Temple Heights Llc Vs. Atomic Investments, Inc.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINT FOR OTHER TANAGHO VS REYNOLDS PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY CVRI2302786 SPORTS MANAGEMENT DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT (OVER $25,000) OF EMAN TANAGHO BY CITY OF CHINO HILLS Tentative Ruling: Motion granted. Sustain the objections to Plaintiff’s response to separate statement; sustain the objections to the Caress, Lara, and Wang declarations; overrule the objections to the Rodriguez declaration. I. Wrongful Death Based on Negligence The wrongful death cause of action gives the representatives of a decedent as totally new right of action to compensate the heirs for the loss of companionship or other losses suffered as a result of the decedent’s death. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1263.) The elements of a wrongful death cause of action are: (1) wrongful act or neglect on the part of one or more persons that (2) causes (3) the death of another person. (Norbart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 383, 390.) To establish proximate cause in a wrongful death case, the wrongful act must be a substantial factor in bringing about the death. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1497.) “The actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.” (Id at 1498.) a. Waiver & Release Applicability to Incident Defendants first argue that the Waiver and Release signed by Decedent is valid and bars Plaintiff’s claims. A release may negate the duty element of a negligence action. (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2004) 104 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356) An exculpatory contract releasing a party from liability for future negligence is valid unless it is prohibited by statute or impairs public interests. (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 631, 637.) “Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1356-1357.) This includes a release of all premises liability. (Id at 1359.) The scope of the release is determined the express language of the contract and may apply to all acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, including risks for which plaintiff had no prior knowledge. (Id at 1357.) “With respect to the question of express waiver, the legal issue is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies.” (Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1484.) To be a valid release, the waiver must be “clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.” (Id at 1485.) Express assumption of the risk involves an agreement by the plaintiff to assume the risks of a particular activity and to relieve the defendant from liability. (Ferrell v. Southern Nev. Off-Road Enthusiasts, Ltd. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 309, 318.) So long as the express agreement to assume the risk does not violate public policy, it will be upheld and will constitute a complete bar to a negligence cause of action. (Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589].) “When parties intend for an express assumption of risk provision to exceed the inherent risk of the endeavor for which the release is signed, it is especially important for parties to clearly, explicitly and comprehensibly state the inclusion of noninherent risks.” (Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 12811289. The Release states, in pertinent part, that decedent “release[s] Big League Dreams Chino Hills, LLC…and their parent and affiliate entities and the officers, members, managers, owners, directors, contractors, employees, umpires…and agents of each of the foregoing entities and the City of Chino Hills and its elected officials, officers and employees (collectively the “released parties”) from or with respect to any and all premises or other liability from any cause whatsoever (including, without limitation, negligence in rendering, or not rendering, medical or emergency aid) and for any and all loss of life, bodily injury…” (emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s claims are based on the allegation that Defendants “breached their respective duty of care owed to [decedent] by failing to have an EMT and an AED available for use on [decedent]” (Comp. ¶20). Plaintiff alleges decedent died as a result of Defendants’ negligence while playing an adult softball game at Big League Dreams Chino Hills. (Comp. ¶12.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are based on an act of negligence by Defendants related to use of the Big League Dreams facilities, which is directly covered by the Release. Defendants have met their initial burden to show that the Release bars Plaintiff’s claim. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence of a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff makes several arguments. b. Chino Hills’ Answer to Complaint Plaintiff argues that a release is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pled in the pleadings. Plaintiff notes Big League Dreams pled the release in its Answer in its sixth affirmative defense, but argues that the City’s Answer did not specifically plead the release. Rather, the City’s sixth affirmative defense simply pled assumption of risk. Plaintiff argues this means that the City’s motion must be denied. If not raised in the answer at all, matters constituting an affirmative defense are irrelevant at trial. (Carranza v. Noroian (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 481, 488.) However, where a defense is defectively pleaded, it may be allowed if the pleading gives sufficient notice to enable plaintiff to prepare to meet the defense. (See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.) In addition, the court may grant leave to amend an answer or permit the matter to be raised in a summary judgment motion so long as there is no prejudice to plaintiff. (Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488; Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic School (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1328, 1341.) Here, City’s Answer arguably gives Plaintiff sufficient notice to prepare to meet the release defense. Decedent assumed the risk associated with playing at the sports complex, which was memorialized in the release. Furthermore, there is no prejudice to Plaintiff if the court permits the City to argue the release defense in its motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff is addressing the exact same issue as to Big League Dreams. c. Waiver & Release’s Validity Plaintiff argues the release is not enforceable because it is not easily readable given that it has a font size smaller than 8 points. Plaintiff also contends the Arial font is more