Motion-Secondary: SANDRA TIDWELL VS JACKSON TIDWELL, ETAL

CU23-04724 Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC demurs to the cause of action against it for fraudulent inducement in Plaintiff DARRELL WAYNE BROWN, SR.’s first amended complaint (“1AC”). Defendant additionally moves to strike the 1AC’s prayer for punitive damages. The core of the 1AC’s allegations is that Plaintiff purchased or leased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicle (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant’s authorized dealership that he alleges is defective due to a faulty transmission, among other things. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the faulty transmission and fraudulently concealed it from him. Plaintiff also presents causes of action against Defendant for violation of the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Act”) based on the faulty transmission and other alleged defects in the Vehicle. Notice of Tentative Ruling. Defendant’s notices of demurrer and motion do not advise the recipient that the Solano County Superior Court uses a tentative ruling system, as is required under Local Rule 3.9, subdivision (d). The court cautions Defendant to provide proper notice of the tentative ruling system in future filings. Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) Statute of Limitations. Fraud-based causes of action have a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) However, a fraud cause of action only accrues, and the matching statute of limitations thus only begins to run, upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. (Ibid.) Also, in order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised on demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough if the complaint suggests that an action merely may be barred. (E-Fab Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.) The 1AC states that “transmission defects” in the Vehicle, among other kinds, manifested “within the applicable express warranty period.” (1AC at ¶ 11.) This allegation does not establish a clear point at which Plaintiff became aware of transmission defects in the Vehicle and so does not on the face of the complaint establish a limitations bar. Plaintiff’s allegation that he took the Vehicle in for repairs on January 17, 2020 only mentions brake and seat belt concerns, with no clear link to the Vehicle’s transmission. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff’s other allegations of taking the Vehicle in for repairs state occurrence within the limitations period. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Additionally, even if the allegations were read as establishing that Plaintiff experienced some form of problem with the Vehicle’s transmission more than three years before filing his original complaint, there is nothing to establish on the face of the complaint that Plaintiff was aware at any of those times that the Vehicle had the allegedly fraudulently concealed latent transmission defect causing unsteady vehicle motions and loss of control over acceleration and deceleration as opposed to an unrelated, correctable transmission issue. (Id. at ¶ 64 [effects of allegedly concealed transmission defect].) The statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement cause of action. Fraudulent Inducement. Dhital v. Nissan North America Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (Dhital) offers instructive precedent here. In Dhital the plaintiff brought a lemon law action over his Nissan vehicle’s faulty transmission and additionally alleged fraudulent inducement. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) The trial court sustained Nissan’s demurrer on the fraudulent inducement cause of action, deciding that the economic loss rule barred the claim. (Id. at p. 835-836.) The appellate court reversed, finding both that the economic loss rule did not bar the claim and that the plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently stated fraudulent inducement (insufficiency of pleading being an alternative ground for affirming the trial court ruling that Nissan urged on appeal). (Id. at p. 845.) Fraudulent inducement is a subset of fraud and so Plaintiffs must plead the elements of fraud: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 843; Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294-295.) Fraud must always be pleaded with specificity. (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 132.) The Dhital plaintiff’s allegations included that Nissan manufactured and distributed more than 500,000 vehicles with faulty transmissions; that Nissan knew or should have known of the faults from premarket testing and consumer complaints to both the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and to Nissan itself; and that Nissan issued Technical Service Bulletins (“TSBs”) regarding the transmission problem. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833-834.) The Dhital court found all of this sufficient to state fraudulent inducement: the allegations stated that Nissan made vehicles with transmission defects, Nissan knew of the transmission defects and the hazards they posed, Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but did not disclose them to consumers, Nissan intended to conceal the information, and the plaintiff would not have bought the vehicle in question had the plaintiff known the information. (Id. at p. 844.) Allegations that the plaintiff bought the car from a Nissan dealership with a Nissan-backed warranty and that dealerships are Nissan’s agents for purposes of sale sufficed to state a buyer-seller relationship between the parties. (Ibid.) The court rebuffed Nissan’s argument that the plaintiff was not specific enough about what it should have disclosed where the plaintiff described the effects of the transmission defect and alleged that Nissan knew of these effects from premarket testing and consumer complaints. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s allegations in the 1AC align with those of the Dhital plaintiff. Plaintiff here describes the transmission defect at issue as causing “hard or harsh shifts, jerking, lurching, hesitation on acceleration, surging and/or inability to control the vehicle’s speed, acceleration, or deceleration.” (1AC at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew or should have known of the coolant system defect from pre- and post-production market testing, consumer complaints, and warranty data. (Id. at ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has issued at least eight transmission defect-related TSBs between 2014 and 2019, showing its knowledge of the problem, but never informed the consumer market. (Id. at ¶ 69, fn. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s president acknowledged the existence of the transmission defect in internal discussions in 2016 and that the defect was known internally as a “neck-snapper.” (Id. at ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant concealed information about the transmission defect that would have changed Plaintiff’s purchase decision had it been known to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 71- 72, 75.) Plaintiff alleges obtaining the Vehicle under a warranty Defendant backed, through an authorized dealership of Defendant’s. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraudulent inducement is adequately pled, per Dhital. Motion to Strike. Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a) permits a court to strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, upon a motion or in its discretion. Irrelevant matters are those not essential to the statement of a claim or defense or not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense and demands for relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice;” therefore, a motion to strike may not be based upon extrinsic evidence such as a declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action sounding in fraud, which supports imposition of punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a) [fraud as basis for punitive damages].) This is so even where he simultaneously alleges lemon law violations. (Anderson v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 946 [permitting punitive damages on fraudulent inducement claim alongside civil penalties on Song-Beverly claim].) Conclusion. Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09 Meeting ID: 160 221 0102 Passcode: 650928 One tap mobile +16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)

Case Number: 19SMCV01709 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: City National Bank v. Law Offices of Jeremy Tenser Ltd., et al. CASE NO.: 19SMCV01709 MOTION: Motion to Quash Service of Summons HEARING DATE: 7/11/2024 Legal Standard A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . . (CCP § 418.10(a).) A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process. ( Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.) [C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) [T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper but only if it complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs. ( Id . at 1441-1442.) Analysis Specially Appearing Cross-Defendants Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), RBC Bank (Georgia) N.A. (RBC Bank), David McKay (McKay) and Maria Douvas (Douvas) (together, the RBC Parties) move to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to comply with the statutory procedures for service of process with international law. Due process permits state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who have minimum contacts with the forum state. Minimum contacts means the relationship between the nonresident and the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. ( International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) The extent to which a California court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of defendant's contacts with the state. Under a general jurisdiction analysis (also called all-purpose or unlimited jurisdiction), nonresident defendants may be sued on causes of action unrelated to their activities within the state. ( Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 446-447.) General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are substantial, continuous, and systematic. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.) In such circumstances, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendants business relationship to the forum. ( Id .) The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high, [citation] and requires that the defendants contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence. ( Elkman, supra , 173 Cal.App.4th at 1315.) Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the states markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there. ( Id .) Cross-Complainant Adam Jeremy Tenser has the burden to set forth facts required for general or specific jurisdiction. As Cross-Complainant fails to oppose the motion, he does not meet this burden. Conversely, the RBC parties demonstrate that this Court lacks general jurisdiction. According to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint (SACC), RBC is a multi-national public company, traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange; and, at all times relevant is a Schedule I bank under the Bank Act of Canada, with principal offices at 200 Bay Street, South Tower, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. (SAXC ¶ 10.) RBC does not have any branches in California and is not registered to do business in California. (Richardson Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Its head