialist. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff worked under the management of its Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, JP Veen. ( Ibid .) Plaintiff continuously worked for NHS until November 2022 when she was wrongfully terminated while on disability. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges multiple violations of Californias Labor Code and FEHA by NHS. On May 6, 2024, Defendant NHS filed the instant Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and request for sanctions. No opposition was filed. II. ANALYSIS A. Meet and Confer Requirement A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)¿ Here, Defendants counsel declares that a meet and confer letter was sent to Plaintiffs counsel on April 29, 2023 explaining why the discovery responses were deficient and requesting supplemental responses. (Whang Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant did not receive a response. ( Id., ¶ 8.) The Court finds that counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). B. Discussion Defendant moves to compel Plaintiffs further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One. A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(c).) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. Good cause may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. (See Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; see also Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.); Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, Californias liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. ( Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.) Here, Plaintiff did not provide substantive responses to the interrogatories and instead responded to every Special Interrogatory Nos. 1-126 with the same objection: Plaintiff objects to the entirety of this interrogatory on the grounds that it is unduly burdensome and oppressive because it is calculated to annoy and harass. Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it is unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, and/or identical to other requests propounded by the Defendant in this action. Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the ground that the information sought is in the possession of, known to, or otherwise equally available to the propounding party. Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory to the extent it calls for an improper legal conclusion. Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it invades the right of privacy guaranteed to whom it seeks information. Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney work product rule. Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the Interrogatory is vague and ambiguous. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs boilerplate objections are too general and unmeritorious because they do not state how or why Plaintiff believes Defendants requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or in what way they are confidential, vague or ambiguous. The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One. C. Sanctions A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) Sanctions may be imposed for misuse of discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.030, subd. (a).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.010, subd. (d).) Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 provides that a court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery even if no opposition was filed. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in the misuse of the discovery process by failing to make good faith efforts to respond to Defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One. Defendant requests $2,650 in sanctions for counsels work on this motion, including 5 hours spent on the instant motion and an anticipated 5 additional hours to review the opposition, prepare a reply and appear at the hearing. The Court finds sanctions are warranted. However, since no opposition was filed, the Court awards sanctions in the reduced total amount of $1,590 (6 hours of attorney time at the billing rate of $265 an hour). III. DISPOSITION Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Special Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $1,590 . Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order.

Case Number: 22STCV33677 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Case Name: Naomi Tomita v. City of Hawthorne, et al. Case No.: 22STCV33677 Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication Moving Party: Defendant City of Hawthorne Responding Party: Plaintiff Naomi Tomita Tentative Ruling: The motion for summary judgment is denied. The motion for summary adjudication is denied. This is an employment law action based on alleged disability discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff Naomi Tomita (Plaintiff) sues her former employer, Defendant City of Hawthorne (the City), alleging the following. During the course of her employment in the Office of the Hawthorne City Attorney, Plaintiff developed work-related injuries. Between January 2019 and August 2020 , she underwent procedures on her wrists, right elbow, and right shoulder for those injuries. Her treating physician eventually allowed her to return to work with restrictions. However, by November 5, 2021, those restrictions had been removed. Despite the fact that since March 2, 2021, she had been performing her duties without the need for accommodations, and her treating surgeon provided notes stating that she could return to work without any restrictions, the City (among other things) refused to allow her to continue to work as an Administrative Aide II or accommodate her for different positions. In addition, the City filed disability retirement paperwork for Plaintiff even