Kim, Yang Yae - Decedent

Case Number: 21STCV03788 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 71 Defendant Stephen Patillo dba Quality Stamp Show and Orcoexpo's Motion for a Protective Order is denied as moot.

Case Number: 22SMCV02275 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Holt LC, v. Fox, et al. CASE NO.: 22SMCV02275 MOTION: Motion to Compel Further Responses HEARING DATE: 7/26/2024 Legal Standard In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigants right to discovery is broad. [A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301.) Section 2017.020(a) vests the Court with authority to limit the scope of discovery if the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of the discovery sought clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. CCP § 2019.030 directs the Court to consider the needs of the case, amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and to consider whether the discovery being sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable by a more convenient or less expensive or less burdensome way, when deciding whether to restrict the frequency of extent of use of an authorized discovery method. On receipt of a response to requests for admission the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that an objection to an RFA is without merit or too general. (CCP § 2033.290(a)(2).) The responding party has the burden of justifying objections to discovery. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) Analysis In two separate motions, Plaintiff Regency Holt, LLC moves to compel Defendant Dahlia Fox and Defendant Avrohom Fox to provide their respective verified, code-compliant and objection-free further responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Admission (RFA), Set Three. Plaintiff also requests a monetary sanction of $1,010.00 per motion. Plaintiff demonstrates that it served both defendants with the RFAs on April 8, 2024. (Ruttenberg Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendants provided identical objections-only with no substantive response. (Ruttenberg Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer with Defendants in order to receive code-compliant responses. (Ruttenberg Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant responded by email requesting an extension for further responses of over one month from the date of receipt of Plaintiffs letter. (Ruttenberg Decl. ¶ 5.) RFAs nos. 1-3 6-9 Each request relates to Defendants application or receipt of rental assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic: REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that you applied for rent relief under the CA COVID-19 Rent Relief Program for your tenancy at 1237 S. Holt Ave., Unit 306, Los Angeles, CA 90035 (the Premises). REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that you received rental assistance under the CA COVID-19 Rent Relief Program (Rental Assistance). REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that you received the amount of or approximately $98,100 in Rental Assistance. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that you did not pay the Rental Assistance to Plaintiff for unpaid rent and utilities owed. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that you retained a portion of the money you received in Rental Assistance for your own account. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that you retained all of the money you received in Rental Assistance for your own account. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that you knew you were not the intended beneficiary of the Rental Assistance when you retained the payment for your own account. As to these RFAs, Respondent objected to the extent that it seeks confidential, trade secret, proprietary, financial, and/or commercially sensitive information. This information is privileged and/or confidential and it is protected from disclosure by applicable law. Respondent objects to this request on the ground that it invades the right of privacy guaranteed under Article I, Section I of the California Constitution to the individual(s) about whom it seeks information. It is also not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants fail to justify any of their blanket objections. The requests appropriately pertain to affirmative defenses set forth in the answer. Plaintiffs claim arises from alleged defaults on rent from April 2020 through March 2023. (FAC ¶10.) Defendants allegedly did not pay any rent as it came due during that period, and as of March, 31, 2023, they were delinquent in amount of $180,934.74. (Id.) Defendants have submitted an affirmative defense of COVID-19, claiming that rent demanded was properly delayed because they were unable to pay due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic and that Plaintiffs demand rent due during the COVID-19 protection period. Plaintiff may therefore obtain discovery regarding Defendants purported inability to pay due to the pandemic, including whether Defendants obtained rental assistance. Defendants also do not cite any protected privacy interest or a serious intrusion to such an interest. ( Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) Accordingly, further responses are required. RFA nos. 4-5 REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that the Rental Assistance was required to be paid to Plaintiff for unpaid rent and utilities owed; and REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that you knew the Rental Assistance you received was required to be paid to Plaintiff for unpaid rent and utilities owed. Respondent objected to these requests to the extent that it seeks confidential, trade secret, proprietary, financial, and/or commercially sensitive information. This information is privileged and/or confidential and it is protected from disclosure by applicable law. Respondent objects to this request on the ground that it invades the right of privacy guaranteed under Article I, Section I of the California Constitution to the individual(s) about whom it seeks information. Respondent objects to this request on the ground that it calls for an impermissible expert opinion. It is also not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The objections fail for the same reasons discussed above. Further responses are required. Accordingly, the motion to compel further is GRANTED. Sanctions are mandatory and imposed in favor of Plaintiff in the noticed amounts: a) $1,010.00 against Defendant Dahlia Fox; and b) $1,010.00 against Defendant Avrohom Fox. Sanctions are to be paid within 30 days. Further responses are ordered within 10 days.

