Party Discovery: FORER, JUSTIN V MS JASMINE PROPERTIES LLC

Case Number: 23STCV04534 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Yang Rim Co., Ltd., Plaintiff, Case No.: 23STCV04534 v. Tentative Ruling A & Y International Global Inc., MIQBA, Inc., Adrian Nasimi, David Kim, Fred Kim, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint Moving Party : Defendants A & Y International Global Inc., Adrian Nasimi Responding Party : Plaintiff Yang Rim Co., Ltd. T/R : DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT IS GRANTED. DEFENDANTS to notice. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brought the present action for (1) breach of contract(s), (2) account stated, (3) open book account, (4) common count for services performed, (5) fraud/false promise, and (6) negligent misrepresentation, based on an alleged series of purchase order contracts entered into by Plaintiff and Defendants. Defendants David Kim, Fred Kim, and MIQBA, Inc. are in default. ANALYSIS A party who fails to plead a cause of action.¿.¿. whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. (CCP § 426.50.) Causes of action involving the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the plaintiffs complaint are compulsory and are forfeited if not pleaded in the same action. (CCP § 426.30(a); 426.10(c).) The Court has no discretion to deny a motion for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent substantial evidence of bad faith. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.) Permission to file a permissive cross-complaint may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action. (CCP § 428.50(c). Defendants A & Y International Global Inc. and Adrian Nasimi move for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff Yang Rim Co., Ltd. and Co-Defendants MIQBA, Inc., Fred Kim, David Kim, and new party Alex Kim for (1) intentional fraud, (2) conspiracy to commit intentional fraud, (3) conversion, and (4) conspiracy to commit conversion. The proposed cross-complaint, attached as Exhibit A, arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying complaint. Defendants argue that their first attorney, Andrew Ritholz, withdrew as attorney of record prior to the beginning of discovery and failed to file a timely cross-complaint due to neglect, inadvertence, or oversight. Defendants newly retained counsel has learned new facts from documents produced during discovery on March 28, 2024, which support the filing of this cross-complaint. Defendants also ask for the matter to be abated on the basis that Plaintiff is not qualified to do business in California and, thus, cannot maintain the instant lawsuit. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the motion is supported only by conclusions based on hearsay regarding recently discovered documents. Plaintiff contends that the declaration of Defendants attorney is insufficient. As noted, the Court must allow leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent substantial evidence of bad faith. The Court does not find evidence of bad faith. Defendants may move to abate the action through a separately filed motion. Defendants Motion is GRANTED.

JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETAL Case Number: CVCV21-0197618 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. The Court ordered this matter to arbitration on February 5, 2024. Neither side appeared for the prior hearing on May 3, 2024. The Court notes that Substitutions of Attorney have been filed on behalf of Plaintiffs. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of arbitration.

23CV02998 DIARRA v. KELLY et al MOTION FOR AN ORDER DECLARING CARSON KELLEY’S JUDGMENT DEBT TO MARIAM DIARRA TO BE A COMMUNITY PROPERTY DEBT The motion is denied without prejudice. Diarra obtained a default judgment against Carson Kelly and Humanize Global, US, Inc. in the amount of $40,718.24. The underlying complaint alleged Labor Code violations, breach of contract, promise without intent to perform, and violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Carson Kelly is alleged to be the managing agent of Humanize Global. Diarra worked for or was contracted by Carson Kelly and Humanize Global. Diarra, now as judgment creditor, moves the court to declare that the debt of Carson Kelly is a debt of the marital community of Carson Kelly and his wife Shannon Kelly, to declare the wages of Shannon Kelly be subject to garnishment to satisfy Diarra’s judgment against Carson Kelly, and to authorize that a writ of execution issue in her name. Family Code section 902 defines debt as “an obligation incurred by a married person before or during marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise.” Family Code section 910, subdivision (a) states that “[e]xcept as expressly provided by statute, the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or the judgment for debt.” Page 3 of 4 Diarra has not made a sufficient showing in this motion as follows: 1. Evidence of a marriage between Shannon and Carson Kelly, including the date Carson and Shannon married. The only evidence are the vague statements from counsel and Diarra in their declarations. 2. Evidence that Humanize Global US, Inc. was community property, rather than the separate property of Carson Kelly. In light of the above deficiencies, the court need not reach the merits of the motion. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 4 of 4

