Gonzalez-V-Omni Seals Inc. Et Al. Print

Case Number: 23STCV31555 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Case Name: Jose Meza Torres v. CBW Doors Inc. , et al . Case No.: 23STCV31555 Motion: OSC re: Entry of Default Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff Jose Meza Torres Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Background This is an action arising from alleged wrongful actions taken against Plaintiff Jose Meza Torres (Plaintiff) pertaining to his employment with Defendant CBW Doors, Inc. (Defendant). On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging 10 causes of action for, among other causes of action, failure to accommodate, failure to pay wages, and waiting time penalties. On April 18, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a default judgment application in which Plaintiff seeks the entry of default judgment against Defendant. Also, on such date, Does 1 to 100 were dismissed from this action without prejudice. Legal Standard California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 sets forth the requirements for default judgments. In pertinent part, the rule dictates that a party must use form CIV-100 and file the following documents with the clerk: (1) except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3)¿interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5)¿a declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8)¿exhibits as necessary; and (9)¿a request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1800(a)(1)-(9).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 in order to obtain entry of default judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff has failed to file a Request for Court Judgment form (CIV-100). Plaintiff has also failed to substantiate the requested damages of $183,190.00 as no exhibits are attached to the declaration of Plaintiff. In fact, no exhibits were filed in support of the default judgment application. Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided a signed memorandum of costs and disbursements although Plaintiff is seeking costs. Moreover, the Court notes that there was no proof of service filed showing that Defendant was served with the default judgment application or Plaintiffs notice of intent to obtain punitive damages. As such, Plaintiffs default judgment application is deficient. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs default judgment application is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Case Number: 23SMCV05278 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE ORDER Defendant The Belvedere Hotel Partnership dba Peninsula Beverly Hillss Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration. Defendant The Belvedere Hotel Partnership dba Peninsula Beverly Hills to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff William Prather (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the case Alberto v. Cambrian Home Care (2013) 91 Cal.App.5th 482. The Court need not take judicial notice of this published case, but in any event, Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (a). Analysis Defendant The Belvedere Hotel Partnership dba Peninsula Beverly Hills (Defendant) moves to compel Plaintiff to submit to arbitration on the ground that the parties have an agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant, but Plaintiff has refused to submit to arbitration. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that Defendant has not made a demand for arbitration, certain claims cannot be arbitrated, and the agreement is unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy and unconscionable. The Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition memorandum exceeds the page limit set forth in rule 3.1113(d) of the California Rules of Court, as Plaintiffs opposition is 17 pages long, while the limit is 15 pages, and Plaintiff failed to seek leave of court to file a longer memorandum. The Court exercises its discretion to consider the entirety of the memorandum in the interest of judicial efficiency, but Plaintiffs counsel is advised to familiarize himself with the formatting requirements set forth in the California Rules of Court. [I]n considering a . . . petition to compel arbitration, a trial court must make the preliminary determinations whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and whether the petitioner is a party to that agreement (or can otherwise enforce the agreement). (M & M Foods, Inc. v. Pac. Am. Fish Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 554, 559; see also Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 (Giuliano) [petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence].) In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine whether plaintiffs claims are covered by the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, a defense to enforcement of the agreement. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 states, A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides, in relevant part: On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement. (c) A party to the arbitration is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party . . . . The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. (Engrs & Architects Assn v. Cmty. Dev. Dept (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) General principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632, 640-641 [The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate involves general contract principles].) On August 18, 2021, Plaintiffs first day of employment with Defendant as a Food and Beverage Manager, Plaintiff entered into a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate along with signing other onboarding documents. (Mot., Kupka Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) The arbitration agreement provides that Plaintiff agreed to submit all claims arising from any [employment related] differences to the arbitration procedures described in the agreement entered into by and between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Ibid.) The agreement sets forth the terms of arbitration and clearly states that Plaintiff was giving up the right to a jury trial. (Ibid.) The agreement is a four-page document signed by both Plaintiff and the Human Resources coordinator for Defendant as Defendants authorized representative, and the agreement is said to be between Plaintiff and The Peninsula Beverly Hills and related companies and/or entities. (Ibid.