Enrique Espinoza, Et Al. Vs American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case Number: 23STCV07396 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT CRISTIAN VALDIVIA, Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV07396 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 18, 2024 On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff Cristian Valdivia filed a motion to compel further responses to Request For Production, Set One from Defendant General Motors LLC. A. Plaintiff Did Not Comply With This Departments Procedures. For a motion to compel further, the moving party must meet and confer with the opposing party and file a Separate Statement or follow the Courts alternative method of outlining the disputes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b); California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b).) This Department requires the parties to follow the procedures outlined in Exhibit A of Department 48s Courtroom Information (available on the Courts website, www.lacourt.org) and file a joint statement. Plaintiff did not comply with these requirements. Instead, Plaintiff filed a 21-page motion, 75-page separate statement, and 107-page declaration with exhibits (most of which are irrelevant). B. Plaintiff Did Not Act Diligently, Meaningfully Meet and Confer, or Show Good Cause. A motion to compel further production of documents must include a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) The meet and confer declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Defendant provided responses on July 24, 2023, which Plaintiff deemed insufficient. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 21.) On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer with Defendant by sending a detailed letter which outlined Defendants bad faith litigation antics, Defendants violations of the Civil Discovery Act, and why Plaintiff requires the requested documents to ready the case for trial. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiffs counsel, they attempt[ed] to reach Defendants counsel by telephone on at least 5 occasions from July through October of 2023. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 25.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff never attempted to contact Defendant by telephone in order to have a substantive conversation about their objections. (Pappas Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs counsel contends that they have made diligent efforts on behalf of Plaintiff to meet and confer with Defendants counsel. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 27.) The Court disagrees that this demonstrates a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the issues. Plaintiffs September 6, 2023 letter stated, For the reasons stated above and below, we request that you provide fully code-compliant, responses and further documents within 2 days of the date of this letter. This demand for full productionwithin only two daysis not a good faith attempt to resolve Defendants objections. Instead, the letter merely declares all objections meritless. According to Defendant, it is the same pro forma letter that Plaintiffs counsel recycles in every breach of warranty matter against GM after GM has served its responses to Plaintiffs counsels standard requests for production, which are the exact same in every case. (Pappas Decl. ¶ 5.) The failure to sufficiently meet and confer is also demonstrated by Plaintiffs failure to comply with Department 48s procedures for submission of a joint, not separate, statement. Although Plaintiffs motion is technically timely (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a)), Plaintiff did not act diligently in seeking to compel further responses to discovery that was due one year agoespecially when this discovery is the first set of document production. The Final Status Conference is scheduled for only four days after this motion is heard, and trial is scheduled for August 5, 2024. With these looming deadlines, it is remarkable that Plaintiff did not further discuss the issues with Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs boilerplate and repetitive separate statement does not set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 [To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.].) For these reasons, the motion to compel further is DENIED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 18th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV03201 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B BRYAN MUNGUIA, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No.: 23TRCV03201 vs. [Tentative] RULING VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Moving Parties: Plaintiffs Briyan Munguia and Ricardo Munguia Responding Party: Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The motion is GRANTED as to Nos. 1-29 and 31. Defendant is ordered to respond further and to produce responsive documents within twenty days as to Nos. 1-14 and 31 and within twenty days of the parties entering into a stipulation and confidentiality protective order as to Nos. 15-29. As to No. 30, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court is ordering the case bifurcated for both discovery and trial. In phase one the parties shall try the basic Song Beverly Act claim arising from the claimed breach of the Song Beverly statutory obligations. Phase two shall involve plaintiffs claim to a civil penalty under Civil Code §1794(c) for a willful violation of the statute. Discovery on the phase two issues, such as whether defendant knew that it could not repair the claimed defects, based on its knowledge learned from vehicles other than plaintiffs vehicle (No. 30), shall be deferred until after the trier of fact has returned a verdict favorable to plaintiffs in phase one. BACKGROUND On September 27, 2023, Bryan Munguia and Ricardo Munguia filed a complaint against Volkswagen Group of American, Inc. and South Bay Motors, LLC dba Pacific Volkswagen for violations of Song Beverly Act and negligent repair. LEGAL AUTHORITY 45-Day Rule : This motion must be served within 45 days after service of the response in question (extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, or fax; see CCP § 1013); otherwise, the demanding party waives the right to compel any further response to the CCP §2031.010 demand. CCP §§2031.310(c), 2016.050; see Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745. The 45-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1410. The parties, however, can also agree in writing on a specific later date by which to file the motion to compel. CCP §2031.310(c). Meet-and-Confer Requirement : The motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues outside of court (so-called meet and confer). CCP §§2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2). Separate Statement : Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). Request for Production of Documents On receipt of a response to an inspection demand, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. CCP § 2031.310(a). A statement of compliance shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. CCP § 2031.220. A representation of inability to comply with [a] particular demand for inspection . . . shall affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. This statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. CCP § 2031.230. A motion to compel further response to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to show both: [1] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [2] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing good cause for inspection. But it is not essential in every case. Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial , 8:1495.6 (citations omitted). Declarations are generally used to show the requisite good cause for an order to compel inspection. The declarations must contain specific facts rather than mere conclusions. Id. at 8:1495.7 (citation omitted). The declarations may be on information and belief, if necessary. However, in such cases, the specific facts supporting such information and belief (the sources of the information) must also be alleged. Id. at 8:1495.8 (citation omitted). Most declarations are made by the attorney for the moving party, who is usually more familiar with the relevancy and specific facts constituting good cause for inspection. Id. at 8:1495.9. If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure (the same as on motions to compel answers to interrogatories or deposition questions. . . ). Id. at 8:1496 (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Plaintiffs request that the Court order defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.s to serve further responses to plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-31. In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that on April 16, 2023, plaintiffs purchased a 2021 Volkswagen ID. The subject vehicle was a certified pre-owned (CPO) purchased as a CPO with an accompanying Volkswagen new and full CPO warranty and therefore constitutes a new motor vehicle under the Song Beverly Act. Complaint, ¶9. The subject vehicle was delivered to plaintiffs with serious defects and nonconformities including electrical, transmission, suspension, structural, and engine system defects. Id., ¶11. The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repairs in June 2023 for defects relating to the vehicles electrical system malfunction warning light illuminating with a loss of acceleration. Id., ¶12. Plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repairs in July 2023 for defects relating to vehicles mirrors not tilting when reversing, Travel Assist feature would not engage properly, vehicle would not charge when connected to the charger. Id., ¶13. On August 1, plaintiffs presented the vehicle for massage feature turning on automatically and vehicle would stop charging when unlocked. Id., ¶14. On August 3, plaintiffs returned the vehicle for repairs relating to vehicles doors not unlocking when approaching the vehicle or when attempting to open the door without the key; driver side window would automatically roll up when attempting to roll it down while driving; when using the level 2 charger, the vehicle would stop charging when unlocking the vehicle and would show a red light when locking the vehicle to resume charging. Id., ¶15. On August 14, plaintiffs returned the vehicle for repairs regarding vehicle not charging properly intermittently; driver side window would automatically roll up or down opposite the switch; and easy trunk opening would intermittently malfunction. Id., ¶16. The motion adds that on November 17, 2023, with approximately 56,316 miles, plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repair regarding the drivers side window automatically going up again after being lowered. Plaintiffs explain that on November 17, 2023, plaintiffs propounded Request for Production of Documents, Set One. Defendant asserts that on December 19, 2023, defense counsel requested a 30-day extension but did not receive an answer and thus served its responses asserting objections. On December 28, 2023, plaintiffs counsel sent defense counsel a meet and confer letter. On January 8, 2024, plaintiffs counsel sent another meet and confer letter. Plaintiffs assert that there are four categories of documents relevant to the asserted claims under Song-Beverly Act: (1) plaintiffs own vehicle (Nos. 1-14); (2) defendants policies and procedures for handling Song-Beverly Act cases (Nos. 15-22); (3) defendants warranty policy and the procedure used for handling warranty issues (Nos. 23-29); and (4) information regarding similar customer complaints in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle (Nos. 30-31). No. 30 requests all documents of other customer complaints in defendants ESI of database(s) that are substantially similar to complaints made by plaintiffs with respect to the subject vehicle in other 2021 Volkswagen ID.4 vehicles. No. 31 requests all documents that refer to, reflect, or relate to any Field Service Action issued, or in the process of being issued, in response to complaints experienced by plaintiffs as described in defendants warranty history/summary and within the line items of the repair orders created at defendants authorized repair history. In opposition, defendant argues that plaintiffs did not meaningfully meet and confer. Defendant also asserts that it will produce all documents in its possession, custody, or control which pertain to plaintiffs vehicle under Nos. 1, 3-14. Further, upon plaintiffs execution of a stipulation and protective order, defendant contends, it will produce its confidential policy and procedure materials regarding Song-Beverly claims in response to Nos. 15-29. As to Nos. 30-31, defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to establish good cause, its objections are proper, and the requests are vague, overbroad, and unduly burdensome as there are 20,911 other 2021 Volkswagen ID.4 vehicles. The Court rules as follows: As to Nos. 1-29 defendant has agreed to produce responsive documents, including as to Nos. 15-29 upon entry of a stipulation and confidentiality protective order. As to No. 31, plaintiffs have shown good cause and defendants objections lack merit as the request is specific as to the purported defects in the subject vehicle. Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to Nos. 1-29 and 31. As to No. 30, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ORDER The motion is GRANTED as to Nos. 1-29 and 31. Defendant is ordered to respond further and to produce responsive documents within twenty days as to Nos. 1-14 and 31 and within twenty days of the parties entering into a stipulation and confidentiality protective order as to Nos. 15-29. As to No. 30, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court is ordering the case bifurcated for both discovery and trial. In phase one the parties shall try the basic Song Beverly Act claim arising from the claimed breach of the Song Beverly statutory obligations. Phase two shall involve plaintiffs claim to a civil penalty under Civil Code §1794(c) for a willful violation of the statute. Discovery on the phase two issues, such as whether defendant knew that it could not repair the claimed defects, based on its knowledge learned from vehicles other than plaintiffs vehicle (No. 30), shall be deferred until after the trier of fact has returned a verdict favorable to plaintiffs in phase one. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 23NWCV02902 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Steven Sanchez vs Ford Motor Company, et al. Case No.: 23NWCV02902 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. #8 Tentative Ruling Defendant Ford Motor Companys Demurrer to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant Ken Grody Fords Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendants to give notice. Background This lemon law action was filed on September 13, 2023 by Plaintiff Steven Sanchez (Plaintiff) against Defendants Ford Motor Company and Ken Grody Ford Buena Park (collectively Defendants) alleging four causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act-Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act- Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; (4) Negligent Repair. Defendant Ford Motor Company demurs to the First through Third Causes of Action on the grounds that the Song-Beverly Act does not extend warranties for used vehicles to original manufacturers. Defendant Ken Grody demurs to the Fourth Cause of Action on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the pleading states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e); Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)¿ The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The Song-Beverly Causes of Action Ford argues that the first through third causes of action fail because Plaintiff bought a used car, not a new car. Civ. Code §1793.22 (e) defines what New Motor Vehicle means for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act, including a dealer-owned vehicle and a demonstrator or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty. (CCP § 1793.22(e)(2).)¿Ford cites Rodriguez v. F CA US LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 218, review granted July 13, 2022, S274625. Rodriguez is cited here for its persuasive value.¿¿ Rodriguez parses the meaning of the words, or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty, to determine whether this covers the sale of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturers express warranty. In a well-reasoned and persuasive opinion, Rodriguez concludes it does not. Instead, it holds that demonstrators and dealer-owned vehicles are a narrow class of basically new vehicles that have never been previously sold to a consumer and they come with full express warranties. Rodriguez , supra , 77 Cal.App.5th 209 at 220, bolding added. [W]e conclude the phrase other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty unambiguously refers to cars that come with a new or full express warranty. ( Id. at 222.)¿ Rodriguez distinguishes Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, a case where the consumer was provided with the manufacturers full new car warranty. While the holding of Jensen is that cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturers new motor vehicle warranty are new motor vehicles within the meaning of Civ. Code §1793.22, Rodriguez notes that Jensen was not required to decide the issue since the subject vehicle there was sold with a full new car warranty. It notes that other cases, including Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, have also found it appropriate to limit Jensen to the facts before it. For example, Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 340, expressed having reservations about applying Jensen but found it did not have to under the particular facts before it. Here, Plaintiffs 2019 Ford F-150 was purchased used with 30,031 miles on it. (Lally Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A) Plaintiff does not allege he purchased this car with a new car warranty. (Complaint ¶ 9.) In his opposition, Plaintiff urges the Court to follow the recently decided case of Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5 th 913. Stiles held that a previously owned motor vehicle purchased with the manufacturers new car warranty still in effect is a new motor vehicle eligible for the replace and refund remedy under the Song-Beverly Act. Stiles v. Kia Motors, Inc , supra , at 919. However, Plaintiff cannot rely upon Stiles because the Complaint, as currently pled, does not allege that Plaintiffs vehicle had remaining miles on the manufacturers written warranty. Because the car at issue is a used car and there is no allegation of any remaining miles on the manufactures written warranty the Demurrer to the First, Second and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Negligent Repair Cause of Action Defendant Ken Grody Ford demurs to the fourth cause of action on grounds that the cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule, and that Plaintiffs fail to plead damages. Plaintiffs lack of opposition to this argument is deemed to be a concession. Accordingly, the Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Case Number: 24VECV00215 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: W WALTER BANEGGAS vs JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al. PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Date of Hearing: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: None set. Department: W Case No.: 24VECV00215 Moving Party: Plaintiff Walter Baneggas Responding Party: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC Meet and Confer: Yes. (Thomas decl. ¶¶7-11.) BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action. On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff Walter Baneggas filed a complaint against Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Galpin Jaguar Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. dba Jaguar Van Nuys/Land Rover Van Nuys for Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty. Plaintiff purchased a 2018 Lan Rover Range Rover Velar. Plaintiff alleges they delivered the vehicle to an authorized repair facility for nonconformities, but Defendants were unable to conform the subject vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. [Tentative] Ruling Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Special Interrogatories and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED, in part. discussion Plaintiff Baneggas moves the court for an order compelling further responses to Plaintiffs first set of Special Interrogatories and monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,660.00 against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and its attorney of record, Turner Henningsen Wolf and Vandenburg LLP. On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.¿ (CCP § 2030.300(a).)¿ A motion under subdivision (a) [of CCP § 2030.300] shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.¿ (CCP § 2030.300(b).)¿ In addition, a separate statement is required.¿ (California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1345(a)(2).) Plaintiff moves for further responses to Plaintiffs special interrogatories, set one. Specifically, in response to Special Interrogatories 1-3, 8-9, 17 and 42 Defendant referenced by name certain documents it claimed were produced concurrently herewith. However, Defendant produced no documents. In Response to Special Interrogatories 10-16 [1] and 19-20 Defendant referred Plaintiff to its response to Form Interrogatory 15.1. Lastly, in response to Special Interrogatories 18, 21-27, 29-41 and 43-48, Defendant asserted only objections. In opposition, JLRNA argues the motion was not served with sufficient notice because Plaintiff forgot to take into consideration the additional two court days required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. JLRNA contends the motion should be denied on this basis alone and if not, requests this court reschedule the hearing to a later time with sufficient amount of notice. The court finds JLRNA was not prejudiced by the late filing. The filing was late by two days and JLRNA was able to oppose the motion on the merits despite forgetting to properly calendar their opposition. JLRNA next argues the motion is procedurally defective because what Plaintiff really seeks is a production of documents, not further responses. The court finds no grounds to deny the motion on the