FISCUS VS. PATTERSON, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV22-0199210 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Continue Trial Date: This matter involves multiple parties and Cross- Complaints. Plaintiff is Paula Fiscus. Defendant/Cross-Defendants/Cross-Complainants Gregory G. Gonzales and Marcia J. Gonzales, Trustees of the Greg and Marcia Gonzales Family 2014 Revocable Trust will be referred to as the Gonzales Defendants. James Patterson and Patterson Landscape/Yard Manicurist Agency will be referred to as the Patterson Defendants. The Gonzales Defendants have filed a Motion to Continue the presently set August 20, 2024, trial date. The Patterson Defendants have joined the motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company has not filed anything related to the motion and did not attend the ex parte hearing on June 27, 2024, at which time was shortened to hear the motion today instead of July 22, 2024, as originally noticed. There is no evidence that the Gonzales Defendants provided notice of today’s hearing to Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company. Cross-Defendant Mark Behnke Construction has also not filed anything related to the motion but did attend the ex parte hearing and is therefore aware of today’s hearing. Merits. “To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain.” CRC 3.1332(a). “Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.” CRC 3.1332(c). Circumstances that may indicate good cause are: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. CRC 3.1332(c). When considering whether to grant a motion to continue, there are several factors that the Court must consider including: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. CRC 3.1332(d). The reasons presented by the Gonzales Defendants to continue the trial are that trial counsel has a conflicting trial schedule and because Marcia Gonzales’s son is getting married the week of trial. In the moving papers, the Gonzales Defendants note that the wedding date was set prior to the Court setting the Augst 20, 2024 trial date. The reasons for the Patterson Defendants joining the motion are because counsel has a conflicting trial schedule, counsel is moving homes in late August, and because the Pattersons have a prepaid vacation from August 26- September 6, 2024. It is not clear whether the Pattersons’ vacation was set and prepaid when the Court set the trial date of if the Pattersons planned it after the trial date was set. Plaintiff opposes the continuance on the grounds that Defendants have failed to show good cause for the continuance, and because Plaintiff will be prejudiced by a continuance. The prejudice alleged is that a later trial would not allow time for necessary remediation of the landscaping issues before the next rainy reason. These issues have resulted in significant erosion and flooding. Plaintiff also argues that the parties stipulated to the August 20, 2024, trial date and all agreed that no further continuances would be granted absent stipulation. While this agreement did not make it into the Court’s Order dated April 10, 2024 (which was submitted by the Patterson Defendants), it is clear from the Stipulation that the parties did reach such a stipulation. Conflicting trial schedules do not automatically create good cause to continue a trial. Trial counsel regularly have multiple trials set for the same week. Any attorney who practices in civil law is well aware that not every trial set actually goes forward as scheduled. No good cause has been presented in that regard. As to the wedding, it appears the counsel for the Gonzales Defendants did not check with their client prior to agreeing to a trial date. Had they checked, surely Ms. Gonzales would have pointed out that her son was getting married that week. The unavailability of Ms. Gonzales due to her son’s wedding may constitute an excusable circumstance under CRC 3.1332(c)(2). Similarly, the Patterson’s vacation could also be such a circumstance, depending on when it was scheduled. Regarding the CRC 3.1332(d) factors, the trial date is one month and twelve days away. Trial has been continued twice before. The first was by stipulation on October 13, 2022. The second was by stipulation on April 9, 2024, as discussed above. The Gonzales Defendants have requested a continuance to November of 2024 while the Patterson Defendants have requested 45-60 days. The only alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance would be potentially taking witnesses out of order at trial. Plaintiff may be prejudiced by the continuance. The matter is not entitled to preferential trial setting. Regarding the Court’s calendar, one of the two civil trial courts will be dark on the currently set date of August 20, 2024, which reduces the chance that this matter will be assigned to a courtroom for trial. Counsel is not currently engaged in another trial that causes a conflict and only provides evidence that there are other trials that might affect counsel’s availability. There is no stipulation for a continuance. The parties previously agreed that no further continuances would occur absent a stipulation. Regarding the interests of justice, the Court is in a position of having to weigh how much counsel’s failure to consult with their clients regarding their schedules should be permitted to affect their client on a personal level. It is clear that counsel should have done a better job to make sure that the agreed upon trial date worked for all parties, and not just counsel. This is particularly so when the parties explicitly stipulated that no further continuances would take place. However, the Court does not feel that it is in the interest of justice to punish Ms. Gonzales by potentially preventing her from participating in her son’s wedding based on counsel’s failure to communicate properly. As to the Patterson vacation, it is unclear whether this vacation was set at the time the trial was set or if the Pattersons scheduled their vacation later. However, the Court does understand the need for the Pattersons to be present for the trial to present their testimony. On balance, the Court finds that granting of a short continuance would be in the interest of justice. The Pattersons’ vacation lasts until September 6, 2024. Therefore, the Court intends to continue the trial to Tuesday, September 10, 2024. If this trial date does not work for Plaintiff, the Court will entertain the first available date for Plaintiff. Should the trial be continued, all discovery deadlines will flow from the new trial date. However, the Court notes that Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company was not provided with notice of today’s hearing. Absent an appearance by Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company, the Court will continue today’s hearing to July 22, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63 as that is the date that was originally noticed.

