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  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
						
                                

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MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS (SBN: 226906) FILED HIEU T. WILLIAMS (SBN: 280585) GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI. LLP 2928 JfiH —3 n: 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 ‘ , '. San Francisco, CA 941 1 1 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415)986~8054 MIsom@g0rd0nrees.com HWilliams(a‘gordonrees.com \OOONQUIAUJN—n Attorneys for Defendant PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP, INC. LINDBERGH PORTER (SBN: 100091) I, LITTLER MENDELSON, PC. ‘ ((4101,! 4 333 Bush Street, 34th Floor 2“? San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 433—1940 Fax N0.: (415) 3998490 1poner@1ittler.com MAIKO NAKARAI—KANIVAS (SBN: 271710) 2000 LITTLER MENDELSON, 1255 Treat Boulevard, P.C. Suite 600 [Alt 0 LLP 94111 Suite Walnut Creek, CA Telephone: (925) 94597 932-2468 9D (60mg Rees CA Fax N0.: (925) 946-9809 Street, mnakarai@littler.com & Francisco, Attorneys for Defendants Gordon Battery SUTTER HEALTH and PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION San 275 NMNNNNNNN—‘t—‘l—‘p—n—l—l—lI—l—I—l SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DIANA P. BLUM, OOQOM-bWN—‘OWOOVQUIAMN—‘O MIDI, CASE NO, 115CV277582 Plaintiff, [CONDITIONALLY UNDER SEAL] DEFENDANTS’ VS. JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 1N LIMINE SUTTER HEALTH, a California corporation: TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN, OR PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL ALTERNATIVELY, VVVVVVVVVVVVVV FOR A 402 GROUP, INC, a California corporation; HEARING PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, Trial Date: January 8, 2018 Time: 9:30 a.m. Defendants. Dept: 16 PURSUANT TO CRC 2.551(d) THESE MATERIALS WILL BE UNSEALED AFTER 10 BUSINESS DAYS, ABSENT A FILING OF A MOTION TO SEAL PURSUANT TO CRC 2.551(8) OR COURT ORDER. .1. DEFENDANTS’ .IOINT OPPOSITION T0 PLAINTIrF’s MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) b) I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 6 II. RELEVANT FACTS ............................................................................................... 6 A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Emotional Distress ................................................................ 6 Dr, Lipian’s IME and Report ............................................................................... 7 C. Dr. Lipian’s Qualifications .................................................................................. 7 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 8 A. Dr. Lipian‘s Testimony is Admissible ................................................................. 8 10 1. There is No Basis to Exclude Dr. Lipian’s Testimony ................. ...8 11 2. Regardless if Plaintiff‘s Emotional Distress is Continuing or “Garden Variety," Dr. Lipian‘s Testimony is Admissible ........................................... 10 Il 12 2000 8. Dr. Lipian’s Testimony is Far More Probative Than Prejudicial ...................... 13 94! 13 LLP Suite C. A 402 Hearing isUnnecessary and Inappropriate ............................................. 14 Rees CA 14 Street, IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 15 & 15 Francisco, Gordon Battery 16 San 275 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 .2. DEFENDANTSy JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE T0 EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) b) Cases Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 9 LII Brainard v. Corner, (1976) 59 Cal. App. 3d 790 ...................................................................................................... 13 Britt v. Superior Court, (1978) 20 Ca1.3d 844 .................................................................................................................. 7 OKDOOVO‘ Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc., (2012) 203 CalIApp.4th 49 ......................................................................................................... 9 Comer v. SClIriro, 463 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................... 9 11 Daniels v. Woodford, 12 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................... 9 2000 a. 94l1l 13 Davis v.Prison Health Servs., .4 Jm Suite 2012 US. Dist. LEXIS 61631 (ND. Cal. May 2, 2012) ............................................................ 