Vandelay Industries Tm Llc, Vandelay Industries Km Llc, Vandelay Industries Am Llc V. Bitwise Hold 10 Private Index Fund, Llc, Bitwise Asset Management, Inc., Bitwise 10 Crypto Index Fund, Bitwise Investment Advisors, Llc, Hunter Horsley, Matt Hougan

Case Number: 21TRCV00651 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024, continued from July 19 due to cyber attack CASE NUMBER: 21TRCV00651 CASE NAME: Martorell Law APC v. Evgeny Afineevsky, et al. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Evgeny Afineevsky TRIAL DATE: August 5, 2024 MOTION: (1) By Plaintiff: Motion for Summary Judgment (2) By Defendant: ex parte application to Continue the August 5, 2024 Trial Tentative Rulings: This is the same tentative ruling posted for the July 19 hearing, which counsel might have been unable to review because of the effects of the cyber-attack on the Courts computer systems. (1) Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Triable issues of facts material to the reasonableness of fees and the defense of quality of the representation preclude summary judgment (2) The ex parte application in tentatively denied, or would be granted only for a short period of time sufficient to permit defense counsel to review the remaining 4/5 of the belatedly produced documents. The Application indicates the Plaintiffs failure to provide its work product until the eve of trial has been ongoing for over a year, and that Defendant elected to pursue a strategy of relying on that failure to seek exclusion of evidence at trial rather than other remedies. Defendant did not seek a motion to compel further production, or a motion in limine, or file objections to evidence submitted in support of the pending MSJ, or even seek to continue the hearing on the pending MSJ to allow completion of discovery. The parties reported to the Court in early May that the mediation was not successful, yet this issue of a failure to produce documents requested over a year ago was only first brought to the Courts attention in Defendants July 3, 2024 Separate Statement. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On September 3, 2021, Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC (Plaintiff) filed an action against Defendant including Evgeny Afineevsky, Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC, and DOES 1 through 100 arising out a claim of failure to pay for Plaintiffs legal services rendered in the representation of the Defendants. The suit alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Account Stated; (3) Open Book Account; and (4) Reasonable Value of Services Rendered. Now, Plaintiff files a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the following issues: 1. Issue No. 1: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract, succeeds as a matter of law because Defendants did not uphold their obligations. 2. Issue No. 2: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, Common Count of Account Stated, succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor upheld its obligations to submit billing statements to Defendants, but Defendants have not paid the billing statements, despite stating they would do so. 3. Issue No. 3: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production LLC, Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action, Common Count for Open Book Account, succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor maintained a record of the debts owed to its assignee. 4. Issue No. 4: As alleged against Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC, Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, Reasonable Value of Service Rendered (Quantum Meruit), succeeds as a matter of law because Plaintiff Martorell Laws assignor performed the work under the attorney-client relationship and Defendants retained the benefit of those services. B. Procedural On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. On July 3, 2024, Defendant, Evgeny Afineevsky filed an opposition brief and declarations. On July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief with a new declaration and new exhibits not included in the original moving papers. II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Overrule: all. Sustain: none. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) B. Discussion Preliminarily, this Court notes that in opposition, Defendants have brought an issue of Plaintiffs standing to sue. First, Defendant argues that Bordin Martorell LLO was the original creditor of the alleged debt Plaintiff is now seeking to enforce. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not provided a single piece of documentary evidence establishing an assignment of rights from BM LLP. Defendants contend that in discovery, they asked for such proof, but to date, Plaintiff has provided zero documentation. Plaintiff only includes, in his declaration, that his former law firm, BM LLP, assigned its rights and interests associated with the Lawsuit, including rights and interests to any past due bills, to [his] current law firm, Martorell Law APC. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 7.) The Reply papers provide documentary proof of the assignment to Plaintiff, but that proof was not included in the moving papers. The Courts practice is to consider new evidence submitted at the reply phase and to allow the opposing party to file a sur-reply responding to that new matter. But as discussed below, even if the Court were to reject the standing argument because of the evidence first submitted at the reply phase, there are other grounds for the Court to deny the motion which would render unnecessary a sur-reply and continued MSJ hearing. Here, Plaintiff argues that it established a contract was formed between Defendants and Bordin Martorell LLP (BM LLP). Plaintiff argues that on July 19, 2017, BM LLP and Defendants, Evgeny Afineevsky and Pray for Ukraine Production, LLC entered into a written fee agreement in Los Angeles, California, whereby BM LLP entered into a written fee agreement in Los Angeles, California whereby BM LLP agreed to act as Defendants legal representative in the lawsuit. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that the written free agreement included a $10,000 retainer deposit, which Defendants paid on July 18, 2017. (Martorell Decl., ¶2.) On July 19, 2017, Plaintiff asserts it began legal services. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that among the legal services involved in the subject lawsuit, it drafted a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens (that Defendants chose not to file) and analyzing the same, choice of law analysis, retention of and communication with additional attorneys, communications with various potential witnesses, a pro hac vice application, meeting and conferring with opposing counsel, drafting discovery requests, responding to discovery requests, tens of phone calls, drafting motions to quash, drafting and analyzing benefit of motion for security, drafting a motion for sanctions, drafting a motion for summary judgment, reviewing of large amounts of evidence, and document production. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that it has established that Defendants failed to uphold their obligations on the basis of the fee arrangement. Pursuant to the work performed and the terms of the fee arrangement, BM LLP sent two billing statements to Defendants associate with an outstanding bill of approximately $57,836.54. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff contends that the first billing statement was sent on or around September 12, 2017, and pursuant to the agreement, the payments were to be due within fifteen (15) days of mailing of BM LLPs statement. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants agreed to pay the outstanding legal fees, but that to this day, Defendants have not paid the outstanding legal fees. (Martorell Decl., ¶ 6.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff argues that this Court can and should grant summary judgment as to each of the four causes of action. In opposition, Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff has failed to show that the facts are undisputed on its causes of action. For example, Defendants dispute that there was a meeting of the minds as to the amount owed, that there is a dispute as to the duration of the representation, that Plaintiff failed to investigate insurance coverage or to earlier tender the defense of the underlying action to Defendants production companys errors and omissions policy carrier. See 7/3/24 Separate Statement UMFs 4, 5, 10. Defendants dispute Plaintiffs standing because no corroboration was submitted with the moving papers of the claimed assignment from BM LLP to Plaintiff. See 7/3/24 Sep. Statement UMF 8. The Opposition raises a dispute as to its defense of overbilling for work that was never used or filed to advance the interests of its clients. Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed no substantive pleadings in the case while representing Defendant and its work was not used by Defendants subsequent attorneys. Defendants have provided the declaration of counsel Tarasov indicating that such work was not used nor was it instrumental in the ultimate outcomes of the case. While Mr. Martorell addresses a number of these issues in his reply declaration and its attached exhibits, the conflict between his declaration and that of his former co-counsel Mr. Tarasov by itself demonstrates that the trier of fact will need to resolve the disputed issues of reasonableness of billings, the claimed failure to earlier tender a defense to an E&O carrier and at whose feet lays the blame for that, the affirmative defense of excuse or of quality of the representation, and other matters. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to provide notice.

HG20063283: Fontanila VS R.V. Esau Development Co., Inc. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion for an Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt (CCP 1209) filed by Miguelito C Fontanila (Cross-Defendant) + in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Motion re: RE RV ESAUs INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER RENDERED OCTOBER 19 2022 FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES filed by Margaret Fontanila, Miguelito C Fontanila on 07/05/2024 is Denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for an order that Defendant is in contempt for violation of the Court’s October 19, 2022 order for payment of attorney fees is DENIED. The Court’s October 19, 2022 order awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendant in the amount of $4,622.83, but it did not set forth any date by which those fees and costs had to be paid. Therefore, Defendant’s failure to pay those fees and costs by any particular date is not amenable to contempt. Plaintiffs are free to seek to enforce the October 19, 2022 order the same way they would seek to enforce any monetary judgment. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615 and Lucky v. United Properties Investment Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 143- 144.)

