Jose Cortez Vs Salim Jeevani

Case Number: 22STCV38136 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 76 Plaintiff insurer seeks to recover from the manufacturer of an air vent exhaust fan which caused a fire at the property of Plaintiffs insured, for which Plaintiff paid policy benefits. Defendant Air Vent, Inc. filed a Cross-Complaint against the manufacturer of the motor which was allegedly defective and the cause of the fire. Defendant/Cross-Complainant Air Vent, Inc. moves for an order allowing opposing documents to be filed under seal. Specially-appearing Defendant Powermax Electric Co. Ltd. Guandong moves to quash the service of summons on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction. TENTATIVE RULING Defendant/Cross-Complainant Air Vent, Inc.s motion to seal is DENIED. Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.551(b)(6), Defendant Air Vent, Inc. is to notify the Court within 10 days of this order as to whether the documents shall be filed unsealed. Given the ruling on the motion to seal, and the unsettled status of the opposition brief and supporting evidence, the hearing on specially-appearing Defendant Powermax Electric Co. Ltd.s Guandong motion to quash the service of summons is CONTINUED to August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. ANALYSIS Motion To Seal Defendant/Cross-Complainant Air Vent, Inc. moves for an order allowing opposing documents to be filed under seal, namely the Confidential Declarations of Courtney Jakofsky and Brad Holland. A motion seeking an order sealing the record must be accompanied by a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing . ( Calif. Rules of Court, Rule 2.551(b)(1)[bold emphasis and underlining added].) P er CRC Rule 2.550(d), a court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish all of the following: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Bold emphasis added.) CRC Rule 2.550(e) provides: (1) An order sealing the record must: (A) Specifically state the facts that support the findings; (B) Direct the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of each document or page must be included in the public file. A request to seal a document must be filed publicly and separately from the object of the request. It must be supported by a factual declaration or affidavit explaining the particular needs of the case . ( In re Marriage of Lechowick (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1416 [bold emphasis and underlining added]).) Unless confidentiality is required by law , court records are presumed to be open. CRC Rule 2.550(c)(bold emphasis and underlining added). The trial court cannot rely solely on an agreement or stipulation of the parties as the basis for permitting records to be filed under seal . (Citations omitted.) ( Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) However, moving party must demonstrate by way of a factual declaration or affidavit that all of the CRC Rule 2.550(d) requirements for sealing have been met. ¿ CRC Rule 2.550(d) factors: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record: The Declaration of Courtney Jakofsky does not identify an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record. The motion makes a reference in passing to privacy interests, and makes a generalized reference to AVIs confidential business records, confidential discovery from other cases, and/or third party records designated as confidential. To the extent such documents were designated as confidential, the Court accepts the premise that this presents an overriding interest overcoming the right of public access to the record. In terms of the overriding interest requirement of a closure or sealing order, NBC Subsidiary identifies two separate elements. The first element requires the identification of an overriding interest. (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 12171218; see In re Providian Credit Card Cases, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 298, fn. 3.) Defendant has identified such a potential overriding interesta binding contractual agreement not to disclose. . . . We agree with defendant that its contractual obligation not to disclose can constitute an overriding interest within the meaning of rule 243.1(d). (Citations omitted.) ( Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1283.) As such, the Court finds an overriding interest that overcomes the right to public access. This requirement is satisfied. (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record ; Moving party does not explain why sealing the entirety of the three aforementioned categories of documents, as opposed to redaction of certain portions, is necessary. This requirement is not satisfied. (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed ; Even though moving party has identified an overriding interest, that, by itself, is insufficient to justify a sealing order. We have been unable to find any appellate court decision which construes Publicker to permit sealing of court documents merely upon the agreement of the parties without a specific showing of serious injury . We therefore, with respect, reject defendants broad reading of the citation to Publicker in footnote 46 of NBC Subsidiary . . . . [*1283] . . . [O]nce it is established there is a potential overriding interest, the party seeking closure or sealing must prove prejudice to that interest is substantially probable . ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 1222.) In terms of the overriding interest requirement of a closure or sealing order, NBC Subsidiary identifies two separate elements. The first element requires the identification of an overriding interest . ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court , supra , 20 Cal.4th at pp. 12171218; see In re Providian Credit Card Cases , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 298, fn. 3.) Defendant has identified such a potential overriding interesta binding contractual agreement not to disclose . The second element of the overriding interest analysis is there must be a substantial probability that it will be prejudiced absent closure or sealing . ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 1218; Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821, 832 [107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594].) As we will note, defendant has not shown a substantial probability any such interest in the present case will be prejudiced the second element of overriding interest analysis identified in NBC Subsidiary . This analysis has now been promulgated by the Judicial Council as one of the findings that must be returned before a sealing order can be entered. (Rule 243.1(d)(3) [A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed &.].) ( Universal City Studios, Inc., supra , 110 Cal.App.4th at 1282-83 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) Moving party has not presented admissible evidence that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed. In delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential . [Citation.] Broad allegations of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient . ( In re Cendant Corp., supra, 260 F.3d at p. 194 .) We have been unable to find any appellate court decision which construes Publicker to permit sealing of court documents merely upon the agreement of the parties without a specific showing of serious injury . We therefore, with respect, reject defendants broad reading of the citation to Publicker in footnote 46 of NBC Subsidiary. ( Universal City Studios, Inc., supra , 110 Cal.App.4th at 1282 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) Here, the Declaration of Courtney Jakofsky does not meet this standard of factual specificity. She does not articulate specific examples with articulated reasoning whereby AVI would suffer serious injury if the documents were not sealed. ( Universal City Studios, supra, 110 Cal.App.4 th at 1282, 1283.) This requirement is no t satisfied. (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored ; The proposed sealing is not narrowly tailored, because AVI seeks an order sealing the entirety of the documents. This requirement is not satisfied. (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. Moving party has not addressed why redaction of specific portions of the documents would be insufficient to achieve the overriding interest. This requirement is not satisfied. As such, the motion to seal is DENIED. Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.551(b)(6), Defendant Air Vent, Inc. is to notify the Court within 10 days of this order as to whether the documents shall be filed unsealed: If the court denies the motion or application to seal, the moving party may notify the court that the lodged record is to be filed unsealed. This notification must be received within 10 days of the order denying the motion or application to seal, unless otherwise ordered by the court. On receipt of this notification, the clerk must unseal and file the record. If the moving party does not notify the court within 10 days of the order, the clerk must (1) return the lodged record to the moving party if it is in paper form or (2) permanently delete the lodged record if it is in electronic form. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.551(b)(6).) Motion To Quash Given the ruling on the motion to seal, and the unsettled status of the opposition brief and supporting evidence, the hearing on specially-appearing Defendant Powermax Electric Co. Ltd.s Guandong motion to quash the service of summons is CONTINUED to August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.

MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, CVRI2306086 SOLIS VS FRIAS SET ONE, AND MONETARY SANCTIONS; EXHIBITS BY JANAE CHRISTIE SOLIS Tentative Ruling: Motion denied as the discovery request was served by Plaintiff (a party to the action) in violation of CCP 1013a.

