Sex/Gender Discrimination in Rhode Island

Background

“The State Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) prohibits an employer from either discharging an employee or discriminating against an employee with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on that employee's sex or disability.” (See Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 20.)

“The Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) similarly provides all persons with full and equal benefit of all laws regardless of sex or disability. The terms sex and disability have the same meaning as those terms are defined in FEPA.” (See id.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“A person whose rights under the provision of subsection 42-112-1 have been violated may commence a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate priate equitable relief, and for the award of compensatory and exemplary damages.” (See id.)

Prima Facie Case

“In a gender-based disparate treatment claim based upon the three-step burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must establish the following to state a prima facie case: 

1. she is a member of a protected class;
2. she was performing her job at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job performance;
3. she suffered an adverse job action by her employer; and
4. her employer sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent qualifications."

(See Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc. (1994) 40 F.3d 11, 15; Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 21.)

“The burden of proving a prima facie case is not especially onerous. The second step requires the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action and the third step requires the employee to convince the fact-finder that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for unlawful discriminatory animus.” (See Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 21-22.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“The burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination is not especially onerous, and may even be assumed at the summary judgment stage.” (See Hicks v. Powell, C.A. No. PC 2010-4687, at *1 (R.I. Super. July 24, 2015).)

“In order for a plaintiff to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment as to a particular claim, the plaintiff must "produce evidence that would establish a prima facie case for [that] claim.” (See In re Asbestos Litigation, No. PC-13-5868, at *1 (R.I. Super. Nov. 2, 2016).)

“Conversely, summary judgment is proper where the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case.” (See id.)

“A judge's function when considering a summary judgment motion is not to cull out the weak cases from the herd of lawsuits waiting to be tried; rather, only if the case is legally dead on arrival, should the court take the drastic step of administering the last rites by granting summary judgment." (See id.)

The Court’s Decisions

It is well settled that pursuant to “Section 28-5-7.3 an unlawful employment practice has occurred if sex discrimination was a motivating factor. Even if the practice was motivated by other legitimate factors, a violation of subsection 28-5-7 has still occurred if sex discrimination is one of the motivating factors.” (See Brown University v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 95-4690 (1997), C.A. No. 95-4690, at *1 (R.I. Super. Aug. 6, 1997).)

It is also well settled that “sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, G.L. 1956 chapter 51 of title 28. The term sexual harassment means any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” (See State Dept. of Labor Training v. Rhode Island State Labor, 98-1467 (1999), C.A. No. 98-1467, at *1 (R.I. Super. Oct. 22, 1999).)