Marco Olmedo Renteria,Dora Toledo Salas -Vs- Ayden Temes,Npl Construction Company

Case Number: 24PSCV00619 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: K 1. Defendants Maral Chorbajians Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED [ see below ]. 2. Defendants Abraham Chorbajians, Eli Chorbajians and Maral Chorbajians Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Background Plaintiff Sean Jayewardene (Plaintiff) alleges that he sustained injuries and damages in a June 12, 2023 motor vehicle accident. On April 22, 2-24, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), asserting a cause of action against Mercury Insurance (Mercury), Abraham Chorbajian (Abraham), Eli Chorbajian (Eli) and Maral Chorbajian (Maral) for: 1. Motor Vehicle A Case Management Conference and an Order to Show Cause Re: Why Sanctions Should Not be Imposed for Plaintiffs Failure to Appear on May 13, 2024 are set for July 15, 2024. 1. Demurrer to FAC Legal Standard A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) [A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge. ( S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].) Discussion Abraham, Eli and Maral (together, the Chorbajians) demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivision (e), to Plaintiffs FAC, on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Mercury or Maral. At the outset, the Chorbajians may not demur on behalf of Mercury, nor may Eli and Abraham demur on behalf of Maral. The courts analysis is limited to Maral only as the moving party. The demurrer is overruled. Maral argues that she is an improper party because she is neither the driver nor the owner of the defendants vehicle. (Motion, 2:13-15). Marals argument is extrinsic to the face of Plaintiffs FAC. Plaintiff has identified Maral as a defendant[] who operated a motor vehicle. (FAC, ¶ MV-2). 2. Motion to Strike Portions of FAC Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Discussion The Chorbajians move the court for an order striking out Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages (i.e., FAC, ¶ 14(a)(2).). Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract upon clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is defined as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) A conclusory characterization of defendants conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of oppression, fraud, or malice. . . ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. ( Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) Plaintiffs FAC is devoid of any factual allegations whatsoever showing that the Chorbajians conduct was malicious, oppressive and/or fraudulent to support a claim for punitive damages. The motion is granted.

WATKINS, ET AL. VS. THE ESTATE OF KAREN MORAN Case Number: 23CV-0203208 This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than March 18, 2025. Both parties have posted jury fees. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar

Case Number: 22SMCV00902 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Starbucks Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Starbucks Corporations Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Starbucks Corporation shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment per statute. Defendant Starbucks Corporation to give notice. REASONING Defendant Starbucks Corporation (Defendant) demurs to Plaintiff Augustine Rotibi (Plaintiff)s single cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (SAC) and moves to strike Plaintiffs claim and prayer for punitive damages. [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967), but the Court does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125). Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) First Cause of Action: Unruh Civil Rights Violation The elements of a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act are (1) defendant is a business establishment, (2) defendant intentionally denied plaintiff accommodations, advantages, privileges, facilities, or services, (3) defendant was motivated to do so based on its perception that plaintiff belonged to a statutorily defined group, (4) plaintiff was harmed, and (5) defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm. (See Civ. Code, § 51; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216.) The objective of the Act is to prohibit businesses from engaging in unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious discrimination. Therefore, the Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also where treatment is unequal. (Pizarro v. Lambs Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174, citations omitted.) In its prior rulings on Defendants demurrer to the initial pleading and Defendants demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, the Court ruled that Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to support his claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and Plaintiff has again made no amendments to his claim here. Plaintiff again alleges that he ordered a tea with a spike of lemonade, and when he asked for a refill, he was charged the full amount of the drink based on the color of his skin. (SAC ¶¶ 12, 14, 19-21, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that his client, a Caucasian female, was only charged 50 cents for a refill of the same drink, and he observed other patrons, all Caucasian, requesting and getting a refill for their drinks without any questions or refusal, and discounted rates were only offered to patrons that were Caucasian. (SAC ¶¶ 15, 19, 20.) The Court previously ruled that Plaintiff had not alleged that any discrimination against him was intentional, and Plaintiff had also failed to allege how the corporation may be liable for the cashiers actions. Plaintiff has added no substantive allegations here, continuing to rely on the same facts. Thus, there remain insufficient facts to support a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as Plaintiff has provided only conclusions to support his claim without alleging intentional discrimination or facts which may support liability against Defendant for the cashiers actions. Given that the Court has allowed Plaintiff two opportunities to amend his pleading to state sufficient facts, and he instead relies only on the same facts in each new iteration of the pleading, the Court lacks a basis to conclude that amendment will cure the deficiencies in the pleading, and Plaintiffs opposition does not compel a different conclusion, as he provides no information about possible amendments, instead focusing solely on the veracity of the current facts. Accordingly, Defendant Starbucks Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Starbucks Corporations Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Starbucks Corporation shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment per statute.

