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"Generally, in order that a tenant may be able to claim an eviction because of some act of the landlord which interferes with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises, it must appear to have been the intention of the landlord, in doing the act alleged to constitute, an eviction, to deprive the tenant of his possession or permanently to interfere with his beneficial use or enjoyment of the whole or a part of the premises.” (See King v. King-McLeod-Fraser, Inc. (1964) 98 R.I. 226, 231.)
“The mere act, or default on the part of the landlord which renders the premises uninhabitable or untenantable is not sufficient if that act or default is not accompanied by an intention on the part of the landlord to affect the enjoyment of the premises demised.” (See id.)
“To prevail on a claim for constructive eviction, a tenant must show that actions performed by the landlord or someone acting in his behalf were done with the intent of depriving the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the demised premises either in whole or part.” (See Mills v. Nahabedian (2003) 824 A.2d 500, 503.)
“The landlord's interference must be of a ‘grave and permanent’ nature.” (See id.)
“It is also a general rule that in order that there be a constructive eviction, the landlord's interference with his tenant's use of the property must be of a substantial nature.” (See Frederick Realty Corp. v. General Oil Co. (1969) 105 R.I. 56, 59.)
We review "a hearing justice's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo." (See id.)
“In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, we apply the same standard as the hearing justice and, therefore, we must determine whether no genuine issue of material fact exists and [if] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (See id.)
“When making this determination [w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (See id.)
"[O]nce the moving party establishes the absence of a material factual issue, the party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to establish either by affidavit or by other means the material issue of fact to be decided." (See id.)
It is well settled that “a constructive eviction is sufficient to constitute a breach of covenant, and the lessee may after a demand, or other hostile assertion of a paramount title, yield thereto, although a constructive eviction cannot be deemed to exist without a surrender of the premises.” (See Jefferson v. Brown (1924) 46 R.I. 254, 256.)
It is also well settled that “a voluntary surrender of the possession of the land by the covenantee to the holder of the legal and paramount title, either before or after an adverse judgment, is a sufficient constructive eviction to entitle him to an action against his covenantor on the covenant of warranty.” (See Hebert v. Handy (1909) 29 R.I. 543, 548.)
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