though Plaintiff did not wish to retire. The operative complaint asserts only one cause of action for various violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). To the extent each of those violations constitutes a separate cause of action, Plaintiff is bringing the following claims against the City: (1) discrimination based on actual or perceived disability, (2) retaliation for filing workers compensation claims and requiring reasonable accommodations, (3) failure to give reasonable accommodations, (4) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, and (5) failure to prevent the discrimination and retaliation from occurring. The City now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each of those claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The motions for summary judgment and adjudication is denied. Evidentiary Issues: Plaintiffs objections to the Citys evidence are ruled as follows: Nos. 1, 2, 4-26 are sustained. No. 3 is overruled. LEGAL STANDARD The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. ( Ibid. ) When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. ( Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) DISCUSSION Defendant moves for summary judgment or adjudication, arguing that Plaintiffs claims for disability discrimination (Issue Nos. 1-2), retaliation (Issue No. 3), failure to provide reasonable accommodation (Issue No. 4), failure to engage in interactive process (Issue No. 5), and failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation (Issue No. 6) have no merit. Separate Statement Requirements As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny the motion because the Citys separate statement failed to comply with the California Rules of Court. California Rules of Court require that [i]f summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b) [emphasis added].) As Plaintiff points out, the Citys separate statement does not state Issue No. 1 and also fails to state, verbatim, the rest of the issues (Nos. 2-6). Nevertheless, the Court declines to reject the motion based on those defects because Plaintiff has not argued or explained how those defects impaired her ability to oppose the motion, and the defects are not substantive (i.e., Plaintiff is not arguing, for example, that the separate statement does not contain material facts). (See Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118 [holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reject the summary judgment motion based on the absence of headings within a separate statement of material facts because [t]he facts critical to the ruling were adequately identified, and [the plaintiffs had] not explained how any alleged deficiency in [the separate statement] impaired [their] ability to marshal evidence to show that material facts were in dispute &].) Disability Discrimination (Issue Nos. 1 and 2) Under the first two issues, the City argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for discrimination, and it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a) makes it unlawful [f]or an employer, because of the & physical disability & of any person, ... to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. In general, there are two types of illegal employment discrimination under FEHA: disparate treatment and disparate impact. ( Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.) Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination against one or more persons on prohibited grounds. [Citations.] & [On the other hand] disparate impact, & [takes place, for example, when] regardless of motive, a facially neutral employer practice or policy, bearing no manifest relationship to job requirements, & [has] a disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class. ( Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, fn. 20 ( Guz ) [italics removed].) Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered disparate treatment (intentional discrimination based on disability). California uses the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination based on a theory of disparate treatment, known as the McDonnell Douglas test. ( Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1004 ( Scotch ); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802804.) This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, that is, evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption. ( Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 11441145.) Under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff may raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a prima facie case, the components of which vary depending upon the type of discrimination alleged. [Citation.] ( Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 31 ( Zamora ).) Under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test, the employer may dispel the presumption merely by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. ( Id. at p. 32 [internal citations removed].) Under the third step of the test, the plaintiff must ... have the opportunity to attack the employers proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) However, [w]hen seeking summary judgment or summary adjudication in an employment discrimination case, the burdens established by the McDonnell Douglas framework are altered. ( Zamora , supra , 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.) If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiffs prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the defendants showing. ( Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203.) On a disability discrimination claim, the prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations , and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. [Citation.] ( Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159160 [emphasis added].) The parties do not dispute the following: Plaintiff began to experience pain in 2004 or 2005 that consisted of a burning sensation in her wrists followed by discomfort at night sleeping. There was more pain in her right hand, and she is right-handed. (Plaintiffs response to moving partys separate statement of undisputed material facts, filed June 25, 2024 (the Parties UMF), ¶ 2.) Then, in 2007, Plaintiff began to experience discomfort in her right upper &. This was pain in her right shoulder and had trouble lifting her right arm past her shoulder level and began receiving treatment from an orthopedic doctor and physical therapy. (Parties UMF, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff & filed workers compensation claims related to her alleged repetitive motion injuries to her wrist and shoulder from 2007 to 2018. (Parties UMF, ¶ 4.) In January 2019, she underwent a right wrist carpal tunnel release and open decompression of the ulnar nerve at the right elbow. (Parties UMF, ¶ 5.) After that procedure, Plaintiff was placed on leave from work until March 2021. (Parties UMF, ¶ 5.) While on leave from work, Plaintiff underwent a left-wrist carpal tunnel release in July 2019. (Parties UMF, ¶ 5.) In August 2020, while still on leave, Plaintiff underwent a right shoulder arthroscopic surgery. (Parties UMF, ¶ 10.) On July 19, 2021, approximately five (5) months after returning from leave in March 2021, Plaintiff attended a medical examination performed by Qualified Medical Examinator (QME) Dr. Thomas Montell (Dr. Montell) as part of her workers compensation claim. (Parties UMF, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff told Dr. Montell that she performs approximately 1.5 hours of typing a day at work and Dr. Montell prepared a report that restricted [her] to typing no more than 1.5 hours a day and lifting more than six pounds. (Parties UMF, ¶ 13.) The only substantive declaration the City offered in support of this motion is from Samuel English, the Citys Risk Specialist in the City Attorneys office. He testified that the City was not able to accommodate Plaintiff in her Administrative Aide II position based on the typing restriction that Dr. Montell had imposed on her and that the amount of typing required for the Administrative Aide II position was endangering [Plaintiffs] health. (Motion, English Decl., ¶ 11.) However, a declarant must provide the requisite preliminary facts to show he has personal knowledge about what he has said. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [Subject to Section 801, the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a party, such personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify concerning the matter].) [B]oilerplate sentence, if called as a witness I could and would competently testify under oath to the above facts which are personally known to me, is not sufficient to establish personal knowledge. ( Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 169.) Where the facts stated do not themselves show it, such bare statement of the affiant has no redeeming value and should be ignored. (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 754.) Further, [t]he proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact, when: ¶ (1) The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence of the preliminary fact &. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1).) Here, English has not laid a foundation or shown that he has personal knowledge for his testimony that the City could not accommodate Plaintiff in her Administrative Aide II position and that the amount of typing required for that position was endangering Plaintiffs health. He did not promulgate or enforce personnel policies, did not supervise Plaintiff or play a decisive role in Plaintiffs employment, did not know who decided whether Plaintiff would be accommodated, did not research voice-to-text software, and does not know if anyone did, and fails to explain why the City did not accommodate Plaintiffs typing restrictions. The English declaration is almost entirely inadmissible. Therefore, the Court finds that the City has failed to meet its initial burden of proving that Plaintiff was not able to perform her essential job duties without reasonable accommodations. However, even if the City met that burden, Plaintiff has met her burden of showing that a triable issue exists by testifying that (1) she did not believe she needed any accommodations to do her job in the first place and (2) could not in good faith sign documents certifying that she could not perform her job because she knew she could. (Plaintiffs Compendium of Evidence, filed on June 25, 2024 (COE), Exhibit A Declaration of Naomi Tomita (Plaintiff Decl.), ¶¶ 15, 17.) The City also moves for summary adjudication of the disability discrimination claim, arguing that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for medically separating Plaintiff from her employment, and that reason is that Plaintiff could not be reasonably accommodated as an Administrative Aide II. (Motion, pp. 24:22-25:2.) As stated above, the City has failed to establish that Plaintiff could not be reasonably accommodated as an Administrative Aide II. Therefore, the City has also failed to establish that the City had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for medically separating Plaintiff from her employment. Accordingly, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue exists as to that issue. For those reasons, the request for summary adjudication of the disability claim is denied. Retaliation (Issue No. 3) California cases hold that in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employers action. ( Yanowitz v. LOreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Here, the City moves for summary adjudication of the retaliation claim, arguing that Plaintiff has not produced specific, substantial evidence to show that Defendants legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretext for retaliation and/or there is a lack of causal link. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:9-14.) The City argues that its legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for separating Plaintiff from her position was the fact that Plaintiff could not be reasonably accommodated in her Administrative Aide II position or any alternative position she was qualified for. (Motion, p. 27:5-7.) However, as stated above, the City has failed to meet its initial burden of showing that Plaintiff could not be reasonably accommodated. In any event, when it comes to retaliation cases under FEHA, [t]he central issue is and should remain whether the evidence as a whole supports a reasoned inference that the challenged action was the product of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. ( Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 94 [emphasis added].) The employers mere articulation of a legitimate reason for the action cannot answer this question; it can only dispel the presumption of improper motive that would otherwise entitle the employee to a judgment in his favor. ( Ibid. ) [C]iting a legitimate reason for the challenged action will entitle the employer to summary judgment only when the employees showing, while sufficient to invoke the presumption, is too weak to sustain a reasoned inference in the employees favor. That, and not pretext, must be the focus of the judicial inquiry. [Citations.] ( Ibid. [emphasis removed].) [S]ummary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence cannot support any reasonable inference for plaintiff. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence allowing a reasonable inference that the Citys reason for separating her from her employment was retaliatory. Robert Kim (Kim), the Hawthorne City Attorney, was Plaintiffs ultimate superior & when she worked as an Administrative Aide II. (Opposition, 4:11-12.) During his deposition, Kim testified that any decision concerning Plaintiffs reasonable accommodations and whether Plaintiff would be able to return to work would fall on him. (Plaintiffs Compendium of Evidence, filed on June 25, 2024 (COE), Exhibit F (Kim Depo.), pp. 37:24-38:6; 40:21-22.) Kim also testified that when Plaintiff returned from her leave of absence, he preferred that she did not type at all to prevent her from claiming that she re-aggravated her injury because of typing. (Kim Depo., pp. 40:21-22; 54:16-22.) Kim was very cautious about [Plaintiff] bringing a lawsuit in addition to workers comp cases for other reasons. So [he] didnt really & want to have too much interaction with her, nor do [he] feel that that was necessary because [he] was so preoccupied with so many other things at that point, at that time. (Kim Depo., p. 55:5-8.) The fact that Kim wanted to prevent her from typing because of her perceived disability supports an inference that the Citys separation of Plaintiff from her position was for retaliatory reasons. In addition, the complaint alleges that at one point during her employment, City Manager Vontray Norris (Norris) summarily relieved Ms. Tomita from her duties indefinitely and without pay on November 29, 2021. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that on that day, Norris, English, and a union representative walked into her office and told her that even though she was a great worker and did an excellent job, she would have to leave work because she filed her workers compensation claim. (COE, Exhibit G (Plaintiff Depo.), pp. 106:6-107:10.) This presents a triable issue of fact that the Citys reason for separating Plaintiff from her employment was motivated by retaliatory animus. The City argues that Plaintiff cannot show a causal link between her alleged protected activity of filing a workers compensation claim and the alleged adverse employment action because she filed that workers compensation claim in 2019, and the medical separation from her job occurred about three years later in December 2022. (Motion, p. 26:12-17.) The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employers knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision. [Citation.] [Citation.] ( Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal. (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) A long period between an employers adverse employment action and the employees earlier protected activity may lead to the inference that the two events are not causally connected. [Citation.] ( Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 421 ( Wysinger ).) But if between these events the employer engages in a pattern of conduct consistent with a retaliatory intent, there may be a causal connection. ( Ibid .) Here, even if it is true that there was a long period between the date Plaintiff filed her workers compensation claim and the date she was separated from her employment, Plaintiff has met her burden of showing that a triable issue exists regarding whether the City engaged in a pattern of conduct consistent with a retaliatory intent sufficient to establish a causal connection. As stated above, Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Norris, English, and a union representative walked into Plaintiffs office in November 2021 (years after Plaintiff filed her workers compensation claim) and informed her that she was being released from work that day because she had filed the claim. Plaintiff testifies that after that interaction, she received a letter dated November 29, 2021, from Norris, stating that the City was currently unable to return [her] to [her] fully regular work duties in [her] usual and customary position of Administrative Aide