Jamie Suprina V. Gfi Group, Inc., Michael Gooch, Colin Heffron, Marisa Cassoni, Frank Fanzilli Jr., Richard Magee, Cme Group, Inc., Commodore Acquisition Corp., Commodore Acquisition Llc

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

23CV051739: NAIR, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer Demurrer to the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; MPA, Declaration and Request for Judicial Notice; filed by GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a limited liability company (Defendant) in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/10/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Hearing on Demurrer Demurrer to the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; MPA, Declaration and Request for Judicial Notice; filed by GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a limited liability company (Defendant) scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 10/03/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . The Demurrer to, and Motion to Strike Portions of, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint by Defendant General Motors LLC are CONTINUED to October 3, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. Defendant demurrers to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud and Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. based, inter alia, on the economic loss rule. In opposition, Plaintiffs cite Dhital v. Nissan North America Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 840-841, which held that concealment-based claims for fraudulent inducement to enter a contract (the same type of claim alleged in this case) are not barred by the economic loss rule. The Dhital case has been accepted for review by the California Supreme Court (Case No. S277568). The California Supreme Court has stayed its consideration of the appeal in the Dhital case pending its resolution of a similar issue (whether claims for fraudulent concealment are barred by the economic loss rule) in Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Case No. S272113. Oral arguments in the Rattagan case were held on June 4, 2024. For the sake of judicial economy, the Court continues Defendant’s demurrer in this case pending the decision in the Rattagan case. By no later than September 19, 2024, the parties may file and serve supplemental briefs of no more than five double spaced pages addressing the effect, if any, of the decision in the Rattagan case on this demurrer. The Initial Case Management Conference scheduled for August 6, 2024 is CONTINUED to November 19, 2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24. The Initial Case Management Conference scheduled for 08/06/2024 is continued to 11/19/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse .

Parties to appear in person or remotely. Department 10C is open for in person appearances. Should counsel/parties prefer to appear remotely, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept 10C. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept 10C: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6937 and Pin # 6822.

Case Number: 21STCV45088 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ex rel., ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, vs. ADAM AVELARDO PEREZ, et al. Case No.: 21STCV45088 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Plaintiff-Relator Allstate Insurance Companys motion to compel the deposition of Nonparty ProCare Funding, LLC for business records is granted. ProCare is ordered to appear for deposition and produce documents within 30 days of this ruling. Plaintiff-Relators Allstate Insurance Companys (Allstate) (Plaintiff) moves to compel the deposition of Non-party ProCare Funding LLC (ProCare) to appear for deposition to produce business records issued on November 29, 2023. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2 ; C.C.P. §2025.480(a).) Plaintiff moves on the basis ProCare failed to produce any responsive documents in compliance with the lawfully issued subpoena without justification. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.) Meet and Confer A motion to compel a deposition must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (C.C.P. §§ 2016.040 , 2025.480 (b).) Plaintiffs counsel declares that on March 19, 2024, she sent Defendants counsel Reed a detailed meet and confer letter explaining the deficiencies in ProCares purported objections to the subpoena. (Decl. of Stassi ¶6, Exh. D.) Plaintiffs counsels declaration substantially complies with the requirements of C.C.P. §2016.040. Background On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff served a notice for the deposition for production of business records to ProCare set for December 19, 2023. (Decl. of Stassi ¶3, Exh. A.) On January 19, 2024, ProCares counsel set forth ProCares purported objections to the subpoena in a letter. (Decl. of Stassi ¶5, Exh. C.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on March 22, 2024. ProCare filed its opposition on July 3, 2024. Plaintiff filed its reply on July 8, 2024. Discussion Where a deponent fails to produce any document, the subpoenaing party may move the court for an order compelling the production of documents, upon a showing of good cause. (C.C.P. § 2025.480 (a); see also Thai v. Richmond City Ctr., L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 282, 289.) Good cause may be established where the request is made in good faith and that the documents sought are relevant to the subject matter and material to the issues in the litigation. ( Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 58 6-587.) Documents are discoverable from third parties where they are reasonably likely to lead to the discoverable information or aid in evaluation of the claims. In the context of discovery, evidence is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. ( Moore v. Mercer (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 424, 447.) The broad scope of permissible discovery is equally applicable to discovery of information from a nonparty as it is to parties in the pending suit. ( Johnson v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062.) At this stage, relevance is construed broadly and [a]dmissibility is not the test, information unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. ( Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency, Inc . (2001) 87 Cal.App. 1006, 1013.) Here, good cause exists to compel compliance with Plaintiffs deposition subpoena. The only documents Plaintiff has requested from ProCare are related to the transactions that form the fraudulent scheme alleged in the operative pleading. (SAC ¶¶75-92.) Plaintiff has pursued party discovery, including written interrogatories and requests for production of documents served on New Hope, which has revealed that ProCares arrangement with New Hope is similar to the arrangement New Hope has with Healthcare Financial Solutions, LLC (HFS). (Decl. of Stassi ¶8.) Specifically, like HFS, ProCare agreed to (and did) purchase patient accounts from New Hope prior to any patient services (MRIs) having been rendered and paid New Hope up front for the accounts, as set forth in the Accounts Receivable Purchase Agreement Between ProCare Funding, LLC (Buyer) and Adam Avelardo Perez d/b/a New Hope Imaging Services (Seller) dated March 10, 2021 that Defendants produced in discovery. (Decl. of Stassi ¶8.) The agreement was subsequently amended in 2019, and Defendants produced the amendment and a bill of sale from 2021 relating to ProCares purchase of New Hope patient accounts. New Hopes bank account records that Plaintiff subpoenaed from the banks show that ProCare paid New Hope at least $65,710.00 pursuant to this arrangement. (Decl. of Stassi ¶8; Supp-Decl. of Stassi ¶4, Exh. G.) Plaintiffs deposition subpoena does not seek documents that would disclose patient information, and to the extent that some patient information may be identified in responsive documents, HIPAA allows such disclosure under an appropriate protective order such as the one that exists in the instant matter. ProCare claims it need not comply with the subpoena because it requires production of confidential and sensitive business information. ProCare fails to meet its burden to demonstrate exactly what confidential and sensitive information it would be forced to produce and why the protective order does not provide sufficient protection for that material. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected . . . the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (C.C.P. §2031.240(c)(1); see also HLC Properties, Limited v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 59 [The objecting party has the burden to file evidence of the preliminary facts establishing a privilege exists.].) Here, ProCare has not demonstrated that any such privilege or protection it claims in its objections applies. ProCares objections do not describe any of these purportedly confidential and sensitive documents with particularity, nor has it produced any privilege log. Further, any concern ProCare may have is outweighed by Plaintiffs need for the documents and the protections available under the existing protective order. ( See Supp.-Decl. of Stassi ¶3, Exh. F.) ProCares objections that the subpoena is overly broad and oppressive are unavailing because it fails to make a showing of undue burden. (C.C.P. §2020.220(e) [subpoenaed person bears the burden of demonstrating that the information is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense]; Vasquez v. California School of Culinary Arts, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 35, 42 [stating subpoenaed entity may only oppose production of electronically stored information on the basis that the information is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense].) ProCares conclusory statements do not satisfy its burden to demonstrate undue burden and expense. The Court grants Plaintiffs motion pursuant to C.C.P. §2025.480 and orders ProCare to appear for deposition and produce documents and things within thirty (30) days of this Courts ruling . Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is granted. Conclusion Plaintiffs motion to compel ProCares compliance with Plaintiffs deposition subpoena for production of business records is granted. ProCare to appear for deposition and produce the requested documents with 30 days of this ruling. Moving Party is to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

24CV00800 BURDGE v. AIRSTREAM INC. AIRSTREAM’S MOTION TO STAY The motion to stay is denied. I. BACKGROUND Kathryn Burdge’s (“Burdge’) amended complaint, filed on March 26, 2024, alleges a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in relation to her purchase of a 2023 Airstream Atlas RV. She purchased the Airstream in Temecula, California and she resided in Page 6 of 9 Santa Cruz County at the time of the purchase. Burdge asserts various deficiencies/defects with the RV. In connection with the purchase of the Airstream, Burdge signed a Limited Warranty which stated, in part, the following: “LEGAL REMEDIES: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY NATURE RESTS IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE, WHICH IS OHIO.” (Ex. B to Dec. of March.) This language is found on the second page of the Limited Warranty and is the second paragraph before the signature line for the purchaser. The sales contract is 6 pages long and signatures were required on each page and, on some pages, multiple signatures on each page. II. MOTION Airstream seeks to stay this action to allow