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed this agreement. It follows that Defendant has met its burden of showing an arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not made a demand for arbitration as required for an arbitration agreement to be enforced. Plaintiff provides only an unsworn, conclusory statement to this effect, while Defendant has provided evidence with the motion showing that on December 14, 2023, defense counsel sent a written demand for arbitration by email to Plaintiffs counsel. (Mot., Rosen Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Thus, this argument is unavailing. Plaintiff also argues that state law governs the arbitration agreement because Plaintiff is a California resident, Defendant is a California company, and Defendant has provided no evidence to show the employment relationship involved interstate commerce. First, Plaintiff again provides only a conclusory statement to this effect, but more importantly, Defendant need not make such a showing when the parties agreement that the Federal Arbitration Act governed enforcement of the agreement in paragraph 6 of the agreement. (Mot., Kupka Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) [T]he presence of interstate commerce is not the only manner under which the FAA may apply; the parties may also voluntarily elect to have the [Federal Arbitration Act] govern enforcement of the Agreement, as they did here. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) This argument, too, does not compel a finding that the action should not be submitted to arbitration, i.e., Plaintiffs argument that certain claims are not subject to arbitration under state law is unconvincing when Plaintiff agreed in the arbitration agreement that the agreement is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. Plaintiff also makes several arguments that the agreement is unconscionable. Notably, the arguments largely consist of a recitation of boilerplate law followed by a conclusory statement that the agreement is unconscionable in that regard, which provides the Court with little basis to agree with Plaintiff. Nonetheless, each of Plaintiffs arguments is unpersuasive. It is axiomatic that a party opposing the petition [to compel arbitration] bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the courts discretion, to reach a final determination. (Giuliano, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Courts analyze the unconscionability standard in Civil Code section 1670.5 as invoking elements of procedural and substantive unconscionability. (McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 76, 87 (McManus).) The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on whether the contract is one of adhesion and whether there is oppression arising from an inequality of bargaining power or surprise arising from buried terms in a complex printed form. (Ibid., quotation marks omitted.) The substantive element addresses the existence of overly harsh or one-sided terms. (Ibid.) An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both the procedural and substantive elements are satisfied. (Ibid.) Procedural unconscionability pertains to the making of the agreement; it focuses on the oppression that arises from unequal bargaining power and the surprise to the weaker party that results from hidden terms or the lack of informed choice. (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795.) An arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable where the provision does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or adhering party, is unduly oppressive, or has overly harsh or one-sided terms. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113-114 (Armendariz); McManus, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) An arbitration agreement is lawful if it (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require [the assenting party] to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 102, quotation marks omitted.) First, presentation of an arbitration agreement on a take it or leave it basis, even in an employment onboarding context, does not automatically render the agreement procedurally unconscionable; Plaintiff must also show that there was no opportunity for meaningful negotiation or that he was subjected to oppressive tactics that forced him to sign the agreement. (See Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127 [a compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a take it or leave it basis].) Notably, Plaintiff makes no argument that he was not given the agreement to review and study before signing, and there is no evidence that anyone exerted pressure on him to sign it. Further, the agreement is a relatively short proposal, only four pages in length, in a normal sized typeface, with a heading making clear that the agreement was one to arbitrate claims. Plaintiff argues that because the arbitration agreement provides for an arbitrator from the AAA Employment Dispute Panel in Los Angeles, he has been denied a neutral arbitrator. He provides no legal authority to support his conclusion that this requirement of selection from a specific panel denies him a neutral arbitrator, and the Court has no reason to conclude he will be so denied. Plaintiff also argues that a waiver of representative actions impacts his potential relief, but the agreement only precludes bringing a class action or private attorney general claim, not that certain forms of relief will not be permitted; rather, the agreement allows the arbitrator to award the parties any remedy that would have been available had the action been litigated in court. (Mot., Kupka Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 7, 10.) Plaintiffs reliance on Alberto v. Cambrian Home Care (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 493-494, is also misplaced, as that case concerned a separate agreement with a prohibition of discussing wages, which is not present here, and the Court does not find a prohibition from disclosing personnel data of the hotel to be analogous to a prohibition of discussing wages. Plaintiff further contends that the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy and voidable pursuant to Labor Code section 925. Labor Code section 925 provides as follows: (a) An employer shall not require an employee who primarily resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a provision that would do either of the following: (1) Require the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California. (2) Deprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California. (b) Any provision of a contract that violates subdivision (a) is voidable by the employee, and if a provision is rendered void at the request of the employee, the matter shall be adjudicated in California and California law shall govern the dispute. The agreement does not compel a party to submit to any laws other than those of California, or to adjudicate the claims outside of California, and the arbitrator is permitted to award any remedy as discussed above. Defendant also states it is willing to submit to the application of the California Evidence Code to the arbitration proceedings. (Reply, p. 6, ll. 7-9.) Insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the class waiver, choice of arbitrator procedure, and jury waiver, case law has established that representative actions may be required to be submitted to arbitration (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 662-663), but the Court notes that Plaintiffs complaint does not include any statements that it is brought in a representative or private attorney general manner. For these reasons, Defendant The Belvedere Hotel Partnership dba Peninsula Beverly Hillss Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration.

