Mary Jane Larson Vs. Charles Lyndon Banes, Jr.

Case Number: 24SMCV02244 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Funke v. Castleworks Home Services Company, Case No. 24SMCV02244 Hearing Date July 18, 2024 Plaintiffs Motion for Trial Preference Plaintiff Mary Emily Funke sues for injuries sustained when she was hit by a van when walking in a crosswalk. Her husband Alex Funke sues for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs move for trial preference per Code Civ. Proc. §36. Plaintiff Mary Emily is 77 years old and sustained head, leg, foot and knee injuries, requiring surgery. Plaintiff Alex, who is 79, sues for loss of consortium. Defendants do not oppose, but request that the court issue an order to facilitate discovery process and set the matter out to maximum allowed by law, 120 days. The preference is mandatory under §36(a). Trial will be set in 120 days. The court will discuss shortened notice for dispositive motions and scheduling of depositions. The parties are to meet and confer in advance of the hearing regarding dates for depositions, independent medical examinations, and motions. GRANTED. To the extent plaintiff has not responded to discovery as stated in the opposition, plaintiff is to respond, or the court will discuss scheduling an IDC.

FRINK VS. MANKA Case Number: 23CV-0201842 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Amend Petition: Plaintiff Samuel E. Frink moves pursuant to CCP § 473 to file an Amended Verified Petition. Defendant Paul Manka filed an untimely opposition on July 10, 2024. The opposition was due nine court days prior to the hearing. CCP § 473(a)(1) permits any pleading to be amended in further of justice and on any terms as may be proper, after notice to the adverse party. The Court’s discretion in this regard will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment. Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 920, 939. “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530. The Court finds that the motion was timely made and that granting the motion would be in the furtherance of justice. Defendant’s untimely opposition, which the Court has considered, objects to motion based on alleged procedural defects. In the interests of justice, the Court will exercise its discretion to overlook the procedural defects in Plaintiff’s motion, as well as to overlook the procedural defect of the untimely opposition. Defendant’s opposition requests the Court continue the existing trial and mandatory settlement conference, if the motion is granted. That issue is not properly before the Court. Defendant can file the appropriate motion, if he feels it is appropriate. The motion is GRANTED. A proposed order was not lodged with the Court as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Plaintiff shall prepare the order. No copy of the proposed Amended Petition has been lodged with the Court for filing. Plaintiff shall submit a copy of the proposed Amended Petition for filing. Plaintiff is also required to immediately serve a copy of the filed Amended Petition on Defendant.