SCV-270482, Barton v. General Motors LLC Plaintiff Barton moves for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $147,967.50 for attorney fees per Civil Code section 1794(d). The motion is GRANTED for the reduced amount of $82,000.00. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed this action against GM asserting three causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act regarding a vehicle Plaintiff bought from GM. Ultimately, the parties settled their claims. Plaintiff filed two memorandum of costs to support their motion for fees after the settlement. GM requested the Court to strike or tax a majority of the costs requested by Wirtz Law. The Court entered an order striking a portion of the fees and costs requested in counsel Wirtz Law’s memorandum of costs so that the total award of costs was $8,816.22. Plaintiff now brings this motion for attorney’s fees for representation by Plaintiff’s two counsels, Wirtz Law (“WL”) and Quill and Arrow LLP (“QA”). GM opposes the motion. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The Court rules as follows to Plaintiff’s objection to the Declaration of Kyle Roybal: 1. Objection to Paragraph 4 as inadmissible hearsay, argumentative, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED. 2. Objection to Paragraph 5 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 3. Objection to Paragraph 6 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 4. Objection to Paragraph 8 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 5. Objection to Paragraph 9 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 6. Objection to Paragraph 15 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 7. Objection to Paragraph 21 as in inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED. 8. Objection to Paragraph 22 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED. 9. Objection to Paragraph 23 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED. ANALYSIS Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, attorney's fees are an allowable cost when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (C.C.P. § 1033.5(a)(10)(B).) In general, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs of suit in any action or proceeding. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) The Song-Beverly Act allows for additional recovery by a buyer who prevails in an action per Civil Code section 1794(d), for reasonably incurred costs including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended expenses and other costs in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. Moving Papers Plaintiff broke down the fees incurred for each counsel in the motion. Plaintiff incurred $21,600.00 for QA’s legal representation. QA requests approval of rates of $500.00 for managing attorney and $350 to $425 for associate attorneys. Plaintiff incurred $77,045.00 for WL’s legal representation. WL’s fees are broken down based on various attorney, paralegal, and “non-attorney” rates on page 16 of Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Richard Wirtz. WL requests approval of an increased rate of $750.00 for the managing attorney, $550.00 for senior attorneys, $450.00 for associate attorneys, and $250.00 to $300.00 for paralegal rates. Counsels also request a multiplier of 1.5 to the lodestar fees requested so that the total attorney’s fees amount requested is $147,967.50. GM argues that Counsel’s work in the matter warrants a fee award of only one quarter of the $147,967.50 requested. GM argues that the billing was excessive and requests that the multiplier be denied because this is a routine Song-Beverly matter of many that counsels work on regularly. Application Based on the moving papers, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees per Civil Code section 1794(d). The Court finds the hours worked by counsels to be reasonable, with multiple attorneys assisting at the two separate firms. The Court will reduce WL’s rates to the amounts reasonable in the local area. As WL did not sufficiently show that Plaintiff attempted to find local counsel, but were unsuccessful, the Court will not award rates acceptable in the Los Angeles area. The Court will award QA’s requested rates as reasonable per local standards. The Court also does not find that a multiplier of 1.5 is warranted in this matter as counsel has not shown sufficient justification for the enhancement. Accordingly, the Court will award fees as follows: Name Position & Experience Hours Hourly Rate Fees Wirtz Law Alana Mellgren Associate Attorney 12.9 350.00 $4,515.00 Amy Rotman Senior Attorney 18.1 450.00 $8,145.00 Jessica Underwood Senior Attorney 50.6 450.00 $22,770.00 Richard Wirtz Managing Attorney 37.1 550.00 $20,405.00 Rebecca Evans Managing Paralegal 3.8 250.00 $950.00 Florence Goldson Senior Paralegal 2.3 250.00 $575.00 Andrea Lizarraga Paralegal 4.0 200.00 $800.00 Amanda Vitanatchi Paralegal 11.2 200.00 $2,240.00 TOTAL WL: $60,400.00 TOTAL QA: $21,600.00 TOTAL FEES: $82,000.00 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $82,000.00. Plaintiff shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

Case Number: 24LBCV00120 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: S27 Plaintiff has discovery motions scheduled for 7/09/24, 7/18/24, and 7/23/24. There is also a status conference re: appointment of a discovery referee scheduled for 7/09/24. In the interest of efficiency, the Court continues the 7/09/24 and 7/18/24 motions to 7/23/24, to be heard concurrently with the currently scheduled motion to deem RFAs admitted. The Court takes off calendar the status conference re: appointment of discovery referee. Upon further review, all pending motions are related motions to compel responses to initial discovery (and deem RFAs admitted), based on the contention that Defendant has not served any timely responses to outstanding discovery. The Court finds this is not the type of discovery dispute that warrants appointment of a referee. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Case Number: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 FIDEL HERNANDEZ MEDINA, an individual and PATRICIA HERNANDEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants . Case No.: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: 7/10/24 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs Background Pleadings Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandez (Plaintiffs) sue Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota USA) pursuant to an October 14, 2022 Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b). The claims arise from allegations that Toyota USA has breached express and implied warranties in favor of Plaintiffs by failing to repair, replace, or repurchase a used Toyota vehicle purchased by the Hernandez Plaintiffs subject to express warranties through which Toyota USA undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Relevant Procedural History On February 20, 2024, trial commenced in this action before concluding on February 26, 2024. On February 24, 2024, the jury issued its verdict in favor of Toyota USA. On March 8, 2024, judgment was entered in Toyota USAs favor. On March 21, 2024, Toyota USA filed its Memorandum of Costs, seeking to recover $22,309.48 in costs. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Tax Costs. On June 26, 2024, Toyota USA filed its opposition to the instant motion. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply papers. Motion to Tax Costs Legal Standard : In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the prevailing party requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. ( Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.) The term prevailing party for costs purposes is defined by statute to include: ¿ (1) The party with a net monetary recovery; ¿ (2) A defendant who is dismissed from the action; ¿ (3) A defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and ¿ (4) A defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) If the party does not fall within one of these four express categories, the court may exercise its discretion to award or deny costs. (See Lincoln v. Schurgin (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 100, 105.) If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) For example, even if a plaintiff maintains a net monetary recovery, in determining the prevailing party in the litigation, the trial court should also consider, if applicable, the defendants success on its declaratory relief claims and exercise its discretion to allow costs or not and, if allowed, to apportion them as appropriate. ( Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1142; see, e.g., Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 104-105 [when plaintiff wins net monetary recovery but defendant prevails in its cross-action for declaratory relief, case presents circumstance not otherwise specified; in that case, determination of prevailing party is matter within courts discretion].) ¿Allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc . (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) A party seeking to tax costs must provide evidence to rebut this prima facie showing. ( Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266, superseded by statute on other grounds in Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1) [whether costs permissible from filing of complaint or from date of 998 offer].) Mere statements unsupported by facts are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing that costs were necessarily incurred. ( Jones v. Dumrichob , supra , at p. 1266.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. ( Ibid .) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. , supra , 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute, a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized. ( Ibid .) Discretion is abused only when, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. ( Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)¿ Order Striking or Taxing Costs : GRANTED IN PART As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Toyota USA is not seeking to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) because that statute is limited to buyers of consumer goods. Rather, as the prevailing party in this action, Toyota USA is entitled to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) and 1033.5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs appear to argue the opposite. (See Reply at pp. 3-4, relying on Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) However, this argument is not persuasive. Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) does not explicitly preclude a seller of consumer goods from recovering their costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 1032. Indeed, in Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, the Court rejected this argument. ( Id. at p. 988 [In this case, plaintiff filed suit under the Song-Beverly Act, but defendants prevailed. Defendants sought to recover their costs and expert witness fees under sections 1032, subdivision (b) and 998, subdivision (c), whereas plaintiff argued the more specific provisions of the Act prohibited prevailing defendants from any such recovery. We conclude defendants are entitled to their costs and expert witness fees].) Thus, in determining whether an award of costs should be issued, the Court will rely on the guideline set forth under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c). Here, Toyota USA seeks $22,309.48 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1032 and 1033.5. By way of its motion, Plaintiffs seek to tax these costs in the following categories: (1) motion and filing fees in its entirety or alternatively $181.08; (2) deposition costs in the amount of $4,351.70; (3) court reporter fees in their entirety; and (4) other costs and fees in the amount of $2,338.49. First, Plaintiffs argue that Toyota USAs requested costs of $1,447.72 for motion and filing fees should be stricken because they include attorney service fees, and Toyota USA has failed to correctly identify the actual court motion and filing fees incurred. (Motion at pg. 5.) However, this ignores the numerous invoices enclosed and referenced by Toyota USAs Memorandum of Costs at Attachment 1g that identify the court motion