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  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
  • KHALIL MSALAM, et al  vs.  ARIA SARBELAND, et al(26) Unlimited Other Real Property document preview
						
                                

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L.M. PARMENTER, STATE BAR NO.176196 1 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 501 ‘B’ Street, Suite 200 2 San Rafael, CA 94901-3846 T: 415-738-7901 - LMPARMENTER@LAWPAR.COM 5/2/2022 3 MANUEL A. JUAREZ, STATE BAR NO.200706 4 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 2143 Cedar Street, Suite 200 5 Berkeley, CA 94709 T: 510-841-6164 - BAYLAW1@YAHOO.COM 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 KHALIL MSALAM, ET AL. 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 10 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 KHALIL MSALAM, JULNAR MSALAM, Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES JAMILAH MSALAM, GHASSAN MSALAM, 12 JAMIE MSALAM, JONATHAN MSALAM] The Hon. Robert D. Foiles ANDREW MSALAM by his Guardian ad 13 Litem Jimilah Msalam, PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS ARIA SARBELAND AND 14 Plaintiffs, MARTHA SARBELAND’S MOTION TO 🙵 vs. STRIKE PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD 15 AMENDED COMPLAINT ARIA SARBELAND, individually, in his 16 official capacity and as Trustee of the Aria [Concurrently filed with 1.] Plaintiffs’ Sarbeland Trust, the Martha Fabiola Sarbeland Opposition to Demurrer; and 17 Trust, and the Sarbeland Trust; MARTHA 2.] Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Defendants’ SARBELAND, individually, in her official Impropere Jointly Filed Demurrer and Motion to 18 capacity and as Trustee of the Aria Sarbeland Strike] Trust, the Martha Fabiola Sarbeland Trust, and 19 the Sarbeland Trust; FREDDIE A. Date: May 13, 2022 ARELLANO, JR. individually, in his official Time: 9:00 a.m. 20 capacity, and DOES 4-20 individually and in Dept.: 21 their official capacities. 21 Action Filed: May 10, 2019 Defendants. Trial Date: Not Set 22 23 24 * As set forth in the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Defendants' jointly filed Demurrer – Motion to Strike – it is 25 extremely confusing, if not impossible, for the Plaintiffs to ascertain if the Defendants are seeking to demur, or if they are 26 seeking to strike an allegation. We respectfully ask the Court that 27 any incorrect assertion made by the Plaintiffs be strictly construed against the Defendants for their having improperly jointly filed the 28 Demurrer and the Motion to Strike in one document. 1 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE 1 COUNSEL OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE PLAINTIFFS Khalil Msalam, Julnar 2 Msalam, Jamilah Msalam, Ghassan Msalam, Jamie Msalam, Jonathan Msalam, and Andrew 3 Msalam by his Guardian ad Litem Jimilah Msalam (collectively “Plaintiffs”), through their 4 attorneys of record, file their Opposition to Defendants Aria Sarbeland and Martha Sarbeland’s 5 (“Defendants”) Motion to Strike the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC” or “Complaint”). 6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer -which has been improperly filed jointly 7 with the Motion to Strike, is opposed in a concurrently filed Opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer. 8 Plaintiffs have also concurrently filed a Motion to Strike the Defendants’ improper jointly filed 9 Demurrer and Motion to Strike the TAC. 10 Plaintiffs submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ to Defendants Aria Sarbeland and Martha Sarbeland’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Third 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ Opposition is based upon this Memorandum of Points and 12 Authorities, and any further oral argument received by this Court at the hearing of this matter . 13 14 🙵 Dated this 2 nd day of May 2022. Respectfully submitted, 15 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 16 17 By: 18 L.M. Parmenter Attorney for Plaintiffs 19 KHALIL MSALAM, ET AL. 20 21 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 22 23 By: 24 Manuel A. Juarez Attorney for Plaintiffs 25 KHALIL MSALAM, ET AL. 26 27 28 2 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1 3 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................................1 4 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................2 5 A. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE IS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE 6 DENIED BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PLED IN 7 PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT ...............................................2 8 B. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 9 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED IN 10 PLAINTIFFS’ TAC .................................................................................................3 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 1. PLAINTIFFS SUFFICIENTLY PLED FACTS DEMONSTRATING PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 12 DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN DESPICABLE CONDUCT .......................4 13 2. PLAINTIFFS’ PUNITIVE DAMAGES ALLEGATIONS ALSO MEET 14 THE REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 3294 – WITHIN 🙵 15 THE LANDLORD – TENANT CONTEXT ..................................................7 16 C. ATTORNEY FEES ARE PROPERLY PLED IN THE PLAINTIFFS’ TAC .........8 17 1. PLAINTIFFS MAY ALSO SEEK ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE 18 THEORY OF A ‘TORT OF ANOTHER’ ......................................................8 19 D. THE TRUSTS NAMES IN THE PLAINTIFFS’ TAC ARE THE ALTER EGOS 20 OF THE DEFENDANTS AND MUST BE A PART OF THIS ACTION .............8 21 E. DISGORGEMENT HAS BEEN PROPERLY PLED BY THE PLAINTIFFS IN 22 THE TAC ...............................................................................................................10 23 F. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ALLEGE CLAIMS FOR PREJUDGMENT 24 INTEREST .............................................................................................................11 25 IV. IF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE TAC IS DEFECTIVE, LEAVE TO AMEND 26 SHOULD BE GRANTED. .............................................................................................11 27 V. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................12 28 i Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 CASES 3 Angie M. v. Superior Court 4 (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217 ............................................................................................... 4 5 Bank of the West v. Superior Court 6 (1992) 2 Cal. 4 th 1254 ...................................................................................................... 10 7 Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital 8 (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 1034 ............................................................................................ 5 9 First Nationwide Savings v. Perry 10 (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657 ............................................................................................. 10 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 Grieves v. Sup. Ct. PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 12 (1984) 157 CA 3d 159 ...................................................................................................... 11 13 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 14 (1981) 119 Cal. App.3d 757 .............................................................................................. 5 🙵 15 Hilliard v. AH. Robins Co. 16 (1983) 148 Cal.App.374 ..................................................................................................... 5 17 Howard v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. 18 (2010) 187 Cal 4 th 498 ..................................................................................................... 11 19 Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. 20 (1993) 1 Cal.App.4th 612 ................................................................................................... 3 21 Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries 22 (1993) 6 Cal 4th 644 ....................................................................................................... 11 23 Lectrodryer v. Seoulbank 24 (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 723 ............................................................................................... 10 25 Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. 26 (1977) 74 Cal 3d 762 ....................................................................................................... 11 27 // 28 ii Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE 1 Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments 2 (1976) 60 Cal.App. 3d 288 ................................................................................................ 7 3 Penner v. Falk 4 (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858 ................................................................................................ 3 5 People ex rel. Kennedy Beaumont Inv., Ltd. 6 (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102 ............................................................................................. 10 7 Perkins v. Superior Court 8 (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 1 ................................................................................................... 3 9 Peterson v. Superior Court 10 (1982) 31 Cal.3 d 147 ........................................................................................................ 4 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 Pistorius v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 12 (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 541 ............................................................................................... 4 13 Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division 14 (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618 ......................................................................................................... 8 🙵 15 Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Car Enterprises 16 (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 1120 ............................................................................................ 5 17 Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. 18 (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 232 ................................................................................................. 4 19 Rivera v. Sassoon 20 (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1045 ............................................................................................... 3 21 SK_F Farms v. Superior Court 22 (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902 ................................................................................................ 4 23 Smith v. David 24 (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101 ............................................................................................... 3 25 Stoiber v. Honeychuck 26 (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 ............................................................................................ 