Case Number: 23BBCV02845 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 26, 2024 DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV02845 MP: Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC (Defendants) RP: Brandon Brooks (Plaintiff) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Brandon Brooks (Plaintiff) brings this action against Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC (collectively Defendants) associated with an apartment Plaintiff rented from Defendants (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to remedy a number of deficient conditions at the Subject Property. The Court previously sustained Defendants demurrer to various causes of action and Plaintiff has subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiffs FAC contains 12 causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Statutory Breach of the Warranty of Habitability (Civil Code §§1941, 1941.1, And 1942.4), (3) Violation of Civil Code §1942.4, (4) Violation of Civil Code §1942.5, (5) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, (6) Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq., (7) Private Nuisance, (8) Negligence, (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (10) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, (11) Violation of LAMC 45.33, and (12) Violation of Civil Code § 789.3(a) As before, Defendants now generally demur to the causes of action for Private Nuisance and IIED on grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes and Defendants reply. ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Id. ) A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. ( Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. ( Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. ( Blank , supra , 39 Cal. 3d at 318.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. ( Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.) The court may also [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (C.C.P. § 436 (b).) II. MERITS Meet and Confer C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) and 435.5(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer and/or motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Mantovani Decl. ¶ 4.) Facts Plaintiffs FAC contains an overarching facts section, which is incorporated by reference into each of his 12 causes of action. Plaintiff alleges that shortly after commencing tenancy, someone stole his parking spot (FAC. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff also alleges that his vehicle was vandalized after his parking spot was reassigned. (FAC ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Property had its gas service interrupted for a prolonged period of time for repairs. (FAC ¶ 34.) Plaintiff states that this interruption caused him to experience severe health symptoms because he could not use his fireplace and other gas appliances. (FAC ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that the gas remains turned off for the building. (FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants did not provide the necessary accommodations after he was furloughed during the Covid-19 pandemic. (FAC ¶ 40.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was served with a 3-day notice to quit which was followed by two unlawful detainer suits. (FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs FAC also contains a list of alleged defective conditions of the Subject Property which include infestations, extensive water damage, and unsafe/unsanitary common areas. (FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff does not provide any further allegations as to the nature of these defects or when they occurred. ( Id .) Plaintiff alleges that he has contacted Defendants with respect to these defects several times, but the problems persist. (FAC ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges he was forced to hire his own pest and mold inspection companies. (FAC ¶ 52.) Seventh COA Private Nuisance Sustained without Leave to Amend To establish an action for private nuisance, (1) the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) the invasion of the plaintiffs interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. ( Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, [citations, italics, brackets, and quotation marks omitted].) The Court previously sustained the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend. The Court relied on the reasoning in El Escorial Owners Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. which held Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. ( El Escorial Owners Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) The Court also cited Melton v. Boustred , which found that a demurrer is properly sustained where a nuisance claim is merely a clone of the negligence claim. ( Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.) The Court found Plaintiffs arguments that his cause of action was not duplicative to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff argued that his nuisance cause of action differed from his negligence cause of action because it alleged both intentional and negligent behavior of Defendants. This argument is virtually unchanged in Plaintiffs current opposition. Likewise, the Court remains unpersuaded. The Courts previous ruling made clear that Plaintiff must allege facts specific to his nuisance claim if he wished it to survive demurrer. A review of the FAC shows that no such allegations are present. Plaintiff has added allegations that he had a possessory interest in the Subject Property. (FAC ¶ 125.) While this is an element of a private nuisance action, it does not speak to any specific behavior of Defendants in creating a nuisance. Plaintiff also has added a list of alleged actions by the Defendant to this cause of action. (FAC ¶ 128.) They are as follows: a. Failing to address hazardous gas leaks and exposure risks; b. Allowing infestations of vermin and pests to persist; c. Neglecting to remedy mold, mildew, and extensive water damage; d. Failing to replace essential safety features, such as the fireplace pilot exchanger; e. Providing inadequate heating and improper ventilation; f. Ignoring ongoing plumbing issues and unsafe or unsanitary common areas; g. Failing to maintain the safety and security of the Plaintiff's designated parking space, resulting in vandalism of Plaintiff's vehicle. (FAC ¶ 128.) The Court does not find these allegations