Ruling
Carter VS Autonation Honda Fremont
Jul 18, 2024 |
Civil Unlimited (Other Breach of Contract/Warr...) |
HG21114959
HG21114959: Carter VS Autonation Honda Fremont
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by
Autonation Honda Fremont (Defendant) in Department 512
Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Elizabeth Riles
The Motion to Compel Discovery (not Further Discovery) - 1 moving party, 1 motion filed by
Autonation Honda Fremont on 03/20/2024 is Granted in Part.
This Tentative Ruling addresses defendant Edgren Motor Company, Inc. dba Autonation Honda
Fremont’s (“Autonation”) two unopposed Motions to Compel plaintiffs Deborah Carter
(“Carter”) and Russell Daniels (“Daniels”) (Carter and Daniels are collectively “Plaintiffs”) to
Appear for their respective Depositions (the “Motions to Compel.”)
The Motions to Compel are GRANTED IN PART, as set forth below.
The Court ORDERS each of Carter and Daniels to appear for their respective deposition on dates
mutually agreeable to the parties within forty-five days of the date on which the final Order on
these Motions to Compel is entered. The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to meet and confer with
Autonation in good faith regarding dates for Plaintiffs’ respective depositions as ordered above.
The Court ORDERS plaintiff Carter to pay a monetary sanction in the amount of $2,500.00 to
Autonation within forty-five (45) days of the date on which Autonation serves Notice of the
Court’s final Order on the Motions to Compel on Ms. Carter.
The Court ORDERS plaintiff Daniels to pay a monetary sanction in the amount of $2,000.00 to
Autonation within forty-five (45) days of the date on which Autonation serves Notice of the
Court’s final Order on the Motions to Compel on Mr. Daniels.
The Court notes possible defects in the relevant Notices of Deposition, which seek to conduct
remote depositions of each of Plaintiffs by zoom videoconference but do not contain the location
of the deposition officer. (See CCP §§ 2025.230, 2025.250, 2025.260 and CRC Rule 3.1010.
Rule 3.1010 allows parties to conduct remote depositions, but the noticing party is required to
make all arrangements to allow the deponent to participate remotely and expressly states that the
deponent must appear “as required by statute.”) However, by failing to timely serve written
objections to the Deposition Notices or to respond in any way to the Deposition Notices, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs have waived any defects in the Notices of Deposition. Similarly,
Plaintiffs have waived any objections to the present Motions to Compel by failure to timely
respond.
The Court has reviewed the evidence in support of Autonation’s monetary sanctions requests and
finds that in the totality of the circumstances, including Plaintiffs’ in pro per status, Autonation’s
out-of-pocket costs for court reporters, and the prior monetary sanctions awards against Plaintiffs
in this action, the sanctions awards ordered above are appropriate.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
HG21114959: Carter VS Autonation Honda Fremont
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by
Autonation Honda Fremont (Defendant) in Department 512
The Court reminds Plaintiffs that, although they may elect to represent themselves in pro per,
they must comply with the same rules of civil procedure as litigants represented by professional
legal counsel. (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98.)
The Court advises Autonation that Plaintiffs’ correct mailing address appears to be:
1705 E. 23rd STREET [not Avenue]
Merced, CA 95340
Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint lists the wrong address, Plaintiffs’ Summons appears to contain
the correct address.
CONTESTING TENTATIVE RULINGS
PLEASE NOTE: If any party contests the tentative ruling, the hearing on the motion will occur
remotely via the court’s own video-conferencing system.
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, subdivision (a)(1), this tentative ruling will become
the order of the Court unless it is contested before 4:00 PM on the court day preceding the
noticed hearing date.
To contest a tentative ruling, a party should do the following:
First, the party must notify Department 512, by email at Dept512@alameda.courts.ca.gov and
copy all counsel of record and self-represented parties. The contesting party must state in the
subject line of the email the case name, case number and motion.
Second, the party shall log into the eCourt Public Portal, search for this case (e.g., by case
number), select the case name, select the "Tentative Rulings" tab, click the "Click to Contest this
Ruling" button, enter the party's name and a brief statement of the party's reason for contesting
the tentative, and click "Proceed."
Parties may appear via videoconference, using the Zoom.com website or application.
TO CONNECT TO ZOOM:
Join the meeting using the following link: https://www.zoomgov.com/j/16057661931
Join the meeting by Phone:
Meeting ID: 160 5766 1931
1 669 254 5252, 16057661931# US (San Jose)
1 669 216 1590, 16057661931# US (San Jose)
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
HG21114959: Carter VS Autonation Honda Fremont
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by
Autonation Honda Fremont (Defendant) in Department 512
833 568 8864 US Toll-free
Ruling
DEBORAH K. OGAWA VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC, ET AL.
