Ruling
2024CUPP019108 LEE ESTELLE GARRISON vs MACERICH MANAGEMENT, CO., et al.
Jul 19, 2024 |
Ronda J. McKaig
|
Motion for Protective Order |
2024CUPP019108
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF VENTURA
Tentative Ruling
2024CUPP019108: LEE ESTELLE GARRISON vs MACERICH MANAGEMENT, CO.,
et al.
07/19/2024 in Department 41
Motion for by Non-Party
Tentative Rulings:
The Court GRANTS Madeline Rana’s application to appear Pro Hac Vice.
The Court GRANTS Non-party Apple Inc.’s motion for a protective order. The protective order
shall be modified in a way that is limited to production of records by Apple. The Court makes
the following changes to Apple’s proposed protective order:
• Item 2 – Definitions.
o Subparagraph (a), shall be modified to read:
“Discovery Material” means all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner
generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, or
tangible things) that are produced, disclosed, or generated by Apple, Inc., in this case.
o Subparagraph (d), shall be modified to read:
“Producing Party” means Apple, Inc.
• Item 3 – Computation of Time
o This item shall be modified to read:
The computation of any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Order shall be governed by
the provisions for computing time set forth in the California Code of Civil Procedure.
• Item 4 – Scope
o Subparagraph (a), shall be modified to read:
The protections conferred by this Order cover not only Discovery Material governed by this
Order as addressed herein, but also any information copied or extracted therefrom, as well as all
copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations thereof that might reveal Protected Material.
• Item 8 – Discovery Materials Designated as “Confidential”
o Subparagraph (b)(ii), shall be modified to read:
(ii) The Receiving Party’s in-house counsel, such counsel’s immediate paralegals and staff, and
any copying or clerical litigation support services working at the direction of such counsel,
paralegals, and staff;
o Subparagraph (b)(x), shall be added and read:
(x) The Receiving Party(ies).
• Item 16 – Discovery from Experts or Consultants
Item 16 shall be deleted. The proposed language goes beyond the scope of Apple’s motion.
2024CUPP019108: LEE ESTELLE GARRISON vs MACERICH MANAGEMENT, CO.,
et al.
The protective order contains a mechanism by which designations can be challenged and the
parties should follow those procedures going forward. The Court declines to rule on any
proposed designations at this time.
A revised protective order is to be submitted forthwith. Apple to give notice.
Ruling
TORRES VS TORRES
Jul 18, 2024 |
FL-23-001854
FL-23-001854 – TORRES VS TORRES
Petitioner’s Request for Order re Stay of Civil Case—HEARING REQUIRED.
Procedural Posture -
The Petition for Dissolution in this matter was filed on July 11, 2023. The Response to the Petition was filed on August 10, 2023. The pleadings agree that the date of marriage is October 18, 2003. While the pleadings disagree on the actual date of separation, it appears undisputed that duration of the parties’ marriage is over ten years, and therefore one of statutory long-term duration.
The Court ordered the case to be designated as “complex” by party stipulation on April 24, 2024, within the meaning of Family Code section 2032(d). (Stipulation for Designation of Case as Complex, etc., 4/24/24.)
Respondent filed a Notice of Related Case in this action on April 30, 2024, referencing a case filed in the Civil Division of this Court on April 5, 2024, entitled Estella Torres and Jose Torres v. Golden State Construction & Framing, Inc., Juan Torres, Sandra Torres, and Doe defendants, CV-24-002580. Defendant Juan Torres is the Respondent in this case and Defendant Sandra Torres is the Petitioner. Defendant Golden State Construction & Framing, Inc., (GSC) is a business entity in which Petitioner claims a community property interest.
According to the Findings and Order After Hearing (FOAH) of December 5, 2023, the Court ordered that, inter alia, Respondent was to produce an accounting of the $418,000.00 taken from GSC in November of 2023. (FOAH, 12/5/23, Attachment, p. 1, No. 4.)
According to the FOAH of May 7, 2024, the Court ordered that, inter alia, Phillip Brumley was appointed as a receiver to collect rents from the parties’ income-producing properties and to serve as an Evidence Code section 730 expert to access/review the financial information for each and every asset which is entirely or partially community in character, for the purpose of assisting the Court in the characterization, valuation and division of the marital estate. (FOAH, 5/7/24, Attachment, p. 1, Nos. 1.(a) & (b); Stipulation re Joint Expert, etc., 6/3/24.)
Judicial Notice –
The Court hereby notifies the parties that the Court intends to take judicial notice of the pleadings in the related civil case, but only for facial matters and not for the truth of any disputed factual allegations contained therein. (Evid. Code, §§ 452(d), 455; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v ALRB (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 141 [court could take judicial notice of complaint for defamation and other documents filed, but not of truth of any factual assertions appearing in such documents]; Jefferson’s Cal. Evid. Benchbook, Ch. 49, § 49.10(6).)