Burdge to re-file the case in Ohio, the forum selection state. Airstream bases its motion on the above-referenced forum selection clause contained in the signed limited warranty. Airstream contends a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is a motion to stay (or dismiss) the action to allow a plaintiff to file in the proper court. Airstream argues the forum selection provision is mandatory and reasonable. Further, Airstream acknowledges Burdge cannot be compelled to waive her rights under Song-Beverly, and thus, it will stipulate to have the Ohio courts apply Song-Beverly in this case. Airstream contends a stay would allow for time to determine if the Ohio courts would apply Song-Beverly. If they will not, then Burdge could bring the case back to Santa Cruz. Burdge opposes the stay. She argues Airstream failed to provide evidence demonstrating she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause. Even though Burdge signed the limited warranty “she had to sign the document even if she did not understand the importance of the forum selection clause.” (Opp at pg. 3.) That is, Burdge was required to sign the acknowledgment of document and that does not prove she waived her rights under Song-Beverly freely and voluntarily. Burdge asserts Airstream failed to provide evidence that the designated forum will not diminish her rights afforded under California law. Specifically, she argues, even if the court finds she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause, Airstream cannot show that Ohio law will not diminish her substantive rights. Burdge contends Airstream’s offer to stipulate to have the Song-Beverly apply in Ohio is insufficient because the choice of law in the Limited Page 7 of 9 Warranty states that Ohio law will govern procedural issues and how the express warranty is construed and interpreted. III. DISCUSSION “Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; see also Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; CCP § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”].) "The procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) “California law is ‘in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such [mandatory] forum selection clauses. [Citations.] No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445.) “‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our state's public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 147.) “The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily ‘bears the substantial burden of proving why it should not be enforced.’ [Citations.] That burden, however, is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California statutes. In that situation, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause bears the burden to show litigating the claims in the contractually designated forum ‘will not diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded … under California law.’ [Citations.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) In this case, while she did sign the limited warranty, the court agrees with Burdge that the warranty was not signed knowingly as to the forum selection clause and that application of the clause would be unreasonable and/or unfair. The clause is buried in the second to the last paragraph and is written in legalese such that a reasonable consumer could not be expected to understand they were acquiescing to file a lawsuit in Ohio. The exclusive jurisdiction section does not adequately inform the consumer that they would need to file suit in Ohio for warranty issues, especially given that Burdge lives in California and purchased the Airstream in Page 8 of 9 California. The court also notes the length of the sales contract and number of signatures required as factors which balance in Burdge’s favor. The court does not find Airstream has carried its burden in demonstrating that Burdge’s substantive rights will not be diminished in any way if the case is brought in Ohio. Despite the offer of Airstream’s counsel to stipulate to apply California law in Ohio, there is no guarantee the Ohio courts will agree to this arrangement; that is, what is the effect of the stipulation in the Ohio courts? Second, Airstream’s proposal would create two pending actions, which does not promote judicial economy. Third, having California courts apply California law simply makes more sense in terms of protecting Burdge’s rights under the Song-Beverly Act and for efficient case management. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 9 of 9

CV-21-002417 – CLEMENTS, BOBBY vs ODAY, JEFF – Defendants’ Motion for Terminating and Monetary Sanctions and in the Alternative Evidentiary Sanctions – GRANTED, in part, Denied in part, unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s order of February 16, 2023, compelling Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s properly propounded discovery within fourteen (14) days, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s verbal admonishment in that regard at the Case Management Conference of October 30, 2023, constitutes a willful failure to comply with the Court’s orders that warrant the imposition of terminating sanctions against Plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure §§2023.010 and 2023.030; Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 727, rehearing denied, review denied; Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007), 149 Cal.App.4th 285; Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004), 117 Cal.App.4th 913; Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 6050. Monetary Sanctions of attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $1560.00 are hereby awarded against Plaintiff payable to Defendant’s Counsel, Aleshia M. White within thirty (30) days of service of this order on Plaintiff.