3, 7 27 // 28 iii Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE 1 Taylor v. Superior Court 2 (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5 3 Triodyne, Inc. v. Superior Court 4 (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 53…………………………………………………………………….2 5 West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. 6 (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 831 ................................................................................................ 4 7 STATUTES 8 Business and Professions Code § 17200 ................................................................................ 10 9 Business and Professions Code § 17202 ................................................................................ 10 10 Civil Code § 1941 ............................................................................................................... 3, 7 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 Civil Code § 3294 ................................................................................................................... 3 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 12 Civil Code § 3294(a) ............................................................................................................... 3 13 Civil Code § 3294(c) ............................................................................................................... 4 14 Civil Code § 3294(c)(2) .......................................................................................................... 4 🙵 15 Code of Civil Procedure § 435 ................................................................................................ 2 16 Code of Civil Procedure § 436 ................................................................................................ 2 17 Code of Civil Procedure § 437 ................................................................................................ 2 18 Code of Civil Procedure § 452. ............................................................................................... 3 19 Code of Civil Procedure § 576 .............................................................................................. 11 20 OTHER AUTHORITIES 21 Rest.3d Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ........................................................................... 10 22 FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 23 S.E.C. v. Hufman (5th Cir. 1993) 996 F.2d 800, 802 ............................................................. 10 24 U.S. v. Philip Morris USA (D.C. 2004) 310 F.Supp.2d 58 ..................................................... 10 25 TREATISES 26 Rest.3d Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 ..................................................................... 10 27 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide. Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutte r Group) 28 iv Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE 1 7:197, p.7-63 ....................................................................................................................... 3 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group), 3 3:260-3:264.5, p. 3-132.30-p.3-137 ..................................................................................... 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 12 13 14 🙵 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1 2 I. INTRODUCTION 3 Defendants Aria Sarbeland and Martha Sarbeland’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 4 motion to strike (“MTS”) lacks merit factually and legally. As set forth below, the punitive 5 damages claims, attorney’s fees claims, the prayers for prejudgment interest and 6 disgorgement, and allegations about the alter ego trusts of the Defendants, are all factually 7 supported in the TAC. Thus, Defendants’ MTS should be denied in its entirety. 8 Meet and Confer: Shortly after the filing of the TAC, an email was received from 9 Defendants’ counsel stating Defendants’ intention to move to challenge the TAC. That email 10 contained no information, case law, statutory law or argument as to why the Defendants LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ would be seeking to challenge the TAC. After very careful further review and consi deration 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES and further extensive research, an email was returned to Defendants’ counsel informing him 12 that the Plaintiffs would not be willing to amend their TAC. Contrary to Defendants’ 13 assertions in their jointly filed demurrer and MTS, there was never any refusal on the part of 14 🙵 the Plaintiffs to engage in a meet an confer process. 15 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 16 The events giving rise to this action occurred during the tenancy relationship between the 17 Plaintiffs and the Defendant landlords at 24 Ottawa Street, San Mateo, California 94401 18 (hereinafter “subject property” or “premises”). At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs were the 19 tenants of the Defendants for a period of 8 years from August 2010, until the Plaintiffs were 20 constructively evicted, on or about January 2018. Plaintiffs complied with all of their duties pursuant to law and the lease agreement – including the timely payment of rent each month to the 21 Defendants. 