difficult to read to the normal person than Times New Roman. To support this argument, Plaintiff cites Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 511, 521. That case deal with a release provision printed in six-point type. The court specifically did not decide if the size of the font mattered to judicial enforcement of the release – “although we need not decide the issues, we question whether public policy in this state would permit judicial enforcement of a provision printed in such small type…” (Id. at p. 521.) This is dicta and is not a legal holding. This court cannot deny the motion for summary judgment on this basis. Plaintiff also provides the declaration of Val Lara, employee of Amazon Graphics. Lara states the release is in Ariel font, which is “a more difficult font type to read for the normal person than Times New Roman.” (Lara Decl. ¶5.) This does not create a triable issue of material fact. There is no authority that states a release is invalid because it is written in Ariel font and there is no evidence that decedent could not read the release given its font. d. Separate Statement Plaintiff next argues that Big League Dreams failed to set forth in its separate statement a clear statement negating the element of duty or assumption of the risk. Plaintiff argues that Big League Dreams could have stated in its separate statement that it didn’t not have a duty to have an EMT or AED available but instead it said “There was no requirement for [AEDs] or medical personnel to be maintained at Big League’s Sports Park in Chino Hills when the incident occurred on May 27, 2022.” (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiff is grasping at straws. The Separate Statement sets forth Defendant’s contentions and addresses the only cause of action before the court (negligence). (See CRC Rule 3.1350(d).) e. Big League Dreams’ Required to have EMT on site? Plaintiff argues that Big League Dreams was required to have an EMT/AED available at the facility. Plaintiff provides the declaration of Jack Caress in support of this argument. Caress has a career in sports marketing and production and has a “wide-ranging business, academic, and personal career in a variety of enterprises and creative ventures.” (Caress Decl. ¶1.) He is the founder and CEO of Pacific Sports LLC which has produced over 440 multisport events throughout the world. (¶¶1, 3.) Caress has provided expert commentary on CBS, NBC, ESPN, Fox and Cablevision Sports and has competed in/directed over 100 triathlons. (¶¶4-5.) Caress renders three opinions. First, Caress states that based on the size of the Big League Dreams Sports Complex, “an AED and EMT should have been required and available for use in such an emergency situation that [decedent] was in.” (¶13(1).) Caress states that the use of an AED or presence of an EMT “could have meant the difference between life and death.” (Ibid.) Caress is not a medical doctor and does not have any training in the medical field. Caress does not have any authority (policy, statute, best practices, etc.) to explain why he believes and AED or EMT should have been “required.” Second, Caress states that in his research, he has “found no law in the State of California that specifically states that an AED or EMT is required to be present and available during a baseball game…however, it is highly recommended that sport complexes or facilities of this size have at least an AED available.” (¶13(2).) Again, Caress does not state who or what entity “highly recommend[s]” having an AED available. This statement is simply Caress’s musing on the subject. Third, Caress again acknowledges “there is no law that specifically states that an AED or EMT is specifically required to be available at a baseball game or sports complex,” but sets forth his opinion that “an AED and EMT should b[e] available at a [large] sports complex, such as Big League Dreams.” (¶13(3).) Caress’s statement of opinion does not constitute evidence that the failure of Defendants to have an AED or EMT present at the facility constitutes negligence or gross negligence. f. Gross Negligence Plaintiff argues the failure to have an EMT and AED on site can be construed as gross negligence, which is not barred by the Release. Public policy precludes enforcement of an agreement that would shelter a party from its own aggravated misconduct; thus a release exculpating a party from negligence liability does not extend to gross negligence (failure to adhere to even a minimal standard of care). (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 776-777; Rosecrans v. Dover Images, Ltd. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1088.) Gross negligence is defined in California as either a “want of even scant care” or “an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1185-1186.) It “connotes such a lack of care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results.” (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 857 (quoting Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729.) Failure to follow an industry’s standard safety practices can constitute gross negligence. (Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546, 557.) Generally, whether an act constitutes gross negligence is an issue of fact; however, summary judgment may be granted where the complaint alleges no facts showing an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care. (City of Santa Barbara, surpa, 41 Cal. 4th at 767.) The Complaint asserts one cause of action for negligence but no cause of action for gross negligence. However, California does not recognize a distinct cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence. (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal. 4th at 779-780.) Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to plead gross negligence as a cause of action separate from the negligence cause of action. To plead gross negligence, the plaintiff must plead the traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation and damages, as well as extreme conduct on the part of the defendant. (Rosencrans, supra, 192 at 1082.) Plaintiff’s argument is based on Jack Caress’ declaration. As discussed more fully above, the Caress declaration does not present any evidence of a triable issue of material fact concerning Defendants’ alleged gross negligence. It is simply Caress’ opinion that an AED or EMT should have been available but Caress acknowledges twice that there is no law or statute requiring such things at sporting facilities. Caress’ opinion does not present any triable issue of material fact concerning gross negligence. Even if Caress’ opinion shows ordinary negligence (which it does not), there is certainly no evidence of a want of scant care by Defendants.