Case Number: 21STCV28618 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On August 3, 2021, Plaintiffs Elia G. Castranova and Theresa Castranova filed this action against Defendants Carolyn Lucy Giles (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and premises liability. On December 28, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. On May 15, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Elia G. Castranova with prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On May 29, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to set the deposition fee of Dr. Anthony Virella, to be heard on July 11, 2024. Trial is currently scheduled for October 18, 2024. PARTY'S REQUEST Defendant asks the Court to set a reasonable fee for the expert witness deposition of Dr. Anthony Virella. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.470 provides: (a) If a party desiring to take the deposition of an expert witness under this article deems that the hourly or daily fee of that expert for providing deposition testimony is unreasonable, that party may move for an order setting the compensation of that expert. Notice of this motion shall also be given to the expert. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. In any attempt at an informal resolution under Section 2016.040, either the party or the expert shall provide the other with all of the following: (1) Proof of the ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for similar services provided outside the subject litigation. (2) The total number of times the presently demanded fee has ever been charged and received by that expert. (3) The frequency and regularity with which the presently demanded fee has been charged and received by that expert within the two-year period preceding the hearing on the motion. (c) In addition to any other facts or evidence, the expert or the party designating the expert shall provide, and the courts determination as to the reasonableness of the fee shall be based on, proof of the ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for similar services provided outside the subject litigation. (d) In an action filed after January 1, 1994, the expert or the party designating the expert shall also provide, and the courts determination as to the reasonableness of the fee shall also be based on, both of the following: (1) The total number of times the presently demanded fee has ever been charged and received by that expert. (2) The frequency and regularity with which the presently demanded fee has been charged and received by that expert within the two-year period preceding the hearing on the motion. (e) The court may also consider the ordinary and customary fees charged by similar experts for similar services within the relevant community and any other factors the court deems necessary or appropriate to make its determination. (f) Upon a determination that the fee demanded by that expert is unreasonable, and based upon the evidence and factors considered, the court shall set the fee of the expert providing testimony. (g) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to set the expert witness fee, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.470.) DISCUSSION After the accident, Plaintiff Theresa Castranova (Plaintiff) received treatment from Dr. Virella. Dr. Virellas office informed Defendants counsel that Dr. Virellas deposition fee is $2,500.00 per hour. Defendant asks the Court for an order setting Dr. Virellas compensation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.470. Defendant has submitted unrefuted evidence that similar experts . . . within the relevant community charge $1,050.00 (Dr. Paul Kaloostian), $1,500.00 (Dr. Luke Macyszyn), and $1,500.00 (Dr. Sohaib Kureshi) per hour for services similar to those Dr. Virella will provide at his deposition. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.470, subd (e).) Although Defendant served the motion on Dr. Virella and Plaintiff, they have submitted no response to the motion. In addition, Dr. Virellas office denied Defendants request for the following: (1) Proof of the ordinary and customary fee actually charged and received by Dr. Virella for similar services provided outside the subject litigation; (2) The total number of times the presently demanded fee has ever been charged and received by Dr. Virella; and (3) The frequency and regularity with which the presently demanded fee has been charged and received by Dr. Virella within the preceding two years. (Mendoza dec. ¶¶ 8-9.) Dr. Virellas office stated that it could not make any exceptions to the $2,500.00 per hour deposition fee. Based on this evidence, the Court finds that the $2,500.00 fee which Dr. Virella demands is unreasonable. (See Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc . (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 304 [experts customary hourly fee is only one factor in determining a reasonable fee under statutory predecessor to Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.470].) The Court sets Dr. Virellas deposition fee at $1,500.00 per hour under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.470. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Defendant Carolyn Lucy Giles motion to set Dr. Anthony Virellas expert witness compensation. The Court sets Dr. Virellas expert witness compensation at $1,500.00 per hour for deposition testimony. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 23CHCV02085 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/11/24 TRIAL DATE: 6/30/25 Case #23CHCV02085 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES (Request for Production, Set 1) Motion filed on 1/16/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Edward Sandstrom RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order compelling Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. to provide further responses to Plaintiff Edward Sandstroms Request for Production, Set 1, Nos. 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 38. Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against East Valley and its counsel, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, in the amount of $2,161.65. RULING : The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as set forth below. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 5/24/22 between Plaintiff Edward Sandstrom (Plaintiff) and Defendant William Peterson (Peterson), an employee of Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. (East Valley), while Peterson was driving East Valleys tow truck. Plaintiff claims to have suffered extensive injuries as a result of the accident. In this action, among other things, Plaintiff has included a claim for loss of income and loss of future earning capacity. On 7/14/23, Plaintiff filed this action against Peterson and East Valley alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence against all defendants, (2) Negligent Entrustment against East Valley and Does 1-50 and (3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention against East Valley and Does 1-50. On 8/2/23, Plaintiff served East Valley with Requests for Production, Set 1. (Chichyan Decl. ¶3, Ex.A). After granting several extensions of time to respond, East Valley served responses to the requests on 11/17/23. ( Id . ¶5, Ex.B). Plaintiff found East Valleys responses to certain of the requests to be deficient. Id . During the meet and confer process, Plaintiffs counsel extended the deadline for East Valley to provide further responses to 1/10/24 and the deadline to file a motion to compel further responses was extended to 2/9/24. ( Id . ¶¶6-7, Ex.C, D; Herme Decl. ¶6). East Valley failed to serve further responses by the 1/10/24 deadline due to a calendaring mistake. (Herme Decl. ¶6). As a result, on 1/16/24, Plaintiff filed (served on 1/15/24) the instant motion seeking an order compelling East Valley to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production, Set 1, Nos. 