9 3 CA 14 Z Street. Dixon v,City nfCoeur d’A/ene, 93 I: 15 Francisco, 2011 US. Dist. LEXIS 158543 (D. Idaho Apr,28, 2011) ....................................................... 11 uoh a Battery 16 Edwards v. Ayers, U 542 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................... San 9 275 17 In re Terry H., 18 40 Ca]. App. 4th 1675 (1995) ................................................................................................... 12 19 J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist, (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 323 ..................................................................................................... 9 20 Lanni v. New Jersey, 21 (D.N.J. 1998) 177 F.R.D. 295 ................................................................................................... 14 22 Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, 594 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.Pa. 1984) .............................................................................................. 14 23 Lytel v. Simpson, 24 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 53927 (ND. Cal. July 21,2006) ......................................................... 12 25 Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc, 178 Cal, App. 4th 735 (2009) ..................................................................................................... 9 26 Pascouau v. Martin Marielta Corp. 27 (D. C010. 1998) 994 F. Supp. 1276 ........................................................................................... 14 28 People v. Adan, (2000) 77 Ca1.App.4th 390 ......................................................................................................... 9 .3. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION T0 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN People v.Parker, (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 1184 .............................................................................................................. 8 People v.Stoll, (1989) 49 Ca1.3d 1136 ................................................................................................................ 8 LII-kWh) People v. Thomas, (1962) 204 Ca1.App,2d 292 ...................................................................................................... 9 People v. Visciotti, (1992) 2 Ca1.4th 1,80 ................................................................................................................ 8 Perez v. Health, No. OVOOOVG‘N 15-cv—01792-HSG (MEJ), 2016 US. Dist. LEXIS 38939 (ND. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016) 10 111111 Rund v. Charter Commune, No. S-05-0502 FCD GGH, 2007 US. Dist. LEXIS 10993 (ED. Cal. Jan, 30,2007) .............10 Smalley v, Bury, (2005) 128 Ca1.App.4th 977 .................................................................................................. 8, 9 11 Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 12 (1967, Cal App 4th Dist) 247 Cal App 2d 774 ......................................................................... 10 2000 LLP 94111 13 Strickland v. United States, Suite 115 US. App. DC. 5 (DC. Cir. 1963) ....................................................................................... 9 Rees CA 14 Street, United States v Kokoski, & 15 Francisco, 1996 US. App. LEX1S 8405 (4th Cir, 1996) ............................................................................. 9 Gordon Battery 16 United States v, O’Kemmrd, San 201 Fed Appx. 369 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................ 9 275 17 Vinson inSuperior Court, 18 (1987) 43 Ca1.3d 833 .............................................................................................................. 6, 7 19 Verse v. Sarasy, (1997) 53 Cal.App,4"‘ 998 ........................................................................................................ 13 20 Statutes 2] Code of Civil Procedure 22 Section 2032.320 .................................................................................................................. 7, 10 23 Evidence Code Section 352 ............................................................................................................................... 13 24 Evidence Code 25 Section 402 ......................................................................................................................... 14, 15 26 Evidence Code Section 720 ................................................................................................................................. 