VERDIN VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. Case Number: 23CV-0202892 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of mediation. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24STCV08602 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING OREN BEN ELISHA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTINA YING DONG, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV08602 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Calendar Number: 5 Defendants Christina Ying Dong (Dong) and Sylmar Calvert LLC (Sylmar) (collectively, Defendants) move to expunge the notice of lis pendens currently recorded on the property located at 14401 Calvert Street, Van Nuys, California 91311 (the Property). Defendants additionally move for an award of attorneys fees. The Court GRANTS Defendants motion and ORDERS the expungement of Plaintiffs lis pendens on the Property. Background This case relates to failed negotiations between Plaintiffs Oren Ben Elisha and Yosef Ben Elisha (Plaintiffs) and Defendant Dong to purchase real property located at 14401 Calvert Street, Van Nuys, California 91311 (the Property) through Defendant Sylmar. On July 27, 2023, Dong entered into a purchase agreement to purchase the Property and opened escrow. (Dong Decl. ¶ 5.) In August of 2023, Dong offered Plaintiffs an opportunity to invest in an entity that would take title to the Property. (Dong Decl. 6.) On August 9, 2023, Dong filed the Articles of Organization for Sylmar for this purpose. (Dong Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A.) The parties were scheduled to close escrow by February 28, 2024. (Dong Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs filed this action on April 5, 2024, raising claims for (1) resulting trust; (2) constructive trust; (3) specific performance; (4) quiet title; (5) accounting; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; and (8) dissolution of partnership. Request for Judicial Notice The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 3 to Plaintiffs opposition as public records. The Court does not take notice of the truth of their contents. Evidentiary Objections The Court overrules Plaintiffs evidentiary objections. Legal Standard A party to an action who asserts a real property claim may record a notice of pendency of action in which that real property claim is alleged. The notice may be recorded in the office of the recorder of each county in which all or part of the real property is situated. The notice shall contain the names of all parties to the action and a description of the property affected by the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.20.) Except in actions subject to Section 405.6, the claimant shall, prior to recordation of the notice, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and to all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property claim as shown by the latest county assessment roll. &. Immediately following recordation, a copy of the notice shall also be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Service shall also be made immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later joined in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.22.) At any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party. . . with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §405.30.) A lis pendens may be expunged either (1) if the pleadings do not contain a real property claim, or (2) if the court finds that the party claiming the lis pendens has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.31, 405.32.) The party asserting the lis pendens has the burden of proof under Section 405.31 and Section 405.32.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30) The burden is to demonstrate that their pleadings contain a real property claim and that the probable validity of their real property claim can be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §405.31; see also McKnight v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 291, 298 [the burden is upon the recording party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was commenced and prosecuted for a proper purpose and in good faith] .) Probable validity exists when it is more likely than not that the claimant will obtain a judgment on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.3.)¿ Any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded the court may also upon motion by any person with an interest in the property, require the claimant to give the moving party an undertaking as a condition of maintain the notice in the record title. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.34) Discussion Procedural Defects Any notice of pendency of action shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of pendency of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.23.) Defendants contend that the lis pendens is subject to expungement under Code of Civil Procedure, section 405.23 because Plaintiffs did not immediately serve the notice on Defendants or file it with the Court. (Dong Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.) On July 9, following Defendants filing of this motion, Plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens with this Court and served the notice on Plaintiffs counsel. The notice requirement is intended to assure that property owners receive prompt notice of the recording of a lis pendens. ( Biddle v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 135, 137.) However, where a plaintiff substantially complies with the notice statute and promptly conveys actual notice to the affected party, the purpose of the statute is satisfied. ( Ibid .) In Biddle , the plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens and mailed a copy to the defendant simultaneously, sent it to the wrong location and did not request a return receipt as required. ( Id . at pp. 136-137.) The court found that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice statute. ( Id . at p. 137.) Here, the delay was longer. Plaintiffs served the notice roughly three months after filing it. However, Defendants had actual notice, and the method of Plaintiffs eventual service was otherwise proper. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs substantially complied with the notice statute. Substantive Defects A lis pendens may be expunged either (1) if the pleadings do not contain a real property claim, or (2) if the court finds that the party claiming the lis pendens has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.31, 405.32.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and dissolution of partnership are not real property claims. Plaintiffs do not contest this. Plaintiffs rather contend that their claims for resulting trust, constructive trust, specific performance, and quiet title are real property claims that satisfy the test of probable validity. The Court first notes that Plaintiffs Complaint is exceedingly short, with the factual allegations comprising slightly over one page. The factual allegations themselves only contain general statements that the parties had worked together on real estate opportunities as partners in the past, and that Dong owed Plaintiffs fiduciary duties as a result; that Dong and Plaintiffs agreed to form a partnership to purchase the Property; that Plaintiffs were involved in the negotiation and diligence process; and that Dong then purchased the Property herself under Sylmars name. The Complaint alleges that this purchase breached the parties agreement, as well as Dongs alleged fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. The Complaint does not expand on the terms of the parties agreement, what performance was obligated of each party, or whether it was oral or in writing. Further, the Complaint does not contain any allegations specific to each of the eight causes of action. Nor have Plaintiffs amended the Complaint in the three months since it was filed to fill out these allegations. Plaintiffs attempt to expand on the allegations of the Complaint in their opposition brief, stating that the reason the Complaint is so threadbare is because Plaintiffs were in a rush to file the lis pendens and thereby prevent Defendants from selling the Property. (Opposition at p. 12:10-12.) While that may be so, Plaintiffs are certainly not still in a rush three months later. Specific Performance To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) To obtain specific performance after a breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally show: (1) the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both reasonable and supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a substantial similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract. ( Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463, 472 [citation and quotation marks omitted].) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the statute of frauds with respect to the alleged contract. A contract coming within the statute of frauds is invalid unless it is memorialized by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent. ( Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2 (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 552, citing Civ. Code, § 1624.) An agreement for the sale of real property or an interest in real property comes within the statute of frauds. ( Ibid , citing Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) Although the parties dispute whether the alleged agreement was for the purchase of land, the Court assumes for the sake of the statute of frauds analysis that it is because the alternative would render Plaintiffs contract claims inappropriate for a lis pendens in any event. Here, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of a writing memorializing the contract. Plaintiffs contend that a series of text messages sent between Dong and Yosef Ben Elisha memorialize the contract. Yosef Ben Elisha declares that the text messages state as follows: Dong: Hi Yossi, hope all is well. I made an appointment with Armin today to go to his office at 2pm. Thank you for introducing him and his firm. If you are still interested in the project. You are welcome to join me. Plaintiff Yosef Ben Elisha: Good morning Christina, I can follow up with you around 12pm to try to show up. I do have meeting that I will need to schedule to make it happen. I will let you know around 12pm. Dong: Thanks so much Yossi. Sorry for the late notice. Just decided to meet with him for final DD before closing :) Plaintiff Yosef Ben Elisha: Yes I will be there 2pm (Decl. Yosef Ben Elish ¶ 29 [emphasis in original].) There are two problems with Plaintiffs argument. First, these text messages hardly set forth the key terms of an agreement to purchase the Property. Second, [a]n electronic message of an ephemeral nature that is not designed to be retained or to create a permanent record, including, but not limited to, a text message or instant message format communication, is insufficient under this title to constitute a contract to convey real property, in the absence of a written confirmation& (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (d) [emphasis added].) The Court therefore concludes that the text messages that Plaintiff provides do not satisfy the statute of frauds. [F]ull performance takes a contract out of the statute of frauds has been limited to the situation where performance consisted of conveying property, rendering personal services, or doing something other than payment of money. ( Secrest , supra , 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Plaintiffs argue that the contract does not fall under the statute of frauds because they substantially performed. (Opposition at p. 14:5-10.) Plaintiffs contend that this substantial performance consisted of completing due diligence, meeting and communicating with the prior agent of the Property, communicating with the Propertys prior owner, communicating with the contamination specialist, communicating with prospective investors, retaining an architect, putting together cost estimates, and putting together a timeline of development. The problem with Plaintiffs argument is that full performance, not substantial performance, is required. Plaintiffs do not provide any allegations in the Complaint or arguments in their brief indicating what performance was actually required of them. The Court is not prepared to jump to the conclusion that the list of actions Plaintiffs provide constituted the full performance of Plaintiffs obligations under the alleged contract. The Court therefore finds that the statute of frauds is not satisfied. As a result, there Plaintiffs have not shown the probable validity of their claims for specific performance or breach of contract. Resulting Trust There are two problems with Plaintiffs resulting trust claim. First, [a] resulting trust does not arise from any oral agreement between the parties, but only as a result of the advancement of at least part of the consideration by the one claiming to be the beneficiary. ( Laing v. Laubach (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 511, 517.) Plaintiffs have failed to allege or provide a written agreement. Second, [a] resulting trust cannot be enforced in favor of a person who has paid part of the consideration for the transfer of property unless it is possible to clearly establish the amount of money contributed by him [or her] or the proportion of his [or her] contribution to the whole purchase price &. One who claims a resulting trust in land must establish clearly, convincingly and unambiguously, the precise amount or proportion of the consideration furnished by him [or her] &. If the claimant does not, then the presumption of ownership arising from the legal title is not overcome and a resulting trust will not be declared. ( Lloyds Bank California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038, 10441045 [citations and quotation marks omitted].) Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they paid any of the consideration for the Property, let alone part of it. For both of these reasons, Plaintiffs have not shown the probable validity of their claim for resulting trust. Constructive Trust [A] constructive trust may only be imposed where the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that res; and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party who is not entitled to it. ( Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of a contract giving them a right to the Property. Plaintiffs have not pled or argued a different basis for such a right, either. As a result, Plaintiffs have not shown that they can satisfy the second element, and therefore have not shown the probable validity of this claim. Quiet Title Code of Civil Procedure, section 761.020 sets forth the requirements for an action for quiet title: The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following: (a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any. (b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession. (c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought. (d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought. (e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) There are several problems. First, the Complaint is not verified. Second, at its most generous reading, the Complaint alleges that the parties formed a contract to purchase the Property together but as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the statute of frauds with respect to this contract, and therefore cannot show the basis for their title to the Property. For both of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established the probable validity of their quiet title claim. Conclusion Plaintiffs have failed to show the probable validity of any of their claims sounding in real property. The Court therefore grants Defendants motion and orders the expungement of Plaintiffs lis pendens on the Property.