are specific to Plaintiffs nuisance claim, particularly in light of the allegations in the cause of action for Negligence. In that cause of action Plaintiff alleges the Defendant negligently allow the following conditions: (1) mold and/or mildew; (2) water damage; (3) lack of effective waterproofing and weather protection; (4) lack of or decrease in unit services; (5) failure to timely replace the fireplace pilot exchanger; (6) inadequate heating devices; (7) gas exposure; (8) improper ventilation; (9) outgrown vegetation and unkept landscaping; and (10) inoperable central air condition, rendering the Subject Property substandard and untenantable as alleged herein. (FAC ¶ 143.) The Court notes that the vast majority of the conditions resulting from Defendants alleged negligence overlap with those resulting from Defendants alleged intentional behavior. All of the allegations in FAC paragraph 128 are attributable to either intentional acts or negligence and none of the allegations are accompanied by specific facts indicating intentional behavior. Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs negligence action does not explicitly mention the parking situation, the Court notes the FAC contains no allegations that this situation arose from Defendants intentional actions. Plaintiff merely alleges that he complained of the parking situation and Defendants response was markedly deficient. (FAC ¶ 31.) The Court finds the additional allegations upon amendment are insufficient to set Plaintiffs claim of Private Nuisance apart from his claim of Negligence. As Plaintiff has had previous opportunity to allege additional facts speaking specifically to nuisance and has failed to do so, the Court finds it improbable that further amendment would cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the demurrer to the cause of action for Private Nuisance is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Ninth COA IIED Sustained with Leave to Amend The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendants outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, [citation and ellipses omitted].) The Court previously sustained the demurrer to this cause of action, finding Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled intentional conduct. Specifically, the Court focused on the Defendants alleged refusal to remediate, given that courts have preciously found IIED claims proper in situations where a landlord has outright refused to remediate habitability issues. ( Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057.) The Court found that the facts alleged in the Complaint did not indicate a complete refusal to remediate. Plaintiff alleged he emailed about various conditions on October 20, 2021, July 14, 2022, August 26, 2022, April 12, 2023, and April 13, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 41.) At the same time, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants responses have been inconsistent and inadequate, allowing the infestation and unsanitary conditions to persist. (Compl. ¶ 52.) The Court found this latter allegation indicated that some remediation had taken place but that it was insufficient to remedy Plaintiffs concerns. The Court notes that such insufficient response was not akin to an intentional refusal to remediate. Upon amendment Plaintiff has removed the above referenced allegation that Defendants response was inconsistent and inadequate. Instead, Plaintiff now pleads that, &[d]espite Plaintiffs continual appeals regarding the aforementioned infestations and substandard conditions within the subject property, Defendants have completely ignored each of these requests& (FAC ¶ 54.) First the Court notes that there are no specific allegations as to which requests have been responded to and which have been ignored. From Plaintiffs FAC it is clear that he has complained on multiple occasions to Defendants about various conditions at the Subject Property. (See FAC ¶ 24, 45, 188.) Regardless, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendants were not responsive to an email in early April (FAC ¶ 45) and an email on April 27, 2023 (FAC ¶ 47.) This leaves the prior year and half of complaints, including emails specifically identified in paragraph 24, unaccounted for. Further, there is a complete lack of particularity in identifying the subject of these complaints. It appears from Plaintiffs FAC that his complaints regarding the parking situation received some sort of response, as he alleges that Defendants response was markedly deficient. (FAC ¶ 29.) This indicates that Defendants were responding at least in some capacity to some of Plaintiffs complaints. Further, Plaintiffs allegations that Defendants were unresponsive to the April emails is equally indicative of negligence as it is intentional behavior. If Plaintiff wishes to state a claim for IIED based on Defendants intentional refusal to remediate, it is incumbent upon him to allege facts showing such refusal occurred. Lastly, Plaintiffs substituting of inconsistent and inadequate for the allegation that he was completely ignored does little to assuage concerns regarding the sham pleading doctrine. The sham pleading doctrine generally prohibits a plaintiff from amending a complaint to omit harmful allegations from prior pleadings, without explanation. ( Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) Under the sham pleading doctrine, [a] plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict facts pleaded in the original complaint, or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false. ( Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877-878.) Here, Plaintiff has added no allegations which explain his previous contention that Defendants response was inadequate rather than an outright refusal to remediate. Plaintiffs amendment is not so much an addition of facts as a substituting of language. Despite the above, the Court finds the FAC contains sufficient information such that the Court believes sufficient facts can be pled to support the claim if they exist. Although Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently articulate these as of yet, it remains possible he could do so. Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike Defendants seek to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages and all references to Defendants conduct as malicious oppressive despicable or outrageous. (See FAC ¶¶ 93, 99, 100, 101, 115, 167, 1280 182.