Godbolt, Veneice W -Vs- Watts, Cary

Case Number: 23CHCV02412 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/18/24 Case #23CHCV02412 4 MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT Motions filed on 5/23/24. MOVING PARTY # 1: Defendant Joy Arredondo MOVING PARTY # 2: Defendant Jennifer Helliwell MOVING PARTY # 3: Defendant Roy Esqueda MOVING PARTY # 4: Defendant Amanda Esqueda RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Alvaro Castellon NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : (1) An order setting aside the default entered against Defendant Joy Arrendondo on 5/1/24. (2) An order setting aside the default entered against Defendant Jennifer Helliwell on 5/1/24. (3) An order setting aside the default entered against Defendant Roy Esqueda on 5/1/24. (4) An order setting aside the default entered against Defendant Amanda Esqueda on 5/1/24. RULING : The motions are granted. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 8/10/23, Plaintiff Alvaro Castellon (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Roy Esqueda; Estate of Brenda Marie Perez; Amanda Esqueda; Jennifer Helliwell, Joy Arredondo and Does 1-50. On 9/14/23, Defendants Roy Esqueda, Amanda Esqueda, Jennifer Helliwell and Joy Arredondo (collectively, Defendants) filed an answer to the complaint. After taking the depositions of Defendants Jennifer Helliwell and Roy Esqueda, pursuant to Plaintiffs request, Defendants stipulated to Plaintiff filing a First Amended Complaint which added causes of action for conversion and fraud/concealment and included a claim for punitive damages. ( See 3/15/24 Stipulation and Order). Pursuant to the stipulation, Defendants had 30 days to respond to the First Amended Complaint after it was filed. Id . On 3/20/24, Plaintiff filed and served the First Amended Complaint. On 5/1/24, pursuant to Plaintiffs requests, separate defaults were entered against each of the Defendants. When Defendants counsel became aware of the defaults, a request was made to Plaintiff to stipulate to have the defaults set aside because they were the result of a calendaring error on the part of Defendants counsel. ( See Tran Decls.). Plaintiffs counsel failed to respond to the request. (Tran Decls.). Therefore, on 5/23/24, Defendants each filed a motion to have the default entered against them set aside. On 5/29/24, at the Case Management Conference, the Court advanced the hearings on the motions to 7/18/24 and the parties waived notice. ( See 5/29/24 Minute Order). Plaintiff has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motions. ANALYSIS Due to the attorney declarations of fault that accompany each motion and the fact that the motions were filed and served well within 6 months of the entry of default, relief is mandatory. See CCP 473(b); (Tran Decls.). CONCLUSION The motions are granted. Defendants Roy Esqueda, Amanda Esqueda and Joy Arredondo are ordered to separately file their Answer to the First Amended Complaint which is attached to each of their motions as Exhibit A. Defendant Jennifer Helliwell is ordered to reserve a hearing date for the demurrer and motion to strike attached to her motion as Exhibits A and B and file and serve such pleadings which indicate the reserved hearing date.

WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 24VECV00135 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 107 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES NORTHWEST DISTRICT Kristopher Lamberson, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dennis Schroeder, Defendant. Case Number Department 24VECV00135 107 COURTS [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Demurrer [THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE RULING IN THE ABOVE CASE]: Defendant Dennis Schroeder demurs to the first amended complaint brought by plaintiffs Kristopher Lamberson, Dante Santana, and Jordan Cox. This court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND On April 20, 2022, plaintiffs Kristopher Lamberson (Lamberson), Dante Santana (Santana), and Jordan Cox (Cox and, together with Lamberson and Santana, Plaintiffs) leased a property (the Property) from defendant Dennis Schroeder (Defendant and, together with Plaintiffs, Parties) by executing a lease agreement (the Lease). (FAC p. 2, 4.) The Lease expired on May 1, 2023, required a $50,000 security deposit, and called for monthly rent of $35,000. (Ibid.) On May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs vacated the Property, but Defendant did not return the security deposit to them. (Ibid.) Paragraph A of Section 35 of the Lease reads, in relevant part, Landlord and Tenant agree to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or any resulting transaction, before resorting to court action. Mediation fees, if any, shall be divided equally among the parties involved. If, for any dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, any party commences an action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate after a request has been made, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action. (Complaint Exh. 1.) The Lease identifies Defendant as Landlord and Plaintiffs, inter alios , as Tenant. ( Ibid .) On January 10, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint (the Complaint). On March, 19, 2024, Plaintiffs amended the Complaint and filed a first amended complaint (the FAC), which alleges causes of actions for (1) bad faith retention of a security deposit and (2) breach of contract. After Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, Defendants counsel sought to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel about the issues raised by the Demurrer and requesting voluntary dismissal in favor of mediation, which request Plaintiffs refused. (Jackson Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. D.) On May 21, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer (the Demurrer). On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition (the Opposition) to the Demurrer, to which Defendant replied on July 10, 2024. After Defendant brought the Demurrer, Plaintiffs e-mailed Defendant agreeing to move forward with mediation. (Gillick Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) Defendant e-mailed Plaintiffs the name of a preferred mediator, and Plaintiffs obtained that mediators availability. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs mistakenly forwarded the e-mail with the mediators availability to a non-existent e-mail address instead of to Defendant, and efforts to pursue mediation ceased. (Ibid.; Jackson Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs indicate that they are no longer willing to move forward with mediation. (Gillick Decl. ¶ 6.) II. PROCEDURAL MATTERS Timeliness of Filings Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.40, subdivision (a), a demurrer to a complaint should be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint. Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers should be filed at least 16 court days before they are set for hearing, oppositions thereto should be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies to any oppositions should be filed at least five court days before the set hearing. Judges have discretion as to whether to consider or strike an untimely demurrer or pleading. ( McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281; Tuck v. Thuesen (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 193, 196 (disapproved on other grounds by Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176).)¿¿¿ Plaintiffs filed a proof of service indicating that Defendant was personally served on May 3, 2024. We are satisfied that the Demurrer, the Opposition, and the reply are all timely. The Meet & Confer Requirement California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.41, subdivision (a) requires parties to meet and confer in good faith before the filing of a demurrer to attempt to informally resolve the objections raised in the demurrer.¿The demurring party is required to file and serve with the demurrer a declaration either confirming that parties were unable to resolve the issues raised by the demurrer despite having met and conferred or that the opposing party failed to meet and confer with the demurring party in good faith. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿430.41, subd. (a)(3).) Defendant filed with the complaint a declaration by his counsel indicating that parties met and conferred before the filing of the Demurrer but were unable to resolve the issues raised thereby. (Jackson Decl. ¶ 3.) We are satisfied that this requirement has been met. III. LEGAL STANDARD As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Ibid. ) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿A complaint is sufficient if it contains [a]¿statement¿of the¿facts¿constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿425.10(a)(1).) Under this standard, a complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)¿¿¿ [W]here the only issue litigated is covered by the arbitration clause, and where plaintiff has not first pursued or attempted to pursue his arbitration remedy, it should be held that (1) plaintiff has impliedly waived his right to arbitrate, such that defendant could elect to submit the matter to the jurisdiction of the court; (2) defendant may also elect to demur or move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust arbitration remedies; and (3) defendant may also elect to move for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration if defendant also moves to compel arbitration. ( Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (1971) 4 Cal.3d 888, 899, emphasis added.) Mediation provisions are interpreted according to the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. ( Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1518.) The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense. (Civil Code § 1644) We interpret the intent and scope of the agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made. ( Frei v. Davey , supra , at 1518, quoting Lloyd's Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc . (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 119798.) IV. DISCUSSION The Demurrer Defendant demurs to both causes of action in the FAC pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 430.10(a), (b) and/or (e) on the ground that the parties expressly agreed to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of [the Lease], or any resulting transaction, before resorting to court action, but Plaintiffs prematurely filed this action prior to engaging in required alternative dispute resolution. (Notice of Demurrer p. 2.) Parties disagree about whether the Lease mandates mediation before this action may be brought in this court. (Demurrer p. 5; Opposition p. 2.) Plaintiffs sole argument is that [m]ediation is a condition precedent to attorneys fees only. (Opposition p. 2.) We disagree. Plaintiffs interpretation of the Leases mediation provision is contrary to the plain meaning of its language. The Lease requires parties to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or any resulting transaction, before resorting to court action. The subsequent sentences in the mediation provision regarding attorneys fees add to Parties agreement to mediate; they do not create conditions precedent to it. Following Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 , supra , 4 Cal.3d 888 at 899, Defendant may demur to the FAC. Because both causes of action brought by the FAC arise between Parties, all of whom are parties to the Lease, out of the Lease, Plaintiffs were required by Section 35 of the Lease to pursue mediation before bringing this action. In other words, the only issues being litigated are covered by the mediation clause, and Plaintiffs have not first pursued or attempted to pursue mediation. Therefore, following Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 , supra , at 899, Defendant may (1) submit the matter to the jurisdiction of this court, (2) demur to the FAC, or (3) move to compel arbitration and a stay of proceedings. Defendant, by bringing the Demurrer, elects the second of its options. We recognize that Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 , supra , 4 Cal.3d 888 at 899 refers only to arbitration agreements and not to mediation agreements or generally to all alternative dispute resolution agreements. However, Plaintiffs do not raise this argument in the Opposition and have thus waived it. (See Assad v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1615 [stating that complete silence in an opposition to a motion, as to an issue, results in a waiver the right to argue the matter in trial court and on appeal].) Additionally, we are satisfied that courts generally treat arbitration agreements and mediation agreements similarly. We therefore consider Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 , supra , at 899 to be applicable to all alternative dispute resolution agreements. We also recognize that Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 , supra , 4 Cal.3d 888 at 899 only permits a defendant to demur to a complaint if the plaintiff has not pursued or attempted to pursue its alternative dispute resolution remedies. (Emphasis added.) However, Plaintiffs do not argue in the Opposition that the Demurrer should be overruled because they attempted to pursue mediation, and Plaintiffs therefore waive the argument. (See Assad v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co ., supra , 42 Cal.App.4th 1609 at 1615.) Additionally, we find Plaintiffs efforts to pursue mediation to be inadequate or non-existent. Plaintiffs were required by Section 35 of the Lease to have pursued mediation before bringing the Complaint, but all of Plaintiffs efforts to pursue mediation occurred after Defendant brought the Demurrer. Additionally, Plaintiffs mediation efforts consist of seeking Defendants preferred mediator and obtaining that mediators availability. Then, Plaintiffs never e-mailed the mediators availability to Defendant, and thereby ended mediation efforts. We do not find these efforts to amount to a real or significant attempt to pursue mediation. Leave to Amend Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) If there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.) If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment. ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Courts generally allow at least one time to amend a complaint, after sustaining a demurrer, even without any request for leave to amend. ( McDonald v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 297, 303.) While this is the first time a demurrer has been sustained in this action, we do not see any reasonable possibility that Plaintiffs failure to pursue mediation before bringing this action can be cured by amendment. Rather, to bring their claims, Plaintiffs must first pursue mediation, and only if and after these efforts fail may Plaintiffs pursue litigation. Accordingly, this court SUSTAINS the Demurrer without leave to amend. Dated: July 17, 2024 _______­­­­­­­­­­___________________________ Hon. Eric Harmon Judge of the Superior Court

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 23VECV05137 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: W ALLAN MARTIA, et al. vs S.B.S. TRUST DEED NETWORK (SBS), et al. demurrer to the cross-complaint of bryan russolesi and motion to strike Date of Hearing: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: None Set Department: W Case No.: 23VECV05137 BACKGROUND On November 16, 2023, Plaintiff Allan Martia and Knolton, Inc. filed a complaint against Defendants S.B.S. Trust Deed Network (SBS), Bryan Russolesi, Daymon Harris, Barbara Chiling, and Timothy Glasserand for (1) Violation of CC 2924.11 (d); (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (4) Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; (5) Interference with Contract; (6) Quiet Title. (7) Declaratory Relief; (8) Temporary and Permanent Injunction; (9) Fraud; (10) Wrongful foreclosure (threatening to wrongfully foreclose); and (11) Cancellation of Instrument. On January 22, 2024, Bryan Russolesi filed aCross-Complaint against Allan Martia, Knolton, Inc., and Reel West, Inc. for (1) Fraud; (2) Judicial Foreclosure; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Declaratory Relief. [Tentative] Ruling I. Defendant Knolton, Inc.s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint of Bryan Russolesi and Motion to Strike is OVERRULED II. Cross-Defendant Reel West, Inc.s Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint of Bryan Russolesi is OVERRULED. ANALYSIS I. DEFENDANT KNOLTON, INC.S DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT OF BRYAN RUSSOLESI AND MOTION TO STRIKE Defendant Knolton, Inc. demurs to the cross-complaint of Bryan Russolesi on the grounds Russolesis complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for fraud against Knolton, Inc. Defendant also moves to strike the cross-complaint on the grounds it was filed without leave of court. [1] Fraud Defendant Knolton, Inc. demurs to the fraud cause of action on the grounds Cross-Complainant has failed to allege specific facts as to the elements of fraud. The elements of fraud are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. ( Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Knolton, Inc. argues the fraud cause of action is a mashup of general conclusory allegations with no reference to any representation. For example, Paragraph 12 alleges Martia on behalf of himself and other cross defendants misrepresented that he intends to comply with his obligation under the amended note and deed of trust that Martia executed &, and Cross Complainant contends that Martia had breached the terms the terms of the note. There are no allegations that Knolton had anything to do with the alleged misrepresentation by Martia. Similarly, Martia conspired with other persons unknown at this time &, of their intent not to pay the principal sum and other payment required by the note and amendment. (XC ¶13.) Knolton contends there is no allegation it was a party to or responsible for the Secured Note nor are there allegations all the Cross-Defendants are deemed agents of each other or conspirators is not specific enough. The court finds the fraud cause of action in the cross-complaint is sufficiently alleged for the purposes of a demurrer. Russolesi alleges on April 2021, Martia, on behalf of himself and the Cross-Defendants, including Knolton, misrepresented to Russolesi that Martia would repay the principal sum that he borrowed from Russolesi and the other lenders that are named in the Secured Promissory Note dated April 22, 2021. (XC ¶6.) Russolesi also alleges in May 2023, Martia, again on behalf of Cross-Defendants, misrepresented that he intended to comply with his obligations under the Amendment to Secured Promissory Note dated April 1, 2023 (XC ¶12.) The complaint alleges Martia and all the Cross-Defendants, including Knolton, were agents of one another. (XC ¶5.) The complaint goes on to allege the Note, 2021 Deed of Trust, Amendment, and the misrepresentations of Martia regarding them were used and intended by Cross-Defendants to fraudulently induce Russolesi and the Beneficiaries into agreeing to loan Martia the Principal Sum, and to agree to the Note, 2021 Deed of Trust, and Amendment, and cause them to delay enforcing their remedies thereunder. (XC ¶13.) Russolesi claims these Cross-Defendants conspired among themselves to deceive and conceal the true facts regarding their intention not to pay. (XC ¶13.) This sufficiently alleges Knolton along with Martia and the other Cross-Defendants were agents and/or co-conspirators of one another for the purposes of a demurrer. Accordingly, the demurrer to the fraud cause of action is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Knolton argues the cross-complaint should be stricken in its entirety because he filed his answer on December 29, 2023 and his Cross-Complaint on January 22, 2023. However, the court agrees with Plaintiff that Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10 is applicable as to Knolton and therefore, Russolesi did not need to file his cross-complaint against Knolton at the same time he filed his answer to Martias complaint. If Martia wanted to strike the cross-complaint, then they could. i. CROSS-DEFENDANT REEL WEST, INC.S DEMURRER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF BRYAN RUSSOLESI Cross-Defendant Reel West, Inc. demurs to the cross-complaint of Cross-Complainant Bryan Russolesi on the grounds Russolesi failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of fraud. For the reasons stated above, the court finds Russolesis fraud allegations sufficient for the purposes of a demurrer.

Case Number: 23STCV12604 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING ANTHONY KIM vs. EUNICE J. BODAK Case No.: 23STCV12604 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Bodaks motion to set aside the entry of default is GRANTED. On 6/2/2023, Plaintiff Anthony Kim, in pro per, filed suit against Eunice J. Bodak, Sunok Ham Lee, Chares C. Yoo, Grace Eunhye Ryu, Wisdom Jeehye Ryu, alleging quiet title. On 6/14/2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against the same parties alleging the same claim. On 9/12/2023, Complainants Charles C. Yoo, Grace Eunhye Ryu, and Wisdom Jeehye Ryu filed a cross-complaint against Eunice J. Bodak, alleging: (1) abuse of process; (2) fraud; (3) indemnification; (4) equitable contribution; and (5) declaratory relief. On 1/18/2024, default was entered against Eunice J. Bodak (Bodak). Now, Bodak moves to set aside the entry of default. Discussion Bodak argues that default should be set aside because she was never actually served. In support, Bodak notes that the Proof of Service indicates personal service by the process server on 12/13/2023 at 6:10 pm. However, at the time of the alleged service, Bodak did not reside at the location where she was purportedly served. ( See Motion, Exh. 2.) Moreover, at the time of alleged service, she was living with her mother at her mothers residence as the conservator. Cross-Complainants filed a notice of no objection to this motion. Based on the foregoing, Bodaks motion to set aside the entry of default is granted. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 17, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF LORAN SIMON Notice And Plaintiff'S Motion To Compel Defendant 426 Fillmore Association'S Further Discovery Responses To Plaintiff'S Request For Production Of Documents, Set No. Two, And Request For Sanctions Hearing Required to address why a discovery referee should not be appointed in light of the number of pending discovery motions. Parties to meet and confer before 9:30 a.m. on July 17, 2024 regarding the appointment and selection of the referee. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.