grounds of mislabeling. Plaintiff provided all the necessary information for a motion to compel compliance and JLRNA was able to oppose the motion on that basis. JLRNA lastly argues Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for the requested documents or information. The court disagrees. As for 18, 21-23, 27-26, 31 and 43-44, the court finds JLRNAs policies and procedures relevant. Each is limited to the Song-Beverly Act. JLRNA may seek a protective order for the policies and procedures. The court also finds Special Interrogatories 24-25, 29-30 and 40-41 properly seek information about Defendants training and practices by which it does or does not comply with the Song-Beverly Act. The identity of witnesses is relevant to Plaintiffs claims. The court notes JLRNAs response Discovery is continuing, and JLRNA reserves the right to supplement its response based upon further investigation is not necessarily improper. However, if some information is present, it should be provided now. If new information does come up during JLRNAs ongoing investigation, JLRNAs may supplement its answers. If after reasonable inquiry, JLRNA cannot answer the request, JRLNA must state so. The court notes both parties reference No. 32-39 and 45-48 but these interrogatories are not in the separate statement and this court cannot properly evaluate them. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Special Interrogatories is GRANTED, in part. The request for sanctions in the amount of $3,660.00 is DENIED as both parties positions were substantially justified. .

Case Number: 23NWCV02307 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: C MARIA E. SALMERON v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC CASE NO.: 23NWCV02307 HEARING: 7/17/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #4 TENTATIVE ORDER Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Response to Defendants First Set of Requests for Production is CONTINUED. Moving Party to give NOTICE. Background This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiff Maria E. Salmeron moves to compel further responses to her Request for Production of Documents, Set One from defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC. Timeliness Notice of the motion to compel further must be provided within 45 days of service of the verified response or on or before any specific later date to which the parties have agreed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) This 45-day deadline runs from the date the verified response is served and is extended for service by mail in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1010.6, subdivision (a)(4) and 1013, subdivision (a). Failure to timely move to compel within the specified period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) On October 25, 2023, Defendant served unverified responses to Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22, Ex. 5.) Responses consisted of objections and responses. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22, Ex. 5.) Defendant served verifications on November 21, 2023. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22. Ex, 6.) The 45-day clock runs only upon service of verified responses. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 2031.250, subd. (a).) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on December 8, 2023. Taking into account of November 21, 2023 as the response date, Plaintiff is timely. Meet and Confer The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) For purposes of determining whether a motion to compel discovery was preceded by a reasonable and good faith effort to meet and confer, such an attempt at informal resolution requires something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) Based on the meet-and-confer letters, it appears that the parties did not meet and confer in good faith. For example, Plaintiff proposed that the parties stipulate a protective order, and Defendant said that it will produce responsive documents pursuant to a protective order. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶¶ 27, 29, Ex. 7, 8.) Defendants also suggested that the parties speak by telephone to further deliberate. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 29, Ex. 8.) The parties are ordered to meet and confer telephonically, in person, or by video conference. If there are outstanding issues remaining, they are to submit a joint amended separate statement by August 16, 2024. The Court will hear any outstanding issues on Wednesday, August 28, 2024 at 10:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C.

Case Number: 22STCV33860 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: 51 Tentative Ruling Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51 HEARING DATE: July 19, 2024 CASE NAME: Blanca Mazariegos v. General Motors LLC CASE NO .: 22STCV33860 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Blanca Mazariegos RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General Motors LLC REQUESTED RELIEF: 1. An Order Awarding Attorneys Fees of $31,875.00 2. An Order Awarding Costs of $3,433.20 TENTATIVE RULING: The fee motion is granted in part. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff Blanca Mazariegos (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) with two causes of action for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; and (2) Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint concerns Plaintiffs purchase of a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN 1GCPWBEK2NZ117813. On November 21, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer. On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys fees and costs. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion. On May 31, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. LEGAL STANDARD: A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) By permitting buyers who prevail under Song-Beverly to recover their attorneys fees, our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible. ( Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc . (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994.) The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. ( Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . . ( Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) A calculation of attorneys fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the lodestar approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar at the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ( Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys fee award. ( Ibid. ) It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted. ( Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts in the billing record. ( Id . at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be reasonably specific and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. ( Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyers damages recovery. ( Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. ( Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure,¿ and other circumstances in the case . ( EnPalm, LLC v.¿Teitler¿Family Trust ¿(2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. ( Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank,¿N.A. ¿(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)¿ ANALYSIS : Plaintiff requests $31,875.00 in attorneys fees and $3,433.20 in costs for a total of $35,308.20. Defendant requests that the court reduce the attorneys fees to $12,863.50 and costs to $2,523.25. Four attorneys were involved at various junctures in this case. (Barry Decl., ¶ 17.) C. Richard Lara was the handling attorney ($350 hourly rate). (Barry Decl., ¶ 17; Lara Decl., ¶ 6.) The involvement of David N. Barry ($600 hourly rate before 3/31/23, $625 thereafter) became necessary given the facts and complexity of the case, the litigation posture of Defense, and given this case was approaching trial. (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 17, 22.) Otis R. Hayes ($500 hourly rate) and Jeramy D. Templin ($350 hourly rate) also worked on the case. (Hayes Decl., ¶ 5; Templin Decl., ¶ 7.) Prevailing Party Here, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement that provided for GM to pay Plaintiff $54,000.00, inclusive of loan payoff, representing a full repurchase in exchange for the Subject Vehicle; that Plaintiff is the prevailing party; and that attorneys fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Plaintiff would be paid in compliance with Civil Code § 1794(d) by way of motion. (Barry Decl., Exh. 4.) Lodestar Fees The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ( Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132). In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. ( Bell v. Clackamas County ¿(9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See¿ Gates v. Deukmejian ¿(9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. ( Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy ¿(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Plaintiffs argue the hourly rates are reasonable. Here, the requested hourly rates are as follows according to the Motion, p. 14: · David N. Barry: 16.4 hours at $675/hour [1] · Otis R. Hayes: 8.5 hours at $500/hour · Brian Kim: 2.8 hours at $350/hour · C. Richard Lara: 41.9 hours at $350/hour · Jeramy D. Templin: 2.6 hours at $350/hour The court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable based on the hourly rate of similarly situated attorneys in the Los Angeles area. Based on the Laffey Matrix, attorneys with similar years of experience as Plaintiffs counsel as identified above have comparable, if not a higher hourly rate. However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below. Thus, the hourly rates are appropriate. Reasonableness of Hours Billed To determine if the requested amount is reasonable, California courts utilize the lodestar method. The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) Although a verified fee bill is prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, ( Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. ( Mikhaeilpoor , supra , 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 247.) The court has reviewed the fee bill submitted by Counsel and the proposed reductions by Defendant. Plaintiffs contend that the billable hours are reasonable. The total amount billed is 72.2 hours. While Plaintiff is to be commended for not billing for all work and assigning much of the work to a junior associate billing at $350 per hour, the hours billed for this unremarkable lemon law case with no dispositive motions and very little other motion work seems high. Upon further review of the billing, the Court questioned the reasonableness of some billing entries. Pleadings, Motions, & Discovery Boilerplate filings serve a useful purpose. They increase productivity by allowing for simple edits to existing documents. Thus, utilizing templates is to be commended when it results in efficiency. However, if templates are employed but attorneys are still billing significant time to make minor changes, such use of legal resources is unwarranted and any such bill is unreasonable, particularly if the attorney is billing at a high hourly rate. ( Mikhaeilpoor , supra , at p. 250.) Here, the court found instances where the time spent for minor cut and paste edits to templates was unreasonable. i. Discovery Requests to Defendant The Court reviewed the time spend for drafting discovery requests, reviewing discovery, responding to discovery, a motion to compel a deposition, preparing meet and confer letters, drafting an IDC statement and drafting memos to file. Drafting discovery motions and meet and confer letters, and memos to file for a sophisticated, highly practiced Lemon Law firm is template or clerical work. Responding and reviewing discovery is similar to cookie cutter work. An IDC Statement is to be a memorandum measured in pages that is supposed to concisely state the issue. The Court reviewed the IDC statement in this case. It could not have reasonably taken 3.5 hours of attorney time to write. The Court is mindful of the purpose of an IDC. It is supposed to save costs and not generate 3.5 hours of billable time. Accordingly, these fees are unreasonable. ii. Fee motion Counsel billed 12.2 hors for a fee motion. This looks like many that this Court has reviewed. It is simply an accounting and a template. A seasoned Lemon Law firm should spend no more than 7 hours on this motion in this matter. iii. Travel Time Counsel billed for 3.3 hours totaling $1,410 traveling to and from court. This Court agrees that this charges are unreasonable on their face. As such, the Court reduces the requested lodestar by $8,410. In all other respects, the billings are proper and reasonable. To be clear, the Court finds the reasonable amount of fees, based upon its experience and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and complexity of this case, and the professed specialization of Plaintiffs counsel is $23,465. Costs: Plaintiffs request $3,433.20 in costs and expenses. The memorandum of Costs is attached to the Barry Decl. as Exhibit 7. [2] Items on a verified cost bill are prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs. ( Hadley, supra , 167 Cal.App.3d at 682). Under CCP § 1794(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. Defendant argues that the Court should reduce the requested amount by $909.15. This is based on parking and mileage, filing fees, future estimated court reporter fees, and future jury fees. The requested costs are appropriate. Moreover, while the reporter charge was estimated at the first hearing, the charge has been incurred as of this, the subsequent hearing. Thus, as of today, the $550 for a future hearing is an incurred cost However, the Court agrees that parking of 59.80 for attending the CMC and Post-Mediation status Conference was unnecessary. These were hardly critical appearances that required in person appearance as opposed to appearing remotely, which would have generated no costs. Thus, the Court reduces the costs by $59.80. CONCLUSION: For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows: Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED, in the amount of $23,465 and costs in the amount of $3,373.40 for a total of $26,838.40 payable within 45 days of service of this order. Moving party is to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 16, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder S. Kalra Judge of the Superior Court [1] The Court will note, however, that the hourly rate for Mr. Barry requested in the motion is higher than the hourly rate Mr. Barry requests in his declaration. Barry Decl., ¶ 22: Please note, I am only seeking an hourly rate of $600 for services rendered after January 13 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023. I am only seeking an hourly rate of $625 for services rendered 14 after April 1, 2023.] [2] Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to bring a Motion to Tax Costs so the challenges should be overruled. The Court notes that Plaintiff, for their part, did not file a separate memorandum of costs but rather only attached cost as an Exhibit to this fee motion. As such, the time to file a Motion to Tax Costs may not have even commenced since the Costs Memorandum has yet to be filed.