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs punitive damages claims are, at least in part, derived from the IIED cause of action. Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to that cause of action with leave to amend, Defendants motion strike punitive damages is MOOT. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC s Demurrer and Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on July 26, 2024 with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE DEMURRER TO THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. THE DEMURRER TO THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS MOOT. CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE SET FOR AUGUST 27, 2024 IS ADVANCED AND CONTINUED ON THE COURTS MOTION TO NOVEMBER 12, 2024 AT 9:00 AM UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANT GOL 5 TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 23PDUD03277 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ROGER KARAYANS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION This is an action arising from the alleged breach of a lease agreement due to nonpayment of rent concerning a property located at 3920 Foothill Blvd., La Crescenta, California 91214 (the Premises). On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff Westport La Crescenta, LLC (Plaintiff) filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint against Defendants Roger Karayan (Defendant) and Does 1 to 20. On September 25, 2023, Defendant filed an Answer to the Unlawful Detainer Complaint. On November 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendant. On December 28, 2023, default was entered against Defendant. On April 3, 2024, the Court entered default judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the total of $93,886.73. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served Notice of Entry of Judgment. On July 11, 2024, Defendant, who is self-represented, filed the instant Motion for Relief from Default Judgment. [1] Defendant seeks an order vacating the default and default judgment entered against him. Defendants motion is made on the grounds that he was unaware that he needed to file an additional answer and he had the mistaken belief that his original answer was all that he needed to file and that he was never properly served with any of the courts notices regarding hearing dates. (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:2-7.) On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion. As of July 25, 2024, no reply brief has been filed. Any reply brief was required to have been filed and served at least five court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) II. LEGAL STANDARD The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Application for . . . relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding was taken. ( Ibid .) It is well settled that appellate courts have always been and are favorably disposed toward such action upon the part of the trial courts as will permit, rather than prevent, the adjudication of legal controversies upon their merits. ( Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 525.) III. ANALYSIS Improper Notice of Motion Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied as it is deficient under CCP § 1005(b). Plaintiff contends that Defendants motion was not served with the required notice period. The Court agrees. [A]ll moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) [I]f the notice is served by mail, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if the place of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Initially, the Court finds that the proof of service concerning the motion is defective as it indicates that the motion was served on Plaintiff via mail on July 8, 2023. Service of the motion on July 8, 2023 would not have been possible given that this action was not filed until September 18, 2023. Even if Defendant made an error in the proof of service and Plaintiff was, in fact, served with the motion by mail on July 8, 2024, service on such date would not be compliant with CCP § 1005(b). The motion is noticed for a July 30, 2024 hearing date and therefore it should have been served on Plaintiff no later than July 1, 2024, which is 16 court days plus five calendar days before the hearing date. Thus, the service of the motion is untimely as Plaintiff was not given adequate notice of the motion. The Court recognizes that Defendant is pro per . Litigants who represent themselves in pro per are held to the same standards as attorneys. ( Kobayshi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) Even if the motion had been procedurally proper, Defendant did not make the required showing to set aside the default and default judgment. Defendant declares that he did not know that he was required to file an additional answer to the FAC, which resulted in the default and default judgment against him. (Karayan Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant does not dispute that he was served with the FAC. The Court reminds Defendant that [a]ny alleged ignorance of legal matters or failure to properly represent himself can hardly constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect as those terms are used in section 473. ( Goodson v. Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40.) Also, Defendant has failed to show that he exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon an important business matter. ( Ibid .) Defendant has chosen to represent himself and he is not, for that reason, entitled to any more (or less) consideration than a lawyer. ( Ibid .) IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based on the foregoing, Defendant Roger Karayans Motion for Relief from Default Judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 30, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT [1] The Court notes that Plaintiff filed two essentially identical motions for relief from default judgment. The motions are the same but for the spacing of the motions being different. The motions rely on the same arguments, cases and statutes, declaration, and exhibits. Also, the Court notes that the caption in the notice of motion requests to quash service but the notice of motion sets forth no grounds for such relief and the memorandum of points and authorities makes no argument concerning quashing service. Thus, the Court will treat Defendants motion solely as a motion for relief from default judgment.

