Onemain Financial Group Llc Vs Goens, Terrence A

TRUIST BANK VS. STOCK, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203124 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 28, 2024 to Plaintiff Truist Bank and counsel, Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., for failure to timely serve pleadings on Defendant Chris Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(b) and Local Rule of Court 3.03 and failure to timely seek default on Defendant Bright Nichols Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(g). “The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.” CRC 3.110(b). Local Rule 3.03 mandates that Plaintiff serve Defendant with Local Form LF-CIV-100 and file a proof of service within the same timeframe. The Complaint in this matter was filed on September 1, 2023 and no proof of service has been filed for defendant Chris Stock. Plaintiff did not address defendant Chris Stock in the written response to the Order to Show Cause. CRC 3.110(g) requires Plaintiff to file a request for entry of default within 10 days after the time for service of the responsive pleading has elapsed. Defendant Bright Nichols Stock was served on October 7, 2023. The time for filing a responsive pleading expired November 6, 2023. No extension was requested or granted. No default was requested. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Declaration that asserts that a default packet “is pending to be drafted.” No explanation is given for the noncompliance with CRC 3.110. No default judgment has been requested. With no sufficient excuse for the delay, sanctions are imposed in the amount of $250.00 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court will issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal pursuant to Gov’t Code Section 68608(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the complaint and LF-CIV-100, failure to timely seek default judgment, and failure to timely prosecute. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal is set for Monday, September 9, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal. This matter is also calendared on Monday, September 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for review regarding status of service. ****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings ******************************************************************************************

Case Number: 21SMCV01012 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 21SMCV01012 MOTION Motion to Vacate Judgment MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. OPPOSING PARTY none BACKGROUND On June 7, 2021, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Plaintiff) filed a complaint for damages against Defendant Inna Kostina (Defendant). Default was entered against Defendant on August 31, 2021, and default judgment was entered against Defendant on December 11, 2021. Plaintiff now moves to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without prejudice because Defendant has submitted a fraud claim under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 128. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD SECTION 473 RELIEF Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a court may relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . Code of Civil procedure section 473 includes a discretionary provision, which applies permissively, and a mandatory provision, which applies as of right. ( Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 (hereafter Minick ).) Section 473 is a remedial statute to be applied liberally in favor of relief if the opposing party will not suffer prejudice. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. Unless inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails. ( Minick, supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [cleaned up].) The mandatory provision of section 473, subd. (b) requires an attorneys sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect[.] Otherwise, relief under section 473 is discretionary. The party or the legal representative must seek such relief within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable]; People v. The North River Ins. Co . (2011) 200 Ca.App.4 th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months]). The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period. ( Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp . (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) However, in the case of a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding determining the ownership or right to possession of real or personal property, without extending the six-month period, when a notice in writing is personally served within the State of California both upon the party against whom the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding has been taken, and upon his or her attorney of record, if any, notifying that party and his or her attorney of record, if any, that the order, judgment, dismissal, or other proceeding was taken against him or her and that any rights the party has to apply for relief under the provisions of Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall expire 90 days after service of the notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) ANALYSIS With regard to timing, judgment was entered on December 11, 2021, yet Plaintiff did not move to vacate the judgment until May 30, 2024, long after the requisite six months in which Plaintiff may bring the motion. The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period. ( Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp . (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) Further, the motion is not supported by any declaration or affidavit of fault. Therefore, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff the requested relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Moreover, the Court does not find Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) to provide a legal basis to vacate the Judgment which was entered on the request of Plaintiff, especially when Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence in support of the motion. Conclusion Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment entered against Defendant on December 11, 2021. The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court ruling. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

TRUIST BANK VS. STOCK, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203124 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 28, 2024 to Plaintiff Truist Bank and counsel, Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., for failure to timely serve pleadings on Defendant Chris Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(b) and Local Rule of Court 3.03 and failure to timely seek default on Defendant Bright Nichols Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(g). “The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.” CRC 3.110(b). Local Rule 3.03 mandates that Plaintiff serve Defendant with Local Form LF-CIV-100 and file a proof of service within the same timeframe. The Complaint in this matter was filed on September 1, 2023 and no proof of service has been filed for defendant Chris Stock. Plaintiff did not address defendant Chris Stock in the written response to the Order to Show Cause. CRC 3.110(g) requires Plaintiff to file a request for entry of default within 10 days after the time for service of the responsive pleading has elapsed. Defendant Bright Nichols Stock was served on October 7, 2023. The time for filing a responsive pleading expired November 6, 2023. No extension was requested or granted. No default was requested. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Declaration that asserts that a default packet “is pending to be drafted.” No explanation is given for the noncompliance with CRC 3.110. No default judgment has been requested. With no sufficient excuse for the delay, sanctions are imposed in the amount of $250.00 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court will issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal pursuant to Gov’t Code Section 68608(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the complaint and LF-CIV-100, failure to timely seek default judgment, and failure to timely prosecute. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal is set for Monday, September 9, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal. This matter is also calendared on Monday, September 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for review regarding status of service. ****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings ******************************************************************************************

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT ON CVCO2306079 CITIBANK VS FUENTEZ COMPLAINT FOR COLLECTIONS BY LORETTA T FUENTEZ Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be issued.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND CVCO2300171 TD BANK VS RODRIGUEZ DEFAULT JUDGMENT Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be issued.