and filing fees incurred. Furthermore, [i]f the items in a cost memorandum appear proper, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence the expenses were necessarily incurred by the prevailing party. (Citation.) To controvert this evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to present evidence showing the contrary. (Citation) ( Whatley-Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1115.) Filing fees and electronic filing fees are recoverable costs (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(1), (14).) Thus, it is Plaintiffs burden to present evidence to show why these costs should not be awarded. In this regard, Plaintiffs identify $181.08 worth of filing fee costs that should be taxed. (Motion at pp. 6-7.) Of these costs, the Court finds that the filing fees associated with Toyota USAs Motions in Limine were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation because they had been untimely filed. Therefore, these costs are taxed in the amount of $65.34. As to the costs associated with unsuccessful motions, the Court finds that these costs were not prepared merely out of convenience and are recoverable as a result. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c).) Second, Plaintiffs argues the claimed deposition costs should be taxed in the amount of $4,351.70 because the amounts are excessive and unnecessary. Recovery of deposition costs is allowed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendants point out that multiple deposition dates for the plaintiffs had to be scheduled and rescheduled. In this instance, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to undermine the prima facie evidence that the expenses were necessarily incurred by Toyota USA. ( Whatley-Miller, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1115.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that Toyota USAs claimed court reporter fees should be taxed because they are not recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033 subd. (b)(5). (Motion at pg. 8.) This argument is not persuasive. The Court has discretion to allow additional costs that are reasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4). Based on the invoices submitted with its Memorandum of Costs, Toyota USA has shown that these claimed costs were for court reporting fees during the trial. Such expenses are reasonable in light of the understandable prudence of preserving a record for appeal. Notably, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to suggest that the amount of these fees is unreasonable. Therefore, the Court declines to tax this category of costs. Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the claim for other costs and expenses that include meals, copying charges, travel, and lodging. (Motion at pp. 8-12.) The Court largely agrees that many of these costs are either not allowed or not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. For instance, Toyota USA seeks to recover $50.37 in FedEx charges of trial documents and the final status conference. Courier and messenger fees are recoverable, at the discretion of the trial court, if they are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. ( Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 696, as modified (July 18, 2019), rehg denied (Aug. 9, 2019), review denied (Oct. 23, 2019).) Because these costs are not expressly allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5, it is Toyota USAs burden to establish why these costs were necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) However, the opposition fails to articulate such a necessity. Thus, the Court taxes these courier costs as not reasonable. Also, Toyota USA seeks to recover $19.98 associated with a CARFAX report for trial, but Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(b)(2) excludes investigation costs. Moreover, Toyota USA seeks to recover a combined amount of $2,095.49 for meals, lodging, and travel. While it is in the Courts discretion to award these costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c)(4), they have been properly objected to, and Toyota USA has failed to meet its burden in establishing why these costs were not merely convenient and reasonable in amount. In terms of the $196.90 in costs spent for additional copies of trial exhibits, these costs are allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(13) and appear to be reasonable in amount. Thus, the Court declines to tax these amounts. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is granted in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs. Conclusion Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs.

Case Number: 22AHCV00604 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT ENCORE AUTOMOTIVE, INC. , Plaintiff(s), vs. ROBERT Y. LEE, et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22AHCV00604 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF ENCORE AUTOMOTIVE, INC.S MOTION TO COMPEL ROBERT Y. LEES RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORIES Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 10 , 2024 On August 24, 2022 , plaintiff Encore Automotive, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Robert Y. Lee (Defendant). On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for an order compelling Defendants responses to First Set of Form Interrogatories. On June 26, 2024, Defendant filed a response to this motion stating that responses without objections had been served. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief stating that Defendant failed to serve responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 50.2, 50.3, 50.4, 50.5, and 50.6. In light of Defendants apparent failure to serve responses to these interrogatories, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion in part and orders Defendant to serve verified responses, without objections, to Form Interrogatory Nos. 50.2, 50.3, 50.4, 50.5, and 50.6 from Plaintiffs First Set of Form Interrogatories, within 15 days of the date of this order. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 10th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.