Case Number: 23LBCV01658 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: S27 The Court heard a discovery motion in this case on 4/18/24. The Court, in its final order, noted that there were four additional discovery motions scheduled for hearing. The Court continued the hearing on all four motions to 7/30/24 and ordered the parties to meet and confer in an attempt to resolve all issues, including sanctions. On 7/17/24, Defendant filed timely opposition to the motions. Defendant, in the opposition papers, indicates the motions are all moot. Any reply to the opposition was due on or before 7/23/24. The Court has not received reply papers. The Court therefore finds the motions are moot and takes them off calendar. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Case Number: 23STCV30963 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Frazier, et al. v. Roberta Stephens Villas Preservation, L.P., et al. Case No.: 23STCV30963 Matter: Demurrer; Motion to Strike Moving Party: Defendants Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, Inc. and Roberta Stephans Villas Preservation, L.P. Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend. The Motion to Strike is denied as moot. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a landlord-tenant matter, and the Complaint was filed on December 18, 2023. Defendants Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, Inc. and Roberta Stephans Villas Preservation, L.P. now demur to the entirety of the Complaint for uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts. Because there is no opposition, the Complaint is deemed abandoned. ( Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) The Demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend. Given the ruling on the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is denied as moot. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 21STCV42296 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Jane Doe filed this action against Defendants, LBUSD, Cabrillo High School, John Doe, and Does 1-50 for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. Plaintiff filed her complaint on 11/17/21. LBUSD filed a demurrer and motion to strike on 7/05/23, which resulted in a court order limiting the causes of action pled in the complaint and striking Cabrillo High School as a defendant from the action. LBUSD filed an answer to the complaint, with the subject causes of action and allegations stricken, on 12/20/23. 2. Prior Hearing The Court previously heard Defendants motion to compel responses to SROGs, set three, on 5/14/24. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending she was incarcerated and scheduled to be released soon, and asking that the Court continue the hearing on the motion until she was released. The Court continued the hearing on the motion, and also scheduled the hearing on a motion to compel further responses to SROGs, set two and a motion to compel deposition for the same time. 3. Current Status of Discovery Dispute The parties have scheduled Plaintiffs deposition for 8/02/24. It appears all issues relating to SROGs, set two, are resolved. Plaintiff served further responses to SROGs, set three, but Defendant contends her responses to SROGs 37, 38, and 41 remain deficient. Defendant has a motion for stay of proceedings scheduled for 9/12/24. The hearing on todays motions is continued to 9/12/24. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs supplemental responses to SROGs 37, 38, and 41, and they appear to remain deficient. The parties must continue to work together to resolve any discovery issues without the need for a court order. If the parties are able to resolve their issues, they must take the motions off calendar prior to 9/12/24. If they are unable to do so, they must each file declarations and briefs re: any outstanding issues at least two weeks prior to the continued hearing date. The Court understands sanctions are at issue. If all other issues are resolved but Defendant wishes to pursue sanctions, the parties must file briefs and declaration at least two weeks prior to the continued hearing date and the Court will consider the issue of sanctions at that time. LBUSD is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 23BBCV00532 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 26, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV00532 MP: Arsen Hovanesyan M.D. (Defendant) RP: Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (Co-Defendants) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Rima Shafrazian, Gevik Shafrazian, and Greta Shafrazian, individually and as successor in interest of the estate of Joseph Shafrazian (Decedent) (collectively Plaintiffs) bring this action against Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, WellRx, Inc. dba Wellness Lab, Jivan Melikian, M.D., Artin Aghakhani, R.PH., Karina Nazarian, Linda Nguyen, R.PH., Aram Manoukian, and Arsen Hovanesyan, M.D. (Hovanesyan) (collectively Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Defendants negligently failed to deliver Decedents prescriptions for a heart condition, ultimately resulting in his death. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Hovanesyan. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Hovanesyan for (1) Wrongful Death by Medical Negligence and (2) Survival Action. Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition; however, an opposition was filed by Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (hereinafter Co-Defendants). ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (C.C.P. § 437c(a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangsterv. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) II. MERITS Co-Defendants Opposition The Court notes that neither it, nor the parties, have located any California state court authority directly addressing whether a co-defendant can oppose another co-defendants motion for summary judgment. However, in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, the California Supreme Court held that "any adverse party" may oppose a summary judgment motion. A real party in interest has standing to prosecute an action, except as otherwise provided by statute. (C.C.P. §367.) A real party in interest must have an actual, substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. ( County of Alameda v. State Board of Control (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103.) A person who has an actual interest in the subject matter of an action, and therefore a right to relief, has standing. (Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351.) A party to whom indemnity might be owed or who would owe indemnity is a real party in such an action. ( Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes/All American Development Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 40.). However, that is not the case here. On May 16, 2023, Co-Defendants filed their Cross-Complaint stating causes of action for (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Contribution, and (3) Declaratory Relief. The adverse parties in Co-Defendants Cross-Complaint are the fictious entities/persons identified as Roes 1-50. A review of the Courts records reveals that Co-Defendants have never amended their Cross-Complaint to identify the parties unknown to them at the time of filing. Nor have Co-Defendants ever independently filed a Cross-Complaint against Hovanesyan. As such, it would appear to the Court that Co-Defendants lack standing to oppose this motion. In reaching this conclusion, in addition to Aguilar as noted above, the court finds the United States District Court case of Eckert v. City of Sacramento (E.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 3211278, helpful. In Eckert , the Court stated: Union Pacific raises a procedural question that has been infrequently addressed: [i]n the absence of cross-claims, may one co-defendant be the sole & opposition to another co-defendants motion for summary judgment? The Blonder Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that in the absence of a crossclaim, a co-defendant lacks standing to oppose his co-defendants motion for summary judgment. Under the rationale of Blonder , since there is no crossclaim between the Defendants, Union Pacific and the City are not adverse parties and the City therefore does not have standing to oppose Union Pacifics motion for summary judgment. The Citys arguments opposing Union Pacifics motion will therefore not be considered. ( Id . at 3, citing to Blonder v. Casco Inn Residential Care, Inc. (D.Me. May 4, 2000) 2000 WL 761895, at *1 [internal citations omitted].) The Court finds the rationale set forth, and referred to in Eckert is persuasive. (See also Fraioli v. Lemcke , 328 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.R.I.2004) 263 n. 4 [[S]ince none of the defendants in this case have filed cross claims against each other, the defendants are not adverse parties who are entitled to object to each others motions for summary judgment.]; Dixon v. County of Alameda (N.D.Cal. Apr.18, 1997) 1997 WL 220311, at *6 n. 8 [noting that co-defendant did not have standing to oppose co-defendants motion for summary judgment]; C.F. Bean Corp. v. Clayton Indus. Ltd. (E.D.La. Aug.19, 1996) 1996 WL 470644, at *1 [same].) Further, that language of C.C.P. § 437c indicates there is no standing for a co-defendant to oppose a motion for summary judgment that does not seek relief against it. (See C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2) [If the defendant meets its burden to show that a cause of action has no merit by showing that an element of the cause of action cannot be established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.].) Request for a Continuance Although the Court finds that the Co-Defendants do not have standing, it will further note that a request for continuance is denied for the reasons stated in Hovanesyans Repy to Co-Defendants Opposition. Facts In order to determine whether Hovanesyan has produced unrefuted evidence that he adhered to the standard of care, the Court finds it useful to provide a brief summary of the general facts of the case. On February 2, 2022, Decedent presented to his cardiologist, Hovanesyan, for a history and physical. (Exh. G. pp. 1997.) Decedents history and physical revealed that he suffered from a small to medium anterior perfusion defect consistent with ischemia. ( Id .) On March 1, 2022, Decedent presented to Adventist Health Glendale wherein Hovanesyan performed a coronary angiography. ( Id . at pp. 1982-1987.