Walton Law Group, P.C. Vs Hope Zarro, Et Al.

Case Number: 24STCV07667 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles PHILIP MARKOWITZ, Plaintiff, vs. FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV07667 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Complaint Filed: 03/27/24 Trial Date: N/A Hearing date: July 11, 2024 Moving Party: Defendant Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan Responding Party: Plaintiff Philip Markowitz Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Allegations The court has considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The motion is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Background This is an action arising from the alleged not providing coverage and unreasonably delaying in making a coverage determination on [a] claim. (Complaint, ¶ 29.) On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff Philip Markowitz (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Insurance Contract; and (2) Tortious Breach of Insurance Contract. On March 28, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Mel Red Recana sitting in Department 45 at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. (03/28/24 Minute Order.) On May 8, 2024, Defendant filed and served the instant Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Allegations. Also, on such date, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion. Defendant filed and served a reply brief on July 2, 2024. Legal Standard Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)¿ The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)¿ Meet and Confer Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) Counsel for Defendant, James P. Lemieux (Lemieux), provides a declaration in support of the motion. Counsel states the following: on April 30, 2024, he wrote to Plaintiffs counsel, Jeffrey A. Cohen, Esq., regarding Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations. (Lemieux Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) He expressed his concern that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to support the claim and that the claim was unsupported and defective as pleaded. ( Id .) He asked that Plaintiff agree to strike his punitive damages claim from the complaint without prejudice. ( Id .) Shortly after the letter was transmitted, Mr. Cohen responded by e-mail on April 30, 2024, and Mr. Cohen disagreed. ( Id ., ¶ 3; Ex. B.) Mr. Cohen argued that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a bad faith claim and that bad faith allows for punitive damages awards. ( Id .) Given the impasse over the propriety of Plaintiffs punitive damage claim, the instant motion was necessary to resolve the issue. ( Id ., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has not been met as counsel did not meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The Court, however, will still assess the merits of the motion to strike. The Court reminds the parties of the need to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. Discussion Allegations of the Complaint The Complaint relevantly states the following: in 2018, Plaintiff obtained a marine insurance policy from Defendant that provided for insurance coverage to and for Plaintiffs watercraft vessel (the Vessel). (Complaint, ¶ 4.) In June 2022, Plaintiff renewed the policy, and the effective dates of the policy were from June 18, 2022, through June 18, 2023. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6.) The coverage amount for losses under the policy is $95,000.00. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) On January 23, 2023, heavy rains flooded the Vessel and damaged its engines, which resulted in an unforeseen, sudden, and accidental loss to the Vessel. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff reported the loss to Defendant in February 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff submitted a claim to Defendant. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant asked for additional information concerning the claim, which was provided, and to this day Defendant has failed to provide a coverage determination for the amount of the loss. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-24.) Defendant has not paid Plaintiff any money on the claim, in whole or in part, to date, and has not made a coverage determination after over a year to review, analyze, and process the claim. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) Appropriateness of Striking Punitive Damages In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Civil Code § 3294 authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Malice is defined as either conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. ( Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331.) Fraud under California Civil Code , Section 3294(c)(3) means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. ( Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) Facts must be pled to show that a defendant act[ed] with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights. ( Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co . (1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462.) Conduct that is merely negligent will not support a claim for punitive damages. ( Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1288.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations are insufficient. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages pursuant to its second cause of action. (Complaint, ¶ 33.) Such allegations, however, are set forth in a conclusory manner. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to impose punitive damages against Defendant. Plaintiff has not made a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Moreover, the opposition to the motion to strike seems to argue as to the sufficiency of the second cause of action and does not make a reasoned argument as to the sufficiency of the punitive damages allegations in the complaint. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to strike punitive damages allegations from the complaint. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike with 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 11, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 21STCV28642 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 los angeles unified school district ; Plaintiff , vs. scottsdale indemnity company a/k/a nationwide e&s / specialty , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 21STCV28642 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs motion for court determination of defendant scottsdale indemnity companys claim of privilege MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School District RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Scottsdale Indemnity Company Motion for Court Determination of Defendant Scottsdale Indemnity Companys Claim of Privilege The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. DISCUSSION Plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School District (Plaintiff) moves the court for an order determining, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.285, that the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work production protection do not apply, or that defendant