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, line 3, PLAINTIFF JULIA MALDONADO Motion To Compel Further Responses To Form Interrogatories Employment-Law, Set One, To Defendant Delta Dental Of California Pro Tem Judge Scott Borrowman, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: Motion to compel GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Section 1(c) of the Instructions to Form Interrogatories makes clear that an answering party retains the right to make any objection to form interrogatories. Considering the proffer on the scope of Defendant's operations in California, the objection based on scope is sustained. However, Defendant must still answer the interrogatory to the extent possible - including the extent to which it does not object. CCP 2030.220(b). Thus, Defendant must provide complete information for those actions to which it does not object. If Plaintiff remains unsatisfied with the response, Plaintiff may meet and confer and then file another motion to compel. Any such motion after amendment will allow the Court to evaluate whether the limited response is sufficient. Sanctions DENIED. Further meet and confer could have resolved this dispute. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to sborrowman@gmail.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. = (302/JPT)

Case Number: 23STCV30324 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 49 Michelle Ceja, et al. v. On-Line Power, Incorporated, et al. (1) DEFENDANT ON-LINE POWER, INCORPORATEDS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (2) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant On-Line Power, Incorporated RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Michelle Ceja and Mayra Flores STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: Plaintiffs Michelle Ceja and Mayra Flores allege they were constructively discharged from their employment with Defendant On-Line Power, Incorporated, after complaining of harassment from a coworker, Defendant Octavio Reyes. Defendant On-Line Power now demurrers to the Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action in the First Amended Complaint and moves to strike portions therein. Plaintiffs opposed both motions. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Demurrer to the FAC is OVERRULED. Defendants Motion to Strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file an Answer to the FAC within 21-days of this Ruling. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. DISCUSSION: Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint I. Meet and Confer The Declaration of Attorney Ali Shalchi reflects that the meet and confer obligation was satisfied. (CCP § 430.41.) II. Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) III. Analysis Defendant On-Line Power demurrers to the Seventh Cause of Action for Battery and the Eighth Cause of Action for Assault. Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs have failed to identify the alleged tortfeasor that committed the battery against Plaintiff Flores. Not so. Plaintiff Flores alleges that Defendant Octavio Reyes followed her into a workplace restroom and grabbed her shoulders forcefully, pushed her against the sink, and demanded that she kiss him. As she told him to stop, he began kissing her on the forehead and on both cheeks. (FAC ¶¶ 25.) Defendant then argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting that Defendant On-Line is vicariously liable for the tort of its employee, Defendant Reyes, or that Defendant ratified Reyes conduct. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. [Citation.] (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991), 54 Cal. 3d 202, 208). A risk arises out of the employment when in the context of the particular enterprise an employees conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business. [Citations.] In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. [Citation.] (Id., citing Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.3d at p. 968). Even tortious conduct that violates an employees official duties, does not benefit the employer, and is willful or malicious in nature may be within the scope of employment. (Id.) Relatedly, [a]n employer may be liable for an employee's act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort. [Citations.] The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification. [Citation.] The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery. [Citations.] Whether an employer has ratified an employee's conduct is generally a factual question. [Citation.] (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2012) 212 Cal. App. 4th 258, 272). Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Reyes, an employee of Defendant On-Line Power, assaulted or battered Plaintiff Flores at work. (FAC ¶¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Reyes was an employee and supervisor at On-Line Power at the time of [Plaintiffs] employment. (Id. ¶ 15.) After Defendant Reyes alleged assault on Plaintiff Flores, Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Flores promptly notified ON-LINE POWERs Supervisor Jose Zamora of the assault, who said he would talk to REYES and investigate the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 28.) Plaintiffs also allege Plaintiff Flores reported the incident to Supervisor Ben Cortez, who then referred FLORES to Human Resources and reassured her the incident was being investigated. (Id. ¶ 29.) For a brief time, Defendant Reyes was sent home. (Id. ¶ 30.) Two or three weeks later, however, Defendant Reyes returned to work under a signed contract. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) Thus, for pleadings purposes, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Reyes assaulted and/or battered Plaintiff Flores, and that Defendant On-Line power subsequently ratified that misconduct by permitting Defendant Reyes to return to work. (See Ventura, supra, 212 Cal. App. 4th at 272 [The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification].) The court need not determine at this time whether Defendant On-Line Power is vicariously liable for the acts of Defendant Reyes. Finally, Defendant argues the FAC is uncertain because it lumps the Defendants together and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs. But when considering the FAC liberally and in context, Defendants concerns are overblown. (Taylor, supra, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1228.) The ultimate facts against the Defendants supporting liability are clear form the pleading. Moreover, [d]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are strictly construed because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery. (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125.) Therefore, the