office is in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. (Id.) RBC does not have branches or a corporate registered agent for service of process in California. (Id. ¶ 6; Hosp Decl. ¶ 3.) McKay is RBCs President and Chief Executive Officer and Douvas is its Chief Legal and Administrative Officer. (Douvas Decl. ¶ 1; Richardson Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) They are not domiciled in California, are not employees or officers of CNB, and are not members of CNBs board of directors. (Id.) McKay and Douvas do not have an office in California. (Id.; SAXC ¶¶ 12, 14.) RBC Bank is a separate National Banking Association organized under the laws of the United States with its principal business office in Raleigh, North Carolina. (Wren Decl., ¶ 3.) RBC Bank is also an indirect subsidiary of RBC, owned by RBC USA Holdco, which is owned by RBC Group Holdco. (Id.) RBC Bank does not have any branches in California. Day-to-day business of RBC, RBC Bank, and CNB is managed independently. (Id. ¶ 4.) Each bank also has a separate board of directors. (Wartburg Decl. ¶ 3.) In 2015, CNBs former parent company, City National Corporation, merged with RBC USA Holdco. (Richardson Decl. ¶ 5.) Upon the merger, CNB became a wholly owned subsidiary of RBC USA Holdco. (Id.) RBC USA Holdco is in turn owned by RBC Group Holdings, an LLC formed under the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Toronto, Ontario. (Id.) However, t he fact that a foreign corporation has an in-state subs idiary or affiliate does not subject the corporate parent to general jurisdiction in that state. ( Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 US 117, 136;¿see also Young v. Daimler AG¿ (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 855, 866-867 [no general jurisdiction over parent corporation even if plaintiffs reside in state, accident occurred there, the vehicle was purchased there, and vehicle was manufactured by defendant's subs idiary].) CNB retained its name, has its own officers and board of directors, maintains its own corporate books and records, and has its own offices and employees. (Wartburg Decl. ¶ 3.) Where general jurisdiction cannot be established, a court may assume specific jurisdiction over a nonresident, if the nonresident purposefully directed its activities at forum residents, or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law. ( Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235.) Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part test: (1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.¿¿( Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054 [purposeful¿availment¿exists where a defendant performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum state].) The RBC Parties lack the minimum contacts with California necessary for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Again, Cross-Complainant does not oppose and therefore fails to meet its burden. None of the allegations involve any affirmative acts by the RBC Parties that were directed or took place in California. Instead, The SACC relies on an apparent theory of vicarious liability, ratification of City National Banks conduct, which allegedly impacted all commercial banking clients. (SACC ¶ 96.) On June 19, 2015, the Law Firm applied for a business line of credit with CNB. (SAXC ¶¶ 26, 4752.) The Law Firm also applied for (and later entered into) a business overdraft line agreement with CNB on August 29, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 3335.) CNB wrongfully cancelled the Law Firms line of credit on January 25, 2019 and its overdraft line on February 19, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 3638, 72.) CNB deducted funds from the Law Firms account to satisfy an order from the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB), only to later return the funds, resulting in a state tax delinquency. (SACC ¶¶ 3641.) CNBs former outside counsel, also based in California, breached his privacy and threatened him. (Id. ¶¶ 1518, 4244.) Tenser pleads causes of action for fraud, extortion, violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), negligence, and violations of Californias Unfair Competition Law (UCL). (Id. ¶¶ 45113.) The RBC Parties allegedly authorized, fail[ed] to correct, indicate[d] a passive and indifferent attitude, and adopt[ed] CNBs fraudulent conduct as their own. (SAXC ¶¶ 69, 101, 103.) CNB parties evidence shows that there is no pervasive and continuous control over CNBs day-to-day operations. CNB retained its name, has its own officers and board of directors, maintains its own corporate books and records, and has its own offices and employees. (Wartburg Decl. ¶¶ 23.) RBC Bank is headquartered in North Carolina, not California, and lacks any subsidiary relationship with CNB. The cross-complaint does not allege any California connected conduct by McKay or Douvas in their personal or professional capacities. Therefore, personal jurisdiction is not established. As a separate basis to quash, cross-complainant fails to establish valid service on the foreign defendants. The proof of service shows that on March 8, 2024, the process server personally delivered the service documents to Raven Gero, Office of Jennifer Liu, Counsel, Royal Bank of Canada at 200 Bay Street, South Tower, 6th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5J 2J5. However, Raven Gero is not an employee of RBC Bank, is not a designated agent for service of process for RBC Bank, or an officer, general manager, or a person authorized by RBC Bank to receive service of process. (Wren Decl., ¶6.) Raven Gero is a law clerk who works at RBCs headquarters in Toronto, Canada. (Richardson Decl., ¶ 11.) Gero also is not an agent for, or authorized to accept service of process on behalf of, McKay and Douvas. Accordingly, the motion to quash is GRANTED.