23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/10/2024 Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial and Relief from Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(a)(3) for Good Cause; filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 Tentative Ruling - 07/09/2024 Patrick McKinney The Motion re: Plaintiffs Notice Of Motion And Motion for Trial Continuance and Request for Relief from Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(a)(3) for Good Cause filed by Jeffrey Ochoa on 06/14/2024 is Granted. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Continue Trial Date is GRANTED as follows. The Court ORDERS that trial in this action is CONTINUED fifteen (15) days to Tuesday, 8/20/2024 at 10:00 a.m. The Court further ORDERS that the hearings on plaintiff Jeffrey Ochoa’s (“Plaintiff”) Motions for Summary Adjudication (“MSAs”) of certain affirmative defenses of each of defendants Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. (“Kaiser Gypsum”), Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“VGA”), and Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) are set for Monday, 8/26/2024 at 3:00 p.m. in Dept. 18. The Court continued the initial hearing date of 6/21/2024 to 7/10/2024 to allow the parties to submit supplemental briefing not to exceed seven pages each solely regarding the legal question whether this Court may properly continue the trial date to 8/20/2024 pursuant to CCP § 36(f) and continue hearings on the MSAs to 8/26/2024, a date after the continued 8/20/2024 trial date. Plaintiff and Defendants Kaiser Gypsum, VGA, and Ford filed supplemental briefing. Plaintiff also filed a 38-page declaration, which the Court has not considered, as the Court’s 6/21/2024 Order did not authorize submission of further evidence by any party. Ford’s supplemental briefing primarily states Ford’s willingness to stipulate to a 30-day trial continuance. However, the Court cannot force other defendants to so stipulate, even though Plaintiff would apparently be willing to do so. VGA and Kaiser Gypsum argue that the purpose of the summary judgment/adjudication statute would be defeated if the Court were to order an 8/26/2024 hearing on the MSAs, citing to CCP § 437c(a)(3). § 437c(a)(3) provides: “The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading.” VGA and Kaiser Gypsum also cite to CCP § 581(a)(6), which provides: “’Trial.’ A trial shall be deemed to actually commence at the beginning of the opening statement or argument of any party or his or her counsel, or if there is no opening statement, then at the time of the administering of the oath or affirmation to the first witness, or the introduction of any evidence.” §437c(a)(3) sets no limit on the date of hearing in advance of “trial” when the Court in its SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/10/2024 Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial and Relief from Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(a)(3) for Good Cause; filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 discretion finds that good cause exists to move a dispositive motion hearing date closer to trial. Thus, this Court may properly set a hearing date on the MSAs at any time up to the date and time trial “actually commences” pursuant to § 581(a)(6), i.e., when opening statements or the swearing in of the first witness occurs, whichever comes first. VGA and Kaiser Gypsum have cited to no case law or other authority suggesting that the Court’s interpretation of the two referenced statutes is incorrect. Although certain “pre-trial” proceedings within the meaning of § 581(a)(6) will commence on 8/20/2024 including addressing motions in limine and jury selection, it is unlikely that opening statements or the swearing in of witnesses will occur by 8/26/2024. The Court finds good cause for the above Order. As stated in the Court’s 6/21/2024 Order, the Court inadvertently provided in the Trial Preference Order in this action that Defendants could have dispositive motions heard on fifty (50) days’ notice, to which Plaintiff implicitly stipulated, but did not clearly provide that shortened notice for defendants’ dispositive motions was contingent on defendants’ stipulation that Plaintiff would also have the same shortened notice period for Plaintiffs’ dispositive motions. The Court finds that basic fairness militates for allowing Plaintiff to have his dispositive motions heard, even if trial cannot properly be continued beyond 8/20/2024, pursuant to CCP § 36(f). The Court is also unaware of any prior instance where an asbestos defendant has refused to stipulate to shortening of Plaintiff’s notice period for dispositive motions when the Court has tentatively ordered a shortened notice period applicable to both plaintiffs and defendants. (See e.g., the Court’s 1/31/2023 Order Granting Trial Preference in Martin v. Avon Products, Inc., Alameda Sup.Ct. Case No. 22CV016973 (the “Martin Action”), a case in which Kaiser Gypsum did not contest a shortened notice period for dispositive motions that applied equally to all parties.) The Court incorporates by reference the 1/31/2023 Trial Preference Order in the Martin Action herein. Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion as set forth above. CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERS Notify the Court and all other parties no later than 4:00 pm the day before the scheduled hearing and identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal - https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select Search 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select Click to Contest this Ruling SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/10/2024 Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial and Relief from Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(a)(3) for Good Cause; filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select Proceed.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 5. PLAINTIFF YINGNAN LI's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 1ST Amended COMPLAINT. Off calendar. Notice of settlement of entire case filed June 18, 2024. =(302/RBU)