22 During Plaintiffs’ tenancy, Plaintiffs suffered from Defendants’ neglect, malicious 23 behavior, and reckless behavior - as it pertained to the Premises. This included, but was not 24 limited to: leaking plumbing /sewer discharge and pools of human feces below home, sewer 25 backup, constant disruptive and trespassory construction and remodeling work conducted by 26 unlicensed day laborers at the home including weekends and holidays, this, inter alia, created 27 constant toxic dust and particulates and other exposures to hazardous industrial/construction 28 1 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE materials on a constant basis, rodent infestations, nuisance, etc. All in violation of California 1 Health & Safety Code sections 17920.3 &17920.10. 2 Plaintiffs informed Defendants about the defective conditions in their dwelling and the 3 subject property as a whole and demanded that Defendant make repairs to their dwelling. Rather 4 than make the necessary repairs and correct the nuisance problems, Plaintiffs’ many complaints 5 were completely ignored, and Plaintiffs were informed to fix whatever repairs were needed at their 6 own expense which they did. 7 As way of example, Defendants demanded that Plaintiffs pay them $3,000.00 in order to 8 rectify the under the under the home human feces discharge problem. At the time, Defendant 9 Martha Sarbeland claimed she had no money and was too poor to fix up her own home. Plaintiffs 10 obliged only to have the Defendants misappropriate those funds and retain a day laborer to attempt LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ to rectify the unsafe and unhealthy matter. Defendants pocketed the money and never credited or 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES returned the Plaintiffs’ monies. Moreover, at Paragraph 22 of the lease agreement drafted by the 12 Defendants, Defendants certified to the Plaintiffs that they had full insurance to cover problems 13 such as are set forth in this action. Instead, Defendants lied for years to their carrier, the State 14 🙵 Farm Insurance Co., falsely claiming that the Defendants were the owner-occupiers of the 15 Premises when they knew they were renting the Premises to the Plaintiff family. This malicious 16 and reckless insurance fraud on the part of the Defendants, created a situation wherein if the entire 17 Msalam perished in a fire at the dwelling – there would have been no insurance coverage – but 18 there would have been full coverage for the Defendants to re-coup insurance monies for the loss of 19 the home they rented to the Plaintiffs. Further, as alleged in the TAC, had the Plaintiffs known the 20 truth of the matter, they would never have moved into the subject property. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 21 A. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE IS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE 22 DENIED BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PLED IN 23 PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 24 Sections 435 through 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure govern motions to strike. A 25 Motion to Strike may only be granted where the allegation at issue are, among other grounds, 26 “irrelevant, false or improper.” Code of Civ. Proc. § 436. Where a motion to strike is so broad as to 27 include irrelevant matters, the motion should be denied in its entirety. Triodyne, Inc. v. Superior 28 Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 536, 542. 2 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE Motions to strike are generally disfavored under California Law. See, Weil & Brown, 1 California Practice Guide. Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) 7:197, p.7-63; Code of 2 Civ. Proc.. § 452. It is public policy in California to allow disputes to be resolved on the merits, 3 and pleadings will be construed very liberally. Id. As with a demurrer, the grounds for a motion to 4 strike must appear on the face of the complaint. All allegations must be taken as true and all 5 inferences drawn in favor of Plaintiff. Id. 6 Even conclusory allegations will not be stricken where other portions of the complaint 7 contain factual allegations, which support the conclusions. See, e.g., Perkins v. Superior Court 8 (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 1, 6. “The distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not 9 at all clear and involves at most, a matter of degree.” Id. Any uncertainty or ambiguity is a matter 10 to be clarified by discovery, not through attacking the pleadings. See, e.g., Khoury v. Maly's of LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ California, Inc. (1993) 1 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES As set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ TAC sufficiently alleges facts to support claims for punitive 12 damages, request for attorneys’ fees, disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and prejudgment interest 13 against the moving Defendants 14 🙵 B. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED IN 16 PLAINTIFFS’ TAC 17 Section 3294 of the Civil Code governs when punitive damages are permitted under 18 California Law. California Law has held that a landlord may be liable for punitive damages if the 19 requirements of Civil Code section 3294 are met. See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 20 Cal.App.3d 903, 920 (- nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of Section 1941 of the Civil Code, breach of the implied warranty of habitability); Rivera v. Sassoon (1995) 39 21 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1046 (- breach of habitability); Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867 22 (- long term knowledge of dangerous condition); Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, fn. 3 23 (- plaintiffs may seek general and punitive damages for alleged tortious breach of warranty). 24 Civil Code section 3294(a) states: 25 In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising 26 from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, 27 fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example 28 and by way of punishing the defendant. (emphasis added). 3 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE This statute allows Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages if the jury determines that 1 Defendants’ conduct constitutes “oppression, fraud or malice.” Civil Code § 3294(c). The terms 2 “oppression, fraud or malice” are stated in the disjunctive (“or”) so that punitive damages are 3 allowed if any one of the three types of conduct is present. Pistorius v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 4 America (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 541, 556. 5 Under Civil Code section 3294, “malice” includes: 6 ...conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause 7 injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious 8 disregard of the rights or safety of others. (emphasis added). 9 Similarly, “oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and 10 LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” Civil Code § 3294(c)(2), (emphasis 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES added); see also Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 232, 246. 12 As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs’ TAC pleads facts that demonstrate that Defendants 13 engaged in “despicable conduct” “with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of 14 others.” 🙵 15 1. PLAINTIFFS SUFFICIENTLY PLED FACTS DEMONSTRATING 16 DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN DESPICABLE CONDUCT 17 Longstanding case law recognizes this secund category of punitive damage cases, which 18 may not involve intent to harm, but which do involve "despicable conduct" committed "with a willful and conscious disregard of” plaintiffs’ health and safety. See Peterson v. Superior Court 19 (1982) 31 Cal.3 d 147, 158-159; West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 20 831, 867-879; Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-1229. See also, Weil 21 & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group), 3:260- 22 3:264.5, p. 3-132.30-p.3-137. 23 Punitive damages may be awarded for torts, even where based on negligence, if the 24 defendant’ conduct shows a conscious disregard for the rights or safety of the plaintiff. Peterson, 25 supra, at 58-59 (emphasis added); SK_F Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 26 907; Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896. "Where non intentional torts 27 involve conduct performed without intent to harm, punitive damages may be assessed ‘when the 28 conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (emphasis added.) See, 4 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE e.g., Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 1034, 1044 (citations omitted). See 1 also, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal. App.3d 757, 811. 2 While "vile" or "contemptible" actions often justify, punitive damages, it is not required. In 3 fact, a defendant is not even required to have intended harm or have engaged in an intentional act 4 against particular victim for punitive damages to be justified. See Ramona Manor Convalescent 5 Hosp. v. Car Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 1120; Hilliard v. AH. Robins Co. (1983) 148 6 Cal.App.374, 391-392. It is sufficient that a defendant be aware that their conduct would have 7 injurious consequences to someone. See, e.g., Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp., supra; Taylor, 8 supra; Hilliard, supra. 9 Here, Defendants chose to ignore this entire category or type of conduct that has been 10 recognized to support punitive damages, which perfectly describes the case at bar as pled in LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ Plaintiffs’ TAC. Defendants’ Motion to Strike punitive damages should be denied because 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts that Defendants were aware of the harm associated with their 12 conduct and Defendants willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences in conscious 13 disregard for Plaintiffs’ health and safety. 14 🙵 Specifically, Plaintiffs pled the following in their TAC: 15 24. Defendants, and each of them, as below indicated, acted with oppression, 16 fraud and/or malice in that, among other things, they acted with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of the Plaintiffs. 17 25. Defendants, and each of them, acted with malice, oppression and/or fraud 18 in that, among other things, they acted with a willful and conscious disregard 19 for the rights and safety of the Plaintiffs despite knowing the risk of serious injury or death that could likely result from the unsafe and dangerous 20 condition of the Subject Property. 21 26. Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known that the 22 conditions at the Subject Property were a safety hazard that posed a danger to human life, including but not limited to: 23 a) Ongoing feces/sewer infestation underneath dwelling with toxic fumes 24 emanating into the Plaintiffs dwelling continuously; b) Nonfunctioning / inadequate heater at the dwelling with the Plaintiffs 25 suffering continuous frigid temperatures inside their home, especially at night; 26 c) Ongoing cockroach and ant infestations; 27 d) Water and frigid air intrusion into the dwelling: of the Plaintiffs; e) Horrific rodent infestation with dead rodent carcasses in the dwelling 28 creating nauseating odors in the Plaintiffs’ dwelling and large swarms of flies; 5 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE f) Mold and mildew infestation With associated foul smells; 1 g) Faulty plumbing and raw sewage conditions; 2 h) Harassment and trespass through constant dangerous construction work and Defendants’ constant at will entry without notice to the Plaintiffs. By 3 way of example of this abusive misconduct, on one such occasion Aria Sarbeland entered the Plaintiffs’ dwelling to find Julnar Msalam in a state of 4 undress as she had just gotten out of the shower. Based on information and 5 belief this was done to sexually harass the Plaintiff and intimidate her; i) Unsafely, recklessly and maliciously failing to warn the Plaintiffs of the 6 danger of the Defendants’ unlicensed and unpermitted day laborers/ 7 handymen, and workers they picked up off the streets to conduct work upon the Subject Property, among other dangerous conditions. 