Case Number: 23STCV09246 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 kenneth t. leonhardt ; Plaintiff , vs. fca us llc , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV09246 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: (1) plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories (2) plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Kenneth T. Leonhardt RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant FCA US LLC (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with each motion. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardt (Plaintiff) moves the court for an order compelling defendant FCA US LLC (Defendant) to serve further responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One, numbers 14, 20, 39, and 43. The court notes that, in its opposition, Defendant has submitted the declaration of its counsel, in which counsel states that Defendant (1) supplemented its responses [to Special Interrogatories numbers 14 and 20] to include the names and addresses of the service advisors it believed to have performed service on the subject vehicle[,] and (2) agreed to produce a corporate representative to testify at deposition regarding the decision whether or not to repurchase the subject vehicle in response to Special Interrogatories numbers 39 and 43. (Gregg Decl., ¶¶ 7, 11.) Although Defendant attached a copy of Defendants supplemental responses to those interrogatories, Defendant did not file a proof of service establishing that those responses have been served on Plaintiff. (Gregg Decl., Ex. B [Supp. Response].) Moreover, Plaintiffs reply does not appear to indicate that Plaintiff received the supplemental responses. Thus, the court evaluates Plaintiffs motion based on the responses that Defendant served on September 15, 2023. (Yakoobian Decl., Ex. O; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409 [Whether a particular response does resolve satisfactorily the issues raised by a motion is a matter best determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, based on the circumstances of the case].) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 14 and 20 because (1) Defendants exercise of the option to produce documents under section 2030.230 is unwarranted, and (2) the objections to those interrogatories are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subds. (a)(2), (a)(3).) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 39 and 43 because the objections to those interrogatories are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3).) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Plaintiff moves the court for an order compelling Defendant to serve further responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, numbers 7, 10, 20, 24, 25, 44-52, 53-55, and 56-65. In its opposition, Defendant asserts that it has since supplemented its responses to this discovery. (Gregg Decl., ¶ 8.) However, although Defendant has filed a copy of Defendant FCA US LLCs Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents to Defendant (Set One), dated March 28, 2024, Defendant did not attach a proof of service establishing that it served the supplemental responses on Plaintiff. (Gregg Decl., Ex. B, pp. 1-25 [Supp. Responses].) Moreover, in his reply, Plaintiff asserts that he has not received those supplemental responses. (Reply, p. 1:17-22 [Plaintiff is only in possession of Defendants initial responses dated September 15, 2023].) The court therefore evaluates Plaintiffs motion based on the responses that Defendant served on September 15, 2023. (Yakoobian Decl., Ex. N; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further response to Requests for Production of Documents, number 7 because (1) the statement of compliance is incomplete since it does not state that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in Defendants possession, custody, or control and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production, and (2) the objections in the response are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (a)(1), (a)(3), 2031.220.) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, numbers 10 and 24-25 because the objections in the responses to those demands are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(3).) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further response to Requests for Production of Documents, number 20, limited to the production of documents evidencing policies and procedures regarding the handling of repeat complaints by customers regarding their vehicles. The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, numbers 44-46, 47 (first), 47 (second), 48-52, and 62-65, limited to the requested documents for vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make, and model of the subject vehicle. The court denies Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, numbers 53-61 because those demands are overbroad and unduly burdensome. ORDER The court grants plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardts motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, the court orders defendant FCA US LLC to serve further, full and complete answers to plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardts Special Interrogatories, numbers 14, 20, 39, and 43, which comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.210-2030.250, within 20 days of the date of this order. The court grants in part plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardts motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents as follows. The court orders defendant FCA US LLC (1) to serve on plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardt further written responses, which comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210-2031.250, to plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardts Requests for Production of Documents (i) numbers 7, 10, and 24-25, (ii) number 20, limited to the production of documents evidencing policies and procedures regarding the handling of repeat complaints by customers regarding their vehicles, and (iii) numbers 44-46, 47 (first), 47 (second), 48-52, and 62-65, limited to the requested documents for vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make, and model of the subject vehicle, and (2) to produce to plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardt all documents and things in defendant FCA US LLCs possession, custody, or control which are responsive to those requests (and limited as set forth above), within 20 days of the date of this order. The court orders plaintiff Kenneth Leonhardt to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 18, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV29419 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 ISAAC COHEN , et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. TESLA, INC. , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV29419 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT TESLA, INC.S MOTION TO COMPEL BINDING ARBITRATION Background Plaintiff Isaac Cohen (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 1, 2023 against Defendant Tesla, Inc. (Defendant). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) violation of lemon law, (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, (3) negligent repair, (4) misrepresentation, and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. I n the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 10, 2022, he purchased a 2022 Tesla Model Y automobile. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that [s]oon after purchase of the automobile, Plaintiff began experiencing nonconformities with the automobile that required Plaintiff to return to TESLAs authorized repair facilities on several occasions during the warranty period. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges that [s]uch nonconformities included defects that substantially impaired the automobiles use, safety, and/or value. (Compl., ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse, to replace the automobile or make restitution. (Compl., ¶ 47.) Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims, and for an order staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. Request for Judicial Notice The Court grants Defendants request for judicial notice. Legal Standard In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial ( e.g. , fraud, unconscionability, etc.). (( Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414 .) Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (( Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 ) ; (( Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219 .) California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration. (( Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686 .) This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute. ( Ibid. [internal quotations omitted] .) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts involving interstate commerce. ( 9 U.S.C. section 2 , et seq .; (( Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247 .) Discussion A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement In support of the motion, Defendant submits the Declaration of Raymond Kim, who is a Manager, Business Resolution with Defendant. (Kim Decl., ¶ 2.) In his declaration, Mr. Kim states that Plaintiff initially ordered a 2022 Tesla Model Y with VIN 7SAYGDEF0NF485321 (the Subject Vehicle) from Tesla on or about April 10, 2022. In placing that order, Plaintiff agreed to the terms of a Motor Vehicle Order Agreement (Order Agreement), thereby agreeing to be bound by its terms and conditions, which included an agreement to arbitrate. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Order Agreement between Plaintiff and Tesla, Inc. detailing the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs purchase of the Subject Vehicle that I obtained from Tesla, Inc.s electronic document storage kept in the ordinary course of business. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3.) Mr. Kim states that Plaintiff placed the order by clicking a Place Order button on Teslas website. Plaintiff would not have been able to place the order without clicking this button on Teslas website or authorizing someone to do so on Plaintiffs behalf. Prior to placing the order, Plaintiff would see text and be advised that Plaintiff are [sic] agreeing to the Order Agreements terms and conditions. There would be a hyperlink to the Order Agreement terms and conditions that the Plaintiff could click on and view prior to proceeding with the order. If a customer clicks on this hyperlink, a new window would open revealing the Order Agreement. Further, once executed, the Order Agreement would become visible to the customer on the customers mytesla.com account for as long as the customer owns the vehicle. Once an Order Agreement is executed, as was done here, the Order Agreement is automatically saved to the electronic document storage system containing all of the documents related to the subject transaction. Given my knowledge and understanding of Teslas procedures, the Order Agreement only ends up in the electronic file (as it did here) after a consumer has executed the Order Agreement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 4.) The Motor Vehicle Order Agreement attached as Exhibit 1 to Mr. Kims declaration provides, inter alia , as follows: Agreement to Arbitrate . Please carefully read this provision, which applies to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates, (together Tesla). If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products. We will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration, which will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla, and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others purchasing or leasing Tesla vehicles. In other words, you and Tesla may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and any other claims must be arbitrated. If you prefer, you may instead take an individual dispute to small claims court. You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this Agreement by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA 94539-7970, stating your name, Vehicle Identification Number, and intent to opt out of the arbitration provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to arbitrate overrides any different arbitration agreement between us, including any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) In his supporting declaration, Mr. Kim states that [w]hile the customer may opt out of the Agreement to Arbitrate by sending a letter to Tesla stating that intention within thirty days of execution of the Order Agreement, Plaintiff did not do so. Tesla maintains letters in which its customers opted out of the Agreement to Arbitrate, but it did not receive any such letter from Plaintiff. (Kim Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant asserts that all of Plaintiffs Claims fall well within the scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate. The relevant language in the arbitration provision provides that the parties agree: any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.&All of the Plaintiffs claims arise out of the relationship between Plaintiff and Tesla. (Mot. at p. 10:8-14, citing Kim Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) In the opposition, Plaintiff states that he opposes the instant motion with respect to Plaintiffs fourth and fifth causes of action. Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he agreed to the subject Agreement or that it covers the first, second, and third causes of action of Plaintiffs Complaint. In the opposition, Plaintiff first asserts that [f]ederal law precludes pre-dispute binding arbitration of warranty disputes. (Oppn at p. 3:10.) Plaintiff appears to be arguing that federal law precludes arbitration of Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Plaintiff cites to 16 C.F.R. § 703.5 , subdivision (j), which provides that [d]ecisions of the Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any person. However, the warrantor shall act in good faith, as provided in § 703.2(g) of this part. In any civil action arising out of a warranty obligation and relating to a matter considered by the Mechanism, any decision of the Mechanism shall be admissible in evidence, as provided in section 110(a)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310(a)(3). 16 C.F.R. § 703.1, subdivision (e) provides that [m]echanism means an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies, as provided in section 110 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310 . Plaintiff appears to assert that under these provisions, pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitration of any warranty claim is unlawful. (Oppn at p. 3:14.) In the reply, Defendant counters that the instant matter does not involve a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provision. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires resort to an informal dispute resolution if the manufacturer makes one available to its customers. (Reply at p. 3:14-16, emphasis omitted.) Defendant cites to 15 U.S.C. § 2310 , which provides in part that Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms. ( 15 U.S.C. § 2310 , subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff also cites to Exhibit D to Plaintiffs counsels declaration, which is the Federal Register/Vol. 80, No. 138, dated July 20, 2015. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D.) This document concerns, inter alia , the Federal Trade Commissions final action concerning review of interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D, p. 1.) The document provides, inter alia , that [s]ince the issuance of the 1999 FRN, courts have reached different conclusions as to whether the MMWA gives the Commission authority to ban mandatory binding arbitration in warranties&In particular, two appellate courts have questioned whether Congress intended binding arbitration to be considered a type of [informal dispute settlement mechanism], which would potentially place binding arbitration outside the scope of the MMWA&Nonetheless, the Commission reaffirms its long-held view that the MMWA disfavors, and authorizes the Commission to prohibit, mandatory binding arbitration in warranties. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D, p. 10.) However, Plaintiff does not appear to cite to binding legal authority demonstrating that Plaintiffs cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act may not be subject to arbitration. In addition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff seems to argue that the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts the FAA and creates an unqualified right of access to the courts for consumers claiming breach of warranty claims, and further, that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated rules and that the Court should follow the FTCs construction of the statute&Here, as in Epic , the FTC is not responsible for administering the FAA and their interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act as it applies to that statute is therefore not subject to deference. (Reply at p. 3:1-9.) In Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 502-503 , cited by Defendant, the United States Supreme Court noted, [s]hould employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their employers? As a matter of policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the answer is clear&In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their termsincluding terms providing for individualized proceedings. Nor can we agree with the employees suggestion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command&It is this Courts duty to interpret Congresss statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRAand for three quarters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties agreements unlawful. As noted by Defendant, the Epic Court found that the employees say we must rule for them anyway because of the deference this Court owes to an administrative agencys interpretation of the law. To be sure, the employees do not wish us to defer to the general counsels judgment in 2010 that the NLRA and the Arbitration Act coexist peaceably; they wish us to defer instead to the Boards 2012 opinion suggesting the NLRA displaces the Arbitration Act. No party to these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference. But even under Chevron s terms, no deference is due. To show why, it suffices to outline just a few of the most obvious reasons. The Chevron Court justified deference on the premise that a statutory ambiguity represents an implicit delegation to an agency to interpret a statute which it administers. Here, though, the Board hasnt just sought to interpret its statute, the NLRA, in isolation; it has sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act. And&on no account might we agree that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a second statute it does not administer. (( Id. at pp. 519-520 .) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that the fifth cause of action is not subject to the arbitration provision in the subject Agreement. Plaintiff also asserts that the misrepresentation claim is not included in the scope of the arbitration provision. (Oppn at p. 5:1-2.) In the fourth cause of action for misrepresentation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that the automobile was safe to drive, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff after each service attempt that the automobile was serviced properly and that there would be no further problems with the automobile, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiffs automobile did not qualify for repurchase, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiffs automobile was not subject to repurchase under the Lemon Law, and that Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that there was nothing they could do to assist Plaintiff other than offer to re-inspect the automobile. (Compl., ¶¶ 98-102.) Plaintiff alleges that [t]he representations made by Defendants&were false. (Compl., ¶ 104.) Plaintiff contends that he has alleged that Tesla sought to avoid warranty coverage by committing fraud and misrepresenting the terms of the warranty coverage to Plaintiff. In essence, Tesla avoided and attempted to deny the relationship between Plaintiff, as the subject consumer, and Tesla, as warrantor. Given this, Tesla cannot turn to an arbitration provision that seeks to cover any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla&to compel arbitration of an [sic] claim arising from the fact that Tesla avoided its relationship with Plaintiff by way of fraud. (Oppn at p. 5:13-19, emphasis omitted.) The Court notes that Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority to support this proposition. Moreover, the Court does not see how the allegations of the Complaint show that Defendant purportedly attempted to deny the relationship between Plaintiff. (Oppn at p. 5:15.) The Court agrees with Defendant that the fourth cause of action for misrepresentation arise[s] out of and relate[s] to the relationship between the parties. (Mot. at p. 10:26-27.) Next, Plaintiff argues that [b]ecause the possibility of fraud was simply not foreseeable at the time the parties agreed to the arbitration provision, Tesla cannot force the provision to cover the unforeseeable claim. (Oppn at p. 6:25-27.) However, Plaintiff cites to non-binding federal authority in support of such assertion. ( See Oppn at pp. 6:27-7:14.) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that the fourth cause of action is not subject to the arbitration provision in the subject Agreement. The Court finds that Defendant has established that an arbitration agreement exists and that it covers the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff in this action. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion to compel arbitration is granted. The entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs arbitrable claims. The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on July 17, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration five court days prior to the status conference, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: July 17, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court