Case Number: BC667915 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING SLAUSON GAS STATION, LLC , vs. BROADWAY FEDERAL BANK . Case No.: BC667915 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Defendant Broadway Federal Bank, F.S.B.s unopposed motion for attorneys fees against Plaintiff Slauson Gas Station, LLC is granted in the reduced total amount of $257,406.75. Defendant Broadway Federal Bank, F.S.B. s motion for attorneys fees against Plaintiff Hooman Nissani is granted in the reduced amount of $314,832.33. Defendant Broadway Federal Bank, F.S.B. (Broadway) (Defendant) moves unopposed for an order awarding its attorneys fees against Plaintiff Slauson Gas Station, LLC (Slauson) (Plaintiff) in the total amount of $275,699.50.00, comprised of $269,199.50 in fees defending this action against Slauson, and an additional $6,500 in connection with the instant motion . (Notice of Motion Slauson, pgs. 2-3; Civ. Code §§17 17, 1785, 1785.31(e), 1788.30.) Defendant moves for an order awarding its attorneys fees in the total amount of $466,548.50 against Plaintiff Hooman Nissani (Nissani) (Plaintiff) in the total amount of $472,548.50, comprised of $466,548.50 in fees defending this action against Nissani, and an additional $6,000 in connection with the instant motion. (Notice of Motion Nissani, pgs. 2-3; Civ. Code §§1717, 1785, 1785.31(e), 1788.30.) 1. Motion for Attorneys Fees- Slauson Request for Judicial Notice Defendants 12/27/23 request for judicial notice of (1) Declaration of Teresa Taylor in Support of Defendants Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues, filed in this action concurrently with the Motion for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2023; (2) Complaint for Damages filed in this action on July 7, 2017; and (3) Minute Order from November 9, 2023, in this action is denied because this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket. Defendants 12/27/23 request for judicial notice of (1) A Certificate of Status from the Secretary of State from October 25, 2023, for Slauson Gas Station, LLC, showing that Slauson Gas Station is suspended, with certificate number 154265623 (D-RJN, Exh. 4); and (2) Entity Status Letter from the Franchise Tax Board from July 18, 2023, for Slauson Gas Station, LLC, showing that Slauson Gas Station is not in good standing with the Franchise Tax Board (D-RJN, Exh. 5) is granted. Procedural Background On July 7, 2017, Slauson filed a lawsuit against Defendant for Breach of Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Accounting, and Violation of the Consumer Credit Report Act. On November 9, 2023, at the Final Status Conference, Defendant brought on for hearing its Motion in Limine to Exclude All Evidence Offered by Slauson Gas Station, LLC at Trial (Motion in Limine) on the grounds that on or about November 1, 2021, Slauson was again suspended by the California Secretary of State and Franchise Tax Board and remained suspended ever since, and due to its suspended status, Slauson should be prohibited from prosecuting the action and participating at trial. (Decl. of Richman ¶2.) Just as the Court was about to grant the Motion in Limine and exclude Slauson from participating in the trial, Slauson stated on the record that it was dismissing its Complaint. (Decl. of Richman ¶¶3, 4; D-RJN, Exh. 3.) Defendant filed the instant motion on December 27, 2023. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed. Discussion Civil Code §1717(a) provides, in part: In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorneys fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other costs. Where a contract provides for attorneys fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. Reasonable attorneys fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Civ. Code §1717(a).) Here, Defendant is the prevailing party in a contract with Slauson, the Promissory Note, which contains the following cost and expenses provision: Borrower hereby agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses paid or incurred by Lender by reason of, as a result of, or in connection with this Note, the Deed of Trust or other Loan Documents, including, but not limited to, any and all attorneys fees and related costs whether such costs or expenses are paid or incurred in connection with the enforcement of this Note, the Deed of Trust and Loan Documents, or any other them, the protection or preservation of the collateral or security for this Note or any other rights, remedies or interests of Lender, whether or not suit is filed. . . . (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶5, Exh. 2 at pg. 5.) Section 11 of the Guaranty also contains the following attorneys fees provision: The prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and all other costs and expenses which may be incurred by the prevailing party in connection with the enforcement, preservation of rights under, or defense of this Guaranty or in connection with any other dispute or proceeding relating to his Guaranty, whether or not incurred in any Insolvency Proceeding, arbitration, litigation, or other proceeding. (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶11, Exh. 3 at ¶11.) Further, the Loan Agreement contains a costs, expenses, and taxes provision, which provides, Borrower shall pay to Lender, on demand: (7.12.1) Attorneys fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Lender in connection with the negotiation, preparation, execution, delivery, and administration of this Agreement and any other Loan Document. . . . (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶4, Exh. 1 at §7.12.) Defendant is the undisputed prevailing party under the Promissory Note, Guaranty, and Loan Agreement. Defendant succeeded in its litigation objectives against Slauson upon Slausons filing of the dismissal, and Slauson failed. ( See Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 608-609.) Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorneys fees. Reasonable Fees To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiffs counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.) Defendants counsel declares the following hourly rates for the services of Epport, Richman & Robbins, LLP: (1) Steven N. Richman ($550.00/hour); (2) Kimia Sehati ($475.00/hour). (Decl. of Richman ¶¶13-14; Exh. A.) Defendants counsel declares the following hourly rate for the services of Donna L. La Porte: $215.00/hour. (Decl. of La Porte ¶4.) These rates are appropriate given each the attorneys relative experience and qualifications. ( See Decl. of Richman; Decl. of La Porte. ) Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated its counsels hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law. Billed Hours The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) Defendants counsels fee recovery is based on 421.70 hours spent by its attorneys at Epport, Richman & Robbins, LLP litigating this case for a total of $222,695.00 (Decl. of Richman ¶¶14, 17, Exh. A.), and hours spent by La Porte litigating this case for a total of $34,711.75 (Decl. of La Porte ¶9-10, Exh. B.). [1] Therefore, Defendants attorneys fees is granted in the combined total of $257,406.75. Defendant also requests an additional 8 hours in fees to draft the instant motion. (Decl. of Richman ¶20.) In light of the fact that the instant motion is unopposed, the Court declines to grant Defendants requested three anticipated hours to review an opposition and file a reply. Therefore, Defendants request for additional fees in the reduced amount of $3,800.00 is appropriate, per the following calculation: $475.00 x 8 = $3,800.00 Defendants motion is granted. Conclusion Accordingly, Defendants unopposed request for attorneys fees is granted in the reduced total of $257,406 .75 . Moving Party to give notice. 2. Motion for Attorneys Fees- Nissani CRC Violations C.R.C. Rule 3.1354(b) provides, All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: (1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; (2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; (3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and (4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material. (CRC, Rule 3.1354(b).) Nissanis 7/15/24 evidentiary objections are in violation of CRC, Rule 3.1354(b) because they are not numbered consecutively; fail to State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; and fail to quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material. To avoid confusion, the Court numbers each paragraph of the evidentiary objections consecutively. Evidentiary Objections Nissanis 7/15/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Gerald G. Knapton (Knapton) are overruled as to Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and sustained as to No. 3. Defendants 7/24/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Grant Stiefel (Stiefel) are overruled as to Nos. 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12, and sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Request for Judicial Notice Defendants 3/13/24 request for judicial notice of (1) Declaration of Teresa Taylor in Support of Defendants Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues, filed in this action concurrently with the Motion for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2023; (2) Complaint for Damages filed in this action on July 7, 2017; (3) Minute Order from November 9, 2023, in this action; and (4) Judgment After Verdict, entered on January 24, 2024, is denied because this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket. Procedural Background On July 7, 2017, Nissani, along with Ebrahim Nissani and Slauson, filed a lawsuit against Defendant for Breach of Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Accounting, and Violation of the Consumer Credit Report Act. On November 9, 2023, at the Final Status Conference, Slauson stated on the record that it was dismissing its Complaint. (Decl. of Richman ¶¶3, 4; D-RJN, Exh. 3.) Nissani proceeded with the case, bringing the case to a jury trial, which began on December 11, 2023. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant on each of Nissanis remaining claims and awarded Nissani $0.00. Defendant filed the instant motion on March 13, 2024. Nissani filed his opposition on July 15, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on July 24, 2024. Discussion Civil Code §1717(a) provides, in part: In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorneys fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other costs. Where a contract provides for attorneys fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. Reasonable attorneys fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Civ. Code §1717(a).) Here, Defendant is the prevailing party in a contract with Slauson for which Nissani was the signatory and guarantor on the Promissory Note, which contains the following cost and expenses provision: Borrower hereby agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses paid or incurred by Lender by reason of, as a result of, or in connection with this Note, the Deed of Trust or other Loan Documents, including, but not limited to, any and all attorneys fees and related costs whether such costs or expenses are paid or incurred in connection with the enforcement of this Note, the Deed of Trust and Loan Documents, or any other them, the protection or preservation of the collateral or security for this Note or any other rights, remedies or interests of Lender, whether or not suit is filed. . . . (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶5, Exh. 2 at pg. 5.) Section 11 of the Guaranty also contains the following attorneys fees provision: The prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and all other costs and expenses which may be incurred by the prevailing party in connection with the enforcement, preservation of rights under, or defense of this Guaranty or in connection with any other dispute or proceeding relating to his Guaranty, whether or not incurred in any Insolvency Proceeding, arbitration, litigation, or other proceeding. (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶11, Exh. 3 at ¶11.) Further, the Loan Agreement contains a costs, expenses, and taxes provision, which provides, Borrower shall pay to Lender, on demand: (7.12.1) Attorneys fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Lender in connection with the negotiation, preparation, execution, delivery, and administration of this Agreement and any other Loan Document. . . . (7/12/23 Decl. of Taylor ¶4, Exh. 1 at §7.12.) Defendant is entitled to attorneys fees under the attorneys fees provisions of the Promissory Note, Guaranty, and Loan Agreement, pursuant to Civil Code §1717. Defendant is also entitled to its attorneys fees for prevailing on Nissanis non-contract claims under Civil Code §1717. Where claims based on the contract are combined with non-contract claims, the prevailing party is entitled to fees only for work done on the contract claims unless the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorneys time into compensable and non-compensable units. ( Grant vs. List & Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993; Las Palmas Assoc. vs. Las Palmas Ctr. Assoc. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220; Shadoan vs. World Saving & Loan Assn (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 97; Fed-Mart Corp. vs. Pell Enters. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215.) The attorneys time spent on overlapping claims is also compensable. ( Reynolds Metals Co. vs. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124; Nazemi vs. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633; On vs. Cow Hollow Prop. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1568; Bruckman vs. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051.) Defendant is the undisputed prevailing party on the cause of action for breach of contract and for non-contract claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, accounting, and violation of Civil Code §1785.1 because the allegations are all inextricably intertwined and overlapping with the contract claim. The claims in the operative pleading are premised on the same core factual allegations: a breach of contract claim in connection with a loan transaction based on allegations that Defendant breached the Promissory Note, Guaranty, and Loan Agreement between Slauson, Nissani, and Defendant. Plaintiffs claims were premised on the fact that Defendant allegedly improperly reported his default under the Promissory Note, Guaranty, and Loan Agreement to credit reporting agencies. Because Nissanis noncontract claims are inextricably intertwined with his contract claim, Defendant is entitled to recover all of its fees for prevailing on all of Nissanis claims. ( See Wagner v. Benson (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 27, 37 [stating holder of a note which provides for payment of fees incurred to collect the balance due is entitled to fees incurred in defending itself against interrelated allegations of fraud].) Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to attorneys fees as the prevailing party. Reasonable Fees To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiffs counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.) Defendants counsel declares the following hourly rates for the services of Epport, Richman & Robbins, LLP: (1) Steven N. Richman ($550.00/hour); (2) Kimia Sehati ($475.00/hour). (Decl. of Richman ¶¶13-14; Exh. A.) Defendants counsel declares the following hourly rate for the services of Donna L. La Porte: $215.00/hour. (Decl. of La Porte ¶4.) These rates are appropriate given each the attorneys relative experience and qualifications. ( See Decl. of Richman; Decl. of La Porte. ) Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated its counsels hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law. Billed Hours The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) Defendants counsels does not provide the total hours spent by its attorneys at Epport, Richman & Robbins, LLP litigating this case, but indicates it reduced fees in the amount of $36,107.50 from the billing statements for fees incurred in connection to claims brought by Slauson and Ebrahim Nissani, seeking a total of $412,406.00 on this motion (Decl. of Richman ¶¶14, 17, Exh. A.), and for hours spent by La Porte litigating this case for