demurrer for uncertainty fails. Accordingly, Defendants Demurrer to the FAC is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendant also moves to strike portions of the FAC pertaining to a request for punitive damages. (See Notice of Motion, p. 2 & 3.) Defendant argues Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Civil Code § 3294 provides that [i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. As defined in § 3294(c): (1) Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) Oppression means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (3) Fraud means that a defendant intentionally misrepresented or concealed a material fact and did so intended to harm a plaintiff. When the defendant is a corporation, [a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation. [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123, 164.) Here, considering the allegations discussed more fully in the demurrerand accepting them as truePlaintiffs have alleged sufficient or specific facts of fraud, oppression, or malice. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Reyes, an employee of Defendant On-Line, assaulted and battered Plaintiff Flores in workplace restroom. (FAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs go on to allege that Abbie Gougerchian, owner of Defendant On-Line, was aware of Defendant Reyes alleged pattern of sexual harassment. (Id. ¶ 33.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged that Gougerchian, apparently an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant On-Line, ratified Defendant Reyes misconduct by keeping him employed despite knowledge of his misconduct. If true and proven at trial, these facts could support an award of punitive damages against the entity Defendant. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file an Answer to the FAC within 21-days of this Ruling. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 15, 2024 ___________________________________ Randolph M. Hammock Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept49@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

CHIFFER VS WILLDAN CVRI2204377 FINAL APPROVAL FINANCIAL SERVICES Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling issued. Appearances requested.

Case Number: 23STCV14103 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 STEPHANIE D. GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. THE LEGACY LAWYERS, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.: 23STCV14103 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: plaintiffs motion to compel compliance BACKGROUND On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff Stephanie D. Gonzalez filed this action against Defendant The Legacy Lawyers, A Professional Law Corporation, asserting causes of action for: (1) Labor Code retaliation; (2) FEHA retaliation; (3) discrimination; (4) harassment; (5) failure to prevent; (6) violation of equal pay; and (7) constructive discharge. The action stems from Plaintiffs assertion that she was paid less than her male coworkers. Plaintiff alleges that after she complained about the disparity, Defendant began retaliating against her. Plaintiff alleges that the working conditions became so intolerable that she was forced to resign. On June 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel compliance with requests for production. Defendant filed its opposition on June 26, 2024. Plaintiff filed her reply on July 2, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling . . . thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that partys statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320(a).) DISCUSSION The instant motion concerns RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93, which sought production of metadata related to certain key documents in the case: a coaching memo issued to Plaintiff; and two policies regarding job requirements and pay structure. (Demerjian Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant responded to these requests by agreeing to produce responsive documents. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The discovery was propounded back in August 2023, and Defendant served its responses in October 2023. ( Id. , ¶¶ 4-5.) To date, Defendant has not produced the metadata requested by RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93. ( Id. , ¶ 10.) It is undisputed that Defendant agreed in its responses to produce the subject metadata. It is further undisputed that Defendant has not in fact produced the subject metadata in the eight months since it served its responses. Thus, Defendant has fail[ed] to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with [its] statement of compliance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320(a).) Accordingly, an order compelling production is warranted. Defendant avers that it has not typically used metadata in its documents and therefore is unfamiliar with how to secure, save, and produce metadata. (Underwood Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant believes that it will have to engage an IT expert in order to properly extract the metadata. ( Id. , ¶ 13.) Defendant also had to focus its efforts on an insurance coverage issue related to the case that recently arose. ( Id. , ¶¶ 9-11.) However, this does not justify the eight-month delay since Defendant first served its responses promising to produce the metadata. It is unclear why Defendant only realized now that it needs to retain an IT expert to assist with extracting the metadata, when the discovery was served back in August 2023. Furthermore, Plaintiff offered to accept the original native files and then have her own expert extract the metadata, thus obviating the need for Defendant to retain an IT expert. (Demerjian Reply Decl., Ex. 2.) Defendants compliance and cooperation on other discovery matters does not excuse its conduct with regards to the RFPs at issue in this motion. The insurance issue has no bearing on Plaintiffs right to obtain discovery. Thus, Defendant has failed to articulate substantial justification for its failure to produce documents. Sanctions are warranted, albeit in a reduced amount. An hourly rate of $750 is not warranted for this type of motion, nor are the 7 hours claimed. (See Demerjian Decl. ¶ 12.) The Court instead awards $1,600 for 4 hours at a rate of $400. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion to compel compliance is GRANTED. Defendant shall produce documents responsive to RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93 within 15 days of this order. The Court sanctions Defendant and its counsel in the total amount of $1,600, to be paid within 30 days of this order.