Case Number: 21STCV04307 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On February 3, 2021, July 29, 2022, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente filed this action against Defendants City of Los Angeles (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort. Also on February 3, 2021, the Court appointed Ani Piliposian to serve as Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes guardian ad litem. On May 3, 2021, Plaintiffs Hernan Vicente, Ani Piliposian, and Nicholas Vicente, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem, filed a first amended complaint against Defendant and Does 1-50 for negligencemotor vehicle (Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a)). On May 24, 2021, Defendant filed an answer. On January 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On June 20, 2024, Petitioner Ani Piliposian (Petitioner) filed a petition for expedited approval of the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente s claims. PETITIONERS REQUESTS Petitioner asks the Court for expedited approval of the compromise of the action of minor Plaintiff Nicholas Vicente ("Plaintiff"). DISCUSSION In Section 8 of the petition, Petitioner states that Plaintiff received treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. However, the petition does not include medical expenses for this treatment (see Section 13a) or provide medical or billing records from Childrens Hospital Los Angeles. The Department of Health Care Services February 5, 2024 letter does not state that Medi-Cal paid for Childrens Hospital Los Angeles treatment. Petitioner should explain whether Plaintiff incurred medical expenses for treatment at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles, the amount of those expenses, and whether those expenses will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. The Court cannot approve the petition unless it shows that the minors compromise will reimburse all of Plaintiffs medical expenses that have not been reduced or waived. The non-medical expenses include $100.02 for Administrative/Misc. fee. (Section 14b.) The Court will not award this amount without evidence that it qualifies as an allowable cost under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5., subdivision (a), or is allowable as a cost expressly authorized by law (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)). Section 19b(2) of the petition states that Petitioner will provide the name, address, and branch of the depository in Attachment 19b(2). The petition does not include an Attachment 19b(2). The Court denies the petition. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Nicolas Vicentes action filed by Petitioner Ani Piliposian on June 20, 2024. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 21STCV07734 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER 21STCV07734 MOTIONS Motion to Substitute MOVING PARTIES Plaintiff Maria Cabriales OPPOSING PARTY None MOTIONS Plaintiff Maria Cabriales (Plaintiff) moves for an order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.31, substituting Lourdes Cabriales, Fermin Javier Cabriales, Jesus Jose Cabriales, Jose Federico Cabriales, Maria Zoila Diaz Cabriales, and Hector Hugo Cabriales, Plaintiffs only children, in their capacity as successors in interest to the deceased Plaintiff, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.11. No opposition has been filed. ANALYSIS California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31 provides that the decedents personal representative or, if none, the decedents successor in interest may continue a decedents pending action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30; see Adams v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 78-79.) A successor in interest is the beneficiary of the decedents estate or other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the subject of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.11.) Section 377.33 provides that the court in which an action is continued may make any order concerning parties that is appropriate to ensure proper administration of justice, including the appointment of the decedents successor in interest as a special administrator or guardian ad litem. Section 377.32 provides that a person who seeks to commence such an action as the decedents successor in interest must file an affidavit or declaration providing certain information, including the decedents name, date and place of decedents death, and statements regarding whether the estate has been administered and that the affiant or declarant is the successor in interest on decedents claim. ( Id ., § 377.32(a).) A certified copy of the decedents death certificate must also be attached to the affidavit or declaration. ( Id ., § 377.32(c).) Here, Plaintiff filed her complaint on February 26, 2021. Plaintiff passed away on March 14, 2022. A certified copy of Plaintiffs death certificate has been attached. (Exh. 1.) The certificate shows that Plaintiff was widowed at the time of death. The Court finds that Lourdes Cabriales, Fermin Javier Cabriales, Jesus Jose Cabriales, Jose Federico Cabriales, Maria Zoila Diaz Cabriales, and Hector Hugo Cabriales have filed declarations, under penalty of perjury, that they are Plaintiffs only children and successor in interest to Plaintiffs interest in this action. Therefore, the motion to substitute is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants the motion to substitute Lourdes Cabriales, Fermin Javier Cabriales, Jesus Jose Cabriales, Jose Federico Cabriales, Maria Zoila Diaz Cabriales, and Hector Hugo Cabriales as successors in interest to Maria Cabriales, deceased. Moving Party shall give notice of the Courts orders, and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 20STCV47746 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Petition to Approve Compromise of Minor Plaintiffs, RDB and David Blandin, individually and as successors-in-interest to Decedent, Christina Elizabeth Hurley filed this action against Defendants, Dignity Health, et al. for wrongful death/medical malpractice. RDB is a minor and has appeared in this action through his GAL and his attorney. The parties have agreed to a global settlement of the entire case, and Blandin, as RDBs parent and GAL, seeks approval of RDBs settlement. The Court has reviewed the petition to approve the settlement, and finds there are errors that must be cured before the Court can approve the settlement. ¶10 of the unredacted version of the petition contains a redaction. ¶11 appears to contain incorrect and incomplete information. 11(a) is checked, which is appropriate when no other plaintiff has a settlement of the case. 11(b) is not checked, but is filled out; this should only be filled out if another plaintiff is receiving settlement proceeds. 11b(3) indicates Petitioner is not a party to the case, but this is not correct. Petitioner is a plaintiff in the case. Notably, the Notice of Settlement, filed on 5/28/24, indicates the entire case has settled. All terms of the settlement with all parties must be disclosed in ¶11, including the amounts of settlement and reasons for apportionment of the settlement proceeds. Additionally, if Counsel will receive funds from Petitioners settlement, those funds must be disclosed at ¶17c. Finally, the Court notes that Petitioner wishes to have $55,000 transferred to a custodian pursuant to the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Petitioner failed to file required Attachment 18b(6), which would set forth the name and address of the proposed custodian and the money or other property to be transferred to the custodian. Petitioner is admonished to fully review Probate Code §3900, et seq., if Petitioner wishes to have monies transferred in this manner. By way of example, Petitioner must review §3912, which details the duties of custodians, including 3912(e), which requires the custodian to keep records of the monies and to make those records available to a parent or legal representative of the minor or to the minor himself if he has attained the age of 14. Petitioner is admonished that he cannot be the custodian of the monies. Petitioner must reserve a hearing for a future petition to approve minors compromise and must file and serve an amended petition curing the above defects at least sixteen court days prior to the hearing date. 2. Motion to Seal Records Petitioner moves to seal the various documents detailed above, contending the parties settlement agreement includes a confidentiality provision, such that all documents revealing the amount of the settlement, amount of attorneys fees, and healthcare records should be redacted. a. Law Governing Motions to Seal (1) Scope of Rules. C.R.C., Rules 2.550 and 2.551 apply to trial court records sealed or proposed to be sealed by court order. They do not apply to discovery motions and records in discovery proceedings, but do apply to discovery materials used at trial or submitted for adjudication of matters other than discovery proceedings. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(a).) (2) Records Presumed To Be Open. Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(c).) (3) Findings Required To Seal Records. The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish all of the following: (a) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(d)(1).) (b) The overriding interest supports sealing the record. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(d)(2).) (c) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(d)(3).) (d) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(d)(4).) (e) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(d)(5).) (4) What Constitutes an Overriding Interest? The Advisory Committee Comment to C.R.C., Rule 2.550 notes that the rule leaves the determination of what constitutes an overriding interest to case law and that, in appropriate circumstances, courts have found various statutory privileges, trade secrets, and privacy interests to be overriding interests. (5) Court Approval Required. A record may not be filed under seal without a court order or based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(a).) (6) Motion/Application To Seal Record. Sealing a record is requested by a motion or application for an order sealing the record, supported by a memorandum and a declaration of facts sufficient to justify sealing. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(1).) If necessary to prevent disclosure, the motion or application and supporting and opposing documents may be filed in a public redacted version and lodged in a complete version conditionally under seal. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(5).) A copy of the motion or application must be served on all parties who have appeared. A party who already possesses copies of the records to be placed under seal must be served with both a complete unredacted version and a redacted version. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(2).) (7) Lodging Records Conditionally Under Seal. When the motion or application is made, the record is lodged conditionally under seal unless the record has previously been lodged or good cause exists for not lodging it. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(4).) A record that may be filed under seal is lodged with the court in a sealed envelope or container labeled conditionally under seal with a cover sheet containing the information required on a caption page and stating that the record is subject to a motion or application to file the record under seal. The clerk endorses the cover sheet with the date of receipt and retains the record without filing. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(d).) (8) Procedure for Confidential Documents. A party who files or intends to file documents disclosed during discovery that are subject to a confidentiality agreement or a protective order but does not intend to request sealing must (a) lodge the unredacted records and other documents that disclose their contents conditionally under seal, (b) file redacted copies that do not disclose the contents, and (c) give written notice to the party who produced the records that the records and documents lodged under seal will be placed in the public court file unless that party files a motion or application to seal the records. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(3)(A).) Within 10 days, the party who receives the notice may file a motion or application to seal the records or to extend the time to file. If the party does so, the documents remain conditionally under seal until the court rules on the application or motion. If the party does not do so, the clerk promptly places the documents in the public file. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(3)(B).) (9) Contents of Sealing Order. The order sealing a record must be narrowly tailored, specifically set forth the facts that support the findings and [d]irect the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of the documents must be placed in the public file. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(e).) The order must state whether the order itself, the register of actions, any other court records, or any other records in the case are to be sealed and whether any person other than the court is authorized to inspect the record. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(e)(2), (e)(3).) Unless the sealing order provides otherwise, the parties may not disclose the contents of any sealed materials in subsequently filed records or papers. (C.R.C., Rule 2.550(e)(4).) There must be no less restrictive means to achieve the overriding interests. These findings embody constitutional requirements for a request to seal court records, protecting the First Amendment right of public access to civil trials. (See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218; Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 97, 104; People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App 4th 1009, 1026 in determining whether to seal records, courts must weigh constitutional requirements for disclosure against such factors as privacy rights.) (10) Grant of Motion or Application. If the court grants the motion or application, the clerk replaces the cover sheet with a file-endorsed copy of the court's order and labels the record sealed by order of the court on (date). (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(e)(1).) (11) Denial of Motion or Application. If the motion or application is denied, the clerk returns the lodged record to the requesting party and does not place it in the case file unless that party notifies the clerk in writing within 10 days after denial that the record is to be filed. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(b)(6).) (12) Custody of Sealed Records. Sealed records are securely filed and kept separate from the public file in the case. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(f).) Where voluminous records in the possession of a public agency are to be sealed, the order may direct the agency to maintain the records in a secure fashion. (C.R.C., Rule 2.551(g).) b. Settlement Agreement Confidentiality Pursuant to Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4 th 233, 241, it is in the public interest to uphold the confidentiality of a private settlement. Petitioner lodged an unredacted version of the petition to approve minors compromise, and also filed a redacted version. The main difference between the redacted and unredacted version of the petition is the amount of the settlement. Additionally, as noted above, the names of the settling defendants are redacted from both versions of the document. The Court wishes to hear from Counsel, at the hearing, concerning why the names of the settling defendants are redacted. Notably, their identify is public record, as the complaint and all other documents in the case remain unsealed. The Court finds the redactions concerning amounts are appropriately and narrowly tailored. The Court will grant the motion to seal the entire petition, but will only permit Petitioner to file the amended petition with the names sealed if the Court is satisfied with the explanation at the hearing. The Court will make an order concerning the amended petition at the time of the hearing, such that no additional motion to seal the amended petition need be filed. The Judicial Assistant will handle the petition in accordance with the procedure detailed above. 3. Conclusion The motion to seal documents is granted. The petition to approve compromise is denied without prejudice for the reasons set forth above. Petitioner must file an amended petition curing all defects at least sixteen court days prior to any newly scheduled hearing date.