Ruling re Stay Request –
The Court has reviewed the pleadings and papers filed by all parties, including the civil Plaintiff’s response to the ex parte request for temporary orders, filed as a special appearance. After such, the Court is inclined to grant the request and order a stay but invites counsel to be heard on the nature and extent of the stay.
Rationale –
The rule of jurisdictional priority in California Superior Courts is of constitutional origin. Our State Constitution preserves the integrity of each department of a superior court by providing that the judgments, orders and proceedings of any one “session” of the court held by any one or more judges of the court shall be equally effectual as though all of the superior court judges presided at the “session.” (Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 4.)
This effectively means that, despite the division of a superior court into branches or departments, each county has only one superior court and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Because a county's superior court is one tribunal, the department first to properly exercise jurisdiction over a matter has “exclusive” jurisdiction until the matter is finally disposed of; and orders and judgments made by that department during the progress of a case are binding on all other departments of the court unless and until the judgment is overturned on appeal. (Williams v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.2d 656, 658-662;Marriage of Oliverez (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1249.)
Consequently, while a Family Code dissolution proceeding is pending in the family court, no other superior court department may act to interfere with the family court's exercise of its powers in that proceeding. (Dale v. Dale (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1183; Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961-962.)
Notably, case law establishes that the nature of the civil suit at issue is one that conflicts with the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the marital estate. Thus, it has been held that after a family law court acquires jurisdiction in a dissolution action to characterize, value and divide the parties' community property, no other department of the superior court may entertain proceedings or make an order adversely affecting the family court's property division jurisdiction. (Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at 961; Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454-1455; McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893.)
In Askew, the court of appeal held that the civil trial department improperly “usurps” the family law court's power and obligation to determine the community versus separate character of disputed properties when, pending a dissolution action, it exercises jurisdiction over a spouse's fraud suit to impose constructive or resulting trusts on the other spouse's interest in the properties, noting that by doing so, “the civil court [is] removing from the family law court the power to characterize and divide those properties as community. Given that the family law court already had subject matter jurisdiction to divide the community property, the civil trial court had no jurisdiction to so act.” (Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at 962, emphasis added.)
Here, one of the remedies being sought by the civil plaintiffs is precisely to impose a constructive trust as to the ownership interests in GSC of Petitioner and Respondent. (Complaint, Second Cause of Action, p. 4, No. CV-24-002580.) While Respondent and the civil Plaintiffs argue that determination of their interests in GSC does not interfere with adjudication of Petitioner’s and Respondent’s respective interests in GSC, and in fact should even precede this Court’s adjudication thereof, the Court disagrees. This proceeding has not reached the stage where characterization and valuation of GSC by the Court is feasible without a party stipulation. And because Respondent is the “operating spouse” with primary management and control, Petitioner has raised questions regarding breach of fiduciary duty that may alter the equal division rule with regard to the marital estate. (See FOAH, 12/5/23, supra.) As such, were the civil Plaintiffs to prevail, since all three defendants have been sued jointly and severally, and were the civil judge to grant the relief requested, this Court may be unable to adjudicate and divide GSC unequally, in whole or in part, as is expressly authorized if findings are made in Petitioner’s favor. This is merely one example and a myriad of other family law property issues may be similarly impaired, for instance, questions of reimbursement, valuation, etc. Moreover, the Notice of Related Action filed both by the civil plaintiffs in the civil action and by Respondent in this action asserted that this action and the civil action “involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims,” and “involves claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property.” (Notice of Related Case, p. 1, (h), in FL-23-001854 and CV-24-002580.)
Conclusion –
Claims stemming directly from a family law case belong in the family court rather than on the general civil side of the superior court. This is so even though the claims could be pleaded as general civil causes of action (such as breach of contract, fraud, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, infliction of emotional distress, etc.). (Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22, 25-26; Burkle v. Burkle (2006)144 Cal.App.4th 387, 393-394.) As noted in Neal, “Almost all events in family law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant wants to be creative with various causes of action. It is therefore incumbent on courts to examine the substance of claims, not just their nominal headings.” (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 25-26; Burkle, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 394-399 [tracking Neal “in all relevant particulars”]; see also, McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 893; Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1483-1484.)
This ruling, if confirmed, will be made without prejudice or comment on the merits of joinder as to the civil plaintiffs, whether by party motion, intervention, or sua sponte by the Court, on reasonable notice and with opportunity to be heard by all interested parties. The Court will also entertain arguments about the appropriateness of bifurcation and early trial as a means to mitigate the nature and extent of the stay order.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department #25:
