Keefe, Thomas Et Al Vs. Karen Apuzzo Langton As Member Of The Holliston Planning Board Et Al

GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV21-0197823 This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which as previously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates. J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Complaint, Allegations, and Defendants’ Default Plaintiff DML Capital, Inc. contends it holds valid deeds of trust against properties on Cougar Lane in Running Springs and on State Highway 189 in Blue Jay. However, due to a mistake the deeds of trust were not properly recorded. The Blue Jay property is owned by the Riordans, John and Lisa (Lisa is also known as Lisa Griggs-Riordan). 1 The Running Springs property is owned by Lisa’s company, Veracity Marketing, LLC (Veracity), but there was a “vesting error” in the deed of trust as it identified Lisa as the owner. Therefore, the pending litigation was commenced on September 20, 2023, against the Riordans and Veracity. DML seeks declaratory relief or a determination that the liens are valid and enforceable. The complaint also contains causes of action for equitable lien and reformation. 1 Because the Riordans share the same last name, the Court will refer to them by their first name for the purpose of clarity. The Court means no disrespect. 3 The proofs of service of summons on file indicate Lisa was personally served at the Blue Jay address on October 11, 2023. John was substitute served at the same time and at the same address via Lisa. Defaults were entered against the Riordan’s on November 27, 2023. The Motion to Vacate John, but not Lisa, now moves to set aside the default on the grounds that service was defective and did not result in actual notice as the couple had separated in November 2021 and were living in different households, with John living at the Cougar Lane property and Lisa living at the Blue Jay property. Thus, John did not reside at the residence where substitute service was allegedly perfected. John also contends his mother learned of the lawsuit in mid-January 2024 and contacted DML’s attorney to resolve the lawsuit. Then, in March 2024, John received a solicitation letter from an attorney about the lawsuit. It is unclear if John had been informed about the lawsuit by his mother. In any event, John attended a hearing on March 20, 2024, and then retained counsel. The set aside motion followed on April 23, 2024. The motion also indicates that Lisa fraudulently pledged the properties as collateral during the time the parties were separated. The motion is supported by a declaration from John, the proof of service of summons, the request for entry of default, property history records, quit claim deeds, a proposed answer, and a proposed cross-complaint for fraud, indemnity, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault against Lisa. The motion is opposed by DML, which essentially argues that it had attempted to obtain a default judgment, but it never came to fruition because the Court was improperly requiring a default prove-up hearing. Regardless, the judgment was never entered and the pending motion was filed. DML also argues that the motion is untimely because John’s mother admitted during the January 2024 phone call that her son was aware of the lawsuit yet John waited until April to file 4 his motion. Finally, DML refutes John’s suggestion that he was defrauded, but those arguments are beyond the scope of the pending motion. The opposition is supported by a declaration from attorney Charles Correia and various exhibits, which are irrelevant as they go towards DML’s prima facie case or refuting John’s assertions about Lisa’s alleged fraud. DISCUSSION The Law Related to Motions under Code of Civil Procedure Sections 473 The trial court has broad discretion to vacate a judgment and/or the preceding clerk’s entry of default so long as the moving party establishes the grounds for relief, the relief has been raised in a procedurally proper manner, and the motion is made within any applicable time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), “[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party … from a judgment … or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” However, a motion for such relief must be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after the entry of the judgment, default, order, etc. The six-month limit is jurisdictional in nature. (Maynard v. Brandon (2005) 36 Cal.4th 364, 372.) In this case, John has presented a valid basis for why the default was taken against him— a reason that DML has not refuted. Namely, John did not live at the address were he was purportedly substitute served because he and Lisa separated and he did not live at the property at the time of service. This means service was defective because to perfect substitute service in the manner advanced by DML, the service documents must be left at the defendant’s “dwelling house” 5 and then mailed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20.) DML’s claimed service is therefore factually inaccurate and, in-turn, legally invalid. (See 10/25/24 Proof of service at ¶ 5b.) Although DML argues that John’s mother purportedly admitted that John knew about the lawsuit in January 2024, “[a]ctual notice of the action alone, however, is not a substitute for proper service and is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 392.) Furthermore, the assertion in the declaration from attorney Correia about what John’s mother told him about John’s knowledge of the lawsuit would logically be hearsay since it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Finally, even assuming that John had notice of the lawsuit in January 2024, the three month delay in filing the motion is not necessarily unreasonable since it appears that settlement efforts were made and then John sought an attorney referral service in the interim. The motion was otherwise filed well within the outer six month limit imposed by section 473. Conclusion Based on the foregoing: The Court grants defendant John Riordan’s motion to set aside the default. Defendant John Riordan shall have thirty (30) days to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. The Court sets a trial setting conference for September 18, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Counsel for defendant John Riordan is ordered to provide notice. 6

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT A-NHI LE INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE QU YAN KUANG AND A-NHI LE REVOCABLE TRUST Notice Of Motion And Motion To (1) Reopen Discovery For The Limited Purpose Of Compelling Plaintiffs Deposition; And (2) Compel Plaintiffs Deposition Request For Sanctions Of $10,495.00 Against Plaintiff Enkhdul Batsukh And Her Attorneys Of Record, Thomas W. J. Purtell, Esq. And The Law Offices Of Thomas W.J. Purtell; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities is granted in part. Plaintiff's deposition shall occur on a mutually agreeable date no later than July 19, 2024. Defendants are awarded sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney in the amount of $3,137.50, consisting of ten hours or reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $225 per hour plus .3 hours of reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $275 per hour plus costs of $805. Plaintiff's request in her conditional non-opposition papers for affirmative discovery relief is not considered in connection with defendants' motion because it was not properly raised in opposition papers and, in all events, now appears to be the subject of a separate noticed motion to be heard on August 1, 2024. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

23CV035374: VENTAS REALTY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs MOHAMMED, et al. 07/19/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice in Department 25 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Jenna Whitman The application of Jennifer Metzger Stinnett for admission pro hac vice is GRANTED. The court sets a compliance date for payment of annual renewal fee. (Gov. Code 70617(e)(2).) Compliance Hearing renewal PHV Stinnett is scheduled for 07/16/2025 at 03:00 PM in Department 25 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.

Case Number: 23GDCV02307 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: E Case No: 23GDCV02307 Hearing Date: 07/18/2024 8:30am Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: JOHN WOOD, as assignee of the Estate of Donald R. Wood; v. MARK G. MCNELIS; and MARK G. MCNELIS & ASSOCIATES, CPAS, INC., and DOES 1-20 [TENTATIVE RULING ON DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE] Moving Party: Defendants, Mark G. Mcnelis and Mark G. Mcnelis & Associates, CPAs, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff, John Wood Moving Papers: Notice/Demurrer Opposition Papers: Opposition Reply Papers: No Reply RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to all four causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed 5/13/2024 on grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under CCP § 430.10(e). BACKGROUND Plaintiffs initial Complaint was filed on 10/30/2023. An Amended Complaint (AC) was filed on 2/5/2024. On 2/16/2024, Defendants demurrer to the initial Complaint was denied as moot based on the filing of the Amended Complaint. On April 11, 2024, this Court heard Defendants demurrer to the AC. The AC asserted causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Common Counts, and (3) Accounting. On April 11, 2024, this Court overruled the demurrer to the first two causes of action and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to the third cause of action. On 05/13/2024, Plaintiff filed the SAC. The SAC alleges four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Common Counts, (3) Accounting, and (4) Unfair Competition. PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)) : Ok Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b) :Ok Meet and Confer A party filing a demurrer shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a).) The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41(a)(4).) Here, Defendants counsel alleges that the parties were unable to resolve the issue presented by this demurrer. (Bates Decl. ¶ 5.) LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS Demurrer Sufficiency A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda , (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law &. ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn , supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading & is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. ( Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp . (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to determine whether or not the & complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. ( Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. ( Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) ANALYSIS First Cause of Action (Breach of Oral Contract) This action arises from an alleged oral contract that was entered into between John Woods Assignor (the Estate of Donald R. Wood Wood Estate) and Defendants on or about May 20, 2020. Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 20, 2020 an oral agreement was entered between the Wood Estate and Defendants whereby the Wood Estate would transfer client files held by Donald R. Wood prior to his death on April 23, 2020 in exchange for Defendants agreement to pay the Wood Estate twenty-five percent (25%) of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years following the transfer of the aforementioned clients and/or client files. Since neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's assignor could guarantee that any of the clients whose files were transferred to Defendants would agree to utilize the services offered to them by Defendants within the following year, it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing to Plaintiff's assignor if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. However, Plaintiff is informed and believes that several of the aforementioned clients whose files had been transferred to Defendants by the Wood Estate agreed to utilize the services offered by Defendants, and did in fact utilize Defendants services. (SAC ¶ 13.) Defendants demur