Scottsdale Indemnity Company (Defendant) has waived any claim of such privilege or protection, as to (1) all or part of Defendants production of documents identified as Bates Nos. SCD0000732 SCD0001049, and (2) the portions of the March 25, 2024 deposition of Ana Campos concerning Exhibit 17 to that deposition. If electronically stored information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as attorney work product, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.285, subd. (a).) After being notified of a claim of privilege or of protection under subdivision (a), a party that received the information shall immediately sequester the information and either return the specified information and any copies that may exist or present the information to the court conditionally under seal for a determination of the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.285, subd. (b).) As a threshold matter, the court notes that the parties have not set forth, in their briefs, the exact documents in the approximate 400-page production that Defendant contends are privileged. (Andrade Decl., Ex. A [March 26, 2024 letter requesting the destruction of documents bates-numbered SCD0000732-SCD0001049]; Gerson Decl., ¶¶ 4-8.) However, Defendants revised privilege log, dated April 19, 2024, has identified the following page numberswhich consist of emails, draft letters, counsels notes, and a form setting forth premium information of a third partyas privileged: (1) numbers 906-910 (attorney-client privilege); (2) numbers 912-917 (attorney-client privilege); (3) numbers 918-920 (work product protection); (4) numbers 924-928 (attorney-client privilege); (5) number 943 (work product protection); (6) numbers 956-958 (attorney-client privilege and work product protection); (7) numbers 959-962 (work product protection); (8) numbers 962-966 (attorney-client privilege); (9) numbers 1046-1049 (attorney-client privilege); and (10) counsels notes set forth on pages 733, 827, 831, 836, 839, 842, 845, 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 861, 871, 972, 973, 975, 977, 1005, 1009, 1011, 1013, 1016, 1018, 1020, 1022, 1025, 1027, 1030, 1034, 1037, 1040, 1042, 1044, and 1045 (work product protection). (Andrade Decl., Ex. F, Privilege Log, p. 1; Gerson Decl., ¶ 15 [On April 19, 2024, [Defendant] reproduced the file with appropriate redactions of the privileged documents contained within the file, and produced alongside it a new privilege log, noting the redactions].) Thus, the court has evaluated Plaintiffs motion and Defendants claims of privilege as to the documents identified in Defendants April 19, 2024 privilege log. First, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show that the documents containing email correspondence are protected by the attorney-client privilege. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [The party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise, i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship].) Defendant has submitted evidence establishing that it retained (1) the law firm Selman Breitman, LLP (the Selman Firm) as its outside coverage counsel, and (2) the law firm Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP (the Manning Firm) to defend defendant After School All Stars (ASAS) in the underlying action and in this action. (Gerson Decl., Ex. A, McRoberts Decl., ¶ 7; Hochhausler Decl., ¶¶ 1-2, 4.) Defendant has also submitted evidence explaining that K&K Insurance Group, Inc. (K&K) acted as its claims administrator, and performed various claims administrations functions, including retaining defense counsel for ASAS. (Gerson Decl., Ex. A, McRoberts Decl., ¶ 8.) As to the communications between Defendant (including through its claims administrator, K&K) and the Manning Firm regarding the defense of ASAS, the court finds that Defendant has made a prima facie showing that the communications were made in the course of a tripartite attorney-client relationship and therefore are protected by the attorney-client privilege because (1) [w]hen an insurer retains counsel to defend its insured, a tripartite attorney-client relationship arises among the insurer, insured, and counsel[,] and (2) Defendant has submitted evidence establishing that it, as the insurer for ASAS, retained the Manning Firm to represent ASAS, its insured. ( Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1083; Hochhausler Decl., ¶ 4; Andrade Decl., Ex. F, Privilege Log, p. 1, ¶ 9 [email correspondence between Manning Firm and K&K].) Thus, the confidential communications between either the insurer [(here, Defendant)] or the insured [(here, ASAS)] and counsel [(here, the Manning Firm)] are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and both the insurer and insured are holders of the privilege. ( Bank of America, N.A. , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) As to the communications between Defendant (including through its claims administrator, K&K) and the Selman Firm, the court finds that Defendant has made a prima facie claim of privilege by showing that (1) Defendant retained the Selman Firm to act as its coverage counsel, such that (2) the communications described in the privilege logwhich describe the subject emails as confidential communications with coverage counselwere made in the course of an attorney-client relationship. (Gerson Decl., Ex. A, McRoberts Decl., ¶ 7; Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [party has initial burden of establishing preliminary facts of a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship]; Andrade Decl., Ex. F, Privilege Log, p. 1, ¶¶ 1 [email correspondence between Selman Firm and K&K], 2 [email correspondence forwarding communications from Selman Firm between K&K and Defendant], 4 [email correspondence between K&K, Selman Firm, and Defendant], 6 [email correspondence between K&K, Selman Firm, and Defendant], 8 [email correspondence between Selman Firm, K&K, and Defendant].) Thus, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden to make a prima facie claim of privilege as to the communications between it, its claims adjuster K&K, the Manning Firm, and the Selman Firm. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 733.) Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the communications are not privileged. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [Once that party establishes facts necessary to support a prima facie claim of privilege, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish the communication was not confidential or that the privilege does not for other reasons apply].) Plaintiff contends that the privilege arising from an attorney-client relationship (whether arising from a tripartite relationship or generally) does not apply here because such privilege does not protect an insurers internal communications concerning coverage issues relevant to the insureds litigation and Defendant retained coverage counsel to perform [Defendants] investigation of the claim (i.e., claims handling)[.] (Reply, p. 3:1-3, 3:8-9.) The court disagrees. The court acknowledges that a court should determine the dominant purpose of the relationship between an insurance company and its in-house attorneys to determine whether the relationship is one of attorney-client or one of claims adjuster-insurance corporation. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at pp. 739-740.) If the court determines that the dominant purpose of such a relationship is not that of attorney and client, communications between the insurer and its counsel that is acting as a claims adjuster would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. ( Id. at p. 740.) As set forth above, Defendant met its initial burden to show the existence of an attorney-client relationship by submitting evidence establishing that it retained the Selman Firm as its coverage counsel, such that it is presumed that the communications were made in confidence. (Gerson Decl., Ex. A, McRoberts Decl., ¶ 7; Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 733.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants relationship with the Selman Firm is more analogous to claims adjuster-insurance company than attorney-client. In support of this contention, Plaintiff relies on the following two assertions made by Defendant in its motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication: (1) Defendant retained coverage counsel who promptly sought information necessary for [Defendants] coverage investigation[,] and (2) Defendant promptly retained coverage counsel and promptly agreed to defend [Plaintiff] under a reservation of rights. (Andrade Reply Decl., Ex. H, p. 24:4-5, 24:8-11.) The court finds that these two statements do not show that the dominant purpose of the relationship between Defendant and the Selman Firm was that of claims adjuster-insurance corporation. These statements do not establish that the Selman Firm was acting solely as a claims adjuster, or even acting mostly as a claims adjuster, on behalf of Defendant. As set forth above, the inquiry concerns the dominant purpose of the relationship between Defendant and the Selman Firm. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 [emphasis added].) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the attorney-client privilege does not apply on the ground that the dominant purpose of Defendant and the Selman Firms relationship was that of claims adjuster-insurance corporation. Moreover, the court finds relevant that, in its opposition papers, Defendant represented that its communications involving, inter alia , the Selman Firm concerned case strategy and case updates, further supporting Defendants assertion of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between it and the Selman Firm. (Opp., p. 12:11-13.) Third, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that Defendant waived its right to assert the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 733.) The right of any person to claim attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to the disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).) [T]he disclosure contemplated in Evidence Code section 912 involves some measure of choice and deliberation on the part of the privilege holder. ( McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1101; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644, 652 [Based on the language of Evidence Code section 912, we hold that waiver does not include accidental, inadvertent disclosure of privileged information by the attorney].) When determining whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege, a trial court must examine both the subjective intent of the privilege holder and any manifestation of the holders intent to disclose the information. [Citations.] Other relevant considerations include the precautions the holder took to maintain the privilege and the promptness with which the holder sought return of the inadvertently disclosed document. ( McDermott Will & Emery LLP , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101-1102 [internal citations omitted].) Plaintiff contends that both Defendant and ASAS waived their rights to assert the attorney-client privilege and work product protection because (1) Defendant did not attempt to claw back the documents until two years after the production thereof; (2) Defendant raised a privileged-based objection at the end of deposition, after allowing Plaintiffs counsel to question Ana Campos about one of those documents; and (3) ASAS did not assert the privilege at the deposition of Ana Campos. The court disagrees. Defendant has submitted evidence establishing that (1) its counsel inadvertently overlooked the subject communications and documents and did not intend to include those documents in Defendants production, and (2) it did not discover the production of the privileged documents until the March 25, 2024 deposition of Ana Campos. (Gerson Decl., ¶¶ 8-13; Roberts Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) Moreover, counsel states that they did not have occasion to review the documents after Defendants 2022 production. (Gerson Decl., ¶ 12; Roberts Decl., ¶ 6.) The court finds that Defendant did not have the subjective intent to disclose privileged materials to Plaintiff in its production, nor did Defendant manifest an intent to disclose or to consent to disclose such information by asserting the privilege two years after its production, in light of the evidence establishing that Defendant first learned of the disclosure at that time and (1) asserted the privilege at the end of the deposition and on the record, and (2) promptly requested, the day after the deposition, that Plaintiff destroy the documents. ( McDermott Will & Emery LLP , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101; Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a); Andrade Decl., Ex. A [March 26, 2024 letter from Defendant requesting destruction of documents].) The court acknowledges, as Plaintiff has pointed out, that Defendants counsel did not object to the use of one privileged document (labeled as Exhibit 17) until the conclusion of Ana Camposs deposition. (Limber Decl., ¶ 5 [stating that, [a]t the conclusion of the Campos deposition[,] counsel asserted privilege].) However, the court finds that this conduct does not evidence a subjective intent to disclose privileged information. The attorney representing Defendant in this deposition has stated, in her declaration, that while she believed the exhibit appeared on its face to contain privileged material, she wanted to fully review and analyze the document and identify all individuals referenced, before making any statements on the record. (Limber Decl., ¶ 3.) After reviewing the exhibit during a break, counsel asserted the attorney-client privilege on the record. (Limber Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) The court finds that Defendants counsels conduct, in ensuring the applicability of the claim of privilege before asserting it on the record and doing so at the conclusion of the deposition, does not show a subjective intent to disclose the information, or to consent to its disclosure. ( McDermott Will & Emery LLP , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101; Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).) The court further finds that ASAS did not waive its right to claim the attorney-client privilege and work product protection by electing not to assert the privileges at the deposition of Ana Campos. Counsel for ASAS has