Case Number: 21STCV04307 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On February 3, 2021, July 29, 2022, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente filed this action against Defendants City of Los Angeles (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort. Also on February 3, 2021, the Court appointed Ani Piliposian to serve as Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes guardian ad litem. On May 3, 2021, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, filed a first amended complaint against Defendant and Does 1-50 for negligencemotor vehicle (Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a)). On May 24, 2021, Defendant filed an answer. On January 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On June 20, 2024, Petitioner Ani Piliposian (Petitioner) filed a petition for expedited approval of the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente s claims. PETITIONERS REQUESTS Petitioner asks the Court for expedited approval of the compromise of the action of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente ("Plaintiff"). DISCUSSION In Section 8 of the petition, Petitioner states that Plaintiff received treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. However, the petition does not include medical expenses for this treatment (see Section 13a) or provide medical or billing records from Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. The Department of Health Care Services February 5, 2024 letter does not state that Medi-Cal paid for Childrens Hospital Los Angeles treatment. Petitioner should explain whether Plaintiff incurred medical expenses for treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles, the amount of those expenses, and whether those expenses will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. The Court cannot approve the petition unless it shows that the minors compromise will reimburse all of Plaintiffs medical expenses that have not been reduced or waived. The non-medical expenses include $100.02 for Administrative/Misc. fee. (Section 14b.) The Court will not award this amount without evidence that it qualifies as an allowable cost under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5., subdivision (a), or is allowable as a cost expressly authorized by law (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)). Section 19b(2) of the petition states that Petitioner will provide the name, address, and branch of the depository in Attachment 19b(2). The petition does not include an Attachment 19b(2). The Court denies the petition. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes action filed by Petitioner Ani Piliposian on June 20, 2024. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 23BBCV02636 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B angela mehtemetian and sarkis mehtemetian as co-trustees of the mehtemetian revocable trust dated november 18, 2014 , et al. , Plaintiffs, v. claudia kelley , Defendant. Case No.: 23BBCV02636 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: demurrer; motion to strike BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Angela Mehtemetian and Sarkis Mehtemetian as co-trustees of The Mehtemetian Revocable Trust dated November 18, 2014 (Trust), Angela Mehtemetian, and Sarkis Mehtemetian (collectively, Plaintiffs) allege that Plaintiffs own property located at 10405 Ditson St. in Sunland. They allege that Defendant Claudia Kelley (Defendant) owns property at 10417 Ditson St. Plaintiffs allege that in June 2022, while they were still in escrow for their property, Defendant approached the wall dividing the backyard between the two properties and pointed out that Plaintiffs chain link fence encroached onto Defendants side at one section. Plaintiffs allege they offered to allow Defendant to move the fence back. They allege that in October 2022, Defendant laid rocks along the side of Plaintiffs driveway in a dirt area separating the two properties and that Defendant entered their property to put up plastic rods with strings. They allege that Defendant also told Plaintiffs not to cut the hedges, though Plaintiffs claim the shrubbery was on their side of the property. Plaintiffs allege that they retained a surveyor, who confirmed that the shrubs were on their side of the property. Plaintiffs allege that they began efforts to install a chain link fence and that Defendant has begun a campaign of harassment against them as a result. The first amended complaint (FAC), filed April 2, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) trespass to land; (2) private nuisance; (3) IIED; (4) negligence; (5) injunction; (6) quiet title; (7) declaratory relief; and (8) invasion of privacy. B. Motions on Calendar On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the FAC. On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs. On July 12, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER Defendant demurs to the 3 rd cause of action for IIED, arguing that it fails to allege sufficient facts and is uncertain. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendants intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiffs injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendants outrageous conduct. ( Vasquez v. Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with great specificity, the acts which she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of behavior usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Id. ) In the 3 rd cause of action for IIED, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conduct towards Plaintiffs has been extreme and outrageous, and that Defendant intentionally engaged in a course of conduct designed to inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶44-45.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conduct include: (a) Making claims to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS), falsely accusing Plaintiffs of violations and causing unnecessary investigations, inspections, and stress; (b) Interfering with Plaintiffs' lawful construction of a fence on their own Property, trespassing without authority and hindering their enjoyment of their property rights; (c) Repeatedly interfering with Plaintiffs' quiet use and enjoyment of their Property, including by physically trespassing on the Property and making unwarranted complaints and allegations to LADBS, thereby causing emotional turmoil; (d) Installing several security cameras intentionally pointed at Plaintiffs' home, invading their privacy and causing Plaintiffs severe distress; and (e) Using her three Rhodesian Ridgeback dogs to intimidate and worry Plaintiffs and their grandchildren, creating a hostile environment and causing anxiety and fear. ( Id. , ¶46.) Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants conduct, they have suffered severe emotional distress, including but not limited to Plaintiffs each visiting Kaiser Permanente to address complication of severe anxiety on January 17, 2024; and Sarkis Mehtemetian was taken to the emergency room at Bear Valley Community Hospital for complications with high blood pressure resulting from anxiety and distress. ( Id. , ¶47.) Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of behavior usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 . ) At the pleading stage, the Court will accept the allegations as true. Defendant argues that the IIED cause of action fails to adequately allege extreme and outrageous conduct because making claims to the LADBS, interfering with the construction of a fence, installing cameras, and having 3 pets do not constitute IIED. (Dem. at p.11.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts regarding Defendants intent. However, P laintiffs do not merely allege that Defendant reported Plaintiffs to the LADBS, but include facts that Defendant made false reports; Plaintiffs not only allege that Defendant interfered with Plaintiffs construction of a fence, but did so with the intent to hinder their enjoyment of their property; Plaintiffs not only allege that Defendant installed cameras, but that Defendant intentionally pointed the cameras at Plaintiffs home to invade their privacy; and Plaintiffs not only allege that Defendant had 3 dogs, but that she used them to intimidate Plaintiffs and their family members. Taking the truth of these allegations together, the FAC sufficiently alleges extreme and outrageous conduct and Defendants intent to cause emotional distress. The demurrer on the basis that the 3 rd cause of action lacks sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against Defendant is overruled. Next, Defendant argues that the litigation privilege under Civil Code, § 47(b) bars the 3 rd cause of action with respect to Defendants complaints made to the LADBS. However, if the litigation privilege applied, it would not bar the entirety of the 3 rd cause of action, as Plaintiffs have alleged various other grounds for Defendants purported extreme and outrageous conduct. A demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy. ( Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal. App. 4th 1028, 1047.) Thus, this will not be a ground to sustain the demurrer. Finally, Defendant argues that the 3 rd cause of action is uncertain because the allegations are vague and the cause of action fails to state which party is asserting the cause of action against Defendant. (See Dem. at p.17.) The demurrer on this basis is also overruled. The 3 rd cause of action adequately alleges the elements of an IIED claim and puts Defendant on notice of the facts alleged against her. Further, the FAC alleges that the cause of action is being asserted against all Defendants and includes allegations from both Plaintiffs against Defendant. This argument is better discussed in a motion to strike as opposed to a demurrer (see discussion below). The allegations are not uncertain. The demurrer to the 3 rd cause of action is overruled. DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE Defendant moves to strike the allegations for punitive damages, attorneys fees, and other allegations regarding Defendants conduct in paragraphs 36 (1 st cause of action), 41 (2 nd cause of action), 46 and 49 (3 rd cause of action), 53 (negligence), 57 (5 th cause of action), and 74 (8 th cause of action); the prayer for relief at items 2 and 4; and the general allegations at paragraphs 16, 21, 22, 23, and 28. A. Punitive Damages A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Id .) Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud. Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner: (1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations fail to reach the level of despicability required under the code. (Mot. at p.11.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations are conclusory that Defendant engaged in fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive conduct. ( Id. at p.12.) She also argues that punitive damages cannot be awarded on purely negligent conduct. ( Id. at 17.) Defendant essentially provides a recitation of the law on punitive damages from pages 10 to 17, and then makes conclusory, generalized arguments that Plaintiffs allegations fail to reach the level of particularity for a punitive damages claim. The motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages is granted with leave to amend. The allegations at most allege that Defendants acts were willful, fraudulent, and oppressive for which Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages. (See e.g., FAC, ¶¶36, 41, 49, 74.) Additional facts should be alleged to support the allegations for malice, oppression, and/or fraud. The Court notes that the 4 th cause of action for negligence does not seek punitive damages. B. Attorneys Fees The prayer for damages at item 2 seeks attorneys fees and costs if allowable by statute, contract, or other law. CCP § 1021 states that attorneys fees are recoverable if allowed under statute and/or by agreement. In the opposition brief, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they cannot identify a basis for attorneys fees, but state that they reserve the right to amend their complaint if a basis for fees is determined. (Opp. at p.6.) The motion to strike the allegations for attorneys fees is granted without leave to amend. If Plaintiffs ascertain a basis for attorneys fees, they may file a motion for leave to amend at that time. C. CRC Rule 2.112 CRC Rule 2.112 states that each separately stated cause of action must specifically state the party asserting it if more than one party is represented on the pleading. Defendant argues that the complaint fails to comply with Rule 2.112. The causes of action in the FAC allege who the cause of action is being asserted against (all Defendants), but fails to state who is asserting the cause of action as there are multiple Plaintiffs. As discussed above regarding the demurrer, it appears that all Plaintiffs are alleging each of the causes of action against all Defendants. However, for clarification purposes, the motion to strike with respect to the headings of the causes of action is granted with leave to amend. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant Claudia Kelleys demurrer to the 3 rd cause of action alleged in the first amended complaint is overruled. Defendants motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages and the headings of the causes of action is granted with 20 days leave to amend. The motion to strike the allegations for attorneys fees is granted without leave to amend; however, if Plaintiffs later ascertain a basis for attorneys fees, they may file a motion for leave to amend at that time. Defendant shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 19, 2024 ___________________________ John J. Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Monday, July 15, 2024, Line 9. 2- PLAINTIFF JULIANA LOPES DEMASI MOTION To Compel The Court To Appoint A Lawyer. Plaintiff's "motion to compel the court to appoint a lawyer" to represent her in her medical malpractice action is denied with prejudice. The motion cites no authority for court-appointed counsel and the court is aware of none. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