on the basis of the statute of frauds by citing to Civil Code §1624(a)(1) which states, The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the partys agent: (1) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. (Civil Code §1624(a)(1).) Defendants point out that the allegations in the SAC are for an oral contract over a period of four years; Defendants argue the contract could not be performed within a year from the making thereof and is barred by the Statute of Frauds under Civil Code § 1624. Tentative Ruling First Cause of Action Breach of Oral Contract The fact that it is not probable or likely to be performed within a year from the date it is made does not make it invalid if by its terms it is possible that the contract may be performed within a year after it is made. ( Fisher v. Parsons (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 829, 837.) In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that it was possible that the contract could have been performed within one year. Plaintiff argues: In the instant case it was possible that the contract could have been performed within one year. One such possibility exists if each of those clients whose files were transferred to Defendants demanded the return of their files. Another such possibility exists if each of those clients simply refused to engage Defendants as their tax accountant. The allegations in Paragraph 13 (pg. 3) which are incorporated into each cause of action clearly state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year if the clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. Since the contract had the possibility of being performed within year, the defense of the statute of frauds does not apply. (Oppo. p. 4-5.) Here, after further consideration in reading the SAC and reading the Oppositions arguments on how it is possible that the contract could have been performed within one year, the Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument on how the contract could be performed within one year. The alleged oral agreement is for a term of four years. Plaintiff argues that the contract could be performed within one year if each of those clients whose files were transferred to Defendants demanded the return of their files. The Court fails to understand this argument, because based on the allegations of the oral contract, the contract is still for a term of four years. The allegations of the oral contract alleged that 25% of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years following the transfer of the aforementioned clients and/or client files. The Court is unclear on how returning the files, presumably within the first year, shows that the contract could be performed within a year, because by the very nature of the terms of the alleged oral agreement, whether or not the demand of the files happened within the first year appears to be of no significance because the terms of the oral contract allege that the oral contract applies for a period of four years. Thus, the Court is unclear how Plaintiff is presumably arguing that returning the files within a year terminates the four year contract. Plaintiff also argues that the contract could be performed within a year because [a]nother such possibility exists if each of those clients simply refused to engage Defendants as their tax accountant. The Court also fails to understand Plaintiffs argument here. The terms of the contract say &25% of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years& Therefore, even if the clients refuse to engage them as their accountant, the oral contract already considered that issue by stating 25% of all fees, if any & The exact terms of the oral contract appear to consider the fact that it is possible that there could be no fees earned. Either way, if there were fees earned or not, it appears as if this agreement were to apply for a four year period. Plaintiff also argues that the allegations in Paragraph 13 (pg. 3) which are incorporated into each cause of action clearly state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year if the clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. However, the SAC does not in fact state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year. The SAC says, Since neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's assignor could guarantee that any of the clients whose files were transferred to Defendants would agree to utilize the services offered to them by Defendants within the following year, it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing to Plaintiff's assignor if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. (SAC ¶ 13.) The allegations state that it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. The allegations do not state that the contract could be completed within one year. The Opposition also argued that Defendants partially performed the agreement and a contract that might otherwise be subject to the statute of frauds may by entire or partial performance support the contract. Plaintiff cites to Fisher v. Parsons (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 829, 836 to support their argument. Plaintiffs also argue that Plaintiff has alleged partial performance, and Defendants reaffirmed the existence of the contract and the obligation to pay the Wood Estate at all times prior to September 30, 2023 when Mark G. McNelis told Plaintiff that no more accountings would be provided, or payments made. (Oppo. p. 5.) An issue with the Plaintiffs argument here is that Fisher does not state what Plaintiff alleges it to state. The citation to Fisher at 836 is cited entirely out of context. In the partial performance portion of the ruling, the Fisher court was not discussing the statute of frauds. The portion of the ruling in Fisher on partial performance occurred before the Fisher court even addressed the statute of frauds. The portion on partial performance was in a section generally discussing contract formation and law pertaining to requirements contracts. The Court will hear argument, but based on Plaintiffs Opposition and allegations in the SAC, the Court fails to see how the instant contract could be performed within a