S-CV-0052402 Tierney, Ainsley vs. Raddigan, Ryann Elizabeth et al No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Per Local Rule 20.1.7 D. If a party or attorney has a conflict with future hearing dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, or opposes the future dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, the party or attorney must appear at the Case Management Conference. That attorney or party must provide at least 7 days’ notice to all other parties in the case of their intent to appear at the Case Management Conference. [Effective 1/1/19] 07/15/2024 CMC in Dept. 6 at 3 PM Calendar Notes

Case Number: 23AHCV00370 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA OF NON-PARTY CAROLINE BERNSTEIN I. BACKGROUND On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff Carter John Thomas Hasbrook (Plaintiff) initiated this lawsuit against his former wife, Defendant Monica Cione Hasbrook (Defendant) for physical injury damages incurred during a physical attack arising out of the dissolution of their marriage. On July 14, 2023, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff drugged her as she recovered at Huntington Hospital following being struck by a bus. (Gillick Decl., Exh. 1, ¶ 9.) Discovery has revealed records that Defendants sister Caroline Bernstein, a non-party to this action, called the hospital alleging that the parties were using heroin prior to the bus accident and that Plaintiff was the source of the drugs. (Gillick Decl., Exh. 3.) Plaintiff now moves to compel non-party Bernstein to provide responses to Plaintiffs deposition subpoena and request for production of records to corroborate the allegations that he supplied heroin to Defendant. Plaintiff argues that he served Bernstein with a valid subpoena on April 2, 2024, that required Bernstein to produce records by April 18, 2024. Plaintiff argues that no response was received, leading to Plaintiffs process server, Titan Legal Service to mail follow up letters to Bernstein demanding compliance. (Motion, p. 4.) The motion is unopposed. II. MOTION TO COMPEL NON-PARTY COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA A. Legal Standard A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.) A deposition subpoena may command: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.) A service of a deposition subpoena shall be effected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).) Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).) A deponent who disobeys a deposition subpoena may be punished for contempt without the necessity of a prior order of the court directing compliance by the witness. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.240.) A written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1346.) B. Discussion Plaintiff asserts that Bernstein has apparent knowledge of the situation and made claims to a hospital employee that incriminate him against Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that a licensed social worker at Huntington Hospital spoke with Bernstein over the phone on July 27, 2021, and Bernstein stated that Defendant used heroin before the accident and her ex-husband (Plaintiff) brought it to her. (Mot., p. 3.) Defendant provides proof of service showing personal service upon Bernstein with the deposition subpoena on April 2, 2024. (Gillick Decl., ¶ 5; Exh. 4.) There has been no objection filed to the subpoena for Bernsteins deposition, nor has any opposition or motion to quash been filed. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted. Third party Caroline Bernstein is ordered to comply with the subpoena served on her on April 2, 2024. Moving party is ordered to give notice. Dated this 10 th day of July 2024 Hon. Jared D. Moses Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22NWCV01581 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C JULIO ZAYAS v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES CASE NO .: 22NWCV01581 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #6 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff counsel, Ryan J. Daneshrad and Shantel Yaghoobians motion to be relieved as counsel for Julio Zayas is DENIED. Moving Party to give NOTICE. The motion is unopposed as of July 8, 2024. This is a continuance. The Court granted the motion on condition that Plaintiffs counsel submit proof of service of the proposed order within 20 days. As of July 8, 2024, they have not done so. Thus, the Court DENIES the motion.