Case Number: 23STCV08063 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT HICKS MEDIA, INC. a Texas Corporation, as successor to M&M MOMAR, INC., Plaintiff, vs. BIG TICKET PRODUCTIONS, INC.; PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION; CBS STUDIOS f/k/a CBS TELEVISION STUDIOS, a subsidiary of CBS ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, a division of VIACOMBCBS INC.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV08063 [PROPOSED] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Date: July 18, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendants RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Hicks Media, Inc. The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff Hicks Media, Inc., as successor to M&M Momar, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed its First Amended Complaint (the FAC) against Defendants Big Ticket Productions, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, CBS Studios f/k/a CBS Television Studios, a subsidiary of CBS Entertainment Group, a division of ViacomCBS Inc., and DOES 1-50, inclusive for: (1) Breach of Written Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Intentional Interference With Contract; and (4) Accounting. On March 19, 2024, this Court ruled on Defendants demurer to the FAC and, among other things, sustained the demurrer to the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the ground that it failed to allege the elements of a separate claim for breach of the implied covenant. Plaintiffs have now filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (the SAC). Initially, the Court notes that very few changes were made from the pleading of the fraud cause of action in the FAC to its pleading in the SAC, which is the subject of the current demurrer (the Demurrer). Those changes are as follows: 1) Footnote 2 of the SAC (incorporated into the Fraud Cause of Action of the FAC as well as the SAC by paragraph 29), which now adds to the previous footnote 2 in the FAC: Upon information and belief, Defendants delayed production of books and records and did not provide full and accurate disclosure of documents and information to ensure a good faith audit process in a prompt, timely and thorough manner. (FAC and SAC) 2) In paragraph 33 of the SAC, adds the words allocating specific costs and expenses that should not have been included to subparagraph a; 3) In subparagraph 33 b of the SAC, adds the words and/or negotiate and an apostrophe after the word Series; 4) Substitutes the words Variously underreporting or overinflating [sic] for the words Failing to substantiate the incurrence of costs and expenses before the words to Plaintiffs detriment in subparagraph 33 c; and 5) Adds the words , for example the UPN Series license that was well below industry standard, among other transactions in subparagraph 33 d. On May 10, 2024, Defendants filed the Demurrer. On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed its opposition and on July 10, 2024, Defendants filed their reply. MEET AND CONFER The Court finds that the parties sufficiently engaged in the meet and confer process. DISCUSSION The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights. ( Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿¿ A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. ( Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. ¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense. ( Id. ) The Court does not read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] ( West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken. ( Harris , supra , 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] ( Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿ A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿ Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Id. )¿¿ Demurrer to FAC Defendants demur to Plaintiffs SAC on the ground that the second cause of action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The [implied] covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract. The covenant is read into contracts and functions as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party's rights to the benefits of the contract. ( Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.) As such, A breach of the implied covenant of good faith is a breach of the contract. ( Id. ) Establishing that claim requires a showing of (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( DArrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.) Defendants argue that this claim mirrors Plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract and does not state a viable independent duty that any of the Defendants allegedly violated. Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs breach of contract claim against Defendants BTP, Paramount and CBS is premised on the general allegation that Defendants have breached the agreements by failing to pay monies due to Plaintiff. (SAC, ¶ 27.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by unfairly interfering with the Plaintiffs right to receive the benefits of their respective agreements by failing to correctly credit/allocate and negotiate certain revenues, expenses and costs, underreporting or overinflating [something, presumably costs]; and failing to accurately calculate/substantiate costs and expenses. ( Id. at ¶ 33.) As such, Defendants argue that both the breach of contract and implied covenant causes of action are based upon whether Defendants made all payments required under the terms of the M&M Agreement(s). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the ultimate facts which must be pled are set forth in jury instructions, so it is not required to plead every evidentiary fact it seeks to introduce at trial. Furthermore, Plaintiff also argues it has put Defendants on fair notice of its claims. Plaintiff also contends it has pled sufficient facts to allege Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it pled (1) the parties entered into a contract; (2) Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required to be performed by the contract in accordance with the terms of its agreement; (3) Defendants prevented Plaintiff from receiving the benefits of the contract by committing significant financial malfeasance; and (4) Plaintiff was harmed by the conduct. In addition, Plaintiff contends the acts included in this claim are distinctly different than those that would be included under a simple breach of contract cause of action because (1) the allegation that the manipulation of the financials caused a decrease in the revenue Plaintiff was entitled to is not reflected within a simple breach of contract claim and (2) Plaintiff alleges Defendants improperly categorized costs, expenses, depreciation, etc., which negatively affected Plaintiffs revenue. The Court agrees with Plaintiff only with regard to one aspect of its pleading on the Second Cause of Action of the SAC. While Paragraphs 33 a, b and c all allege matters that come within the ambit of obligations relating to a standard breach of contract action, the allegation of Paragraph 33d, relating to Defendants alleged failure to engage in arms-length transactions or otherwise avoid self-dealing when contracting with related entities, giving a specific example of such a situation, raises an issue that would not ordinarily be part of a breach of written contract claim. Such an obligation is not within the ambit of a standard breach of contract claim, but could arise from an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This allegation therefore raises an issue that gives rise to a valid cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Ladd v. Warner Bros. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4 th 1298, 1301. Therefore, the demurrer as to the second cause of action is OVERRULED. Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 18th day of March 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV02073 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 76 Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, including her husband whom she is divorcing and his attorney, have conspired to defame, stalk, eavesdrop and threaten/harass Plaintiff. The Court granted Defendants anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and Sean Collinson move for relief from the deadline to file the motion for attorney fees incurred on appeal. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and Sean Collinsons motion for relief from the deadline to file the motion for attorney fees incurred on appeal is GRANTED. The attorneys fees motion filed on May 30, 2024 is deemed to have been timely filed. ANALYSIS Motion For Relief From Deadline Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and Sean Collinson move for relief from the deadline to file the motion for attorney fees incurred on appeal. Specifically, in the event this Court deems Defendants request for attorneys fees accrued in Plaintiff Neda Heidaris (Plaintiff) second appeal, the Fee Appeal (B334160), as requested in the pending Appellate Fees Motion to be an untimely request, then Defendants (1) hereby move for relief under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d) to extend their time to bring a motion to seek appellate fees accrued in the Fee Appeal, and (2) request this Court deem their pending Appellate Fees Motion timely to the extent it seeks those fees. The grounds for this request is that there is good cause to grant Defendants an extension of time to seek fees on the Fee Appeal and good cause to deem their Appellate Fees Motion as timely filed to the extent it seeks those fees. A court may extend the time for filing an attorneys fees motion for good cause, even after the 60-day period has expired. ( Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 134-135) But the late filing of the motion for attorney fees does not mean that Association is precluded from recovering its reasonable attorney fees. Rule [*135] 3.1702(d) provides: For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees & . Rule 3.1702(d) is remedial and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation. (E.g., Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382 [109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501] [relief to be granted unless absolutely forbidden].) We reject appellant's contention that a rule 3.1702(d) extension of time must be granted before the expiration of the 60-day period. The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation of the California Rules of Court. [Citations.] Our objective is to determine the drafter's intent. ( Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 [55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 152 P.3d 1109].) If the drafters of rule 