Jul 17, 2024 |
21STCV11734
Case Number:
21STCV11734
Hearing Date:
July 17, 2024
Dept:
58
Judge Bruce Iwasaki
Department 58
Hearing Date:
July 17, 2024
Case Name:
Deborah K. Ogawa v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Case No.:
21STCV11734
Motion:
Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs
Moving Party:
Plaintiff Deborah K. Ogawa
Responding Party:
Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Tentative Ruling:
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $70,212.
As to Plaintiffs costs, Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.
I.
Background
Plaintiff purchased a 2018 Honda Odyssey manufactured and distributed by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle contained or developed defects during the warranty period.
Plaintiff alleges that shepresented the vehicle to Defendant for repairs and Defendant was unable to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide her with restitution pursuant to Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on November 8, 2021.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement on May 3, 2024.
II.
Legal Standard
A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).)
The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. (
Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.
¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him]. (
Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc
.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. (
Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿
(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿
¿¿
A court may reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.¿¿(
Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (
Id.
¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be reasonably specific and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (
Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyers damages recovery. (
Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)
III.
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff and Defendant request judicial notice of court opinions in other Song Beverly cases discussing counsels rates.
The request for RJN is granted.
IV.
Evidentiary Objections
Defendants Objections to Shahians Declaration are overruled.
Defendants Objections to Castros Declaration are sustained.
Plaintiffs Objections to Stuhlbergs Declaration are overruled.
IV.
Discussion
Plaintiff moves for attorneys fees as prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d) and the parties settlement agreement. Plaintiff obtained a settlement of $82,500 from Defendant after three years of litigation wherein Defendant agreed that Plaintiff would be prevailing party for purposes of a fee motion.
(Castro Dec., ¶78, Ex. 4.)
Plaintiff argues she is clearly the prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d) and is entitled to a mandatory fee award in the amount of $129,110.59 based on (1) $84,751.50 in attorneys fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (SLP); (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement; (3) $11,196.06 in costs and expenses for SLP; and (4) an additional $3,500 for Plaintiffs counsel to review the Opposition, draft the Reply and attend the hearing on the Motion.
Plaintiffs attorneys fees are based on 164.6 hours of attorney time.
Plaintiffs counsel identifies no fewer than nineteen attorneys who worked on this case.
The hourly rates of these attorneys ranged from $350 to $650.
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees as prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d).
Defendant argues, however, that when the parties were negotiating settlement, Plaintiff represented that the attorneys fees would range from $40,000 to $50,000.
Defendant argues Plaintiffs request for $129,110.59 in fees is excessive.
Defendant argues Plaintiff is, at most, entitled to $21,000 for this cookie cutter litigation.
Defendant objects to the hourly rate and number of attorneys assigned to the case as excessive.
Defendant argues the hourly rate should be set at no more than $350/hr for all attorneys.
Defendant objects to the number of hours as excessive given the cookie-cutter nature of Song Beverly litigation.
Defendant attached as Exhibit A to the Opposition a table addressing each of the time entries submitted by Plaintiff.
Defendant also objects to the costs requested and requests a reduction of $6,023.
Number of hours excessive and improper time entries submitted
Plaintiff counsel expended 164.6 hours on this litigation, which was pending for approximately three years and was litigated up to the eve of trial.
Parties submitted motions in limine and engaged in a last minute mediation before Judge Stern.
(Minute Order dated January 4, 2024.)
·
Improper redactions.
Based on a review of Plaintiffs time entries, the entries on the following dates are so heavily redacted that the court cannot determine their reasonableness or the nature of the task performed:
(1) 3/15/22, Avelino, .5 hours @ $595/hr for a total of $297.50; (2) 9/29/22, Mkrdech, 7.6 hours @ $350/hr for a total of $2,660; (3) 11/9/22, Carvalho, .7 hours @ $550/hr for a total of $385; (4) 11/10/22, Mkrdech, 1.4 @ $350/hr for a total of $490; (5) 6/28/23, Carvalho and .7 hours @ $570/hr for a total of $399.
As such, the requested fee award is reduced by $4,231.50 for failure to provide sufficient detail regarding the work performed.
(Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, pp. 1 and 2.)
·
Unreasonably excessive time entries.
Counsel Deleon spent (1) 2.4 hours on 5/10/23 preparing for deposition of Defendants PMQ; (2) 3.4 hours on 5/11/23 preparing for deposition of Defendants PMQ; and (3) 7.8 hours on 5/12/23 preparing and taking the deposition of Defendants PMQ.
The billable rate for the task was $575/hr.
