Hostile Work Environment in Rhode Island

Background

“The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) provides broad protection against all forms of discrimination in all phases of employment.” (See Guilbeault v. Palombo, C.A. No. PC-13-2109, at *1 (R.I. Super. Mar. 31, 2017).)

"A hostile work environment claim allows an employee to recover against his or her employer [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult[] that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” (See id.)

“As such, RICRA protects plaintiffs against any discrimination which interferes with the benefits, terms, and conditions of the employment relationship-whether it takes the form of disparate impact, disparate treatment, retaliation, or harassment.” (See id.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“A hostile work environment claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to the RICRA.” (See Azar v. Town of Lincoln (2017) 173 A.3d 862, 865.)

“The State Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) prohibits an employer from either discharging an employee or discriminating against an employee with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on that employee's sex or disability.” (See Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 20.)

“A gender-based hostile work environment claim, in contrast, allows an employee to recover against his or her employer [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” (See id.)

Prima Facie Case

“The existence of a gender-based hostile work environment is determined in light of the record as a whole and with regard to the totality of circumstances.” (See id.)

“The test for determining a hostile work environment claim is whether:

1. the employee is a member of a protected class;
2. the employee was subjected to unwanted harassment;
3. that harassment was based upon his or her sex;
4. that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment;
5. that harassment was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim, in fact, did perceive it to be so; and
6. that some basis for employer liability has been established.”

(See O'Rourke v. City of Providence (2001) 235 F.3d 713, 728; Guilbeault v. Palombo, C.A. No. PC-13-2109, at *1 (R.I. Super. Mar. 31, 2017).)

“As compared to a disparate treatment claim that is subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting legal framework, a hostile work environment claim does not use the burden-shifting framework.” (See Cugini v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., C.A. No. WC-2008-0722, at *1 (R.I. Super. Apr. 28, 2020).)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice.” (See Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp. (2005) 864 A.2d 601, 604; Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 20.)

“Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (See id.)

“We will review this evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. That nonmoving party then must prove by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.” (See id.)

“Indeed, it is not uncommon for the summary judgment ax to fall upon a hostile work environment claim.” (See Cugini v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., C.A. No. WC-2008-0722, at *1 (R.I. Super. Apr. 28, 2020).)

The Court’s Decisions

It is well settled that “the hostile work environment theory is often the basis for claims of sexual harassment that affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. subsection 2000e-(2)(a)(1). The harassing conduct, however, need not be sexual in nature; [a]ny unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's gender may, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, constitute a hostile environment in violation of Title VII." (See Decamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (2005) 875 A.2d 13, 23 n.8.)

It is well settled that "consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory [time] period." See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 406 (1st Cir. 2002); Azar v. Town of Lincoln, 173 A.3d 862, 866 (R.I. 2017).