3.1702(d) intended that the extension be granted before the expiration of the 60-day period, they would have said so as they did in rule 3.1702(b)(2), which provides: The parties may, by stipulation filed before the expiration of the time allowed under (b)(1) [(the 60-day period)], extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees & . (Italics added.) Rule 3.1702(d) contains no such limitation: For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation. [I]f a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another related statute indicates an intent the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted. [Citation.] ( In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827 [46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198].) Accordingly, for good cause the trial court had the power to extend the time for filing Association's motion for attorney fees. The good cause would have been counsel's mistake of law in believing that the bankruptcy stay tolled the statutory 60-day period. The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.] Although an honest mistake of law is a valid ground for relief where a problem is complex and debatable, ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief. [Citation.] [Citation.] Thus & a mistaken but reasonable decision by [Association's] counsel that [the 60-day period was tolled by the bankruptcy stay] constitutes good cause for the trial court to permit belated [filing of the motion]. Counsel are not expected to be omniscient, as the [drafters] plainly recognized by writing the good cause exception into [rule 3.1702(d)]. ( City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 346 [85 Cal. Rptr. 149, 466 P.2d 693].) ( Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 134-135) Here, Defendants seek a one-day extension of the deadline on the ground that counsel miscalendared the due date by one day. (Motion, Page 9:10-14.) The Court finds that counsels calendaring error constitutes good cause for the requested one day extension. (See Declaration of Ryan Gordon, ¶¶ 29 34.) Plaintiffs opposition is inapposite in focusing on the memorandum of costs, not the attorneys fees motion. The motion for relief is GRANTED. The attorneys fees motion filed on May 30, 2024 is deemed to have been timely filed.

S-CV-0052440 De Lage Landen Financial Services vs. Infinity Energy No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/14/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Infinity Energy Inc.

Re: Folland v. Rogers Superior Court Case No. 21CECG01468 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: Plaintiff/Petitioner’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award Tentative Ruling: To grant, confirming the arbitration award in favor of plaintiff/petitioner in the amount of $76,265 plus $435 in costs, and $14,709.74 in prejudgment interest, for a total of $91,409.74. Plaintiff/petitioner is directed to submit a proposed judgment consistent with the court’s ruling within 7 days of the service of the minute order. Explanation: Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other person bound by the arbitration award. (Code Civ. Proc., §1285.) A petition shall: (a) set forth the substance or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate unless the petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement; (b) set forth the names of the arbitrators; and (c) set forth or have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators, if any. (Code Civ. Proc., §1285.4.) If a petition is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., §1286.) Here, the moving papers conform to the requirements set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure sections 1285 and 1285.4. In accordance with Code of Civil Procedure, section 1285, petitioner names Denna Rogers as the party to be bound by the arbitration award. A copy of the arbitration agreement is attached to the Complaint which commenced this action. (Compl., Exh. A.) Also, a copy of the arbitrators’ award is attached to the Petition. (Petn., Attachment 6C.) The Petition and Notice of Hearing were properly served on June 6, 2024 by mail. The Petition also provides that the arbitration award was served to respondent on July 7, 2022. (Petn., Item 7.) The Petition provides that the arbitration award is binding because more than 30 days have passed since notice of the award was mailed, and no party filed a rejection of the award or requested for trial. (Petn., Item 8(b).) Further, the Petition is unopposed and no evidence indicating any application has been made to correct or vacate the award, and the statutory period for making such application has now passed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1288. [“A petition to vacate an award or to correct an award shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner.”].) Thus, the Petition to confirm the arbitration award is granted. However, Plaintiff/Petitioner has calculated the prejudgment interest to the date of September 17, 2024. The court calculates the prejudgment interest to be $14,709.74.1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date) 1This figure is calculated using an interest rate of 10% per annum from the date the arbitration award became binding, August 6, 2022 (30 days following the day the award was mailed) through July 10, 2024 (the hearing date of this petition).