BRYANT VS SOUTHWEST MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CVSW2401887 HEALTHCARE INLAND COMPLAINT BY NICOLLE S BRYANT VALLEY HOSPITAL Tentative Ruling: The unopposed request for Leave is GRANTED.

ARROYO vs DKI CVRI2304401 Motion for Early Preference CCP Sec 36 RESTORATION, LLC. Tentative Ruling: The Court finds that Plaintiff has met the requirements of CCP 36 and is entitled to early preference for trial setting. The parties should be prepared to choose a trial date at the hearing.

Case Number: 21STCV07431 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Wallach, et al., v. Providence Health System, et al. CASE NO.: 21STCV07431 MOTION: Approve Minors Compromise HEARING DATE: 7/19/202 4 Summary of Proposed Minors Compromise : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center under the following terms: Settlement to Minor: $1,143,136.11 Settlement to Others: David Wallach - $6,356,863.89 Injuries: Elizabeth Wallach died from a pulmonary embolism the day after giving birth to her daughter, Time Wallach. Time lost her mother's love, companionship, relationship, guidance and support as a result of her mother's wrongful death. Medical Expenses: None. Costs : Petitioner bears costs. Fees : $243,135.42. Counsel provides the retainer with a contingency fee. The terms provide that the Court will set the fee for representation of minor clients. (See ¶12.) The fee requested is approximately 21.26% of the recovery. The Court believes the fee request to be reasonable. Total Settlement $1,143,136.11 Less fees and costs -$243,135.42 Net Settlement $900,000.69 Petitioner proposes to dispose the funds as follows: i) $800,000.69 to be invested in a single-premium deferred annuity, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court; and ii) $100,000.00 be transferred to the trustee of a trust that is either created by or approved in the order approving the settlement or judgment for the minor. Petitioner supplies the terms of the proposed annuity at attachment 18b(3) and trust at attachment 18b(7). These methods are permitted by L.A. County Super. Ct. Rule 4.115. Order : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), has agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center in exchange for $1,143,136.11. The parties having appeared (CRC Rule 7.952(a)), and the Court having reviewed and heard the ¿Petition¿, the Court finds that the settlement is reasonable, and based thereon, approves and GRANTS the petition. (CRC Rule 7.950.) The Court intends to sign the proposed Orders (MC-351, MC-355). THE COURT SETS AN OSC RE COMPLIANCE/PROOF OF RECEIPT OF DEPOSIT ON September 24, 2024, at 8:30 AM. No appearance is required if the receipt is filed. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.