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Filing # 143127552 E-Filed 02/02/2022 11:39:22 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
MARK P. STOPA,
Plaintiff
CASE NO: 2019-CA-8558-Cl
Vv,
MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC and
STEPHEN J. DIBERT,
Defendants.
/
M FI-MIAMI HOLDING
—— ——S, LLC.’S ETN
VERIFIE
—— D MOTION ITV
TO STRIKE
STRIKE SAN
—— SHAM PLEADING
PLEADING
COMES NOW, MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC. pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.150(a) and
(b) and moves to strike the entire Complaint located at Docket Entry # 2 — dated 12/31/2019,
and in support of this Verified Motion to Strike Sham Pleading state as follows:
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF BROWARD )
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Stephen J. Dibert, both
individually and as the former President and Registered Agent of MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC,
who, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1, Stephen J. Dibert, individually and as President/Registered Agent of the now-defunct
corporation of MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC.., verify the truth of all the information contained in
the attached previous filings located as Docket Entry # 5 & # 6 (Attached to this Motion to
Strike Sham Pleading as Exhibit A) and am making these statements based upon my
personal knowledge of these matters with the intent that the trial court rely upon them as
being true, under penalty of perjury.
1 | also swear or affirm to the following facts:
a, MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC is not a proper party to this litigation because all blog
posts were done by me individually (as previously verified) and | have
personally been dismissed from this litigation by the Plaintiff.
***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 02/02/2022 11:39:22 AM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY***
Any blog posts that were posted by me personally regarding the trials and
tribulations of Mr. Stopa and his fall from grace including his disbarment were
done prior to me creating the corporate entity called MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC.
Complaints to the Florida Bar about Mr. Stopa began in 2015 and ended on
September 26, 2019, when he was permanently disbarred by the Florida
Supreme Court.
MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC. was not created as a business entity until
October 2019 — long after my blog posts citing to major news outlets like the
Tampa Bay Tribune, were posted online.
At no time relevant to the events alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint has MFI-Miami
Holdings, LLC ever been used by me to “hold” anything.
MFI-MAIMI HOLDINGS, LLC. never had a bank account, did not obtain an EIN
number from the Federal Government and although listed as a corporation with
the State of Florida, never conducted any business in the State of Florida.
Although I was originally intending to use this company as a true holding
company, I never used it in this way. Instead, | allowed it to administratively
dissolve because it had no useful business purpose after it was wrongfully sued
by the Plaintiff in this case.
As the Registered Agent of MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC., | was never served by
process server. Instead, Plaintiff filed a service document that clearly and
unequivocally states that a female named “Diane Persten Owner of UPS Store”
was served with the Complaint.
Diane Persten has never been affiliated in any way with my now defunct
company, MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC.
WHEREFORE, MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC asks this Honorable Court to Strike the
Plaintiffs Complaint after declaring it a sham; enter an order of summary judgment on the
merits on behalf of MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC and to conduct any additional proceedings
regarding these matters as may be just and proper.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Dated February 1, 2022.
SS
seae
LLL
Stéphen Dibert
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF BROWARD )
Sworn, acknowledged and witnessed before me on this 1* day of February 2022.
BRENDA C. FAGUNDES
ao Notary Public - State of Fiorida
Commission = HH 040577
._ hy Comm. Expires Sep 8, 2024
[Not! Signature:
My commission Expires;Scotemter o8-24 Printed Name: re naa c- Fagundes
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served via
email to markpstopa@gmail.com this 1** day of February 2022.
Samantha Stevins
Samantha Stevins, Esq.
e-mail: stevinslawfirm@gmail.com
2681 Airport Road South, Suite C-104
Naples, Florida 34112
Phone (239) 300-4417
Filing # 104165501 E-Filed 03/02/2020 12:52:28 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
Civil Division
MARK P. STOPA,
Plaintiff,
ve Case No. 19-008558-CI
MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC AND
STEPHEN J. DIBERT
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN J. DIBERT
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF BROWARD )
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Stephen J. Dibert,
who, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1 T am over the age of twenty-one and have personal knowledge of the information set
forth in this Affidavit. Iam competent to testify to the matters stated herein.