Case Number: 24CHCV00391 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-9-24 Case #24CHCV00391, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. vs. Contractors Wardrobe, Inc. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant Contractors Wardrobe, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint · 2 nd Cause of Action for Common Counts · 3 rd Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Motion to Strike · Request for attorneys fees and costs of suit herein incurred and according to the Agreement in Plaintiff's Prayer [p. 6:17-18 of the Complaint] · Attorneys fees [pp. 4:16, 4:25, 5:6, 5:8, and 5:13] · Request for special and consequential damages in Plaintiffs Prayer [p. 6:15] RULING : Demurrer is sustained; motion to strike is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (Plaintiff) is alleging that it entered into a written agreement with Defendant Contractors Wardrobe, Inc. (Defendant). The written agreement, titled Dedicated Contract Services Transportation Agreement, was signed on March 12, 2020. The Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs complaint. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff was to provide transportation of Defendants good throughout California for an initial term of five years, beginning on April 1, 2020. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated the Agreement on August 25, 2023, effective September 9, 2023. Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff for services provided by Plaintiff under the Agreement at the total costs of $1,448,158.87. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff $340,282.82 in unamortized start-up costs and permanent delete charges. Plaintiffs complaint, filed on February 8, 2024, alleges three causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) common counts, and (3) unjust enrichment. Defendant filed its demurrer and motion to strike on May 13, 2024. Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs Second and Third Causes of Action. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants demurrer and motion to strike on June 25, 2024. ANALYSIS A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law& ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Second Cause of Action for Common Counts Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Common Counts on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and is uncertain. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cause of action for common counts pleads four different types of common counts that should have been listed as separate causes of action. Those four distinct common counts are (1) open book account; (2) account stated; (3) goods and services rendered; and (4) money had and received. Each cause of action, count, or defense must be separate stated and given a separate number. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 2.112.) Defendant argues that the four common counts listed by Plaintiff should be distinct causes of action because they each have separate jury instructions: Money Had and Received (CACI § 370); Goods and Services Rendered (CACI § 371); Open Book Account (CACI § 372); and Account Stated (CACI § 373). Demurrers have long been sustained when separate causes of action are not listed separately. ( Haddad v. McDowell (1931) 213 Cal. 690, 692; Campbell v. Rayburn (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 232, 235 (the special demurrer was properly sustained because the complaint was defective in that two purported causes of action were not separately stated).) Plaintiffs opposition does not address Defendants arguments that the common counts should be listed separately. Instead, Plaintiff only argues that common counts are not subject to fact pleading standards. However, as Defendant argues in its reply, the case that Plaintiff cites in support of this argument sustains a demurrer to common counts for failing to comply with facts pleadings standards. ( Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460 (demurring to common counts because plaintiff failed to comply with fact pleading standards by pleading them in a conclusional fashion).) Defendants demurrer to this cause of action is sustained on the basis that the common costs listed under this cause of action should be pled as separate causes of action. Defendant also demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it improperly pleads common counts seeking the same damages as the breach of contract cause of action. Plaintiffs cannot simultaneously: (1) plead that an enforceable express contract exists; and (2) plead common counts seeking the same relief for the same alleged breach. (See Leoni v. Delany (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 (It is the unenforceability of an otherwise valid contract which gives rise to the right of relief through the medium of a common count.); Moore v. Bartholomae Corp. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 474, 477 (The law is established in California that a debt which is predicated upon the breach of the terms of an express contract cannot be the basis of an account stated.).) Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the damages sought by the common counts cause of action are the same as those caused by Defendants breach of a valid and enforceable contract. (See Comp., ¶¶ 12, 13, 18, 22, 24, 29, 31, and 33.) Two of the common counts also expressly allege that they are based on an alleged breach of contract and seek breach of contract damages. (See Comp., ¶¶ 20-21; 24-25, 27.) Plaintiffs cause of action for common counts is based on the same damages as Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of contract and is therefore improperly pled. Defendants demurrer to the second cause of action can also be sustained on this basis. Defendant also argues that the second cause of action is uncertain because Plaintiff does not plead that it is an alternative to the breach of contract cause of action and instead pleads it as its own distinct cause of action. Plaintiffs opposition argues that the common counts are pled in the alternative, but as Defendant points out in its reply, there is no language in Plaintiffs complaint indicating that the common counts are being pled as an alternative to the breach of contract cause of action. The opposition also does not explain how the common counts could be pled in the alternative. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend for the reasons given above. Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Defendant. Defendant argues that demurrer to this cause of action is appropriate because there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 785, 793 (unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action under California law).) Defendant further argues that unjust enrichment cannot stand as its own cause of action. (See Everett v. Mountains Recreation & Conservation Authority (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 541, 553.) Plaintiffs opposition does not address Defendants argument that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action in California. Plaintiff cites CACI § 375 in its opposition, but that section does not apply to the unjust enrichment that Plaintiff has pled because it involves third-party middlemen, and that section states that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action. Defendant also argues that even if there were a cause of action for unjust enrichment in California, this cause of action would also be duplicative of Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action because it requests the same damages. (See Comp., ¶ 37.) Because there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Motion to Strike A court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, [a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. Under CCP § 436(a), [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Under CCP § 436(b), the court may [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Attorney Fees Defendant has requested that Plaintiffs request for attorney fees be stricken because attorney fees are available only when provided for by contract or statute. (CCP §1021.) Plaintiffs complaint claims that it can recover attorney fees according to the Agreement, but the Agreement makes no provision for attorney fees. Plaintiff also makes this claim in its opposition, but its claim is not supported by reference to any section of the Agreement. Plaintiff does refer to Paragraph 3(a) on page 2 of the Contract, but that paragraph only mentions costs, not attorney fees. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorney fees is ordered stricken from the complaint. Special and Consequential Damages Plaintiff also requests special and consequential damages, but Defendant points out that the alleged relevant agreement expressly prohibits the parties from seeking such damages. (Wilson Decl., Ex. A, § 6(d) (in no event will either Party be liable for incidental, consequential (including lost profits and chargebacks), special, punitive or exemplary damages in connection with the goods or the services rendered hereunder even if notice was given of the possibility of such damages and even if such damages were reasonably foreseeable).) Plaintiff argues in its opposition that it does not seek damages for the goods or services rendered; rather, Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendants unilateral cancellation of the contract. However, Plaintiff does not give a basis for seeking special and consequential damages for the cancellation of the contract. Furthermore, Defendant argues in its reply that terminating the services under a service contract arises in connection with&the services rendered hereunder. Therefore, the provision cited above could, in fact, apply to this situation. Because the requested damages are based on a breach of the Agreement but the Agreement forbids recovery of such damages, Plaintiffs request for special and consequential damages is ordered stricken from the complaint. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff is given 30 days leave to amend. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Case Number: 24STCV05465 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 52 Tentative Ruling Order to Show Cause Re: Default Judgment Plaintiff KF Sunray, LLC dba Sunray Healthcare Center requests court judgment by default against defendant Francis Mejia aka Francis R. Mejia, Sr. aka Francis R. Mejia. Plaintiffs application meets all requirements for default judgment. Plaintiffs request for default judgment is granted . The court will sign the proposed judgment plaintiff submitted on form JUD-100 and will enter judgment.