8 j) Purposefully and maliciously failing to obtain insurance for the Plaintiffs’ dwelling and maliciously lying to the Plaintiffs, the Authority, and the State 9 Farm Insurance Co., for years regarding the rental of the Subject Premises to 10 the Plaintiff Family. All done to commit fraud upon the Plaintiffs, insurance LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ fraud, tax fraud and other forms of fraud. Had the Plaintiffs been informed of 11 the truth with regards to the misrepresentation regarding insurance, they PARMENTER LAW OFFICES would never have leased the Subject Property from the Defendants. 12 k) Unsafely, recklessly and maliciously failing to remove the Plaintiffs from 13 the danger of the Defendants’ unlicensed and unpermitted day laborers/ handymen, and workers they retained off the streets to conduct work, 14 construction, remolding, etc, upon the delipidated Subject Property, among 🙵 other dangerous conditions, by failing to remove Plaintiffs to a safe place, 15 such as a hotel. 16 27. Defendants, and each of them, also had advanced knowledge that the 17 aforementioned could and/or would result in the probability of dangerous, unsafe and unhealthy conditions, which foreseeably would lead to harm 18 and/or injuries to the health and safety of the Plaintiffs. Defendants, and each 19 of them, intentionally chose not to take reasonable steps to make the Subj ect Property safe for the Plaintiffs. With respect to those Defendants who 20 presented the Subject Property as being insured, in so presenting, they engaged in fraudulent conduct intended to deceive the Plaintiffs and others 21 by misrepresenting and concealing the dangerous conditions of the Subject 22 Property and the fact that there was no insurance coverage for the Plaintiffs for the acts and omissions of the Defendants. 23 24 28. Defendants, by themselves and/or through their employees and/or agents, acted with malice in that their despicable conduct which was carried on with 25 a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of the Plaintiffs. The term “malice” includes conduct evincing a conscious disregard of the 26 probability that the Defendants’ conduct will result in injury to others. See 27 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757. Defendants’ conduct was so vile, base or contemptible that it would be looked down on 28 and despised by reasonable people. 6 Case No.: 19-CIV-02602 PLAINTIFFS’ O PPOSITION TO D EFENDANTS’ MOTION TO S TRIKE These excerpts are just some examples of facts Plaintiffs have alleged demonstrating that 1 Defendant had knowledge that their tenants, the Msalam family (Plaintiffs), was living on a 2 property with serious substandard conditions and that these substandard conditions existed for 3 several years without any remediating efforts made by Defendants. Ultimately the Plaintiffs were 4 constructively evicted from the Premises due to these ongoing unsafe and unhealthy conditions 5 and constant disruptive behavior. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages were in fact caused 6 by substandard conditions (i.e., feces under the home, rodents, mold, construction debris and dust, 7 ongoing nuisance of construction). A jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants acted 8 despicably and with conscious disregard for Plaintiffs’ health and safety refusing to fix and or stop 9 the dilapidated conditions for several years. Whether the Defendants agree that such facts will 10 persuade a trier of fact that Defendants’ conduct warrants punitive damages is beyond the scope of LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL A. JUAREZ this pleading stage. 11 PARMENTER LAW OFFICES 2. PLAINTIFFS’ PUNITIVE DAMAGES ALLEGATIONS ALSO MEET 12 THE REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 3294 – WITHIN 13 THE LANDLORD – TENANT CONTEXT 14 🙵 Not only do Plaintiffs’ punitive damage allegations meet Civil Code section 3294, but there 15 is specific case law affirming the applicability of punitive damages in the landlord-tenant context 16 analogous to the case at bar. 17 In Stoiber, the Court found the allegations that the landlord “had actual knowledge of 18 defective conditions in the premises including... unsafe and dangerous conditions” were sufficient 19 to allow a plaintiff to plead punitive damages. Stoiber at 920. Stoiber is particularly instructive in 20 this case, as it deals with Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, violation of Section 1941 of the Civil Code, and Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, which are three (3) of the 21 causes of action alleged in Plaintiffs’ TAC. 22 Further, Stoiber affirmed that: “Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) 23 abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest... ” Id. at 921 24 (- quoting Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288, 297). Here, Defendants 25 were in a position of power as the landlords-owners, managing and controlling the 26 place that Plaintiff called home fo