year. Defendants demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of oral contract is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED. Second Cause of Action Common Counts The Court will hear from both parties on the cause of action titled Common Counts. It is unclear to the Court what this cause of action is. It is not for accounting, because the third cause of action is for accounting. The Movant simply argues that the first through third causes of action fail to comply with Civil Code § 1624, but Movant does not explicitly address the second cause of action titled Common Counts. Notably, the Opposition does not appear to address this cause of action. Tentative Ruling Second Cause of Action Common Counts The Court will hear argument. Tentative Ruling Third Cause of Action Accounting The Court will hear argument. TENTATIVE RULING Fourth Cause of Action Unfair Competition Defendants filed a motion to strike as to the fourth cause of action arguing that leave to amend was not granted to file a fourth cause of action. Here, the Defendants are correct to note that at the previous demurrer hearing leave to amend was not granted as to filing a fourth cause of action. In Opposition to the motion to strike, Plaintiff appears to concede that the fourth cause of action should be stricken. Plaintiff states, Plaintiff's opposition is limited to requesting that should Plaintiff desire to pursue a cause of action for unfair competition, or any other cause of action that Plaintiff may assert as a viable cause of action, that the instant motion be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff asserting such causes of action as may be ascertained during the course of this litigation following Plaintiffs n a motion to amend the complaint. Based on the fact that Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants motion to strike the fourth cause of action, Defendants motion to strike as to the fourth cause of action is GRANTED without prejudice. The Reply to the motion to strike noted that the Opposition to the motion to strike was untimely. The Court notes that it still considered the untimely opposition to the motion to strike. The Reply argues that any other causes of action must be filed now, and not in a motion to amend the complaint at a later time. The Replys argument on this point is unavailing. If Plaintiff wanted to file a motion for leave to amend, whether or not leave to amend would be granted would be determined at the resultant hearing. The Replys argument is not before this Court. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled as moot in light of the ruling on the motion to strike. The Court considered the motion to strike, the limited opposition to the motion to strike, and the reply in ruling on the motion to strike. The Court notes that a reply was not submitted to the demurrer. The Court notes that the ruling on the motion to strike is included within this tentative ruling on the fourth cause of action because the motion to strike only sought to strike the fourth cause of action for unfair competition.

21CV003448: CLAYTON, et al. vs CANADA, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Motion to Stike or Tax Costs; filed by Bernadette Rodriguez (Defendant) + in Department 22 Tentative Ruling - 07/11/2024 Brad Seligman The Motion to Tax Costs filed by Herbert Canada, Bernadette Rodriguez on 06/18/2024 is Granted in Part. Defendant Herbert Canada’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Tax or Strike Costs is GRANTED in part. Item 11 ($5,960.45 in court reporter fees) is stricken from Plaintiffs Rupert Gile Clayton and Miriam Rose Pinchuk’s (“Plaintiffs”) Memorandum of Costs in its entirety. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(5).) $130.10 in fees is also stricken from Item 14 because they are associated with rejected filings. (Harris Decl. ¶ 3; Exh. A: 1/23/24: Rejected: $25.00; Rejected: $105.10.) (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) However, Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to the remaining costs at issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (a)(1); (13); (c)(2)-(4).) DISCUSSION A. Item 11 (Court Reporter Fees for Trial Transcripts) The Court strikes Item 11 ($5,960.45 in court reporter fees) that Plaintiffs’ Opposition concedes is unsupported. (Oppo. p.1:22-24; Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(5).) Defendant’s motion is denied as to Items 12 and 14 for reasons set forth below. B. Item 12 (Trial Exhibits) Item 12 consists of $4,807.52 for trial exhibits and is therefore allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 (a)(13).) Defendant’s argument that $2,443.34 of this amount “consists of improper photocopying of deposition transcripts – which are not trial exhibits” lacks merit because the statute makes an exception to its prohibition against photocopying charges for “exhibits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(3).) There is no prohibition in the statute against using deposition transcripts as trial exhibits or against making more than one copy of a particular exhibit. Therefore, the full amount of Item 12 will be allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 (a)(13).) C. Item 14 (Filing/Messenger Fees) Item 14 consists of $1,954.40 in electronic filing/messenger fees. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 21CV003448: CLAYTON, et al. vs CANADA, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Motion to Stike or Tax Costs; filed by Bernadette Rodriguez (Defendant) + in Department 22 Of this amount, the Court strikes $130.10 in fees that Plaintiffs’ evidence indicates are related to rejected filings. (Harris Decl. ¶ 3; Exh. A: 1/23/24: Rejected: $25.00; Rejected: $105.10.) Notwithstanding that Defendant seeks to strike the cost of return ($75) and costs related to the successful efiling of the ex parte documents at issue ($137.90), having stricken the costs associated with the rejected filings, both the return and the successful efiling of these documents were reasonably necessary for the conduct of the litigation and are allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) As to the discretionary costs of messenger services, the late-filing of both Plaintiffs’ Opposition and Defendant’s Reply evidences the occasional need to use messenger services to meet required deadlines throughout the course of litigation. As the requested fees are reasonable in amount and were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” in a timely manner, they are allowed as a discretionary cost. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (c)(2)-(4).) CONCLUSION Item 11 ($5,960.45 in court reporter fees) and $130.10 of the total fees claimed under Item 14 (fees associated with rejected filings) are stricken from Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum. The remainder of costs identified by Defendant’s motion will be allowed. PROCEDURAL DEFECTS Notwithstanding that both the Opposition and Reply were untimely, the Court has considered both on the merits. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 21CV003448: CLAYTON, et al. vs CANADA, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Motion to Stike or Tax Costs; filed by Bernadette Rodriguez (Defendant) + in Department 22 Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

Case Number: 23BBCV01140 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B Tommy Sabre Buttner, Plaintiff, v. Alternative Automotive Solutions, LLC, Defendant. Case No.: 23BBCV01140 Trial Date: July 19, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: Motion for statutory attorneys fees BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Tommy Sabre Buttner (Plaintiff) alleges that this matter involves the deceptive sale of a used, unsafe, defective vehicle that was sold to Plaintiff by Defendant/dealer Alternative Automotive Solutions, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was stolen with a different VIN number so that when Plaintiff reported the issue to the California Highway Patrol, the vehicle was taken away from Plaintiff, impounded, and returned to the original owner even though Plaintiff had paid the dealership in full and had no involvement in the illegal actions of Defendant. The complaint, filed May 22, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) violations of Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq. ); (2) conversion; (3) violations of Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Profs. Code, § 17200 et seq. ); and (4) bond liability. B. Relevant Background This case proceeded to trial before the Court on April 2, 2024. The Court issued a Statement of Decision on April 5, 2024. The Court dismissed the 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th causes of action based on Plaintiffs failure to proceed at trial. The Court stated that Plaintiff would have judgment against Defendant in the amount of $28,095 on the 1 st cause of action. The Court entered Judgment on April 22, 2024. The Judgment states that judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $28,095. Plaintiff may seek costs by Memorandum of Costs and may seek statutory attorneys fees by noticed motion. C. Motion on Calendar On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for statutory attorneys fees. The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief. DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves for attorneys fees and costs after trial in the amount of $21,705. The Court will continue the hearing on the motion for attorneys fees. The Court held a hearing on Defendants motion for reconsideration, vacate or amend judgment, and new trial on June 28, 2024 and defense counsel presented a federal case that had not been cited in its briefs. The Court ordered that the case be filed with the Court and took the matter under submission. On July 2, 2024, the Court issued an order giving Plaintiff until July 12, 2024 to file and serve a responsive brief to Defendants oral arguments and the federal case provided. On July 15, 2024, the Court denied Defendants motion for reconsideration and caused the written order to be served on defense counsel Gary Kast by mail on July 15, 2024. In light of the timing on the ruling and service of the order regarding the motion for reconsideration, the Court will continue the hearing on the motion for attorneys fees in order to provide sufficient time for the parties to file responsive briefs. The Court notes that Defendant did not file an opposition brief to the motion for attorneys fees (based on the original June 12, 2024 hearing date, the opposition was due by June 28, 2024). The Court will give Defendant an opportunity to file an opposition brief prior to the continued hearing date and an opportunity for Plaintiff to file a reply brief. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff Tommy Sabre Buttners motion for attorneys fees is continued to August 16, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. If Defendant intends to oppose the motion for attorneys fees, Defendant shall file and serve the opposition by August 5, 2024. Plaintiffs reply brief shall be filed and served by August 9, 2024. Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 19, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV00514 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV00514 MOTION Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC OPPOSING PARTY Defendant Evanston Insurance Company MOTION Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC (Plaintiff) moves for leave to amend its complaint. After Plaintiff filed this motion, Plaintiff stipulated with all other parties in this litigation to continue the motion until after the scheduled August 29, 2024 mediation. (See Joint Stipulation to Stay Litigation, filed July 8, 2024.) Accordingly, the court continues the motion for leave to amend the complaint to October 30, 2024. The parties are to file a joint status report no later than October 23, 2024 to advise the court whether the parties have resolved any issues relating to this motion. The August 6, 2024 trial date is advanced to July 18, 2024 and, along with the July 18, 2024 final status conference date, are vacated. A post-mediation and trial setting conference will be held on October 30, 2024 as well. Plaintiff is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.