Case Number: 21STCV22368 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING THEODORE FAYE , vs. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Case No.: 21STCV22368 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Plaintiff Theodore Fayes motion for attorneys fees is granted in the total reduced amount of $1,269,893.26, comprised of $1,196.687.50 in attorneys fees and $73,205.76 in costs. Plaintiff Theodore Faye (Faye) (Plaintiff) moves for an order awarding him attorneys fees in the total amount of $2,100,268.14, plus 7% interest from the date of judgment, comprised of (1) the lodestar amount of $1,161,647.50 for 1592 hours incurred; (2) a multiplier of 1.75; and (3) costs in the amount of $67,385.91. (Notice of Motion Fees, pgs. i-ii; C.C.P. § 1021.5; Govt. Code §12965(b).) Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs 7/1/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Jack M. Schuler (Schuler) are sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiffs 7/1/24 request for judicial notice of (1) The December 22, 2020, United States District Court Northern District of California Order on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress, (N.D. Cal., Dec. 22, 2020, No. 16-cv-00236- WHO); and (2) The April 7, 2011, United States District Court Northern District of California Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs in Stonebrae, L.P. v. Toll Bros., Inc . (N.D. Cal., Apr. 7, 2011, No. C-08-0221 EMC), at *23 affd 521 Fed.Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2013) is denied as not relevant. Background This is a FEHA case involving claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and failure to engage in the interactive process, violations of the Labor Code, interference with the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and a cause of action under PAGA (C.C.P. §1021.5). This matter came on regularly for a jury trial from February 5, 2024, to February 20, 2024. On February 20, 2024, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him $915,281.00 in damages. Judgment was entered on March 20, 2024. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed his memorandum of costs. On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended memorandum of costs. On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys fees. Defendant filed its opposition on June 25, 2024. Plaintiff filed his reply on July 1, 2024. Discussion FEHA provides that the court, in its discretion may award to the prevailing party. . . reasonable attorney fees. (Govt. Code §12965(c)(6).) Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party because he prevailed on his FEHA causes of action. Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in its opposition, rather Defendant argues an award of attorneys fees under FEHA is discretionary, not mandatory, and Plaintiffs requested fees should be reduced because Plaintiffs counsel did not meet its burden of establishing the reasonability of fees requested. For the purpose of this motion, Plaintiff is regarded as the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Government Code §12965(c)(6). Reasonable Fees To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiffs counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.) The attorneys of Horton Law Firm, APC, declare the following hourly rates: (a) Laura L. Horton ($950 per hour); (b) Flor C. Dery ($525 per hour); and (c) Meriah Prendergast (paralegal, $125 per hour). (Decl. of Horton ¶¶29-30; Decl. of Dery ¶13.) These rates are appropriate given the attorneys relative experiences and qualifications. ( See id. ) Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated his counsels hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law. Defendant challenges Plaintiffs counsels hourly rates as unreasonable but Defendants argument is unavailing. (Opposition, pgs. 12-17.) The Court finds Plaintiffs counsels rates to be reasonable in their community of practice and do not warrant reductions. Billed Hours The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) The courts discretion in awarding attorney fees is, initially (absent circumstances rendering the award unjust), to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client. The basis for the trial courts calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. [Citation.] Then the court must adjust the resulting fee to fulfill the statutory purpose of bringing the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights . . . into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-service basis. ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) Plaintiffs counsels fee recovery is based on 1,592 hours spent litigating this case ($1,161,647.50). (Decl. of Horsford ¶¶19-20, Exhs. B, C.) Plaintiffs counsel declares the following hours incurred: (a) Laura L. Horton (773.1 hours or $734,445.00); (b) Flor C. Dery (812.1 hours or $426,352.50); and (c) Mariah Prendergast (6.8 hours or $850.00). (Decl. of Horsford ¶20, Exh. C.) Defendant argues Plaintiffs counsels billed hours were not reasonably incurred because they were double-billed and inflated. (Opposition, pgs. 9-12.) Defendants objections to Plaintiffs counsels billed hours are not well taken. Defendants argument that the work performed by two attorneys at trial, depositions, or hearing was duplicative or unreasonable is unsupported by case law. ( See Margolin v. Regional Planning Commission (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1007.) To show unreasonable duplication, fee opponents must provide specific evidence that plaintiffs hours were duplicative or inefficient; generalized objections that the work is excessive or duplicative do not satisfy that burden. ( Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 684.