Iam a citizen of Florida residing in Palm Beach County, Florida.
I have never resided in Pinellas County, Florida.
Tam a named Defendant in the above referenced lawsuit.
lam the sole owner of MFI Miami Holdings, LLC.
MFI-Miami Holdings was incorporated in Broward County, FL on 10/15/2019
MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC has no ownership interest of the website https mfi-
miami.com/.
Exhibit A
***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 03/02/2020 12:52:28 PM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY***
8. Ido not have a physical office located in Pinellas County, Florida.
9. I control the content on the website of https://mfi-miami.com/.
10. I have not posted any content to that website from Pinellas County, Florida.
11. https://mfi-miami.com/ is hosted in the State of Utah not Pinellas County, Florida.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Dated: 3/2/2020
a
yy _
ct ge phwa pe cca
soe
Sieg n J. Dibert
STATE OF FLORIDA
) ss.
COUNTY OF Brawveca
Acknowledged by before me on the 2nd day of March, 2020.
Signature: Notarg! Bw FC
Printed name: (Je y.21 3 farshe.
Notary Public, State of Florida, County of
98a, DAVID J. PERSTEN
og
My commission expires: Matiz Q Jove MY COMMISSION # FF 962277
2,
Ssx EXPIRES: May 9, 2020
Acting in the County of Boo Wart Pepe Bonded Thru Budget Notary Services
Filing # 104164752 E-Filed 03/02/2020 12:45:40 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
Civil Division
MARK P. STOPA,
Plaintiff,
ve Case No. 19-008558-CI
MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC AND
STEPHEN J. DIBERT
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO
TRANSFER VENUE
Defendant Stephen J. Dibert, Pro Se, (“Defendant”) files this Motion to Dismiss or
Alternatively Motion to Transfer Venue pursuant to Rule 1.140(b)(3), Rule 1.40(b)(6), and Rule
1.060(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as well as Fla. Stat. § 768.295, to respectfully
move this Court to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Mark P. Stopa (“Plaintiff and/or
“Stopa”) for improper venue, for filing a suit prohibited by Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, and
for failure to state a cause of action, or, alternatively, to transfer venue of this action to the
Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida.
Defendant MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC, was not an active entity until October 15, 2019
and therefore could not be a named party for actions prior to October 15, 2019 as claimed by
Plaintiff. See attached Exhibit A as proof of formation of MFI Holdings, LLC.
In support of this Motion, Defendant Dibert states as follows:
***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 03/03/2020 11:46:19 AM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY***
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As alleged in his Complaint, Plaintiff is a former attorney who has been permanently
disbarred. Complaint {7 and Exhibit B “Disbarment Order” dated September 26, 2019.
Defendant’s website contains several blogs referencing Plaintiff as stated in Complaint 15.
One such blog post contains a portion of a Tampa Bay Times article which described the
Florida’s Bar decision to seek the immediate emergency suspension of Plaintiff for appearing
“to be causing great harm” to the public by continuing to practice law. The Tampa Bay Times
article is attached as Exhibit C. Defendant’s website provided a link to the Tampa Bay Times
article. Plaintiff has filed the instant complaint asserting a single count under Florida Statute
§ 540.08 “Unauthorized publication of name or likeness”, alleging Plaintiff is entitled to royalty
payments for articles discussing his ethical violations.
Between December 31, 2019 and January 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed fifteen lawsuits in
Pinellas County. This shotgun approach to filing complaints appears to be Plaintiffs attempt to
harass those that posted on their websites the fact that Plaintiff had disciplinary proceedings against
him recommending disbarment. The facts are Plaintiff's office was raided, Plaintiff's former law
firm did file for bankruptcy and Plaintiff was disbarred. Defendant suspects that Plaintiff is
motivated to use this Court in an attempt to collect monies from those posting stories about Stopa’s
downfall on blogs is due to the failed marketing and lack luster sales of Plaintiff's recent book,
“People v Money”. Plaintiff's lawsuits are also an attempt to silence Defendant’s rights of free
speech as protected under the Frist Amendment. The complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the
1 People v. Money website states “This book is the biggest expose on the judicial system of our lifetime, revealing
how corrupt judges aligned with big business for their own benefit, to the detriment of millions.of Americans they
were elected to serve”. One would assume that Plaintiff has now had a change of heart in that he files his complaint
in the court where he claims the judges are corrupt.
The Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be sought as
Defendant did not use Plaintiff's name or story to “directly promote” a product or service and an
exemption pursuant to Florida Statute 504.08(4)(a) permits Defendant’s publication of material
having a current and legitimate public interest.
ARG T
I The Complaint Should be Dismissed or Transferred Due to Improper Venue
Pursuant to Rule 1.140(b)(3) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to move to
dismiss an action based on the defense of improper venue. Florida. Statute § 47.011 clearly states,
“Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action
accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Florida Statute § 47.051 also provides:
“Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or
usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or
where the property in litigation is located. "Fla. Stat. § 47.051.
The burden is on the plaintiff of alleging facts in the complaint to demonstrate that the action
was filed in the proper venue. Woodson Elec. Sols., Inc. v. Port Royal Prop., LLC, 271 So.3d 111,
113-14 Fla. 3rd DCA 2019) (citing Drucker v. Duvall, 61 So.3d 468, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).
Defendant in this instant case contests that Plaintiff choice of venue is correct. Thereby challenging
Plaintiffs choice of venue of Pinellas County. There is no property in litigation located in Pinellas
County as Plaintiff's claims are based on the blogs of Defendant. As the blogs occupy the “space”
on the internet, there is no fixed location that can be claimed as the residence or property of the
internet to exist exclusively anywhere let alone Pinellas County. Defendant has no office or
residence located in Pinellas County nor did any cause of action arise in Pinellas County.
Defendant's website is hosted out of Maricopa County, Arizona.
The burden is now on Plaintiff to establish why filing the complaint in Pinellas County is
correct when Defendant does not reside in Pinellas County; when Defendant does not have an
office in Pinellas County; when there is no physical property that is being litigated in Pinellas
County and/or; when the claimed “action” did not occur Pinellas County. Plaintiff is claiming
“damage” via blogs that occupy space via the internet, not a physical place such as Pinellas County.
If the Court does find that Plaintiffs Complaint is with merit, which Defendant denies, then
venue must transfer to where Defendant resides in Palm Beach County or where MFI-Miami is
located. In this case, Broward County. Fla Rule of Civil Procedure 1.060 addresses the issue of
improper venue:
(b) Wrong Venue. When any action is filed laying venue in the wrong
county, the court may transfer the action ...to the proper court in any
county where it might have been brought in accordance with the venue
statutes. When the venue might have been laid in 2 or more counties, the
person bringing the action may select the county to which the action is
transferred, but if no such selection is made, the matter shall be determined
by the court.
FlaR. Civ. P. 1.060(b). This rule grants the court authority to transfer a case when improper venue
is sought; and transfer, rather than dismissal, is the preferred remedy in such a case. Bush v. State,
945 So. 2d 1207, 1214 (Fla. 2006). Therefore, if the Court agrees venue is improper and does not
decide to dismiss the action, Defendant moves this Court in the alternative to transfer this matter
to Broward County.
IL Plaintiff's Complaint is Prohibited by the Anti-SLAPP? Statute and the Failure to State
Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
In 2015, Florida’s Legislature’s expanded the state’s anti-SLAPP provisions allowing courts
procedure tools to throw out lawsuits early if primarily used to attack comment on public matters.