Case Number: 23TRCV04037 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 17, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 9 PROCEEDINGS Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc. v. Mark Ferrera, et al. 23TRCV04037 1. Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is denied. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Defendant owes a balance due from a loan provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs assignor. On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainant alleges the following facts. Cross-Defendant maintains and practices a policy of attempting to collect on student loans without providing the mandated information, and without possessing and providing the mandated documentation. Cross-Defendant employs unfair and deceptive practices in their loan collection process. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action for violations of : 1. California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act; 2. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 3. Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act; 4. Unfair Competition Law. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendants constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 393. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Id. at 384. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. Baral, 1 Cal.5 th at 384 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has described this second step as a summary-judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiffs evidence as true, and evaluates the defendants showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f). Subdivision (f) does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled. Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 352. In addition, the Court has the discretion to hear an untimely anti-SLAPP motion even if the Defendant failed to request leave of court to file an untimely motion. Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684. Here, the motion runs afoul of both time measures of CCP § 425.16(f). However, the Court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on the merits. I. Conduct in Furtherance of Right of Petition or Free Speech CCP § 425.16(e) states: As used in this section, act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: . . . (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4 th 69, 78. The anti-SLAPP's statute focuses, not on the form of cross-complainants causes of action but, rather, cross-defendants underlying activity that gives rise to the asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92. In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, the court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may be utilized to strike specific allegations of protected activity without eliminating the entire cause of action or primary right. By referring to a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the protected rights of petition and speech, the Legislature indicated that particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16(b)(1), italics added.) Thus, in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity. I d. at 395. A Cross-Complaint may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. However, [o]nly those cross-complaints alleging a cause of action arising from the plaintiff's act of filing the complaint against the defendant and the subsequent litigation would potentially qualify as a SLAPP action. (§ 425.16, subds. (b) and (d).) For example, a person may attempt to bring a SLAPP suit alleging that libelous allegations or statements were contained in the complaint itself. However, because defendant's allegations are privileged communications under Civil Code section 47, the suit would be merit-less. A compulsory cross-complaint on a related cause of action against the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity. By definition, a related cause of action is a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c), italics added.) The SLAPP suit is not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint, but arises out of the litigation process itself. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651(internal citation omitted). Here, a review of the Cross-Complaint and Complaint reveals that the Cross-Complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Complaint. The Cross-Complaint does not arise from petitioning activity. See, Kajima Engineering and Const., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 934. The gravamen of the Cross-Complaint involves allegations that Cross-Complainant is entitled to statutory damages and other relief based on Cross-Defendants unlawful debt collection activities. The Cross-Complaint does not itself arise from the simple act of filing the Complaint, but, instead upon the underlying factual disputes outlined in the Cross-Complaint. The gravamen of the causes of action and the underlying theory of recovery do not depend on the filing of the Complaint itself but upon the alleged underlying facts and conduct of Cross-Defendant during the debt collection process. However, the Court does note that certain specific allegations of the Cross-Complaint do implicate petitioning activity. Cross-Complainant alleged: In this case, the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Credit Corp Solutions, Inc. (Cross-Defendant or Credit Corp) sued Mr. Ferrera without providing the disclosures and documents required under state law. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) In addition, paragraphs 42 to 48, 58c, and 84c-f, of the Cross-Complaint, which attempts to outline failures within the Complaint, also implicate petitioning activity. Here, however, the principle delineated in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376 applies because these allegations referenced above do implicate protected conduct of filing litigation. The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 . In this situation, it is appropriate to analyze whether to strike the specific allegations of the protected activity without eliminating the entirety of the causes of action. II. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. However, the Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to Plaintiff. See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. [Plaintiffs] second-[prong] burden is a limited one. [He] need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower at a demonstration of minimal merit [citation]. At this stage, [t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 531 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Cross-Defendant established the first prong (solely as to the specific allegations referenced above), Cross-Complainant must establish a probability of prevailing on the merits with respect to those allegations. See, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. See Id. Here, as to the specific allegations of protected speech noted above, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to establish a probability of prevailing. Cross-Complainant submitted competent evidence supporting the alleged violations outlined within the allegations. (Decl., Mark Ferrera, ¶¶ 4-10.) Cross-Defendant did not submit any substantive evidence in connection with the motion. The only declaration that was submitted simply outlined attempts in service of documents. (Decl., Abril Saglio-Ruiz.) Instead, it appears that Cross-Defendant primarily relies upon the litigation privilege of Civ. Code § 47(b). However, the litigation privilege does not bar claims for violations of debt collection laws that regulate conduct in litigation. Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc . (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 691, 706; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340. Therefore, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the allegations. Thus, Cross-Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entirety of Cross-Complaint is denied. The anti-SLAPP motion to strike the allegations noted above that do implicate protected activity is also denied. Cross-Complainant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.