Case Number: 22STCV08568 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: B EDGAR ESTURBAN V. IRLANDA SANCHEZ, ET AL. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Date of Hearing: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: 9/19/24 Department: B Case No.: 22STCV08568 Moving Party: Defendant ZLS Trans Inc. Responding Party: None BACKGROUND This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff Edgar Esturban filed a complaint on March 9, 2022. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against Defendants Irlanda Sanchez; Jose Alejandro Medina; Uber Technologies; Raiser, LLC; and Raiser-CA, LLC alleging (1) negligence; (2) negligence per se; and (3) negligent entrustment. On June 7, 2024, Defendant ZLS Trans Inc. (ZLS) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On July 12, 2024, ZLS filed a notice of non-opposition. [Tentative] Ruling GRANT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. A. Meet and Confer CCP § 439(a) provides that Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. ZLS has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the motion. (Mitrovich Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) B. Legal Standard A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.] ( Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp . (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).) C. General Factual Allegations The SAC alleges Sanchez was the driver of a motor vehicle owned by Medina at the time of the collision on March 9, 2020. (SAC at ¶ 1.) ZLS is a transportation company that hires drivers to transport Uber users. ( Id . at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff drove a vehicle owned by ZLS at the time of the collision. ( Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff sustained injuries when Sanchez drove on the wrong side of the street, colliding head on with Plaintiffs vehicle while intoxicated. ( Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) The Uber Defendants are alleged to be employers, and that Plaintiff was within the scope of his employment with the Uber Defendants at the time of the collision because he had just dropped off a passenger on the Uber Defendants behalf. ( Id . at ¶¶ 7, 12.) Plaintiff was required to drive ZLS' vehicle using an Uber Defendants account managed by ZLS. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges the Uber Defendants failed to carry workers compensation insurance and denied Plaintiff access to any workers compensation coverage or benefits. ( Id . at ¶¶ 13, 26.) Uber Defendants required drivers like Plaintiff to follow multiple guidelines, including those related to vehicle safety, cleanliness, and payment. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was not allowed to independently negotiate prices with customers provided through ZLS and Uber Defendants Uber application. ( Id. ¶ 16.) In March 2020, despite a visible warning of a faulty airbag system in Plaintiffs vehicle, ZLS and Uber Defendants refused to inspect the warning and advised Plaintiff to ignore it. ( Id. ¶ 17.) ZLS and Uber Defendants were aware that Uber drivers, including Plaintiff, were involved in numerous collisions and at an increased risk without proper car safety systems like emergency braking and additional airbags. (SAC ¶ 18.) Defendant Employers failed to provide Plaintiff with specialized training to protect himself and the public from the inherent dangers of full-time driving. (SAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was not allowed to drive for Uber Defendants until he physically went to the Uber facility, got approved under the ZLS-controlled Uber account, and agreed to drive his own vehicle. (SAC ¶ 20.) 1. First Cause of Action - Negligence The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages. ( Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255; Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. ( Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) At the pleading stage, the Court will not consider the merits of ZLS contention that Sanchez was the superseding cause of the accident, such that the incident was solely caused by her. This is beyond the scope of the motion. In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether properly pled factual allegations, assumed to be true and liberally construed , are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ( Stone Street Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Com'n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 446, 452-53.) The Court also will not consider the merits of ZLS claim that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he was an employee of ZLS. The SAC alleges as such and for purposes of demurrer, they will be taken as true. (SAC ¶ 7.) ZLS argues that significant discrepancies and incongruities in Plaintiffs allegations demonstrate that Sanchez, not ZLS, was responsible for Plaintiffs injuries. One major discrepancy exists between Paragraphs 13 and 15 of the complaint. In Paragraph 13, Plaintiff alleges that ZLSs failure to provide workers compensation caused his injuries. However, in Paragraph 15, he claims that his injuries were sustained when Sanchez negligently drove on the wrong side of the street, resulting in a head-on collision with Plaintiffs vehicle. This inconsistency suggests that if the injuries occurred at the moment of the accident as described in Paragraph 15, the lack of workers compensation coveragewhich ZLS denies having a duty to providewould have had no impact on the causation of the injuries. Furthermore, in the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff makes several allegations that ZLS failed to provide necessary safety measures, such as readily available and economically reasonable avoidance systems, proper maintenance of safety mechanisms like airbags, and defensive driving training. (SAC ¶¶ 28-34.) However, Plaintiff does not contend that ZLS had a duty to provide these measures. The only mention of duty is in Paragraph 22, related to an allegation against Sanchez. This indicates that Plaintiff was aware of the importance of alleging a duty for a negligence claim but only attributed this duty to Sanchez, implying a tacit admission that the duty violation was solely by Sanchez. The Court agrees with ZLSs arguments and finds that the allegations in the SAC fall short of pleading facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for negligence against the ZLS. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted on this ground. In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist . (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.) Plaintiff has not opposed this motion and otherwise fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility Plaintiff can cure the defect to state a cause of action. Therefore, the motion is granted as to the first cause of action without leave to amend. 