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 38. ( Id . ¶¶6-7, Ex.C-D). Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against East Valley and its counsel, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, in the amount of $2,161.65. East Valley has opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS The opposition indicates that on 1/22/24, East Valley served further responses to all of the requests at issue except number 33. ( See Herme Decl. ¶7, Ex.D; Reply, generally). The opposition also indicates that after the service of the further responses, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter regarding claimed deficiencies in the responses/further responses to requests 23, 33 and 38. (Herme Decl. ¶8, Ex.E). Therefore, East Valley believed that the responses to those three requests were the only responses which remained at issue. (Herme Decl. ¶9). The reply does not dispute that East Valley served further responses to all but one of the requests (no.33) at issue in the motion. However, the reply indicates that Plaintiff is still dissatisfied with the responses/further responses to the all of the requests at issue in the motion, specifically, requests: 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, and 38. ( See Reply, p.2:22-28, p.6:4-6). Plaintiff seems to believe that because the further responses were served after the motion was filed, Plaintiff need not establish the deficiencies in the further responses. ( See Reply, p.2:22-28). The Court does not agree with Plaintiffs position. CCP 2031.310(c) provides: Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response , or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (emphasis added) CRC 3.1345(c) provides, in relevant part: A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include--for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested--the following: (1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; (2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers . . . (emphasis added) As such, once East Valley served further responses to most of the requests at issue, Plaintiff was required to file a new motion addressing the deficiencies in those responses, after making a good faith effort to informally resolve the remaining discovery issues. Plaintiff also fails to explain how East Valley could know that Plaintiff was still dissatisfied with the responses to any of the requests at issue other than requests 23, 33 and 38 as those are the only requests addressed in Plaintiffs meet and confer letter served after the further responses were served. ( See Opposition, Ex.E). In the reply, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to further responses because the information could support a claim for punitive damages against East Valley. However, the complaint does not include a claim for punitive damages nor did Plaintiff indicate in its meet and confer efforts or the moving papers that he was seeking information to support such a claim. As such, East Valley did not have an opportunity to respond to this argument. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish why the further responses to Requests 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37 and 38 provided by East Valley after the motion was filed are deficient. See CCP 2031.310(c); CRC 3.1345(c)(2). The Court further finds that sanctions are not warranted. Pursuant to the parties meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff had until 2/9/24 to file a motion to compel further responses. (Chichyan Decl. ¶7, Ex.D). Plaintiffs counsel gives no indication that he contacted East Valleys counsel after further responses were not received by the 1/10/24 agreed upon deadline and filing the instant motion 3 court days later on 1/16/24, three and a half weeks before the agreed upon deadline to do so. The Court finds that a further response to Request 33, to which East Valley provided no further response, is warranted. ( See Herme Decl., Ex.D). East Valleys first objection to the phrase contractual or legal agreements being vague, ambiguous, overly broad and undefined does not even apply as that phrase is not contained in request 33. East Valley has also failed to justify any of the other objections asserted in response to this request. Further, if any documents are being withheld on the basis of privilege, a privilege log must be provided. CCP 2031.240(c). CONCLUSION The motion is granted as to Request 33. A further response is due within 20 days. The motion is denied as to Requests 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37 and 38. Sanctions are denied. The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to the motion as required by CRC 3.1110(f)(4). Counsel for the parties are warned that failure to comply with this rule in the future may result in matters being continued so that papers can be resubmitted in compliance, papers not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, in Department 301, Line 1. Plaintiff's Application for Default Judgement is HEARING REQUIRED. Plaintiff to appear at the hearing to set a new hearing date. =(301/RCE)

DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR OTHER NON-PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY WASHBON VS STATE FARM DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT CVRI2401690 MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE (OVER $35,000) OF STEVE INSURANCE COMPANY WASHBON BY STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ADAM ANDERSON Tentative Ruling: SUSTAIN with 30 days leave to amend. The third cause of action is uncertain because it includes allegations of negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which are separate causes of action. While Cal. Rule of Court 2.112 does not expressly require Plaintiff to split his claims into separate causes of action, Plaintiff should set forth the different theories into separate counts to facilitate the adjudication of their validity. Moreover, as pointed out by Defendant, this cause of action asserts some allegations against Anderson only, and some allegations against Defendants jointly, rendering the cause of action uncertain. The fourth cause of action for fraud does not state a cause of action with the required degree of specificity. Plaintiff does not describe where or when or by what means the representations were made. Additionally, these representations appear to be contradictory. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits and no coverage was available for the claim, while also asserting Defendants misrepresented that coverage existed. Because there is no context for either assertion, these allegations are confusing and ambiguous. Further, it is not clear who made the representations, or if the employee had authority to speak on behalf of the company. (Plaintiff states that the customer service representatives did not have authority and Plaintiff was not assigned an adjuster. (Complaint Para. 20.)) The allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action for fraud.