stated, in his declaration, that (1) he did not intend to waive any privilege claims on behalf of ASAS, and (2) he did not make an objection on the deposition record because Defendant had already asserted the privilege, such that counsel did not see the need to make a redundant objection. (Hochhausler Decl., ¶¶ 8, 6.) The court finds that this evidence shows that ASAS did not have the subjective intent to disclose or to consent to the disclosure of privileged information. ( McDermott Will & Emery LLP , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101; Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).) Thus, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff did not meet its burden to show that Defendant and/or ASAS waived their rights to assert the attorney-client privilege. Finally, the court notes that three entries on Defendants privilege log identify three categories of documents that it contends are subject to the work product protection. (Andrade Decl., Ex. F, Privilege Log, p. 1, ¶¶ 3, 5, 10.) The parties do not expressly address these entries or dispute that they are subject to the work product protection provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 2018.010 et seq.; instead, Plaintiff appears only to argue that Defendant and ASAS waived this protection. (Mot., p. 10:22-25.) However, the court has determined, for the reasons set forth above, that Defendant did not waive its right to claim that the documents in the subject production are privileged. The court finds that Defendant did not waive its right to claim the work product protection for the same reasons set forth above. ORDER The court denies plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School Districts motion for determination of claim of privilege. The court orders defendant Scottsdale Indemnity Company to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 11, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV12862 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT AND ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Plaintiff, vs. GOTHAM INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV12862 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 16, 2024 Thomas D. Jacobson seeks to be admitted pro hac vice to represent Defendant Gotham Insurance Company in this action. An attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction who is not be a resident of California, regularly employed in California, or regularly engaged in substantial business, professional, or other activities in California may apply to appear as counsel pro hac vice in California. (California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).) The attorney must a verified application together with proof of service by mail of a copy of the application and notice of hearing on all parties who have appeared in the case and on the State Bar of California at its San Francisco office. (California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(c).) The applicant must also pay a $50.00 fee to the State Bar of California. (California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(e).) The application must state (1) the applicants residence and office addresses; (2) the courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) that the applicant is a member in good standing in those courts; (4) that the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) the title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) the name, address, and telephone number of the active member of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record in the local action. (California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d).) The amended application complies with the requirements, and the $500.00 application fee has been paid. (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (e)(1).) Accordingly, the amended application for admission pro hac vice is GRANTED. On or before July 16, 2025, counsel must pay the annual renewal fee of $500.00. (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (e)(2).) A Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Annual Pro Hac Vice Renewal Fees by Thomas D. Jacobson is scheduled for July 18, 2025 at 9:00 AM in Department 48 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 16th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 32 BOGHOS TOVMASSIAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HIPPO INSURANCE SERVICES, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for summary judgment BACKGROUND On May 5, 2023, Plaintiffs Boghos Tovmassian and Marguerite Tovmassian filed this action against Defendants Hippo Insurance Services (Hippo), Spinnaker Insurance Company (Spinnaker), and Patrick Hix, alleging (1) breach of insurance contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) elder abuse. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs own a home located in Tujunga, California (the Property). (Compl. ¶ 1.) The Property was insured by a homeowners insurance policy issued by Hippo, which is owned and underwritten by Spinnaker. ( Ibid. ) In December 2021, the Property suffered wind and water intrusion, leading Plaintiffs to make a claim. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to conduct a full and fair investigation, which resulted in an insufficient payout. ( Id. , ¶ 3.) On April 25, 2024, Hippo and Spinnaker filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) DISCUSSION I. Hippos Liability a. Plaintiffs Had No Contract with Hippo To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the contract existed, (2) the plaintiffs performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. ( Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) A plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of contract against one who is not a party to the contract. ( Tri-Continent Internat. Corp. v. Paris Savings & Loan Assn. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1359.) It is undisputed that the policy was issued by Spinnaker, with Hippo as the program administrator. (Def.s Undisputed Facts (UF) 1; Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The policy was signed by Spinnakers CEO. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, Hippo has satisfied its initial burden by showing that it was not a party to the policy with Plaintiffs. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Hippo is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law. b. Hippo Cannot be Liable for the Implied Covenant The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other partys right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-50.) In the absence of a contractual relationship, no implied covenant claims may be stated. ( Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 422, 430.) As discussed above, Hippo has established that it had no contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an implied covenant claim against Hippo. c. Hippo Cannot be Liable for Elder Abuse Financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) Hippo could not have wrongfully retained Plaintiffs property ( i.e. , the insurance proceeds) if it was not a party to the policy and did not have any obligation to pay Plaintiffs. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. II. Spinnakers Liability a. The Claims are Time-Barred Under California law parties may agree to a provision shortening the statute of limitations, qualified, however, by the requirement that the period fixed is not in itself unreasonable or is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. ( William L. Lyon & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1307, quoting Capehart v. Heady (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 386, 388.) [A] covenant shortening the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance contract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. ( Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 683.) One year was not an unfair period of limitation. ( Ibid. ; see also Ins. Code, § 2071(a) [imposing one-year limitations period for fire insurance claims].) The statute of limitations for actions on insurance claims is equitably tolled from the time the insured notifies the insurer of the claim until coverage is denied. ( Marselis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 122, 124.) The reason for the tolling rule is to avoid penalizing the insured for the time consumed by the insurer investigating the claim. ( Id. at p. 125.) The running of the limitations period resumes upon the insurers denial of a claim, and no further tolling occurs, even if the insurer reconsiders its denial. ( Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 142.) Here, the insurance policy provides that [n]o action can be brought against us unless . . . the action is started within one year after the date of loss. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The loss occurred on December 30, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs reported the loss to Spinnaker on January 8, 2022. (Carden Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Spinnaker issued notice of its coverage position on January 27, 2022, granting coverage on certain items and denying the rest. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Plaintiffs did not file this action until May 5, 2023, well past the one-year limitations period, even accounting for the tolling period between January 8, 2022 and January 27, 2022. Spinnakers reopening of the claim on May 17, 2022 based on Plaintiffs request for reconsideration (Carden Decl. ¶13) did not further toll the limitations period. Therefore, Spinnaker has met its initial burden by establishing that the claims are time-barred. [1] This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable as a matter of law. b. Spinnaker Did Not Breach the Policy There can be no breach of the insurance policy . . . [where] the undisputed evidence established that [the insurer] paid all amounts due under the policy. ( Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) Here, the policy covered direct physical loss to property. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) Spinnaker covered damage to the first-floor flooring, the only part of the Property directly damaged by the water intrusion. (Carden Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. F.) Spinnaker declined to cover the undamaged stairs and second-floor flooring. ( Ibid. ) Spinnaker issued payment for the covered portions. ( Id. , ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. C, D.) Spinnaker has met its initial burden by showing that it satisfied its obligations under the policy. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law for this independent reason. c. Spinnaker Could Not Have Breached the Implied Covenant [A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due. ( Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1153.) Spinnaker could not have acted in bad faith if it correctly denied policy coverage. Furthermore, as discussed above, the claim is time-barred. Therefore, the implied covenant claim fails as a matter of law. d. Spinnaker Could Not Have Committed Elder Abuse Likewise, Spinnaker could not have wrongfully retained insurance benefits if it correctly denied them, and the claim is time-barred in any case. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment filed by Hippo and Spinnaker is GRANTED. [1] This applies to all three causes of action, not just breach of contract, because the policy states that no action may be brought outside one year. The policy does not restrict the limitations period to claims on the policy itself. Furthermore, where the essence of [a] claim[] is an attempt to recover [d]amages for failure to provide benefits under subject contract of insurance, the claim is fundamentally a claim on the policy and is thus time barred under the limitations period stated in the policy. ( Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1063, quoting Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565, 575.)

Case Number: 22STCV13457 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING CBD FRANCHISING, INC. vs. CENTRAL JERSEY DOORS & CLOSETS, LLC Case No.: 22STCV13457 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 CBD Franchisings motion for reconsideration is DENIED. On 4/21/2022, Plaintiff CBD Franchising, Inc. (Plaintiff or CBD) filed suit against Central Jersey Doors & Closets, LLC, Mary Conway, William Conway, One Day Doors and Closets, Inc., and One Day Enterprises, alleging: (1) breach of written contract; (2) breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) tortious interference with contractual relations; and (4) unlawful business practices. On 5/21/2024, the Court granted One Day Defendants motion for summary judgment. Now, CBD Franchising moves for reconsideration of that ruling. Discussion CBD Franchising argues that the Court should reconsider its MSJ ruling because it was denied the opportunity to respond to the non-compete provision arguments and because there was a good will transfer here within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 16601. After review, the Court denies the motion for several reasons: First, the Court disagrees that One Day Defendants only raised goodwill arguments in reply, or that CBD Franchising was denied an opportunity to fully respond to these arguments. One Day Defendants opening brief in support of their motion for summary judgment argued that the 2013 Franchise Agreement expressly and repeatedly states that it does not transfer any goodwill. Moreover, CBD was provided a full opportunity to respond in oral argument, and the Court fully considered those arguments in its ruling. Importantly, as noted by One Day Defendants, CBDF argued for the first time at the May 9, 2024, hearing on the One Day Defendants motion for summary judgment that the 2013 Franchise Agreement (1) transfers a license to use its goodwill and (2) is part of a series of integrated agreements that includes both the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement and the 2016 Transfer Agreement. (Opp., 4:10-12.) As such, CBD Franchising itself advanced arguments for the first time at oral argument which it request be considered now. Taken together, the Court fails to find that CBD Franchisings motion is based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, as a motion for reconsideration must be. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Second, even setting aside the fact that reconsideration is not appropriate given the lack of new or different facts or law, the Court reaches the same conclusion as to the merits for several reasons: First, Section 16601 provides that a person who sells the goodwill of a business . . . may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified geographic area. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16601, italics added.) Here, there was no evidence submitted to show that the Conways, as sellers, sold the goodwill of a business to CBDF as buyer. Rather, CBDF argues that it licensed its goodwill to the Conways via the 2013 Franchise Agreement; that the Conways assigned goodwill to DenMatt Industries via the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement; and that the Conways, with CBDFs consent, assigned their license to use CBDFs goodwill to DenMatt Industries via the 2016 Transfer Agreement. As such, there is no evidence that the Conways ever sold their goodwill, or that they did so with CBDF agreeing as a buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified geographic area. Indeed, the 2013 Franchise Agreement expressly states that it does not transfer the ownership of any goodwill, whether associated with CBDFs proprietary marks or otherwise, such that a franchisee could never sell any goodwill following the termination or expiration of the agreement: Following the termination or expiration of this agreement, no monetary amount will be attributable to any goodwill associated with your use of the Proprietary Marks or operation of the franchised Business or Closets By Design Location, include any local goodwill. (MSJ C.E. Ex. 9, p. 130 2013 Franchise Agreement at p. 42, § 15.01.) The Northern District of Californias decision in Scott v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc . (N.D. Cal. 1990) 732 F.Supp. 1034 supports this interpretation. In Scott , the plaintiff-franchisor argued that section 16601 applied because a franchise agreement is akin to a sale of goodwill in a business. ( Id . at p. 1041.) The Northern District disagreed, and instead found that a franchisor simply does not sell its goodwill to the franchisee but instead, consistent with the terms of a license, only agrees that the franchisee may benefit from the goodwill for a specified period of time. ( Id .) Given that distinction, the court rejected the plaintiff-franchisors argument that section 16601 applied, noting that the position that a franchisor sells its goodwill by entering into a franchise agreement while retaining its ownership of the goodwill is patently untenable. ( Id . at p. 1041, fn. 9.) As applied here, CBDF, as a franchiser, never sold any goodwill to the Conways, and thus the Conways never owned any goodwill to sell. Third, the Court maintains that the 2013 Franchise Agreement, 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement, and 2016 Transfer Agreement are not integrated agreements that should be read together. Civil Code section 1642 provides that [s]everal contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as part of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together. (Civil Code, § 1642.) But, here, the three referenced agreements do not relate to the same matters, are not between the same parties, and were not made as part of substantially one transaction. As noted by One Day Defendants: - The three agreements were signed at different times over a more than three-and-a-half-year period: the Conways signed the 2013 Franchise Agreement in December 2012; signed the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement over three years later in March 2016; and signed the 2016 Transfer Agreement five more months later in August 2016. - The three agreements relate to three distinct transactions: the Conways sought a franchise relationship via the 2013 Franchise Agreement; sold and assigned assets to DenMatt Industries via the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement; and transferred their post-termination rights, duties, and obligations under the 2013 Franchise Agreement to DenMatt Industries via the 2016 Transfer Agreement. - The three agreements were not signed by the same parties: neither CBDF nor DenMatt Industries signed the 2013 Franchise Agreement, and CBDF did not sign the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement. - And the three agreements do not each reference the other: the 2013 Franchise agreement does not reference the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement or the 2016 Transfer Agreement; the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement does not reference the 2016 Transfer Agreement; and the 2016 Transfer Agreementwhich CBDF calls the most important document in the transaction and references as the agreement that binds all three agreements together (Recons. Mot. 7, 17)does not even reference the 2016 Asset Purchase Agreement. (Opp., 7:6-16.) Moreover, even assuming the three referenced agreements were integrated agreements that should be read together, that does not mean that they were merged into one contract. ( Mountain Air Enters., LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 759, noting that while it is the rule that several contracts relating to the same matters are to be construed together (citing Civ. Code, sec. 1642), it does not follow that for all purposes they constitute one contract.) And even if the contracts to be read as one, there is still nothing which would show a sale of the goodwill of a business to CBDF, as required to fall within the scope of the section 16601. Based on the foregoing, CBDFs motion for reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Case Number: 24CHCV00588 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-10-24 Case #24CHCV00588 , Chinyere Valerie Ibe vs. Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc., et al. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint · 4 th Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation · 5 th Cause of Action for Violation of California Business & Professional Code · 6 th Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment · 7 th Cause of Action for Defamation Motion to Strike · Page 24, Paragraph 111 entitled Prayer for Relief, Lines 23-25 [claim for punitive damages] RULING : Defendants demurrer is sustained. Defendants motion to strike is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe (Plaintiff) filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC), in pro per, on March 25, 2024. Plaintiffs complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (2) Bad Faith Denial of Insurance Claim; (3) Breach of the Contractual Duty to Pay a Covered Insurance Claim; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation; (5) Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et. seq.; (6) Unjust Enrichment; and (7) Defamation. The First through Third Causes of Action are only against Defendant Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc. The Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action are against all Defendants. Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC (818 Restoration) is the demurring Defendant in this instance. 818 Restoration demurs to the Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that the water heater in the garage of her home burst. This caused the garage to flood, damaging the drywall and items that were stored in the garage. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that on Marh 24, 2023, Defendant Bamboo Insurance sent out a leak detector from 818 Restoration to take pictures of the damaged drywall in the garage. (FAC, ¶ 21.) She also alleges that water was still trickling out of the water heater when the leak detector from 818 Restoration came out. (FAC, ¶ 25.) She also alleges that 818 Restoration was working with Bamboo to create a story that Plaintiff falsely reported that the water heater flooded the garage. (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff also alleges that Bamboo, using its contractors, including 818 Restoration, found ways to deny her claim. (FAC, ¶ 61.) The last allegations in Plaintiffs FAC related to 818 Restoration is that it made one or more defamatory statements about Plaintiff to a person other than Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There are no other specific allegations related to 818 Restoration. 818 Restoration filed its demurrer on May 28, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 26, 2024, with proof of service by mail. On July 1, 2024, 818 Restoration filed a notice of non-opposition to its demurrer, as it apparently had no knowledge of the opposition that was filed by Plaintiff with the Court and had not yet received the opposition in the mail. Plaintiffs opposition only argues that she was not validly served with the demurrer because she had not consented to service of the demurrer via email, which is how she claimed she received the demurrer. However, the proof of service filed with Defendants demurrer indicates that Plaintiff was served via U.S. Mail, so it is unknown why she did not receive the demurrer in the mail. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant did not meet and confer, but Defendants demurrer indicates that it attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not respond to attempts to meet and confer with her. Plaintiffs opposition contains no arguments regarding the merits of the demurrer and motion to strike. The Court will address the merits of the demurrer and the motion to strike. ANALYSIS A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law& ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation Defendant 818 Restoration demurs to Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation on the basis that it fails to plead any specific allegations against 818 Restoration. The elements of intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. ( Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245.) Notably, in California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Id .) There are no specific allegations against 818 Restoration under this cause of action. Instead, Plaintiff just alleges that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding what would be covered by Plaintiffs insurance policy. (FAC, ¶ 78.) 818 Restoration was not Plaintiffs insurance provider. It was simply an inspector hired by Plaintiffs provider, Bamboo Insurance. There are no allegations under this cause of action for any misrepresentations made specifically by 818 Restoration. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq. 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that there are insufficient facts against 818 Restoration to support this cause of action. Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. includes the California Unfair Competition Law and provides consumers with remedies when businesses engage in unfair or fraudulent practices. Plaintiffs FAC does not contain any allegations indicating that 818 Restoration violated the Business and Professions Code. The only specific allegation against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that Bamboo used it to find ways to deny Plaintiffs claims. This is not sufficient to indicate that 818 Restoration itself engaged any acts that would constitute a violation of the Business and Professions Code. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Sixth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against 818 Restoration. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit at the expense of another to either return the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched. ( Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 255 Cal.App. 4th 759.) Though Defendant does not raise this argument, the Court will note that there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 785, 793 (unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action under California law).) Unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs FAC contains no allegations indicating how 818 Restoration was unjustly enriched. Because unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Seventh Cause of Action for Defamation 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation. Defamation is an intentional tort that requires proof that the defendant intended to publish the defamatory statement. ( Stellar v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App 4th 1498.) California law requires that any words constituting an alleged defamation must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. ( ZL Technologies, Inc. v Does 1 17 (2017) 13 Cal.App. 5th 603.) The only allegations that Plaintiff has against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that it noted that a potential slab leak had occurred in the garage as the water did not reflect a failed water heater in the April 14, 2023, denial of benefits letter to Plaintiff, and that 818 Restoration made one or more of the states to a person other than Ms. Ibe. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There is nothing in Plaintiffs FAC to indicate how 818 Restoration defamed Plaintiff, as the letter would have been issued by Plaintiffs insurance provider, nor does Plaintiff specifically identify the alleged defamation. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Motion to Strike Defendant had moved to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. This Court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, [a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. Under CCP § 436(a), [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civ. Code § 3294. ( Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Id . at 725.) Oppression is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)¿ ¿ Plaintiff has requested punitive damages as part of her prayer for relief, but nowhere in her FAC does she allege that 818 Restoration acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. Because she has not alleged that it acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, she cannot maintain a claim for punitive damages against 818 Restoration. Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is granted for 818 Restoration only. It could still apply to other Defendants. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike is granted. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Case Number: 21STCV33926 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles LGP EQUIPMENT RENTALS, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. LAGD PROPERTIES LLC, a California limited liability company; 1st DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, a California Corporation; RAMON ROMERO, an individual dba SOUTHERN CALI CONSTRUCITON; L.A. GREEN DESIGNS, an unknown form of entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV33926 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 09/14/21 1 ST Amended Complaint Filed: 07/17/23 Trial Date: None set. Hearing date: 07/10/2024 Moving Party: Plaintiff LGP Equipment Rentals, Inc. Responding Party: Defendant 1ST Choice Design and Development Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One and Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $3,000.00 The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. The motion is GRANTED. Recommendation : Grant, Defendant is ordered to serve responses to Requests for Production, Set One without objections within 20 days of this order. Defendant and Defense Counsel are also ordered to pay monetary sanctions jointly and severally in the amount of $750.00 to Plaintiff through its counsel of record. Reason : Plaintiff served Requests for Production, Set One, on December 18, 2023. To date, the Defendant has not served any responses. However, Defendant argues that after a diligent search, it was unable to locate the documents it initially believed it had. Defendants counsel states [w]hen I was corresponding with Plaintiffs counsel, I was unaware that the documents did not exist and based on discussions with my Client we both believed the documents did exist but eventually Defendant was unable to locate them after a diligent search. (Diefenbach Decl. ¶ 8; See also Innabi Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Moreover, Tony Holder, the principal and owner of Defendant 1 st Choice Design & Development states Defendant is ultimately unable to produce the documents because the project file was taken from a former employee who worked as the project manager for both projects, Mr. Alberto Dominguez. (Holder Decl. ¶ 2.) Mr. Holder further states [t]he records that 1st Choice did have that were not lost at the project site were lost when 1st Choice changed office locations in approximately June of 2021 . . . 1st Choice does not have any responsive documents in its custody and control that it can make available for production. I initially believed the project documents existed but was unable to locate them after a diligent search and realized that Mr. Dominguez was in charge of the documents and then other documents were lost during a move. ( Id . at ¶¶ 4-6.) Nevertheless, the Court notes Defendant fails to provide any evidence for its speculations of the former employee taking the records. Therefore, the Court should grant the motion under CCP section 2031.300 and impose the reasonable amount of $750.00 (1.5 hours at $500 per hour) in monetary sanctions on the Defendant and Defense Counsel, jointly and severally. Other Notes : There is a discrepancy as to the sanction amount requested. In the moving papers, Plaintiff seeks $3,000.00 in sanctions. However, in the reply papers, Plaintiff seeks $2,000.00 in sanctions. It is so ordered. Dated: July 10, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV05225 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles ARMANI MARSALIS GATES I, Plaintiff, vs. LEMONADE INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV05225 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 03/09/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: 05/27/2025 Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLC Responding Party: N/A - Unopposed Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1) The Court considered the moving papers. Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. Background Armani Marsalis Gates I filed a Complaint on March 9, 2023 alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The motion before the Court now is Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLCs (Defendant) Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set 1 (the Motion). No opposition has been filed, and Defendant files a Notice of Non-Opposition. Discussion Legal Standard If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: (a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4&(b) The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2031.300) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. (CCP § 2023.030(a).) Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (CCP § 2023.010) Analysis Attached to the moving papers, Defendant provides the Declaration of William A. Hadikusumo (Hadikusumo Decl.) which states that on July 5, 2023, Plaintiff was served by Defendant with Requests for Production of Documents, Set 1. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶3.) The deadline to provide responses was August 8, 2023 but no responses were provided. On August 9, 2023, Defendant reach out and provided an extension until September 6, 2023, however, no responses were ever received. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶¶5-9.) Therefore, the Motion is granted, and sanctions are warranted. Sanctions Defense counsel provides the following calculations: · Counsels hourly rate is $240.00 · Counsel spent 5 hours preparing the instant Motion · Counsel anticipates the hearing taking 1 hour · Counsel incurred a filing fee of $60.00 · Counsel requests a total of $1,500.00 Accordingly, the Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Conclusion Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23SMCV03537 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED. Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New York to give notice. REASONING Counsel who are not active members of the California State Bar and have not been granted permission to appear pro hac vice are prohibited from representing a party in California courts. (Gentis v. Safeguard Bus. Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308.) Counsel licensed in another state may, in the courts discretion, be permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice if counsel is associated with an attorney of record who is an active member of the California bar. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).) Appearance pro hac vice is a privilege and not a right under the United States Constitution. (Leis v. Flynt (1979) 439 U.S. 438, 441.) An application to appear in California as counsel pro hac vice must state: (1) The applicants residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a member in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active member of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d).) Christian P. Jones represents that he is a member in good standing of all bars and with all courts in which he is admitted to practice, and while he has appeared in three other actions in California in the preceding two years, this is not a significantly high number so as to warrant denial of an application to appear pro hac vice here. He has met the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d), he appears qualified and ready to appear pro hac vice, and there are no other facts or circumstances to show that his appearance in this action would cause a significant disruption of orderly justice. Accordingly, Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED.