Spectra Federal Credit Union V. Isaiah Hall

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 21SMCV01459 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The matter is MOOT because an amended answer was filed on July 2, 2024. Had it not been moot, the court would likely have sustained the demurrer, at least in large part.

Motion For Leave to File Motion for Summary Adjudication by REAL BOBS LLC vs ORANGE COAST ADVANTAGE TITLE INSURANCE CVPS2101103 TITLE COMPANY COMPANY, ORANGE COAST TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted at 10:00 a.m.

Case Number: 24STCV07546 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Shereka Stallworth, individually and as successor in interest for Lajune McGinnis, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24STCV07546 vs. Tentative Ruling Carl McGinnis, Jr., administrator of the Estate of Carl M. McGinnis aka Carl Michael McGinnis, Sr., et al. Defendants. Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Demurrer to Complaint Moving Party : Defendant Carl McGinnis, Jr., administrator of the Estate of Carl M. McGinnis Responding Party : Plaintiff Shereka Stallworth T/R : DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IS OVERRULED IN ITS ENTIRETY. DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply. BACKGROUND This is a breach of contract action. Plaintiff Shereka Stallworth, individually and as Successor in Interest for Lajune McGinnis filed a Complaint on March 26, 2024 alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of promise to make a will; (3) quasi-specific performance of contract to make a will; (4) constructive trust; and (5) equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment against Defendant Carl McGinnis, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Carl M. McGinnis aka Carl Michael McGinnis, Sr. Stallworth alleges she filed objections to Defendants petition for appointment as Administrator of the Estate of Carl Michael McGinnis, Sr. because she believed there was a new will. (Compl., ¶¶3-6.) She says her mother, Decedent LaJune Beason McGinnis was joint owner of the home at 21311 S. Perry St., Carson, CA 90745 and had a claim against the Estate of Decedent McGinnis, because he promised to leave the assets to Stallworth. She learned after Decedent McGinnis death that he did not comply with the terms of the agreement and had not executed an estate plan in her favor. ( Id. at ¶41.) ANALYSIS A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it. (CCP § 430.50(a).) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.) The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Id. at 732-33.) The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Id. at 733.) 1. Statute of Limitations Defendant demurs to all causes of actions alleged in the Complaint on the ground that Stallworths individual claims against Decedent Beason and on behalf of Decedent Beason are time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 339 and 366.3. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 339, An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing, except as provided in Section 2725 of the Commercial Code or subdivision 2 of Section 337 of this code, must be filed within two years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339.) Generally, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of breach, which then starts the limitations period running. ( Martini E Ricci Iamino S.P.A.--Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fruit Sales Co., Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2014) 30 F.Supp.3d 954, 974.) Under Code of Civil Procedure § 366.3, subdivision (a), If a person has a claim that arises from a promise or agreement with a decedent to distribution from an estate or trust or under another instrument, whether the promise or agreement was made orally or in writing, an action to enforce the claim to distribution may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply. (Code Civ. Proc., § 366.3(a).) The limitations period provided in this section for commencement of an action shall not be tolled or extended for any reason except as provided in Sections 12, 12a, and 12b of this code, and former Part 3 (commencing with Section 21300) of Division 11 of the Probate Code, as that part read prior to its repeal by Chapter 174 of the Statutes of 2008. ( Id. ) The Complaint alleges that Decedent McGinnis and Decedent Beason entered into an agreement that their estates would be left to Stallworth. (Compl., ¶20.) In October 2014, Decedent McGinnis and Decedent Beason promised to make a will devising their home to Stallworth based on her commitment to them. ( Id. at ¶¶23, 49.) Stallworth relied on these promises and in exchange continued to provide care and companionship to Decedent McGinnis and Decedent Beason. ( Id. at ¶¶27, 31, 52.) The Complaint also alleges that Decedent McGinnis reaffirmed his promise by drafting a legal zoom will on October 28, 2020. ( Id. at ¶¶31, 51.) After Decedent Beason died on October 9, 2020, Decedent McGinnis continued to reiterate his promise to Stallworth. ( Id. at ¶34.) These allegations would support Defendants contention that any claims against Decedent Beason would be time-barred. But Stallworth does not name Decedent Beason or her Estate as defendants in this action. The Complaint also does not allege that Decedent Beason breached an oral agreement; it alleges that Stallworth learned after Decedent McGinnis death, on April 6, 2023, that McGinnis did not complete his will and trust. (Compl., ¶41.) Plaintiffs individual claims are not time-barred. Her claims on behalf of her mother are not time-barred because, as discussed below, she has standing to bring them. 2. Standing McGinnis demurs to all causes of actions alleged in the Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff fails to establish standing to assert these claims on behalf of Decedent Beason. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30, A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest, subject to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate Code, and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30.) Section 377.32, in turn, requires a person who seeks to commence an action or proceeding or to continue a pending action or proceeding as the decedent's successor in interest file a declaration stating, among other things, (1) [n]o proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedent's estate, (2) the declarant is the decedent's successor in interest, and (3) [n]o other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding. ( Aghaian v. Minassian (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 603, 614.) The Complaint alleges that Stallworth sues as successor in interest to Decedent Beason, who died on October 9, 2020. (Compl., ¶9.) Although there is no indication that Decedent Beason died leaving a will, the Complaint also alleges that Decedent McGinnis died on April 6, 2023. ( Id. at ¶¶37, 41.) Even if Decedent Beason died intestate, as Defendant argues, Decedent McGinnis cannot be the successor in interest because he is also deceased. There is no indication that Decedent Beason had any other children or siblings, so a reasonable jury could infer that Stallworth is Decedent Beasons successor in interest. 3. First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Second Cause of Action for Breach of Promise to Make a Will Defendant demurs to the first and second causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs individual claims fail to state sufficient facts regarding the definite and certain terms of the alleged oral contract. Establishing that claim requires a showing of (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( DArrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.) Further, the complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. ( Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458459.) To be enforceable, a promise must be definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the assessment of damages. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 770; see also Cal. Prob. Code, § 21700(a)(4) [a contract to make a will can be established by Clear and convincing evidence of an agreement between the decedent and the claimant or a promise by the decedent to the claimant that is enforceable in equity].) The statutes of this state provide that a person may make a valid agreement in writing binding himself legally to make a particular disposition of his property by will. ( Goldstein v. Hoffman (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 803, 811.) However, [a] contract to make a will is breached only if it has not been complied with at the time of the promisor's death. ( Id. at 812.) The Complaint states sufficient facts to support the first and second causes of action. As discussed above, Stallworth alleges that in or about October 2014, Decedent McGinnis and Decedent Beason promised to make a will devising their home and estate to Stallworth based on her commitment to them. ( Id. at ¶¶23, 49.) In exchange for this promise she continued to provide care and companionship to Decedent McGinnis and Decedent Beason, including assistance with the home and necessities. ( Id. at ¶¶27, 31, 38, 52.) Decedent McGinnis reaffirmed his promise by drafting a legal zoom will on October 28, 2020. ( Id. at ¶¶31, 51.) After Decedent Beason died on October 9, 2020, Decedent McGinnis continued to reiterate his promise to Stallworth. ( Id. at ¶34.) A reasonable jury could infer these to be definite terms of an oral agreement. Stallworth alleges that Decedent McGinnis breached this agreement at the time of his death. ( Id. at ¶¶41, 44-45.) 4. Third Cause of Action for Quasi-Specific Performance of Contract to Make a Will and Fifth Cause of Action for Equitable Estoppel and Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to the third and fifth causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to plead detrimental reliance. An action of the type involved here has been called one for quasi specific performance of the contract to make a will. ( Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127, 130.) Since the making of a will cannot be compelled, there can be no specific performance of such a contract in the strict sense, but under certain circumstances equity will give relief equivalent to specific performance by impressing a constructie trust upon the property which decedent had promised to leave to plaintiff. ( Id. ) Even though Civil Code § 1624 requires that an agreement to make a provision by will be in writing, a party will be estopped from relying on the statute where fraud would result from refusal to enforce an oral contract. ( Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 409-410.) The doctrine of estoppel has been applied where an unconscionable injury would result from denying enforcement after one party has been induced to make a serious change of position in reliance on the contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's performance were allowed to invoke the statute. ( Id. ) The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. [Citation.] The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched. [Citation.] ( Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769.) Although Defendant contends that the third and fifth causes of action fail because Plaintiff does not allege detrimental reliance on Decedent McGinnis promises, detrimental reliance is not the only way to invoke equitable estoppel. Here, the Complaint states sufficient facts to support that Decedent McGinnis was unjustly enriched by Stallworths purported assistance, companionship, and financial support. (Compl., ¶¶27, 31, 38, 52.) 5. Fourth Cause of Action for Constructive Trust Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a valid claim on which the constructive trust remedy can be predicated. A constructive trust is an involuntary equitable trust created by operation of law as a remedy to compel the transfer of property from the person wrongfully holding it to the rightful owner. ( Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990.) The essence of the theory of constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment and to prevent a person from taking advantage of his or her own wrongdoing. ( Id. ) However, a constructive trust may only be imposed where the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that res; and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party who is not entitled to it. ( Id. ) As discussed above, the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support causes of action for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and breach of promise to make a will.