8 27 Evidence Code 28 Section 801 ................................................................................................................................. 8 .4. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN Rules California Civil Jury Instructions Number 2432 l1 ............................................................................................................................ OVJOOQQUIJBWN— 2000 94111 LLP Suite CA Rees Street, & Francisco, Gordon Battery San 275 NNNNNNNNN——~—n—-—HHH~ mflQMAmN—ONOOOQQUIAWNI— .5. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN I. INTRODUCTION While Plaintiff now attempts to downplay her emotional distress claim to avoid facing testimony from Defendants’ renowned psychiatric expert. Plaintiff‘s own testimony and claims in this matter clearly establish her allegations that Defendants‘ alleged conduct caused her to \IQMAUJN suffer severe emotional distress. Indeed, in granting Defendants” Motion for a Psychiatric _ Independent Medical Examination, this Court already detemtined that Plaintiff's mental condition is in controversy and that there was good cause to order a psychiatric examination because Plaintiff was seeking recovery for her continuing severe emotional distress, her mental condition was directly related to the emotional distress claim, and the information was necessary 10 to a fair resolution ofthe lawsuits (Vinson Superior \'. Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833.) Even if,for ll strategic reasons, Plaintiff now tries to suggest she only has “garden variety” emotional distress, 12 Dr, Lipian’s testimony is still directly relevant and should be admitted There is no reason to 2000 LLP 94111 13 exclude Dr. Lipian’s testimony and a 402 hearing is unnecessary. As such, Defendants request Suite Rees CA 14 that the Court deny Plaintiff‘s Motion in Limine Street. & 15 Francisco, I]. RELEVANT FACTS — A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Gordon Battery 16 Emotional Distress — San 275 17 Plaintiff claims that she suffers from 18 19 (See Declaration of Marcie Isom Fitzsimmons in Support of 20 Motion to Compel lME, attached as Ex. A to Declaration ofMarcie Fitzsimmons in Support of 21 Opposition to Motion for Sanctions [“Fitzsimmons Decl."].) She testified that she was 22 —<1d-> 23 (Id) Phimh‘fctaims that while she 24 25 26 27 28 _. was stillworking at the Palo Alto DEFENDANTS’ (1(1.) Foundation Medical Group (“the Physician Plaintiffdenies ever previously experiencing >6— JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTlFF‘S MOTION lN LlMINE Group”), Plaintiffsought she these types of ro EXCLUDE MARK LIPlAN 2000 £11p — (Id) ONOOONON 11 action cause Plaintiffclaims B. On psychiatric (Fitzsimmons when exists emotional Dr. Lipian’s October 26, medical that Dccl. 02) (1) the mental moving party shows “good for a mental distress. she [ME 2016, examination A still has and cause" examination her mental _ Report Defendants (Id-i for such condition filed a motion to compel (“1MB") with court is their psychiatric authorized to order examination. a mental condition ofthat party is “in controversy in (Code Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. examination Civ. where the plaintiff seeks recovery is directly related to Proc. her emotional § independent Mark Lipian. ofa party 2032.320.) to the action" and (2) the for continuing severe distress claim, the Good and LLP 94111 13 the infomtation isnecessary to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. Cal.3d (Vill.§'0]1,.&‘llp7'a, 43 at 842 Suite Rees CA 14 [citing Britt v. Superior Court. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859].) Street, & 15 Francisco, The Court granted Defendants’ motion on November 28, 2016. (Exhibit C to Gordon Battery 16 Fitzsimmons Decl.) As a result, Dr. Lipian conducted his examination of Plaintiff on February San 275 17 7 and 24, 2017. On May 16, 2017, Dr. Lipian prepared a 79-page report. (See Lipian Report, 18 Ex. F to Fitzsimmons Decl.) In preparation for drafting his report, not only did Dr. Lipian 19 conduct the IME, but he reviewed thousands of pages ofdocuments. (Id) 20 Defendants disclosed Dr. Lipian as a psychiatric expert and Plaintiff deposed him for 21 approximately one hour on June 30, 2017. (Fitzsimmons Decl. ‘1110-11,) 22 C. Dr. Lipian’s Qualifications 23 Dr. Mark Lipian isan expert in clinical and forensic psychiatry. (See Dr, Lipian’s CV, 24 attached as Ex. H to Fitzsimmons Decl.) Dr. Lipian’s credentials are beyond reproach. He has 25 testified as a psychiatric expert over 90 times. Dr. Lipian has made over 100 presentations on 26 various topics within forensic psychiatry and has over a dozen publications. He received his 27 PhD. from Yale University in 1985 and his MD. from Yale University School of Medicine in 28 1986. (See Dr. Lipian’s CV, Ex, H to Fitzsimmons Decl.) He is an Assistant Clinical Professor .7. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF‘S MOTION 1N LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LlPlAN in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at UCLA and was the Chief of Psychiatry for Forensic Outpatient Services for the Orange County Health Care Agency from 1992—2013. (1d,) 111. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. OOOONONUIADJNt—t Dr. Lipian’s Testimony is Admissible 1. There is No Basis to Exclude Dr. Lipian’s Testimony An expert’s opinion is admissible when “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact." (See People v. Stall (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1154, 265; Cal. Evid. Code § 720, 801.) Excluding relevant, non- prejudicial, non-confusing evidence merely because it hurts a party’s case is error. (Smalley v. Baty (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 977, 985.) Dr. Lipian’s testimony isbased in psychiatry and forensic psychiatry in particular, 2000 94111 subjects in which he has years ofeducational, practical, and teaching experience. (See CV, Ex. LLP Suite Rees CA H to Fitzsimmons Decl.) Dr. Lipian’s testimony and opinions are based directly on the Street, & Francisco, application to this case ofthe standard treastise in psychiatry — the DSM-V. Plaintiff does not Gordon Battery and cannot argue that Dr. Lipian’s reliance on the DSM-V, examination, and records is an San 275 inappropriate basis for expert opinion. NNNNNNNNN—l—Ii—‘I—‘I—Ih—‘D—‘p‘I—iI—I Nor can Plaintiff argue that Dr. Lipian misapplied the diagnostic criteria stated therein. Plaintiff cannot attack Dr. Lipian’s methodology of conducting an in-person examination and reviewing records of Plaintiffs medical, educational, and OO\IO\U|4>WNt-‘OVDOO\IO\UIAUJN—‘ psychiatric history. Plaintiff cannot say that there are any records Dr. Lipian should have reviewed but did not, nor that Dr. Lipian considered records that other forensic psychiatrists (or any other appropriate expert) would consider irrelevant or misleading. Plaintiff cannot say that any other forensic psychiatrist would have approached the issue differently, or conducted a different analysis. Courts have on numerous occasions accepted the testimony of forensic psychiatrists, and spoken approvingly ofits use by lower courts and counsel. (See, e,g,, People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 80-81 [permitting the defendant in a murder case to present expert testimony from a forensic psychologist]; People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 1184. 1204 [permitting testimony of -8- DEFENDANTS' JOINT Opposmor; TO PLAiMirF‘s MOTION lN LIMIN’E TO EXCLUDE MARK LlPIAN forensic psychiatrist]; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 323, 330 [permitting testimony from forensic psychologist to testify regarding the harm caused by prior molestation]; Chaaban v. Wet Seal. Inc, (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 55 [permitting forensic psychologist to teStify in employment case regarding plaintiff‘s alleged emotional distress damages]; Edwards OWOONChvl-FDJN—u v,Ayers, 542 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2008) [counsel’s reliance on report of forensic psychiatrist was reasonable in determining which defenses to present for criminal defendant]; Comer v.Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 966—967 (9th Cir. 2006) [rational for court to give heightened credence to report of forensic psychiatrist over report from witness without that training]; Daniels v. Woodfard, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) [contrasting credibility and weight ofopinions by a certified forensic psychologist and someone without that training].) In fact, Dr. Lipian’s testimony has been accepted in other cases with no such reservations as Plaintiff posits here. (See, eg, Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001); Davis v.Prison Health Servs., 2000 LLP 94111 2012 US. Dist. LEXIS 61631 (ND. Cal. May 2, 2012).) Suite Rees CA Likewise, courts have for years admitted testimony about Malingering. (See, e.g., Street, & Francisco, Smalley v.Baty (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 977 [permitting evidence of collateral payments to prove Gordon Battery Malingering]; People v. Adan (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 390 [expert testimony of Malingering San 275 permitted in workers‘ NNNNNNNNN_H__.._.._.._.._._,_ compensation fraud case]; People v. Thomas (1962) 204 Ca1.App.2d 292 [“It was. ofcourse, proper on the crossexamination of Dr. Dresser to ascertain his opinion as to whether the appellant WNQMhWNHOWmNQMhWN—d was feigning or malingering with respect to the effect of that injury."]; United States v. O’Kennard, 201 Fed, Appx. 369. 