II. (COE, Exhibit N a copy of the letter, p. 1.) Plaintiff testifies that even though in that letter, Norris claimed that the City had hired Show HR Consulting to assist with the continuation of Plaintiffs disability interactive process, the City had not engaged in any form of interactive process before that time and, therefore, there was nothing to continue. (COE, Exhibit A (Plaintiffs Decl.), ¶ 11.) The Court finds through that evidence Plaintiff has shown triable issues exist regarding whether a causal link exists between her filing her workers compensation claim and the Citys decision to separate her from her employment. For those reasons, the request for summary adjudication of the retaliation claim is denied. Failure to Accommodate (Issue No. 4) Under FEHA, it is unlawful [f]or an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)(1).) The essential elements of a claim of failure to accommodate are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability. ( Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 744 ( Furtado ).) The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are similar to the elements of a ... [FEHA] discrimination claim, but there are important differences. ( Furtado , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) For purposes of [a failure to accommodate] claim, the plaintiff [has to] prove[] he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sought, rather than the essential functions of the existing position. [Citations.] More significantly, the third element ... establishing that an adverse employment action was caused by the employees disabilityis irrelevant to & [a failure to accommodate] claim. Under the express provisions of the FEHA, the employers failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual is a violation of the statute in and of itself . [Citation.] [Citation.] ( Furtado , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 744-745 [emphasis added].) Here, the City moves for summary adjudication of the failure to accommodate claim, arguing that it lacks merit because Plaintiff was accommodated in her Administrative Aide II position until she could no longer be accommodated with or without reasonable accommodation based on her permanent work restrictions and/or could not perform her duties in a manner that would not endanger her health or safety. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:15-20.) However, the Court has sustained Plaintiffs evidentiary objections to Englishs testimony that Plaintiff could not be accommodated and could not perform her duties in a manner that would not endanger her health or safety. Therefore, the City has no evidence to support its factual contention. The City also argues that it accommodated Plaintiff because it gave Plaintiff a leave of absence that extended over two years. (Motion, p. 28:1-4.) However, Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim (and her entire action) is based on events that occurred after she returned from that leave, not before. Therefore, it is irrelevant for purposes of the failure to accommodate claim that the City gave her that leave of absence. For those reasons, the Court finds that the City has failed to meet its initial burden of showing that Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim has no merit. Therefore, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue exists as to that claim. Accordingly, the request for summary adjudication of the failure to accommodate claim is denied. Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process (Issue No. 5) Under FEHA, it is an unlawful practice for an employer to fail to engage in a good faith interactive process with the employee to determine an effective reasonable accommodation if an employee with a known physical disability requests one. ( Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109.) Here, the City moves for summary adjudication of the failure to engage claim, arguing the following. [1] The undisputed material facts show that Defendant was engaged with Plaintiff in the interactive process for several years until Plaintiff could not be accommodated in her position of Administrative Aide II because of her permanent restrictions related to her physical disability. [2] Other positions were considered for Plaintiff and Plaintiff rejected the three positions she was minimally qualified for. [3] Finally, the City considered Plaintiffs request for voice activation software but determined that this request was not practical for Plaintiffs position and would not be sufficient to enable Plaintiff to perform her essential job duties. (Motion, p. 32:8-15.) The Court has already discussed and found the first argument unpersuasive. As to the second argument, the Court has sustained Plaintiffs objections to the portion of Englishs declaration that the City relies on to argue that the City considered and denied Plaintiffs request for voice activation software. (Motion, English Decl., ¶ 7.) To support its second argument, that other positions were considered for Plaintiff and Plaintiff rejected the three positions she was minimally qualified for, the City submits Plaintiffs deposition transcripts. During her deposition, Plaintiff conceded that she was offered three positions but did not want them because they would affect her retirement and offered lower pay than the Administrative Aide II position. (Motion, Declaration of Steven H. Taylor, ¶ 3; Exhibit 2 a copy of Plaintiffs deposition transcript, pp. 150:13-151:22 [Oh. I felt a lot of pressure because I wanted to show that I was cooperative with the interactive process even though it didnt make sense for me to apply for - - for the positions in the long run because of the pay cut and - - and the hour cut. Its a part-time position and it would affect my retirement. My retirement is based