Case Number: 23STLC01390 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 25 PROCEEDINGS : MOTION FOR AN ORDER SEEKING LEAVE OF THE COURT TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lill RESP. PARTY : None MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND (CCP § 473(a)) TENTATIVE RULING : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. SERVICE : [ X ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK [ X ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK [ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NO (location) OPPOSITION : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None REPLY : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None ANALYSIS: I. Background On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed an action against Defendants Abbie L. Lill; Emily Salinas; Miguel Fuentes; Does I through V. Defendant Lill filed an Answer on June 7, 2023. Defendant Lill filed the instant Motion for an Order Seeking Leave of the Court to File a Cross-Complaint (the Motion) on June 14, 2024. No opposition has been filed. II. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) III. Discussion Defendant Lill seeks leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint seeking equitable indemnity and declaratory relief against Emily Salinas and Miguel Fuentes. (Mot., p. 3.) The Motion, however, does not comply with all requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. Specifically, Motion does not identify the pages and line numbers where allegations would be added, deleted, or modified. Defendant Lills counsels supporting declaration also does not state when he discovered the information, the effect, or why it is necessary. As a final note, the Motion fails to provide a courthouse address. Thus, the Notice is defective. Thus, the hearing will be CONTINUED so that Defendant Lill may correct these errors. IV. Conclusion & Order For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23SMCV05929 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Travelers Commercial Insurance Co. v. Luckenbacher, Case No. 23SMCV05929 Hearing date July 11, 2024 Travelers Motions for Orders Compelling Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatives, and Demand for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions In this uninsured motorist case, plaintiff moves to compel defendants responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and demand for production of documents and requests sanctions. No opposition, which would have been due nine court days prior to the hearing (Code Civ. Proc. §1005(b)) was filed. If a party to whom interrogatories or an inspection demand were directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses without objections. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(b), 2031.300(b). Moreover, failure to timely serve responses waives objections to the requests. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(a), 2031.300(a). Failure to verify a response is equivalent to no response at all. Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. If a party unsuccessfully made or opposed such a motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(c), 2031.300(c). Sanctions may be awarded even though no opposition was filed or the requested discovery was provided after the motion was filed. CRC Rule 3.1348(a). Defendant failed to respond. See generally Volk decls. All objections to the requests are waived. Monetary sanctions are warranted. Plaintiffs counsel requests $841.65 for each motion, representing 4 hours of work (2 hours to draft and 2 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing) at counsels hourly rate of $195, plus filing fee of $61.65. The request for sanctions is granted in a reduced amount because the three motions are virtually identical and are unopposed. The court awards a total of 6 hours (5 hours to draft, 1 hour for hearing) at $195/hour, plus filing fees of $184.95 for three motions. GRANTED. Defendant to serve complete, verified responses, without objection, within 20 days of this order. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the total amount of $1,365, plus $184.95 in filing fees, payable within 30 days.