Counsels entry on 5/12/23 also improperly block billed multiple tasks.
(Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 2.) The amount billed for the PMQ deposition totaled $7,820.
The amount of billable time for both preparation and taking the deposition is
reduced
from 13.6 hours @ $575/hr to 8 hours @ $575/hr for a total of $4600, a reduction of $3,220.
Counsel Miller indicates that he spent 10 hours preparing for, travel to and attend continued FSC on January 5, 2024.
(Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 3.) The Jury Trial/FSC began at 9 a.m. and the settlement was put on the record.
(Minute Order dated 1/8/24.)
There is nothing indicating that preparation for and attendance at the FSC on 1/5/24 would have required 10 hours.
The 1/5/24 entry by Miller for 10 hours @ $595/hr for a total of $5,950 is
reduced
to 5 hours @ $595/hr for a total $2,975, a reduction of $2,975.
·
Estimated time for reply prep and hearing attendance
.
Plaintiffs counsel estimates $3,500 for preparation of the reply and hearing attendance.
Counsel does not provide an hourly rate for this estimate.
However, using the maximum rate allowed as discussed below ($575/hr), the number of hours spent would be 6 hours @ $575/hr for a total of $3,500.
Given the reply, including objections and additional evidence, six hours for opposition review, reply prep and hearing attendance is reasonable.
In total, the requested fees are reduced by $10,426.50 due to excessive hours or improperly redacted time entries.
This leaves a balance of $72,073.50.
Hourly rates
The hourly rates to be used in computing the lodestar must be within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.
(
Children's Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta ́
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783;
PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095
(The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work).
Particularly where it is difficult to obtain evidence of market based rates for the same type of work, the courts look at fees charged for cases requiring similar skills.
(
The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com.
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 522, 536537;
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger
(9th Cir.2010) 608 F.3d 446, 454455 (all attorneys in the community engaged in equally complex Federal litigation, no matter the subject matter).
In determining the reasonable rate and reasonable hours, the Court looks to that prevailing in the community for similar work.
(
PLCM Group, Inc.
,
supra
, 22 Cal.4th at 1095;
Ketchum, supra
, 24 Cal.4th at 1132 (the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community).
A reasonable trial court might determine that the similar workor comparable legal services related to insurance defense litigation, rather than to civil litigation in general. Were the court to so conclude, it could view the relevant market to be that of insurance defense litigation and litigators, rather than general civil litigation. The market rate for such services might be limited accordingly. Again, we emphasize that such determinations lie within the broad discretion of the trial court.
(
Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702703.)
The burden is on the fee applicant to produce evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar work.
(
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1019.)
Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.
(
Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)
The trial court is not required to adopt counsels opinion as to the market rate for services of the type performed.
(
Syers Properties III
,
supra
, 226 Cal.App.4th at 702.)
The trial court may accept the actual rate charged as the reasonable rate.
(
Id.
)
Plaintiffs counsel consisted of nineteen attorneys who performed work at hourly rates of $350, $385, $400, $450, $460, $475, $495, $550, $570, $575, $595, $610, $620 and $650.
(Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 5.)
Counsel Shahian testifies as to his extensive experience in Song Beverly litigation, but he does not seek recovery for his time supervising this matter.
(
Id.
at ¶¶1-45, 86.)
The experience and background of the remaining attorneys is set forth in Shahians declaration.
(
Id.
at ¶¶46-84.)
Based on a review of the attorneys profiles and the market rate charged for similar services based on the courts own experience, the hourly rates charged above $575 are excessive.
Those hours billed at $595, $610, $620 and $650 are recalculated at the hourly rate of $575.
·
Avelino.
7.8 hours @ $595 for a total of $4,641 reduced to $4,485, for total reduction of $156.
·
Carvalho.
.9 hours @ $595 for a total of $535 reduced to $517, for total reduction of $18.
·
Lunn.
4.9 hours @ $620 and 9.8 @ $650 for a total of $9,408 reduced to $8,452.50, for a total reduction of $955.50.
·
McCallister and Miller. 34.5 hours @ $595 for a total of $20,527.50 reduced to $19,837.50, for a total reduction of $690.
·
Vaziri.
1.2 hours @ $610 for a total of $732 reduced to $690, for a total reduction of $42.
The adjustment of hourly rates claimed by six of the nineteen attorneys will also address the overstaffing issue raised by Defendant. In total, the requested fee award is reduced by $1,861.50 for excessive hourly rates.
Applying this further reduction to the balance of $72,073.50, the total remaining attorneys fees total $70,212.
Multiplier
Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.
(
Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.
(
Santana v. FCA US, LLC
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351.)
Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation.
(
Id.
)
The court may not consider the contingent nature of the representation in both setting the lodestar and applying a modifier.