a total of $54,502.50 (Decl. of La Porte ¶9-10, Exh. B.). Therefore, Defendants attorneys fees is requested in the combined total of $466,548.50. Defendant also requests an additional 7 hours in fees to draft the instant motion and an additional three hours to review the opposition and draft a reply, and two additional hours to prepare for and appear at the hearing on the instant motion. (Decl. of Richman ¶20.) Nissani raises objections to Defendants motion that are unavailing or lack the requisite particularity. However, Nissanis objections to Defendants counsels billing records as block billed and vague are well taken. (See Decl. of Stiefel ¶¶34-36, 40, Exhs. C, D.) Such billing records as examine additional documents on May 30, 2022, for 0.40 for $210.00 in fees, or Review/prepare emails with Counsel and others; related telephone conversations; prepare Memorandum on June 14, 2022, for 0.70 hours for $367.50 are impermissibly vague and block billed. The Court reduces Defendants request for fees by one third of the total requested fee, granting Defendants motion in the reduced amount of $311,032.33, calculated as follows: 1/3 x $466,548.50 = $155,516.17 $466,548.50 - $155,516.17 = $311,032.33 Defendants request for 7 hours in fees to draft the instant motion and an additional 3 hours to review the opposition and draft a reply, and 2 additional hours to prepare for and appear at the hearing on the instant motion is granted for a reduced total of 8 hours, calculated for a reduced total of $3,800.00, as follows: $475.00 x 8 = $3,800.00 Defendants motion is granted in the reduced total amount of $314,832.33. Conclusion Accordingly, Defendants request for attorneys fees is granted in the reduced total of $ 314,832.33 . Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court [1] The Declaration of La Porte indicates a total of $34,711.75 in attorneys fees, while the Declaration of Richman indicates that La Pore incurred attorneys fees of $46,504.50, citing to the Declaration of La Porte without a pin cite. The Court relies on La Portes calculation of attorneys fees in her declaration and not the value in Defendants motion or Richmans declaration.

DATE: 07/16/24 TIME: 1:30 P.M. DEPT: A CASE NO: CV2200992 PRESIDING: HON. STEPHEN P. FRECCERO REPORTER: CLERK: Q. ROARY PLAINTIFF: ONE SILVER SERVE, INC. VS. DEFENDANT: COLORADO STRUCTURES INC., ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION —- LEAVE TO AMEND FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT RULING The motion for leave to file a second amended cross-complaint (“SACC”) by Monahan-Parker, Inc. and 1201 Fifth Avenue, LLC (“Owners”) is GRANTED. Background This cross-action arises out of the construction of anew AC Hotel by Marriott in San Rafael, California (the “Project”). Owners filed a cross-complaint against multiple parties involved in the construction after plaintiff One Silver Serve, Inc. (a sub-contractor) filed a complaint against Owners alleging it was not paid for work it performed on the Project. Owners’ first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”) alleges they hired DLR Group, Inc. (“DLR”) to be the architect for the Project and Colorado Structures, Inc. (“CSI”) to be the general contractor. (FACC, fff 16-17.) The FACC further alleges that Owners engaged Maroevich, O’Shea & Coghlan Insurance Services, Inc. (“MOC”) and MOC’s successor-in-interest, Symphony Risk Solutions Insurance Services, Inc. (“Symphony”)(collectively, “Broker”) to procure insurance for the Project. Owners allege they provided Broker with specifications for said insurance and paid Broker a fee for procuring the same. (FACC 4 18.) In October 2021, the Bay Area was hit with severe storms causing significant water damage to the Project. (FACC ff] 28-29.) Owners allege, among other things, that because of the various failures of DLR and CSI, including Broker’s failure to provide insurance coverage that complied with specifications provided by Owner, they are entitled to damages, including indemnity from CSI. (See FACC.) Currently before the Court, is Owners’ motion for leave to file a second amended cross- complaint ““SACC”), aa ee €V2200992 Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), the Court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding. As judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit, courts liberally permit amendments of the pleadings. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) Denial is rarely justified unless opposing parties demonstrate unreasonable delay plus prejudice if the motion is granted. A mere showing of unreasonable delay by the plaintiff without any showing of resulting prejudice to defendants is an insufficient ground to justify denial of the plaintiff's motion. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting loss of critical evidence or added costs of preparation, and an increased burden of discovery, inter alia. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Generally, courts allow the amendment and then let the parties test the legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings such as a demurrer. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, and Atkinson v. Elk Corp, (2003) 109 Cal. App.4th 739, 760; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) {| 6:644.) A party requesting leave to amend must also comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. Compliance with the Rules of Court is satisfied by including a copy of the proposed amended pleading, detailing what changes will be made from the previous pleading by stating what allegations are to be deleted or added as compared to the previous pleading including page, paragraph and line number, and attaching a declaration by plaintiff's counsel, as to: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier. Ultimately, as long as no prejudice to the defendant is shown, the liberal policy regarding the amendment prevails. (Mester v. Bragg Mgt. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-297.) Discussion Owners seek leave to file the SACC to add three sets of claims: 1) a violation of Business and Professions Code section 7031 against CSI for a failure to be properly licensed; 2) indemnity- related claims against DLR and Broker; and breach of contract and negligence claims against the subcontractors.' (See Declaration of Michael J. Betz, § 3.) Owners assert that discovery has revealed the additional claims and wrongdoers and that the indemnity claims were only realized after the filing of the FACC. (id. at { 5-7.) Only CSI opposes the proposed amendment. It argues, among other things, that at the October 2, 2023 Case Management Conference, Owners failed to disclose that it may later seek to amend the FACC. CSI argues that the motion is unreasonably late and would result in prejudice in light of the April 2025 trial date. However, CSI fails to adequately describe the prejudice to which it would be subjected if the Court grants the leave requested. Owners assert that the discovery of * Owners further propose additional stylistic revisions to “harmonize the SACC.” (See Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Cross-Complaint, p. 3:4-5; see also Declaration of Michael J. Betz, 8) Page 2 of 3 a C€V2200992 the additional claims and parties was not until after conducting discovery and taking depositions as of February 2024. CSI further opposes the motion arguing that “Undisputed Facts and California Law Confirm [Owners] Cannot Prevail On [their] Disgorgement Claim.” (Oppo., p. 9:12-13.) The standard for the Court’s consideration of whether an amendment should be allowed does not include an evaluation of the evidentiary and substantive merits of a case. The opposing party may test the legal sufficiency of the allegations in other proceedings. (See Kittredge Sports Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, and Atkinson, supra, 109 Cal-App.4th 739, 760.) Owners have satisfied the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. They provide a copy of the proposed amended cross-complaint including the allegations and addition of subcontractor cross-defendants. (See Betz Decl., 44, Notice of Motion Exhs. | & 2; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a); Dye v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1380.) Owners further include a declaration specifying why the amendment is now necessary, when facts giving rise to the amendment were discovered, and why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b); Betz Decl., Jf 3, 5-9.) Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for leave to amend as proposed. Ail parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(B) to contest the tentative decision. Parties who request oral argument are required to appear in person or remotely by ZOOM. Regardless of whether a party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the prevailing party shall prepare an order consistent with the announced ruling as required by Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.11. The Zoom appearance information for July, 2024 is as follows: hittps://www.zoomgoy com/j/ 1602925171 I»wd=NUdsa ViabHNrNjZGZjFsVj VSTUVqQT09 Meeting ID: 160 292 5171 Passcode: 868745 If you are unable to join by video, you may join by telephone by calling (669) 254-5252 and using the above-provided passcode. Zoom appearance information may also be found on the Court’s website: https:/Avww.marin.courts.ca.go Page 3 of 3 a a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 202100555658CUOE: Christiane Lange Applegate vs. Seed Beauty LLC 07/22/2024 in Department 43 Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement Pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act The morning calendar in courtroom 43 will normally begin at 8:45. Please arrive for your hearing no later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called. The Court allows appearances by CourtCall and Zoom, but parties must both use the same platform if appearing remotely. The court’s equipment is not capable of handling mixed remote appearances. Counsel are expected to cooperate in this regard. Refer to the Courtroom 43 webpage for more information about remote appearances. If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:30 a.m. If you wish to appear by CourtCall, you must make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the court day before your scheduled hearing. Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not be granted. No exceptions will be made. For Zoom appearances, you must email the court at Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with a simultaneous copy to all other counsel/self-represented parties no later than 3:00 p.m. the court day before the appearance. INCLUDE THE PHRASE "ZOOM APPEARANCE ON (DATE OF HEARING)" IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR EMAIL. You will receive the login information for your appearance in reply to your email. If appearing by Zoom, log into the hearing no later than 8:30 a.m. The Court will transfer you to the meeting room when your matter is called. Do not attempt to appear by Zoom without following these instructions. With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Coats's secretary, Ms. McIntyre at 805- 477-5894, stating that you submit on the tentative. Or, you may email Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu of sending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing party appears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do not communicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, the Court may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative. Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is required but not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion For Approval of Settlement Under Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) 202100555658CUOE: Christiane Lange Applegate vs. Seed Beauty LLC Tentative Ruling: At 9:43 a.m. on Thursday July 18, 20024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Joint Status Report regarding the Monday July 22, 2024, hearing, stating: “The Parties intend to proceed with the settlement approval hearing as scheduled. The Parties are working on finalizing and obtaining signatures to the settlement agreement and intend on filing the settlement agreement shortly.” At 4:13pm on the same day, the Court received the declaration of Kawnporn “Mai” Tulyathan, attaching, among other things, an unsigned “Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release of PAGA Claims.” Neither submission (the Joint Status Report or the Tulyathan declaration) was timely filed or served on the required parties. The Court intends to continue the hearing to August 12, 2024, so that all parties, including the LWDA, are provided proper notice and all moving papers. It does not appear that the LWDA was provided with any of the declarations accompanying the Motion. Moreover, the Court cannot move forward with this Motion absent a fully-executed settlement agreement. Absent a fully-executed agreement there is no enforceable agreement for the Court to consider. Notably, as of June 6, 2024, the parties stated that they were “still continuing to negotiate one remaining provision in the PAGA settlement agreement that remains unsettled,” and on July 18, 2024, the parties indicated that they were in the process of both finalizing and obtaining signatures. The nature of the one provision is not articulated and there is no explanation for the failure to obtain all signatures to the agreement. In short, there is no agreed upon settlement before the Court and reaching the merits now would be premature. Moving party is ordered to serve notice of the continuance.

CV-22-004006 – GALLO, EMELIA vs COHN, ARTHUR – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs – DROPPED, at the request of the moving party.

C23-02863 CASE NAME: JOAO VITOR LEITE VS. CAMPOS DEMOLITION HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: COMPLAINT FROM: GUSTAVO CAMPOS FILED BY: CAMPOS, GUSTAVO *TENTATIVE RULING:* Defendant Gustavo Campos filed this demurrer on 5/28/24. As of July 8, 2024, no opposition to the demurrer has been filed, therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Background The plaintiff, Joao Vitor Leite, filed a complaint on November 21, 2023, for breach of an oral contract. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant subcontracted with him to perform paving, stair, and wall work on residential property. The plaintiff alleges that he performed the work, but that defendant has not paid and owes the plaintiff over $30,000. The defendant Campos, who owns and operates Campos Demolition, filed this demurrer alleging that the plaintiff is not a licensed contractor, therefore, a demurrer mut be sustained to the complaint. Legal Standard A person or entity who falls under the definition of a contractor cannot obtain relief for non-payment if the person or entity was not a licensed contractor. Business and Professions Code section 7026 defines “contractor” as “any person who undertakes to…construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck, or demolish any building, highway, road…” (Business & Profession Code section 7026). Moreover, courts have held that a demurrer shall be sustained to a complaint for breach of contract if the plaintiff falls within the definition of a contractor under 7026 and was not licensed. (Brunzell Construction Co. v. Barton Development Co. (1966) 240 CA2d 442; Lewis & Queen vs. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal2d 141) Analysis In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he was hired to drain, pave, and perform stair and wall work on a residential property. The work the plaintiff was hired to perform falls within the definition of a “contractor” found in Business and Professions Code section 7026. The plaintiff did not allege that he was a licensed contractor at the time the work was performed or in his complaint. This failure is fatal to the complaint and the court sustains defendant’s demurrer. However, the court notes the plaintiff is self-represented. It may be the plaintiff is a licensed contractor. For this reason, the court is sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024

S-CV-0050397 James, Debbie et al vs. Osborn, Glen et al ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Cross Complaint of Osborn [filed 10/27/23] is not at issue - Need status of Roe Defendants