2. Second Cause of Action - Negligence Per Se Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action from negligence. ( Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-38.) The doctrine of negligence per se does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute. [Citation.] Under the doctrine, the plaintiff borrows' statutes to prove duty of care and standard of care. ( Id .) ZLS argues that the Negligence Per Se claim is invalid for several reasons. First, ZLS reiterates its earlier argument that Sanchezs criminal conduct serves as a superseding cause, which absolves ZLS of any alleged negligence, whether negligent per se or otherwise, and makes Sanchez solely liable. Second, ZLS contends that the Motion should be granted because Negligence Per Se is not a standalone cause of action. Furthermore, the doctrine does not provide a private right of action for the violation of a statute. Instead, it operates to establish a presumption of negligence for which the statute serves as evidence of an element of a preexisting common law cause of action. The Court agrees with ZLS that this is not a standalone cause of action and Plaintiff provides no arguments to rebut this. [T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. ( Johnson v. Honeywell Internat. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) The Court notes that Plaintiff identifies California Vehicle Code section 21650, however, Plaintiff fails to show how there is an applicable standard of care that ZLS violated. Plaintiff does not identify any statute that could possibly cure this defect. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the second cause of action is granted without leave to amend. 3. Third Cause of Action - Negligent Entrustment To prevail on an action for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must prove as follows: (1) that the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) that the defendant was the owner, lessor, or possessor of the vehicle, (3) that the defendant knew or should have known that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle, (4) that the defendant permitted the driver to use the vehicle, and (5) that the driver's incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. ( See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 86364, 864 fn. 8, citing CACI No. 724.) Here, the SAC alleges that Sanchez was incompetent and unfit to drive the vehicle owned by Medina. There is no allegation that ZLS owned, leased, or possessed the vehicle driven by Sanchez, and that ZLS permitted Sanchez to drive Medinas vehicle. It is apparent on the factual allegations that there is no possibility of Plaintiff maintaining a negligent entrustment cause of action against ZLS. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the third cause of action is granted without leave to amend. Moving party to give notice.

Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Respond to JOHNSON vs RIVERSIDE CVRI2303626 Form Interrogatories, Set One by COMMUNITY HOSPITAL RIVERSIDE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL Tentative Ruling: The unopposed motion to compel is granted. In light of the fact that Plaintiff is acting on a fee waiver, the Court finds that sanctions are not appropriate. Plaintiff is to provide verified responses within thirty days without objection.

Case Number: 23AHCV01104 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT PABLO MARTINEZS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION This negligence action arises from a slip and fall incident on property located at 21 Palmetto Drive in Alhambra, California. Plaintiff Jesus Manuel Guerra (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) owned the property, Defendant Palmetto Villas, Inc. (Palmetto) managed the property and Defendant Complete Landscape & Gardening Services maintained the property. Plaintiff, a resident of 21 Palmetto Drive, Unit D, alleges that on May 20, 2021, he slipped and fell while walking on a pathway at the locations entrance. Plaintiff further alleges that a puddle of water and/or accumulated algae cause this accident. On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint alleging causes of action for (1) general negligence as to all three Defendants and (2) premises liability as to Defendants Palmetto Villas, Inc. and Pablo Martinez. On September 27, 2023, Defendant Martinez filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint because Plaintiff only alleged that Defendant owned unit D, not the site where the slip and fall occurred. On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) On February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC). On March 4, 2024, Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiffs FAC pursuant to CCP § 430.10, concurrently with notice and Declaration of John Fu, Esq., (Fu Decl.). On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants Demurrer with the Declaration of Thomas R. Burns, Esq., (Burns Decl.) and attached exhibits. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. A hearing is scheduled for July 18, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Demurrer Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247. A demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. A ubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967. The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604. Questions of plaintiffs ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. A plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how improbable they are. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 ( Del E. Webb ). Allegations need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474. Pleadings are to be broadly construed (Code Civ. Proc. §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38. A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the complaint or in judicially noticeable material but cannot be based on evidence. Speaking demurrers are not permitted. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), §7.8. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. III. ANALYSIS A. Demurrer On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that it was a sham pleading because the original complaint did not identify Defendant as the owner of the entire property. Plaintiffs original complaint states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of Unit D located on the Premises. (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) The operative FAC states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of the Premises . (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred on the issue of Defendants ownership interest of the premises and did not reach a resolution, necessitating the instant motion. (Fu Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A; Motion, p. 5.) Based upon this, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed another Demurrer, moving the Court to sustain the demurrer based on the argument that Plaintiffs original and amended complaints contain inconsistent factual allegations. Defendants position is that the FAC attempts to plead around the defect and therefore amounts to a sham pleading. (Motion, p. 3.) Defendant argues that when a plaintiff attempts to circumvent factual problems by pleading new inconsistent facts in an amended complaint, the plaintiff must provide explain why such a drastic change has occurred. If Plaintiff is unable to do so, the new pleading will be treated as a sham and be disregarded. ( Del E. Webh Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 593, 604; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379, 384; and Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 13, cited by 6 Cal. Prac. Guide, Civ. Proc. Bef-Trial, Sec. 7:48.) Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer because the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable when the facts change due to information obtained in discovery. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff argues that the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable because Co-Defendant Palmetto provided new information during discovery to support Plaintiffs amended allegation that Defendant Martinez owns the entire property, including the incident location. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 24.) Pursuant to the sham pleading doctrine, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. ( Larson v. UHS of Rancho Spring s, Inc . (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.) Courts will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed. ( Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) Given the information obtained through discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiff has appropriately explained the change in the allegations of ownership from the original complaint to the FAC. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Palmetto. On October 30, 2023, Palmetto timely responded to the Special Interrogatories as follows: Special Interrogatory No. 1 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owed the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 1: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 2 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who leased the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 4 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who controlled the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 4: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 6 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owned the LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. (Oppn., Exh. B, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff did not possess this information at the time he filed his original complaint. Plaintiff received this information on October 30, 2023. After the Court sustained Defendant Martinezs demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiff relied on this information when filing the FAC. Therefore, the inconsistent facts between the initial complaint and the FAC are sufficiently explained to bypass an application of the sham pleading doctrine. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendants demurrer to the FAC. IV. ORDER Defendant Martinezs Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 15 days. Counsel for Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 18, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Case Number: 23STCV05798 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING GLENN WRIGHT, et al. , vs. EXODUS RECOVERY, INC., et al . Case No.: 23STCV05798 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Defendant William Wirshing, M.D.s unopposed motion to compel Non-party Harbor UCLA Medical Center to comply with a deposition subpoena for the production of business records is continued to August 9, 2024, at 8:30 am, and directs Wirshing to effect proper service of the instant motion on Harbor UCLA. Defendant William Wirshing, M.D.s unopposed motion to compel Non-party Las Encinas Hospital to comply with a deposition subpoena for the production of business records is continued to August 9, 2024, at 8:30 am, and directs Wirshing to effect proper service of the instant motion on Las Encinas. Defendant William Wirshing, M.D.s unopposed motion to compel Non-party Los Angeles Fire Department to comply with a deposition subpoena for the production of business records is granted. Defendant William Wirshing, M.D., (Wirshing) (Defendant) moves unopposed for this Court to compel Non-party Harbor UCLA Medical Center (Harbor UCLA) to comply with his Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records on the grounds that the records sought pertain to Decedent LeWayne Anthony Wrights (Decedent) mental state, which is at issue in this lawsuit. (Notice of Motion Harbor UCLA, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§1987.1, 2025.480, 2017.010, 56.10, 56.05.) Wirshing moves in the alternative to compel Plaintiffs Glenn Wright (Glenn) Nina Woolfolk (Nina) (Plaintiffs) as successors-in-interest to Decedent to sign authorization for release of records relative to the mental condition and treatment of Decedent. (Notice of Motion Harbor UCLA, pg. 2.) Wirshing moves unopposed for this Court to compel Non-party Las Encinas Hospital (Las Encinas) to comply with his Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records on the grounds that the records sought pertain to Decedents mental state, which is at issue in this lawsuit. (Notice of Motion Las Encinas, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§1987.1, 2025.480, 2017.010, 56.10, 56.05.) Wirshing moves in the alternative to compel Plaintiffs as successors-in-interest to Decedent to sign authorization for release of records relative to the mental condition and treatment of Decedent. (Notice of Motion Harbor Las Encinas, pg. 2.) Wirshing moves unopposed for this Court to compel Non-party Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) to comply with his Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records on the grounds that the records sought pertain to Decedents mental state, which is at issue in this lawsuit. (Notice of Motion LAFD, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§1987.1, 2025.480, 2017.010, 56.10, 56.05.) Wirshing moves in the alternative to compel Plaintiffs as successors-in-interest to Decedent to sign authorization for release of records relative to the mental condition and treatment of Decedent. (Notice of Motion LAFD, pg. 2.) 