370 (7th Cir. 2006) [permitting testimony by two government experts that the plaintiff was Malingering]; United States v,Kokoskz', 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8405 (4th Cir. 1996) [approving the United States’ request to have the case reviewed by “an expert in the field ofmalingering"]; Strickland v. United States, 115 US. Appi DC. 5 (DC. Cir. 1963) [allowing psychiatric testimony that the defendant was not suffering from mental disease, but was Malingering]; see also Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 735, 740 (2009) [“Expert testimony explained that the hallmarks ofa borderline personality disorder are: recounting only the facts in favor ofthe person's story, exaggeration, denial of personal responsibility, and manipulative behaviors.”].) -9. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTlFF’S MOTION 1N LlMlNE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPlAN The “knowledge underlying" Dr. Lipian’s testimony clearly “has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.” (See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion C0. (1967, Cal App 4th Dist) 247 Cal App 2d 774 [holding that the fact an expen's opinion ison an ultimate issue to be determined by ajury is not a ground for its exclusion]t) Dr. Lipian is a psychiatrist specializing in forensic psychiatry, which includes the analysis of whether an individual is affected in a“clinically OOOOQONUIAMNw significant" way ~ meaning more than an average person would be affected - by a particular event. The extensive knowledge, training and experience underlying Dr. Lipian’s testimony thus “has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry" of Plaintiff‘s distress. While Plaintiff may not like what Dr. Lipian has to say, that is not a basis to limit or exclude the scope of or exclude Dr. Lipian’s testimony at trial. Plaintiff’s arguments about Dr. Lipian’s opinions go to the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility ofit. 2. Regardless if Plaintiff‘s Emotional Distress is Continuing or “Garden 2000 Variety,” Dr. Lipian’s Testimony is Admissible 94111 LLP Suile Rees CA Although Plaintiffappears to be vacillating in how she chooses to describe the severity of Street, & Francisco, her alleged emotional distress depending on the circumstances, what is clear is that she is seeking emotional Gordon Battery distress damages in this case and, as discussed, her allegations of emotional distress San 275 are far more than “garden variety.”I The cases that Plaintiff relies on NNNNNNNNN~—.—..—np—-————..— relate to the court's determination as to whether an M was warranted, (See e.g. Rimd v. Charter Communs., No. S~05—0502 FCD GGl-I, 2007 U.S. OONQMfiWNHONDOOflmM-hWN— Dist. LEXIS 10993, at *5 (ED. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) [holding medical examine was not appropriate]; Perez v.Health, No. lS-cv-01792—HSG (MEJ), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38939, at *8 (ND. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016) [denying medical examination].) Here, however, the court has already held that Plaintiff‘s mental condition is in “controversy in the action” and that there is “good cause" for an IME. (Code Civ. Proc. § 20321320; see Exhibit C to Fitzsimmons Decl.) Even ifPlaintiff now claims that she no longer suffers any emotional distress or that she ‘ Notably, while Plaintiffdid not disclose a psychiatric expert, she did identify psychologist Robert McIntyre. purportedly from the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”). on her witness list at trial. Because Plaintiffnever identified this witness in the course ofdiscovery it is difficult to know why she intends to call him. but presumably it is related to her emotional distress damages. . ] 0. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF‘S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE MARK LIPIAN LLP 2000 Rees & Gordon 9411] Suite CA Street. Francisco, Battery 275 San _ _ — that an emotional Defendants’ Defendants did not — suffersjust “garden variety" emotional should be admissible Interrogatories she contends