Case Number: 23STCV20484 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, vs. DANIEL RAY GONZALEZ, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV20484 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 18, 2024 On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, National Association filed this action against Defendant Daniel Ray Gonzalez as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Kim Gonzales. On May 28, 2024, the Court entered default judgment. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc so that the Judgment Debtors name can be corrected. (Motion at p. 1.) Counsel declares that [i]t has come to [her] attention that due to clerical error individually and was left out of Defendants name. (Ramirez-Browning Decl. ¶ 3.) The Estate has no funds because they were transferred to Gonzalez as personal representative. (Ramirez-Browning Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff contends that Gonzalez is personally responsible for the debts and should be included as an individual in the judgment so Plaintiff can pursue collection of the judgment. (Ramirez-Browning Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The Complaint does allege that Gonzalez is sued in his individual capacity, and also as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Kim Gonzales. (Complaint ¶ 2.) However, nowhere else was Gonzalez named in his individual capacity. The Complaints caption identifies the Defendants as DANIEL RAY GONZALEZ, as Personal Representative of ROBERT KIM GONZALES, Deceased, and DOES 1-20. Accordingly, summons issued for DANIEL RAY GONZALEZ, as Personal Representative of ROBERT KIM GONZALES, Deceased, and DOES 1-20. Plaintiff applied for service via publication and later filed a Proof of Publication that gave notice to DANIEL RAY GONZALEZ, as Personal Representative of ROBERT KIM GONZALES, Deceased, and DOES 1-20. Gonzalez was sued only as personal representative of the Estate. Gonzalez was never sued or served in his individual capacity. Adding him to the judgment in his individual capacity is not a correction of a mere clerical errorit is the addition of an entirely new defendant. [A] trial courts authority to amend its judgment nunc pro tunc is limited to correcting clerical errors in the judgment. ( Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1009.) Plaintiff may still be able to amend the judgment in other ways, such as by adding an alter ego of the original judgment debtor, but a nunc pro tunc amendment is not appropriate when this amendment is more than a mere clerical error. Accordingly, the motion to amend judgment is DENIED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 18th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV14534 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 SAMIR B. ARMALY, in his capacity as cotrustee of the Samir B. Armaly and Kelly R. Armaly Revocable Trust, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN L. GOODMAN, MATTHEW YANG, CHRIS CHOREBANIAN, individuals, and FIDARES GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV14534 Hearing Date: 7/16/24 Trial Date: N/A-Judgement entered on 2/14/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Judgment Creditor Samir B. Armalys Motion for Order Assigning Monies Due or Which Become Due Judgment Debtor Stephen L. Goodman Judgment Creditor Samir B. Armalys Motion for Order to Charge Members Interest in LLC Background Pleadings Framing Motion Plaintiff Samir Armaly (Armaly), in his capacity as cotrustee of the Samir B. Armaly and Kelly R. Armaly Revocable Trust (the Trust) sues Defendants Stephen L. Goodman (Goodman), Matthew Yang (Yang), Chris Chorebanian (Chorebanian), and Fidares Group, LLC (Fidares) pursuant to a June 22, 2022 First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging claims of (1) Breach of Contract and (2) Fraud. The claims arise from the following allegations. On February 20, 2020, Armaly, as trustee of the Trust, entered into a written agreement with Goodman, Yang, Chorebanian, Fidares, and three nonparty entities (collectively, the Buyers) (the Agreement). Goodman signed on his behalf and on behalf of the three nonparty entity Buyers, and Yang and Chorebanian signed on their own behalf and on behalf of Fidares. The purpose of the Agreement was for the Trust to loan $2 million to the Buyers in connection with a potential real-estate transaction involving the Insurance Exchange Building in downtown Los Angeles. The Agreement included a term pursuant to which the Buyers would indemnify Armaly for any breach of the agreement by any of the Buyers. The Agreement was amended at least twice to provide the Buyers with additional time to advance the real estate venture and make payments under the Agreements and its amendments, with the final amendment taking place in August 2020 (the August Amendment). Under that amendment, the Buyers were liable to the Trust in the amount of $2,607,500 in monies loaned to the Buyers. The Buyers failed to make payment under the August Amendment, prompting Armaly to send a demand letter to the Buyers on August 13, 2020. On August 28, 2020, Armaly entered into a partial settlement, specifically with the three entity Buyers, in the amount of $2,300,000, in exchange for a release of claims. The settlement reserved Armalys rights to pursue satisfaction against Defendants in this action for the outstanding obligations on the loan. Plaintiff prays for the difference between the loan and the settlement, i.e., $307,500, interest at a rate of 18% per annum, costs arising from Defendants breach of the Agreement and subsequent amendments, and attorneys fees and costs in drafting the amendments and prosecuting this action. On January 18, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of the FAC. On February 14, 2024, judgment was entered in Plaintiff Armalys favor and against Defendants in the amount of $537,611.39. Motions Before the Court On May 30, 2024, Judgment Creditor Armaly filed (1) a Motion for Assignment Order as to Judgment Debtor Stephen Goodman and (2) a Motion for Charging Order as to Defendant Stephen Goodmans interest in Improvement Network Investments LLC and Improvement Network Development Partners LLC (collectively referred to as the LLCs). No opposition has been filed as of July 15, 2024, despite proofs of service filed by moving party on May 30, 2024. Motion for Assignment Order Legal Standard CCP §708.510(a): Except as otherwise provided by law, upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor or to a receiver appointed pursuant to Article 7 (commencing with Section 708.610) all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments, including but not limited to: (1) Wages due from the federal government that are not subject to withholding under an earnings withholding order.(2) Rents.(3) Commissions.(4) Royalties.(5) Payments due from a patent or copyright.(6) Insurance policy loan value. (CCP §708.510(a).) CCP §708.510 states that the court may order the judgment debtor to assign rights to payments due. (CCP §708.510(a).) On its face, this language seems to indicate the court has no authority to order the assignment outright. Nonetheless, other provisions of the statutory scheme indicate the assignment may be ordered directly by the court. For example, the statutes contain language such as order an assignment, right to payment may be assigned, assignment of payments, order assigning the right to payments and reassignment of the right to payments. (CCP §§ 708.510(c),(d),(e) & (f), 708.530, 708.540, 708.560(b).) Construing all the applicable statutes together, it seems clear that the assignment order contemplated by CCP §708.510, et seq. must include a court order that assigns a right to payment outright (not simply an order directing the judgment debtor to do so). (Ahart, Cal. Prac. Guide Enf. J. & Debt. (Rutter Group 2005), ¶6:1422.) The court may only order the assignment of property to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment. (CCP § 708.510(d).) Assignable payment rights include commissions and royalties. (CCP §708.510(a)(3).) In determining whether an assignment order should issue, the Court should consider (1) the reasonable requirements of a judgment debtor who is a natural person and any dependents on the judgment debtor (2) other payments the judgment debtor must make in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments (3) the amount remaining to be due on this judgment and (4) the amount of the right to payment that is being assigned to creditor. (CCP §708.510(c).) Judgment debtor is entitled to claim that all or part of the right to payment is exempt from enforcement of a money judgment. (CCP §708.550(a).) However, judgment debtor must do so by noticed motion at least three days before the hearing on the assignment order application. (CCP §708.550(a).) The motion for exemption must be personally served. (CCP §708.550(b).) Failure to make a timely claim waives any claim of exemption. (CCP §708.550(a).) In conjunction with or after an application for assignment order is made, a judgment creditor may seek a restraining order preventing the judgment debtor from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right assigned to creditor under CCP §708.510. (CCP §708.520(a).) This may issue upon showing of need of the order and the court may require creditor to post an undertaking. (CCP §708.520(b).) Finally, the order restraining transfer of the assigned right must be served on the judgment debtor and the notice must explain that failure to comply may subject the judgment debtor to contempt of court. (CCP §708.520(c).) Motion for Assignment Order : GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Judgment Creditor requests an order assigning any and all payments (1) due to Judgment Debtor from Improvement Networks LLC, and Improvement Network Development Partners LLC (the LLCs), (2) any persons or entities paying rent or lease monies to Judgment Debtor, and (3) any persons or entities from which persons or entities debtor is owed deferred compensation, back pay, or payments on any Accounts or general intangibles as defined in the California Commercial Code and any person or entities, whether named in the order or not, which person or entity creditor comes to believe are paying monies to Judgment Debtor, no matter how such payments are characterized, and which person or entity is served with the assignment order. Judgment creditors request for an assignment order as to all payments due to Judgment Debtor Stephen Morgan from the LLCs is granted. As of May 6, 2024, there is a valid, outstanding judgment against Morgan in the amount of $444,302, after Judgment Debtors other than Goodman made a $105,000 payment. (Armaly Dec., ¶5.) Judgment Creditor also submits evidence indicating that Morgan holds membership interests in the LLCs. (Armaly Dec., Ex. 1.) However, Judgment Creditors request for an assignment order is denied as to (1) any persons or entities paying rent or lease monies to Judgment Debtor, and (2) any persons or entities from which persons or entities debtor is owed deferred compensation, back pay, or payments on any Accounts or general intangibles as defined in the California Commercial Code and any person or entities, whether named in the order or not, which person or entity creditor comes to believe are paying monies to Judgment Debtor, no matter how such payments are characterized, and which person or entity is served with the assignment order. This portion of the requested order fails to specifically identify any individual or entity that is subject to the proposed order. While CCP §708.510 does not specify that the obligator or payments must be identified, a debtor could not assert a claim of exemption without such information. CCP §708.550(a) allows a judgment debtor to file a claim of exemption to an assignment order based on an affidavit setting forth all information required under CCP §703.520(b). (CCP §708.550(a).) The debtor must file a noticed motion asserting an exemption at least three days before the hearing date on the motion for assignment order. (CCP §708.550(a).) Section 703.520(b) also requires that the debtor identify the property subject to the proposed assignment order that would be exempt. (CCP §703.520(b).) Without identifying an individual, entity or specific right to payment from an individual or entity, Judgment Debtor cannot assert a claim of exemption. Judgment Creditors Motion for Assignment Order is GRANTED as to any rights of payment due Judgment Debtor Goodman from the LLCs and DENIED as to (1) any persons or entities paying rent or lease monies to Judgment Debtor, and (2) any persons or entities from which persons or entities debtor is owed deferred compensation, back pay, or payments on any Accounts or general intangibles as defined in the California Commercial Code and any person or entities, whether named in the order or not, which person or entity creditor comes to believe are paying monies to Judgment Debtor, no matter how such payments are characterized, and which person or entity is served with the assignment order. Motion for Charging Order Legal Standard According to CCP §708.310, If a money judgment is rendered against a partner or member but not against the partnership or limited liability company, the judgment debtors interest in the partnership or limited liability company may be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment by an order charging the judgment debtors interest pursuant to Section 15673, 16504 and 17302 of the Corporations Code. (CCP §708.310.) Corporations Code §17302(a) provides [o]n application by a judgment creditor of a member or of a member's assignee, a court having jurisdiction may charge the assignable membership interest of the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment. The court may appoint a receiver of the share of the distributions due or to become due to the judgment debtor in respect to the limited liability company and may make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries that the judgment debtor might have made or that the circumstances of the case may require. (Corp. C. §17302(a).) The court may order foreclosure on a debtor's LLC interest at any time. The purchaser at a foreclosure sale has the rights of an assignee. (Corp. C. §17302(b).) Motion for Charging Order: GRANTED. Judgment Creditor requests a charging order as to Judgment Debtor Goodmans membership interest in the LLCs. There is an outstanding judgment against Goodman in the amount of $444,302. (Armaly Dec., ¶5.) Goodman identified a 12.5% membership interest in Improvement Network Investments and a 20% interest in Improvement Development Partners on his personal financial statement submitted as part of the underlying loan transaction. (Armaly Dec., ¶3.) Judgment Creditors Motion for Charging Order as to Goodmans membership interests in the LLCs is GRANTED. Conclusion Judgment Creditors Motion for Assignment Order is GRANTED as to any rights of payment due Judgment Debtor Goodman from the LLCs and DENIED as to (1) any persons or entities paying rent or lease monies to Judgment Debtor, and (2) any persons or entities from which persons or entities debtor is owed deferred compensation, back pay, or payments on any Accounts or general intangibles as defined in the California Commercial Code and any persons or entities, whether named in the order or not, which person or entity creditor comes to believe are paying monies to Judgment Debtor, no matter how such payments are characterized, and which person or entity is served with the assignment order. Judgment Creditors Motion for Charging Order as to Goodmans membership interests in the LLCs is GRANTED.

MEMBERS 1ST VS. ESTATE OF SMITH, ET AL. Case Number: CVG21-0000494 This matter is on calendar for review of the case. The Court notes that the matter is on calendar on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 23 for hearing on a Motion to Approve Stipulation for Judgment Entered in Civil Case and Approval of Motion to Affix Attorney’s Fees as an Element of Costs in Civil Judgment. The July 22, 2024 hearing is confirmed. A future review hearing will be calendared on July 22, 2024. Today’s review hearing is dropped from calendar. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

S-CV-0051818 Navarro, Maria et al vs. Pinedo, Eugenio et al ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Eugenio, Pinedo; Socorro, PInedo