1. Motion to Compel Compliance- Harbor UCLA Service CRC Rule 3.1346 provides, [a] written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record. (CRC, Rule 3.1346, emphasis added.) Wirshings proof of service on Harbor UCLA indicates Harbor UCLA was served with the instant motion by U.S. Mail on June 13, 2024. Wirshings method of service of the instant motion on Harbor UCLA is in violation of CRC Rule 3.1346 because the motion was not personally served on Harbor UCLA. The Court continues the hearing on Wirshings motion to August 9, 2024, at 8:30 am, and directs Wirshing to effect proper service of the instant motion on Harbor UCLA. 2. Motion to Compel Compliance- Las Encinas Service CRC Rule 3.1346 provides, [a] written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record. (CRC, Rule 3.1346, emphasis added.) Wirshings proof of service on Las Encinas indicates Las Encinas was served with the instant motion by U.S. Mail on June 20, 2024. Wirshings method of service of the instant motion on Las Encinas is in violation of CRC Rule 3.1346 because the motion was not personally served on Las Encinas. The Court continues the hearing on Wirshings motion to August 9, 2024, at 8:30 am, and directs Wirshing to effect proper service of the instant motion on Las Encinas. 3. Motion to Compel Compliance- LAFD Service CRC Rule 3.1346 provides, [a] written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record. ( CRC, Rule 3.1346 , emphasis added.) Wirshings proof of service on LAFD indicates LAFD was served with the instant motion via messenger service on June 14, 2024, and is therefore proper under CRC, Rule 3.1346. Background This matter arises out of Decedents death by suicide and Plaintiffs allegation that Defendants should have prevented Decedents death. Plaintiffs Complaint identified LAFD as having provided information sufficient to make Defendant aware of Decedents condition at the time of his hospital admission that preceded his death. ( See Decl. of Pruett ¶3, Exh. 1.) Wirshing issued a subpoena to the custodian of records for LAFD on January 17, 2024. (Decl. of Pruett ¶4, Exh. 2.) The subpoena was served to the custodian of records for LAFD at 200 North Main Street, #1620, Los Angeles, CA 90012. (Decl. of Pruett ¶4, Exh. 2.) To date, LAFD has failed to respond. (Decl. of Pruett ¶¶4-5, Exhs. 3-4.) The subpoena requested the following documents regardless of date: All dispatch and response logs, treatment, medical and billing records, and any other records or logs, including but not limited to any records/documents that may be stored digitally and/or electronically, all detailed screen shots within any computer system, electronic records, purged records, all electronic correspondence affecting or relating to LeWayne Wright AKA: LeWayne A. Wright, LeWayne Anthony Wright, DOB: 4/11/1994, ss#: xxx-xx-0381. Patient was transported and treated November 23/24, 2020 to Exodus Recovery, Inc. Urgent Care Center located in East Los Angeles. (Decl. of Pruett ¶4, Exh. 2.) The subject subpoena was properly issued by attorneys for Defendant, as permitted under C.C.P. §2020.210(b): Instead of a court-issued deposition subpoena, an attorney of record for any party may sign and issue a deposition subpoena. Subpoenas may be used to compel a California nonpartys production of documents. (C.C.P. §§2020.010(a)(3), 2025.280(b); Terry v. SLICO (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 357.) A deposition subpoena may require a witness to produce records for copying. (C.C.P. §2020.510.) C.C.P. §56.10 provides: A provider of health care, a health care service plan, or a contractor shall disclose medical information if the disclosure is compelled by any of the following: [¶] (1) A court order. . .. [¶] (3) A party to a proceeding before a court or administrative agency pursuant to a subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, notice to appear served pursuant to Section 1987 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or any provision authorizing discovery in a proceeding before a court. (C.C.P. §56.10.) C.C.P. §56.05(j) defines Medical Information means any individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, in possession of or derived from a provider of health care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor regarding a patients medical history, mental health application information, reproductive or sexual health application information, mental or physical condition, or treatment . Individually identifiable means that the medical information includes or contains any element of personal identifying information sufficient to allow identification of the individual, such as the patient's name, address, electronic mail address, telephone number, or social security number, or other information that, alone or in combination with other publicly available information, reveals the identity of the individual. (C.C.P. §56.05(j), emphasis added.) The subpoenaing party may seek a court order mandating the non-partys compliance with the subpoena. (C.C.P. §2025.480; Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Bader (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 123, 132-133.) Additionally, C.C.P. §1987.1 provides, in relevant part, if a subpoena requires the . . . production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court . . . or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b) . . . may make an order . . . directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare. (C.C.P. §1987.1.) Here, LAFD has not objected or responded to Wirshings subpoena. Plaintiffs have not asserted any objections to the subject subpoena. Defendant has exhausted all legal avenues to obtain the requested records from LAFD and Plaintiffs have failed to cooperate or provide a valid legal basis for withholding the records by not responding to Wirshings requests for a signed authorization form to authorize LAFD to release the dispatch records concerning Decedents mental health. Although medical and mental health information is generally privileged, the privilege gives way when the medical or mental health issues are presented as the issues in litigation, as here. Wirshings subpoena seeks records pertaining to the Decedents mental state and health attributed to the incident giving rise to the lawsuit. Litigation seeks to ascertain the truth and this discovery is needed to pursue the truth relative to the nature of the decedents mental illness that ultimately led to his suicide. Therefore, such records are well within the scope of permissible discovery. (C.C.P. §2017.010.) Conclusion Wirshings unopposed motion to compel LAFD to comply with Defendants Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records is granted. Moving Party is to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court