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees is granted in the amount of $1,196,687.50. Final Lodestar Determination The Court denies Plaintiffs request for lodestar multiplier of 1.75. Plaintiffs counsels rates already take into account the risks associated with contingent risk and the preclusion of other work, and the instant case did not pose exceptional difficulty compared to similar FEHA litigation brought before this Court. Costs Any effort to tax or strike costs must occur in the form of a motion to strike or to tax costs and must be served and filed fifteen (15) days after service of the cost memorandum. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) After the 15-day deadline to file a motion to tax costs has passed, the Court clerk must immediately enter the costs. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).) Plaintiff submitted his cost memorandum on March 27, 2024, and then filed an amended memorandum of costs on April 16, 2024. Defendant failed to submit a motion to tax costs within the 15-day deadline. Therefore, Defendants objections to Plaintiffs costs must be denied. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).) Plaintiff requests an additional $5,820.75 that was not included in the amended memorandum of costs for expert fees incurred by Richard M. Pearl in support of the instant motion. ( See Supp.-Decl. of Horsford ¶8, Exh. D.) Such fees are also recoverable by Plaintiff as expert fees. (Gov. Code §12965(c)(6).) Accordingly, Plaintiffs costs are granted in the total amount of $73,205.76, comprised of $67,385.01 in the amended memorandum of costs and $5,820.75 in expert fees incurred on the instant motion. Conclusion Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees and costs is granted in the reduced total of $ 1,269,893.26 , comprised of $1,196.687.50 in attorneys fees and $73,205.76 in costs. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV34394 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: T 22STCV34394 JUAN DE LOS SANTOS VILLABA vs T&R PAINTING & DRYWALL [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Defendant T&R Painting & Drywalls Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant is to answer within 20 days. Introduction Defendant T&R Painting and Drywall (Defendant) demurred to Plaintiff Juan De Los Santos Villabas (Plaintiff) Third Amended Complaint (TAC). The demurrer placed into issue the single cause of action (COA) for violations of Labor Code sections and other provisions of the California Labor Code. Discussion Defendant argues that the TAC failed to allege supportive facts to support the alleged violations of the Labor Code and California Code of Regulations. It asserts that there are no factual allegations actually pled and only legal conclusions. Plaintiff states he added sufficient facts in Paragraphs 22, 30, 34, 36, 40, 42, and 46 of the TAC. These include non-compliance with pay practices, overtime compensation violations, untimely wage payments, faulty pay policies, reimbursement failures, inaccurate wage statements, and record-keeping violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to conform their pay practices to legal requirements by not compensating Aggrieved Employees for all hours worked, including those under their control or permitted to work. (Compl. ¶ 22.) They did not fully compensate Aggrieved Employees for overtime, despite these employees working hours that entitled them to such compensation. (Compl. ¶ 30.), Defendants failed to timely pay Aggrieved Employees within seven days after the close of the payroll, violating Labor Code section 204. (Compl. ¶ 34.) They did not compensate former employees for all hours worked at the correct rate and failed to pay due sums within seventy-two hours of termination, as required. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Defendants did not fully reimburse Aggrieved Employees for necessary job-related expenses, including personal cell phone costs and mileage, violating Labor Code section 2802. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Due to improper payments, the wage statements issued by Defendants did not reflect the correct gross wages, total hours worked, net wages earned, or applicable hourly rates, violating Labor Code section 226. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements and did not keep accurate records of the total hours worked by employees, leading to penalties under Labor Code section 226.3. (Compl. ¶ 46.) The Court finds these to be sufficient factual allegations to support Plaintiffs PAGA claim. The demurrer to the TAC is OVERRULED, WITH 20 DAYS TO ANSWER. IT IS SO ORDERED, Clerk TO GIVE NOTICE.