on the end of my salary. It doesnt make sense to go backwards. Its not a comparable position to even consider, but since they were throwing me the - - the rotten crumbs as my options I wanted to be - - to show that at least I was willing to work in this interactive process].) However, an employers obligation to engage in the interactive process extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation and continues when the employee asks for a different accommodation or where the employer is aware that the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation is needed. This rule fosters the framework of cooperative problem-solving contemplated by the ADA, by encouraging employers to seek to find accommodations that really work .... [Citation.] ( Scotch , supra , 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 [italics added].) Here, the City has not presented evidence that once Plaintiff rejected being demoted to positions at lower pay, it attempted to further accommodate Plaintiff. Merely arguing that it offered Plaintiff positions and that Plaintiff rejected those positions is, without more, insufficient to establish an interactive process. Attempting to transfer an employee to a lower paid position is an adverse employment action, not evidence of a meaningful and good faith dialogue. Therefore, the Court finds that the City has failed to meet its initial burden of showing that Plaintiffs failure to engage claim has no merit. Accordingly, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to show that one or more issues of material fact exist as to that claim. For those reasons, the request for summary adjudication of the failure to engage claim is denied. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation (Issue No. 6) Summary adjudication of the failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation claim is denied because the Court has found that (1) the City has failed to meet its initial burden of showing that the disability discrimination claim lacks merit and (2) triable issues exist as to the retaliation claim. Conclusion The motion for summary judgment is denied. The motion for summary adjudication is denied.

Case Number: 22STCV35792 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 XIANG HAO CUI , et al. Plaintiffs, vs. DAE YONG LEE, aka DAVID LEE , et al. Defendants. STANFORD PLAZA ASSOCIATION, INC., Nominal Defendant. Case No.: 22STCV35791 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS XIANG HAO CUI; 800 EAST PICO BLVD, LLC.; 808 EAST PICO BLVD, LLC.; AND STANFORD PLAZA HOLDINGS, LLC.S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, FORM INTERROGATORIES, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO STANFORD PLAZA ASSOCIATION, INC. Plaintiffs Xiang Hao Cui, 800 East Pico Blvd, LLC, 808 East Pico Blvd, LLC, and Stanford Plaza Holdings, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) move for an order compelling Nominal Defendant Stanford Plaza Association, Inc. (the Association) to serve further responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission, Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents, served on the Association on August 14, 2023. The Association opposes the motion. The Court notes that on July 11, 2024, the court issued a minute order providing, inter alia , that [t]he Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Stanford Plaza Association, Inc. on 03/19/2024 is Granted. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs instant motion to compel further responses is moot. The Association is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: July 15, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV04433 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 DARCY FRENCH vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES TENTATIVE Plaintiff Darcy Frenchs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file the proposed second amended complaint within 20 days of this ORDER. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice within five (5) days. DISCUSSION Code Civ. Proc. section 473 subd. (a)(1) states that: The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. The trial court has discretion to permit or deny the amendment of the complaint, but instances justifying the court's denial of leave to amend are rare. (Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v. Mueller Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636, 642.) Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [Citations], this policy should be applied only [w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . . [Citation.] A different result is indicated [w]here inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation.] (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) Pursuant to California Rule of Court Rule 3.1324, [a] motion to amend a pleading before trial must: (1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. Such a motion must include a supporting declaration stating, (1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC Rule 3.1324, subd. (b).) Plaintiff Darcy French (Plaintiff) seeks leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) alleging the same causes of action, but including new instances of protected activity and retaliation which have occurred since the original Complaint was filed. (Motion at pp. 67.) Such retaliatory actions include continuing to pass Plaintiff over for promotion from April 2023 through January 2024. (Motion at p. 7.) Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the amendment, as the facts to be included in the proposed SAC could not have been included in the original complaint. Defendant City of Los Angeles has filed no opposition to the present motion, and trial in this matter is not set to commence until June 3, 2025. The motion is therefore GRANTED.