(
Id
.)
Another factor considered by a court in applying a multiplier is the result obtained.
The results obtained factor can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort produced an exceptional benefit.
(
Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp
. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 582.)
The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.
(
Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.)
Plaintiff fails to present any facts that would require a multiplier to compensate counsel for their services at fair market value. The lodestar presented by counsel, as adjusted by the Court, fixes the fee at fair market value.
The cases did not involve any novel legal issues.
There is no justification to apply a multiplier.
Costs
Plaintiff includes a request for an award of costs in the amount of $11,196.06.
(Shahian, Dec., Ex. 20, pp. 4-5.)
Defendant objects to the costs on grounds that no supporting documentation is provided, several entries associated with the demurrer provide no explanation as to the nature of the $896.95 in costs, the basis for $2,837.89 in deposition costs when the deposition only lasted a few hours and $4,614 in unnecessary reporter fees on 1/3/24, 1/8/24 and 1/10/24.
Parties stipulated that Defendant would pay Plaintiffs reasonable fees and costs. (Castro Dec., Exs. 2 and 4, ¶2.)
Parties also referenced a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs and stipulated that Plaintiff would be prevailing party for purposes of such a motion.
However, there is nothing explicitly stating that Plaintiff would not be required to file a memorandum of costs under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.
Based on the mandatory language of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, Plaintiff must comply with the procedure for recovery of costs under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, which requires submission of a verified memorandum of costs within 15 days of mailing of notice of entry of judgment.
Submission of a memorandum of costs would organize the requested costs into categories under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.
A memorandum of costs would also trigger Defendants right to tax those costs by noticed motion, with an opportunity to reply to any opposition.
Plaintiffs request for fees by noticed motion is denied.
Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is GRANTED as to the request for attorneys fees in the amount of $70,212.
As to Plaintiffs costs, Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.
Ruling
J CELLARS INVESTMENTS LLC, ET AL. VS HDI GLOBAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Jul 17, 2024 |
22STCV31468
Case Number:
22STCV31468
Hearing Date:
July 17, 2024
Dept:
53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles Central District
Department 53
j cellars investments, llc, d/b/a joseph cellars winery
, et al.;
Plaintiffs
,
vs.
hdi global insurance company
, et al.;
Defendants
.
Case No.:
22STCV31468
Hearing Date:
July 17, 2024
Time:
10:00 a.m.
[tentative] Order
RE:
plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to interrogatories
MOVING PARTY:
Plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC, d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery
RESPONDING PARTY:
Defendant HDI Global Insurance Company
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC, d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery (Plaintiff) moves the court for an order (1) compelling defendant HDI Global Insurance Company (Defendant) to serve further responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-12, 28-33, 38-44, 53-56, 62, 64-68, and 74-80, and (2) awarding monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $14,420.
The court grants
Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-8, and 10-11 because the objections to those interrogatories are without merit.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3).)
The court grants
Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further response to Special Interrogatory number 9 because Defendant has not met its burden to establish that the information requested is protected from disclosure by Insurance Code section 791.13 since it appears that section 791.13 limits the disclosure of personal or privileged information about an individual, and this interrogatory does not ask for such information.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3); Ins. Code, §§ 791.13 [An insurance institution, agent, or insurance-support organization shall not disclose any personal or privileged information
about an individual
] [emphasis added], 791.02, subd. (i) [Individual means
any natural person
who is any of the following . . . .] [emphasis added].)
The court denies Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 12, 42-43, 53-54, 62-63, 66, 73-75, and 78 because Defendants answers to those interrogatories are not evasive or incomplete.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1).)
The court grants
Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 28-33, 38-41, 44, 55-56, 64-65, 67-68, 76-77, and 79-80 because Defendants answers to those interrogatories are evasive and incomplete.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1).)
The court grants Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions against Defendant.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
The court finds that $8,470 ((12 hours x $700 hourly rate) + $70 motion filing fee) is a reasonable amount of sanctions to impose against Defendant in connection with this motion.
(Rogari Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.)
The court denies Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
ORDER
The court grants in part plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winerys motion to compel further responses to interrogatories as follows.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, the court orders defendant HDI Global Insurance Company to serve further, full and complete answers to plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winerys Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-11, 28-33, 38-41, 44, 55-56, 64-65, 67-68, 76-77, and 79-80, which comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.210-2030.250, within 20 days of the date of this order.
The court orders defendant HDI Global Insurance Company to pay monetary sanctions to plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery in the amount of $8,470 within 30 days of the date of this order.
The court orders plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
July 17, 2024
_____________________________
Robert B. Broadbelt III
Judge of the Superior Court