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs claims for medical negligence against Hovanesyan are purely in reference to his alleged failure to ensure Decedents receipt of the medication Plavix. Plaintiff makes no allegations as to whether Hovanesyan negligently performed the coronary angiography. (See FAC ¶ 24 [Defendants Dr. Hovanesyan and Dr. Melikian and DOES 1 through 10 were responsible for prescribing the Clopidogrel/Plavix, following up, and making sure that Mr. Shafrazian was taking Clopidogrel/Plavix after his procedure.].) Hovanesyans post-procedure Progress Notes for Decedent show that Dr. Melikian prescribed Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin on March 1, 2022 on an inpatient basis. (See Exh. G, p. 1989-1993 & 2090.) Decedents records also indicate that, on March 2, 2022 at 9:41 a.m., Hovanesyan ordered outpatient prescriptions for Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin. ( Id . at 2091.) These prescriptions appear to have been ordered to Burbank Tower Pharmacy. ( Id .) Further, the discharge paperwork issued to and signed by Decedent included a Home Medications list which instructed Decedent to take a daily dose of Plavix. ( Id . at 2045, 2067.) Records reflect that on March 2, 2022 at 9:42 a.m., Burbank Tower Pharmacy received Hovanesyans prescription order. (Aghakhani Depo. p. 89, ¶¶ 19-25; Abramian Depo. p. 73, ¶¶ 8-25; Koroglu Depo. p., 53, ¶¶ 2-5.) Though the parties disagree as to why, it is clear that the Plavix and Aspirin prescriptions were placed on hold by Burbank Tower Pharmacy. Hovanesyan is of the opinion that the medications were placed on hold as the result of Decedents not having been given the medication. (See Aghakhani Depo. p. 26, ¶¶ 8-15 [She told me the patient never picked up the medication&thats why they put it on hold.].) On March 14, 2022, Decedent suffered a heart attack and died. (Exh. I.) An autopsy report revealed that Decedents cause of death was a myocardial infarction in the left ventricular free wall. (Exh. J.) Medical Negligence As concerns the action for Medical Negligence, Hovanesyan argues that summary judgment must be granted because there is no triable issue of fact as to whether his actions adhered to the standard of care in treating Decedent. The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage. ( Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1571.) The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony. ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601.) When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence. ( Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984985 [citations omitted].) Hovanesyan submits the declaration of Michael L. Chaikin, M.D. (Chaikin), in support of his motion. Chaikin states that he is a board-certified cardiologist and has been practicing cardiology since 1980. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 2.) Chaikin bases his declaration on his review of Decedents medical records as well as the depositions of Greta Shafrazian, Givek Shafrazian, Rima Shafrazian, Artin Aghakhani, Linda Nguyen, Sarineh Abramian, and Yolanda Siraki. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 5.) Chaikin states that, in his medical opinion, Hovanesyan appropriately documented that Decedent was receiving Plavix on an inpatient basis after the procedure. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 9.) Chaikin further states that Hovanesyans ordering of Plavix to Burbank Tower Pharmacy was within the standard of care. ( Id .) Chaikin states that the records for Burbank Tower Pharmacy indicate they received the prescription order on March 2, 2022. ( Id .) Chaikin states that, from the review of the deposition testimony in this matter, it is unclear why the Plavix prescription was placed on hold. ( Id.) Regardless, Chaikin states that, from his review of the records and testimony, it is clear that Hovanesyan did not place any prescriptions on hold. ( Id .) Chaikin concludes that, in his medical opinion, no act or omission of Hovanesyan caused or contributed to Decedents passing. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 10.) The Court is satisfied from the testimony of Chaikin that Hovanesyans actions were within the applicable standard of care. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have produced no expert testimony in contravention of Chaikins statements. It follows that Hovanesyan has demonstrated by unrefuted evidence that no triable issue of fact exists as to his breach of the standard of care in prescribing Plavix to Decedent. The holding in Munro makes abundantly clear that summary judgment must therefore be granted in favor of Hovanesyan. Survival Action A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedents successor in interest, subject to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate Code, and an action may be commenced by the decedents personal representative or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. (C.C.P. § 377.30.) A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedents cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedents personal representative or successor in interest. ( San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1553.) Here the Court finds Plaintiffs survival action must also fail as they are unable to establish any triable issues of material fact regarding the breach element of the wrongful death cause of action above. Conclusion Hovanesyan has adequately demonstrated that his behavior was within the standard of care by virtue of his experts testimony. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to the contrary and a non-opposition was filed. As Plaintiffs survival action assumes the medical negligence of Hovanesyan, it too presents no triable issue of fact. Co-Defendants do not have standing to contest the summary judgment and have not justified a continuance. Accordingly, Hovanesyans unopposed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Arsen Hovanesyan M.D.s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on June 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, HOVANESYAN TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles