Directors Guild Of America Inc Vs Hopes Wish Production Llc

Case Number: 23STCV30963 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Frazier, et al. v. Roberta Stephens Villas Preservation, L.P., et al. Case No.: 23STCV30963 Matter: Demurrer; Motion to Strike Moving Party: Defendants Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, Inc. and Roberta Stephans Villas Preservation, L.P. Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend. The Motion to Strike is denied as moot. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a landlord-tenant matter, and the Complaint was filed on December 18, 2023. Defendants Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, Inc. and Roberta Stephans Villas Preservation, L.P. now demur to the entirety of the Complaint for uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts. Because there is no opposition, the Complaint is deemed abandoned. ( Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) The Demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend. Given the ruling on the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is denied as moot. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 23STCV10200 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 26, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV10200 MOTION Motion to Continue Trial MOVING PARTIES Defendant Uber Technologies OPPOSING PARTY MOTION Defendant Uber Technologies (Defendant) moves to continue trial. No opposition has been filed. BACKGROUND This case involves a motor vehicle accident. The complaint was filed on May 8, 2023. Defendants answer was filed on May 13, 2024. ANALYSIS Legal Standard Continuances are granted only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring a continuance. ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) A trial court has broad discretion in considering a request for a trial continuance. ( Pham v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 11, 13-18.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 sets forth factors for the Court to consider in ruling on a motion to continue trial. To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) A party seeking a continuance of the date set for trial, whether contested or uncontested or stipulated to by the parties, must make the request for a continuance by a noticed motion or an ex parte application under the rules in chapter 4 of this division, with supporting declarations. The party must make the motion or application as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for the continuance is discovered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new partys involvement in the case; (6) A partys excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination. These may include: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested ; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The courts calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) Discussion Defendant asks the Court to continue trial to November 2025, arguing that it was only recently served on April 13, 2024 and another defendant has not appeared. Defendant argues that it should have the time it would have had if timely served, in order to conduct discovery and file a summary judgment motion. However, no specificity is provided. The Court grants in part the motion to continue trial, but in light of the lack of specificity provided, does not find good cause to continue to November 2025. To the extent a summary judgment motion is timely filed, or more specificity is provided regarding outstanding discovery that cannot be timely completed, the Court will consider a further request to continue. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS in part Defendants motion to continue trial. The Final Status Conference is continued to April 30, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Trial is continued to May 14, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. All discovery and pre-trial motion cut-off dates shall be in accordance with the new trial date. Defendant shall give notice of this order, and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 21TRCV00651 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024, continued from July 19 due to cyber attack CASE NUMBER: 21TRCV00651 CASE NAME: Martorell Law APC v. Evgeny Afineevsky, et al. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Evgeny Afineevsky TRIAL DATE: August 5, 2024 MOTION: (1) By Plaintiff: Motion for Summary Judgment (2) By Defendant: ex parte application to Continue the August 5, 2024 Trial Tentative Rulings: This is the same tentative ruling posted for the July 19 hearing, which counsel might have been unable to review because of the effects of the cyber-attack on the Courts computer systems. (1) Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Triable issues of facts material to the reasonableness of fees and the defense of quality of the representation preclude summary judgment (2) The ex parte application in tentatively denied, or would be granted only for a short period of time sufficient to permit defense counsel to review the remaining 4/5 of the belatedly produced documents. The Application indicates the Plaintiffs failure to provide its work product until the eve of trial has been ongoing for over a year, and that Defendant elected to pursue a strategy of relying on that failure to seek exclusion of evidence at trial rather than other remedies. Defendant did not seek a motion to compel further production, or a motion in limine, or file objections to evidence submitted in support of the pending MSJ, or even seek to continue the hearing on the pending MSJ to allow completion of discovery. The parties reported to the Court in early May that the mediation was not successful, yet this issue of a failure to produce documents requested over a year ago was only first brought to the Courts attention in Defendants July 3, 2024 Separate Statement. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On September 3, 2021, Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC (Plaintiff) filed an action against Defendant including Evgeny Afineevsky, Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC, and DOES 1 through 100 arising out a claim of failure to pay for Plaintiffs legal services rendered in the representation of the Defendants. The suit alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Account Stated; (3) Open Book Account; and (4) Reasonable Value of Services Rendered. Now, Plaintiff files a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the following issues: 1. Issue No. 1: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract, succeeds as a matter of law because Defendants did not uphold their obligations. 2. Issue No. 2: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, Common Count of Account Stated, succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor upheld its obligations to submit billing statements to Defendants, but Defendants have not paid the billing statements, despite stating they would do so. 3. Issue No. 3: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action, Common Count for Open Book Account, succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor maintained a record of the debts owed to its assignee. 4. Issue No. 4: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC, Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, Reasonable Value of Service Rendered (Quantum Meruit), succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor performed the work under the attorney-client relationship and Defendants retained the benefit of those services. B. Procedural On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. On July 3, 2024, Defendant, Evgeny Afineevsky filed an opposition brief and declarations. On July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief with a new declaration and new exhibits not included in the original moving papers. II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Overrule: all. Sustain: none. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) B. Discussion Preliminarily, this Court notes that in opposition, Defendants have brought an issue of Plaintiffs standing to sue. First, Defendant argues that Bordin Martorell LLO was the original creditor of the alleged debt Plaintiff is now seeking to enforce. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not provided a single piece of documentary evidence establishing an assignment of rights from BM LLP. Defendants contend that in discovery, they asked for such proof, but to date, Plaintiff has provided zero documentation. Plaintiff only includes, in his declaration, that his former law firm, BM LLP, assigned its rights and interests associated with the Lawsuit, including rights and interests to any past due bills, to [his] current law firm, Martorell Law APC. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 7.) The Reply papers provide documentary proof of the assignment to Plaintiff, but that proof was not included in the moving papers. The Courts practice is to consider new evidence submitted at the reply phase and to allow the opposing party to file a sur-reply responding to that new matter. But as discussed below, even if the Court were to reject the standing argument because of the evidence first submitted at the reply phase, there are other grounds for the Court to deny the motion which would render unnecessary a sur-reply and continued MSJ hearing. Here, Plaintiff argues that it established a contract was formed between Defendants and Bordin Martorell LLP (BM LLP). Plaintiff argues that on July 19, 2017, BM LLP and Defendants, Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC entered into a written fee agreement in Los Angeles, California, whereby BM LLP entered into a written fee agreement in Los Angeles, California whereby BM LLP agreed to act as Defendants legal representative in the lawsuit. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that the written free agreement included a $10,000 retainer deposit, which Defendants paid on July 18, 2017. (Martorell Decl., ¶2.) On July 19, 2017, Plaintiff asserts it began legal services. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that among the legal services involved in the subject lawsuit, it drafted a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens (that Defendants chose not to file) and analyzing the same, choice of law analysis, retention of and communication with additional attorneys, communications with various potential witnesses, a pro hac vice application, meeting and conferring with opposing counsel, drafting discovery requests, responding to discovery requests, tens of phone calls, drafting motions to quash, drafting and analyzing benefit of motion for security, drafting a motion for sanctions, drafting a motion for summary judgment, reviewing of large amounts of evidence, and document production. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that it has established that Defendants failed to uphold their obligations on the basis of the fee arrangement. Pursuant to the work performed and the terms of the fee arrangement, BM LLP sent two billing statements to Defendants associate with an outstanding bill of approximately $57,836.54. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff contends that the first billing statement was sent on or around September 12, 2017, and pursuant to the agreement, the payments were to be due within fifteen (15) days of mailing of BM LLPs statement. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants agreed to pay the outstanding legal fees, but that to this day, Defendants have not paid the outstanding legal fees. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 6.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff argues that this Court can and should grant summary judgment as to each of the four causes of action. In opposition, Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff has failed to show that the facts are undisputed on its causes of action. For example, Defendants dispute that there was a meeting of the minds as to the amount owed, that there is a dispute as to the duration of the representation, that Plaintiff failed to investigate insurance coverage or to earlier tender the defense of the underlying action to Defendants production companys errors and omissions policy carrier. See 7/3/24 Separate Statement UMFs 4, 5, 10. Defendants dispute Plaintiffs standing because no corroboration was submitted with the moving papers of the claimed assignment from BM LLP to Plaintiff. See 7/3/24 Sep. Statement UMF 8. The Opposition raises a dispute as to its defense of overbilling for work that was never used or filed to advance the interests of its clients. Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed no substantive pleadings in the case while representing Defendant and its work was not used by Defendants subsequent attorneys. Defendants have provided the declaration of counsel Tarasov indicating that such work was not used nor was it instrumental in the ultimate outcomes of the case. While Mr. Martorell addresses a number of these issues in his reply declaration and its attached exhibits, the conflict between his declaration and that of his former co-counsel Mr. Tarasov by itself demonstrates that the trier of fact will need to resolve the disputed issues of reasonableness of billings, the claimed failure to earlier tender a defense to an E&O carrier and at whose feet lays the blame for that, the affirmative defense of excuse or of quality of the representation, and other matters. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to provide notice.

Case Number: 23TRCV01260 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: P Motion: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint RULING The Court considered the moving and opposition papers. Defendant Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc.s Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. BACKGROUND Factual and Procedural Background This suit stems from a slip and fall sustained by Alexandria Covarrubias (Plaintiff) on or about July 5, 2022. Plaintiff commenced this action on April 21, 2023 by filing a Complaint. On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff amended the initial Complaint to substitute Doe 4 with defendant Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc. (Rexford). The operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) was filed on April 25, 2024. The FAC alleges that, while walking down a hallway of Spartan College of Aeronautics & Technology located at 8911 Aviation Blvd., Inglewood, CA 90301 (the Premises), Plaintiff slipped on a puddle of water created by Defendant Island Pro Painting and/or Defendant Tofiga Pro Painting. (FAC, ¶¶8 & 12.) Plaintiff alleges four causes of action: (1) dangerous condition of public property, (2) negligence, (3) premises liability, and (4) negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of employee. Rexford now files the motion before the Court, Defendant Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc.s Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. Rexford demurs to the third and fourth causes of action. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. No reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) The Declaration of Lusine Adzhemyan (Adzhemyan Decl.) attached to the demurrer states that Defense counsel sent meet and confer correspondence to Plaintiffs counsel but received no response. (Adzhemyan Decl., ¶4.) Therefore, the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied. However, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns its attention to the demurrer. DISCUSSION Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Rexfords primary arguments are (1) the third cause of action is duplicative of the second and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and (2) the fourth cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. As to the second and third cause of action, different theories may be alleged in the pleadings, however, facts supporting each theory must also be stated. As explained below, the Court agrees that both the third and fourth causes of action as alleged against Rexford fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, therefore, the demurrer is sustained, and Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. a) Premises Liability The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.) In the FAC it is unclear how Rexford possessed, managed, or controlled the Premises. There are no direct allegations of Rexford being the landlord of the Premises nor that Rexford provided any management services to the Premises. Moreover, the FAC alleges that the puddle of water was created by Defendant Island Pro Painting and/or Defendant Tofiga Pro Painting, which demonstrates that the alleged breach may have been committed by another defendant. (FAC, ¶12.) The opposition papers provide little clarity on the issue, Plaintiff simply reiterates the elements of the cause of action but proffers no supporting facts. Although negligence may be alleged in general terms, a bare allegation that defendants negligence caused plaintiff injury is not sufficient. Plaintiff must allege the acts or omissions that are claimed to have constituted the negligence. (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital (1941) 18 Cal.3d 97, 101.) As the FAC fails to do that here, the demurrer is sustained as to the third cause of action. b) Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision The elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are: (1) the employers hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee; (2) the employee was incompetent or unfit; (3) the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) harm occurs. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836-837.) Similarly, the fourth cause of action lacks any facts suggesting that Rexford failed to exercise due diligence in its hiring, retaining, or supervising practices. To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actors propensity to do the bad act. (Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 264.) It is clear in the FAC that Plaintiff slipped on a puddle of water and fell sustaining injury. However, there are no facts that indicate Rexford knew of the propensity for an employees bad act or omission, nor are there facts suggesting it was even one of Rexfords employees that breached. Therefore, it is unclear as to how Rexford could be held liable. Accordingly, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment].) As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. CONCLUSION Defendant Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc.s Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.

Case Number: 23STCV11783 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT FLORIDALMA AGUSTIN, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. GARY GILLMAN, et al. , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV11783 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PETITIONS FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE OF CLAIM OR ACTION OF DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF JUDGMENT FOR MINOR Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Floridalma Agustin (Petitioner) The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 1005, subdivision (b). BACKGROUND Petitioner, individually and as guardian ad litem for minor claimants Kayro Jehiel Carranza-Agustin (10); Loida Jocabed Carranza (8); and Elimelec Aliel Carranza-Agustin (4) (collectively, Minor Claimants), and Plaintiff Hugo Adolfo Carranza (collectively Plaintiffs), initiated this action against Defendants Gary Gillman; Debbie Gillman; and Encino Management Services (collectively, Defendants). This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. The complaint alleges: (1) breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligence; and (4) breach of contract. Petitioner filed the instant petitions to approve the compromise of disputed claim on behalf of Minor Claimants (collectively, the Petitions). DISCUSSION If an action is pending and settlement is effected prior to trial, the minors compromise must be approved by the court. (CCP § 372.) A petition to approve a minors compromise is governed by California Rules of Court (CRC) , rules 7.950, et seq . and Probate Code sections 3500 and 3600 et seq . The trial court is authorized to approve and allow payment of reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney fees in an action concerning the compromise of a minors claim. (Prob. Code, § 3601, subd. (a); Curtis v. Estate of Fagan (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 270, 277-79; see also CCP § 373.5.) Attorneys Fees Unless the court has approved the fee agreement in advance, the court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor or a person with a disability. (CRC, r. 7.955(a).) The court must give consideration to the terms of the agreement between the attorney and minors representative and must evaluate the agreement based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was made. (CRC, r. 7.955(a)(2).) CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) sets out nonexclusive factors the court may consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees in connection with a petition for minors compromise. Under CRC Rule 7.955(c), the petition must include a declaration by the attorney addressing the factors set forth in CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) that are applicable to the matter that is before the Court. Here, the Minor Claimants, by and through Petitioner, their guardian ad litem, have agreed to settle their claims against Defendants in exchange for $5,000 each. Upon approval, $1,250 of each settlement payment will be allocated towards attorneys fees, and $725.61 will be used to reimburse the fees and costs advanced by Plaintiffs' counsel, leaving a balance of $3,024.39 to be disbursed to Petitioner for each minor claimant. The Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Further, the Court considers the requested amount in attorneys fees, which amounts to 25% of each settlement payment, to be fair and reasonable. For these reasons and because they are unopposed, the Court provisionally GRANTS the Petitions, conditioned on Petitioner appearing (either remotely or in person) at the hearing. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV30186 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT ELIZABETH SHUAI WONG , Plaintiff, vs. FLIPFIT, f.k.a. HUMANS, INC., a Delaware corporation, NOORULDEEN ALAARIF, a.k.a. NOOR AGHA, an individual, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV30186 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIESS, SET ONE Date: August 9, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Elizabeth Shuai Wong (Plaintiff) RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Flipfit, fka Humans, Inc. (Defendant) The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND This is a representative action filed by Plaintiff on December 11, 2023, seeking recovery of civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code §2698, et seq . (PAGA), for alleged Labor Code violations of: failure to pay minimum wage, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide all required meal periods, failure to authorize or permit all required rest periods, failure to pay all earned wages each pay period, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay vested vacation wages, failure to reimburse necessary business expenditures, failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment, failure to maintain an effective Injury and Illness Prevention Program and retaliation for use of Covid-19 supplemental sick pay. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production, Set One (the RFPs Motion), and a Motion to Compel Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One (the SIs Motion) (collectively, the Motions). Defendant filed a consolidated opposition to the Motions on July 9, 2024, and Plaintiff filed a reply on July 15, 2024. DISCUSSION SIs Motion Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2030.290, subdivision (b), when a party directs interrogatories towards a party, and that party fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The moving party need only show that the interrogatories were served on the opposing party, the time has expired to respond to the interrogatories and no responses have been served in order for the court to compel the opposing party to respond. ( Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) Here, Plaintiff served Defendant with Special Interrogatories, Set One (SIs) on January 30, 2024. (Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of SIs Motion, ¶ 3.) Defendant had not served responses to the SIs as of the date of filing of the SIs Motion on April 22, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) On June 7, 2024, however, Defendant responded to all discovery requests served by Plaintiff, without objections. (Declaration of Matthew Theriault (Theriault Decl.), ¶ 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute, and in fact, acknowledges that Defendant did provide objections-free responses to the SIs on June 7, 2024. (Supplemental Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of Plaintiffs Reply (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl.), ¶ 22.) Accordingly, since responses to the SIs, without objections, have now been served, the SIs Motion is MOOT. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the responses are insufficient or not otherwise complete or Code-compliant, Plaintiff has forty-five days from the date of this order to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. RFPs Motion When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Here, Plaintiff served Defendant with Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (RFPs) on January 30, 2024. (Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of RFPs Motion, ¶ 3.) Defendant had not served responses to the RFPs as of the date of filing of the RFPs Motion on April 22, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) On June 7, 2024, however, Defendant responded to all discovery requests served by Plaintiff, without objections. (Theriault Decl., ¶ 10.) Additionally, on July 9, 2024, Defendant produced documents. ( Id. ) Plaintiff does not dispute, and in fact, acknowledges that Defendant did provide objections-free responses to the RFPs on June 7, 2024. (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl., ¶ 22.) Accordingly, since responses to the RFPs, without objections, have now been served, and documents have been produced, the RFPs Motion is MOOT. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the responses and documents produced are insufficient or not otherwise complete or Code-compliant, Plaintiff has forty-five days from the date of this order to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. Monetary Sanctions Nevertheless, the question of sanctions still remains before the Court. [P]roviding untimely responses does not divest the trial court of its authority [to hear a motion to compel responses]. ( Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 407.) Even if the untimely response does not contain objections [and] substantially resolve[s] the issues raised by a motion to compel responses&the trial court retains the authority to hear the motion. ( Id. , at pp. 408-409.) This rule gives an important incentive for parties to respond to discovery in a timely fashion. ( Id. , at p. 408.) If the propounding party [does not] take the motion off calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions, the trial court may deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions. ( Id. at p. 409; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a) [The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed].) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (c).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (c).) In this case, Defendant asserts that the delayed responses were caused by unexpected medical issues experienced by the previous attorney handling the case. The Court also acknowledges that there have been multiple changes in the counsel representing Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff agreed to an extension for Defendant to provide responses by June 7, 2024, and Defendant complied with this deadline. (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 17-22; Theriault Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Thus, the Court finds that, under the circumstances, there is substantial justification for the delayed responses and that monetary sanctions are not warranted. Accordingly, no sanctions are imposed. RULING The Motions are DENIED as moot. The requests for monetary sanctions are also DENIED. Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 9 th day of August 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV17462 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Urick, et al. v. Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, et al. Case No.: 20STCV17462 Matter: Motion to Compel Deposition Moving Party: Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP seeks to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Trentyn M. Urick-Stasa. Because there is no opposition, the Motion to Compel is granted. The deposition is to take place within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions in the amount of $1,000. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 24TRCV00170 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿¿ ¿¿¿ HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 ¿¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00170 ¿¿¿ CASE NAME: Karin Friedman v. Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, et al. ¿ MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. ¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Karin Friedman TRIAL DATE: Not Set. ¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, 3 rd cause of action for negligent hiring ¿¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ A. Factual ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff, Karin Friedman (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, Carellon Behavioral Health of CA, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Hiring. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. The SAC is based on Plaintiffs allegation that on August 18, 2023, Plaintiff called Defendant, Carelon and spoke to a therapist regarding issues of depression and anxiety for forty-five minutes. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that Carelon then emailed her on August 21, 2023 the information of two therapists, both of whom said they were a good match for her, and both of whom were men. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that she called back and asked for female therapists, and they said that none were available in her area. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff indicates that she contacted Defendant Cavuoti to set up an initial meeting because he was the closest therapist to her location. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that a few days after, she spoke with Defendant Cavuoti to explain to him that she requires consistent therapy due to her psychological disorder of depression and anxiety (among other issues). (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further notes that she told him she was adopted and suffered abuse from her mother. (SAC, ¶ 10.) After informing him of this, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti stated he was also adopted, was the same age as her, and stated that they had a lot in common, and that he could not wait to meet her. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that on August 30, 2023, she had her first appointment with Defendant Cavuoti. During this initial appointment Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti spoke with her about his previous weekend in Vegas and brought the conversation back to himself when he informed Plaintiff about his own history of abuse. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends that she was upset by this information as she was also abused as a child. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff notes that the conversation continuously came back to Defendant Cavuoti, and she did not get a lot of time to speak with him about her own issues. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cavuoti abruptly and stated, our time is over. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff notes that he then opened the door and said, I know I am not supposed to do this, and proceeded to hug her while pressing her close to him while making audible, strange noises which sounded like oh, oh. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that after she left, she had her partner pull over on the side of the road and she vomited. (SAC, ¶ 15.) As soon as she got home, Plaintiff notes she took a shower and called her psychiatrists office and told him what had happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also notes that she called Defendant Carelon and told them what happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carelon apologized profusely and said they would send her more referrals, to which they subsequently sent five (5) women. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff notes that she proceeded to speak with her psychiatrist weekly due to the incident, who prescribed her mediation to address her nerves in the wake of the incident. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Subsequently, Plaintiff notes that she unintentionally left her files at Defendant Cavuotis office, and he forced her into further communications to retrieve her paperwork, which caused her additional stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. (Carelon) now files a demurrer to the SAC. B. Procedural¿ ¿¿ ¿¿ On June 14, 2024, Carelon filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 23, 2024, Carelon filed a reply brief. ¿ II. ANALYSIS ¿¿ A. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) B. Discussion Defendant Carelon demurs to Plaintiffs SAC on the grounds that it argues Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of An Independent Contractor fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Kelsey A. Hill is offered in support of Carelons counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Hill declares that on April 2, 2024, she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying the defects in the FAC and asking to meet and confer. (Declaration of Kelsey A. Hill (Hill Decl.), ¶ 2.) On April 10, 2024, Hill indicates that she and her colleague, Junga Kim, met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel and that subsequently, the FAC was amended. On June 6, 2024, Hill indicates that she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying and outlining the legal arguments and bases of Carelons anticipated demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC and asking Hill to meet and confer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 7.) Hill asserts that after receiving no response to her initial email, she sent a follow-up email to Plaintiffs counsel on June 10, 2024, after which Hill and Plaintiffs counsel exchanged emails regarding the anticipated demurrer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 9.) Hill further notes that in her June 13, 2024 email, she explained that Carelons demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC is based on the same grounds as previously articulated with respect to the FAC. (Hill Decl., ¶ 10.) However, despite efforts, Hill notes that the parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the objections. (Hill Decl., ¶ 11.) Thus, this Court finds that the parties have met and conferred in good faith prior to filing the demurrer, and the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor Carelon argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor fails as a matter of law. Carelon argues that Plaintiffs cause of action is defective for three reasons: (1) first, Plaintiff fails to plead that at the time of hiring or prior to , Carelon knew or should have known Defendant Cavuoti presented an undue risk of the particular harm to which Plaintiff was allegedly exposed; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Carelon owed her any duty of care in selecting (and recommending and referring) Cavuoti as a potential therapist; and (3) even if Carelon owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, she has not alleged that Carelon breached that duty by selecting Defendant Cavuoti as a participating provide, or that any such breach was a substantial factor in causing her injury. Generally, a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. ( American States Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 28.) However, [o]ver time, the courts have, for policy reasons, created so many exceptions to this general rule of nonliability that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions. ( Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693.) One of these exceptions is referred to as the peculiar risk doctrine. ( Ibid .) California recognizes a cause of action that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. ( Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054, citing Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836.) The basis for such a claim is that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. ( Capital Cities , supra , at p. 1054; Evan F ., supra, at pp. 836-837.) In Capital Cities , the Second District determined that the demurrer to the plaintiffs pleading was properly sustained because of a lack of specific factual allegations that the casting director, who allegedly drugged, beat, and then facilitated the gang rape of the aspiring actor, was previously known by the employer to act in such a fashion. Plaintiff there had only alleged that the employer knew that the casting director used his position to gain sexual favors, that the director personally used drugs, and that the use of a casting couch is common in the entertainment industry. From Capital Cities the Court finds that when a claim such as negligent hiring or negligent selection of an independent contractor is asserted, greater specificity in pleading the prior knowledge of the employer or hirer is required. In the Second Districts analysis of the demurrer there, the panel stated: knowledge that [casting director] Marshall used his position of authority to extract or to coerce sexual favors is not knowledge that he would first drug and then attack a potential employee. ( Capital Cities, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10541055.) Applying that reasoning here, plaintiff would need to allege that Carelon knew or should have known from some prior incident, screening process, a prior claim, or otherwise that Cavuoti would discuss his own personal history of childhood abuse with a new patient, that he would make veiled romantic overtures to female therapy patients, and that he would hug, embrace, or make inappropriate physical contact with therapy patients. No allegatison of those sort are contained in the SAC. Carelon cites to CACI No. 426 (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention of Employee), noting that in order to sufficiently state a claim for negligent selection of an independent contractor, a plaintiff must show among other things that the hiring defendant knew or should have known that the contractor was unfit or incompetent and that the contractors unfitness or incompetence created a particular risk of harm to other people. ( See CACI No. 426 element 2.) While Plaintiff has alleged each element of CACI 426 in conclusory fashion, more factual detail is required. For example, was Carelon aware of inappropriate behavior of Defendant Cavuoti prior to hiring him? Did other patients of Defendant Cavuoti make similar complaints to Defendant Carelon prior to him being recommended as a therapist to Plaintiff? Without more detailed facts and allegations, Plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. As such, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with leave to amend. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Carelons demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Carelon is ordered to give notice.