The 2015 law extends SLAPP to cover private plaintiffs suits and specified speech activities. As
a background, SLAPPs are legal actions brought against concerned citizens, bloggers, journalists,
businesses, and other entities involved in speaking out on issues of concern to the public. In these
suits, the plaintiff sues a speaker alleging defamation or other civil wrong not for the purpose of
pursuing a case for damages but, rather with the primary motivation to intimidate the target into
silence by the sheer burden and expense of having to defend the lawsuit. If the target or others are
silenced because of the lawsuit, the plaintiff “wins” in attacking defendant’s First Amendment
tights of free speech and the consequence is a limited or warped debate on an issue of public
concern. The purpose of anti-SLAPP laws is clear, to stop abusive lawsuits brought to chill speech.
Florida’s current anti-SLAPP statute prohibits the filing of any suit or claim “against another
person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue . . . as protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and s. 5, Art. I of the State Constitution.” Fla Stat.
§ 768.295(3). It is Florida’s public policy that persons “not engage in SLAPP suits because
such actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of
free speech in connection with public issues.” Fla. Stat § 768.295(1). In enacting the statute,
it was the intent of the Legislature that these types of lawsuits be expeditiously disposed of
? SLAPPs is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
5
by the Courts. “[T]he point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not be dragged
through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights”. WPB Residents for
Integrity in Gov't, Inc. v. Materio, No 4D1 9-967, at *2 (Fla. 4 DCA Oct. 30, 2019) (quoting
People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4" 1315, 1317).
Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4) allows a SLAPP defendant to “move the court for an order
dismissing the action”. In interpreting the statute and the policies behind it, the second district
has held that a motion to dismiss brought under the anti-SLAPP statute requires the trial court
to do more than accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in favor of the claimant. Gundel v. A VHomes, Inc., 264 So. 3d at 314.
The SLAPP defendant bears the initial burden to set forth a prima facie case that the anti-SLAPP
statute applies then the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the claims are not primarily
based on First Amendment rights in connection with a public issue and not without merit in
considering the motion to dismiss.
The instant complaint must be dismissed as Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to show both
that his claim is not primarily based on First Amendment rights in connection with a public
issue and that his claim is not without merit.
Defendant is a “blogger” and in Florida, bloggers are considered to be on the same
platform as journalists and thereby they are held to the same standards. In an Opinion dated
April 11, 2014, the Appellate Court for the Fifth District of Florida in Comins v. Vanboorhis,
135 So. 3d 545 stated the following:
“The advent of the internet as a medium and the emergence of the blog as a means of free
dissemination of news and public comment have been transformative . . . the impact of blogs
has been so great that even terms traditionally well defined and understood in journalism are
changing as journalists increasingly employ the tools and techniques of bloggers — and vice
versa.”
Plaintiff is not pursing Defendant for libel meaning that Defendant has not stated anything
that was not true on his website. Defendant’s posts included his opinion which cannot be
considered defamatory. Plaintiff is not claiming defamation as “public figures” have a higher
burden of proof in cases of defamation and, by his own admission on the website for his book,
Plaintiff claims himself as a public figure. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that any
statement was made with actual malice.
Disbarred attorney Stopa is basing his frivolous claim on Fla Stat § 540.08. However, that
claim is without merit. Plaintiff makes a claim for damages under Fla Stat § 540.08
(Complaint at 412 and 419) claiming that Defendant published articles about Plaintiff on the
MFI-Miami website (Complaint at 415). § 540.08 states that no person shall publish, print,
display or otherwise publicly use for any advertising purpose the name of any natural person
without express written or oral consent EXCEPT the publication or use of the name of any
person in any newspaper, news broadcast or other news medium or publication as part of any
bona fide news report having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name is
not used for advertising purposes. Clearly the information posted on Defendant’s website are
protected by his right to free speech and the issue is a “public issue”.
The legitimate public interest served by Defendant’s website is to provide information to
the public of an attorney that holds himself out to be a defender of homeowners against
foreclosure when in fact the attorney was being investigated by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement and the Court. The court ultimately permanently disbarred Plaintiff. The
information as to the disbarment action and the allegations made as to Plaintiff's failures to
keep his clients informed among other allegations were all publicly available. Defendant
posted publicly available information on his website regarding Plaintiff as well as adding his
personal commentary which is protected under his right to free speech.
The facts provided in Defendant’s blog about the downfall of Plaintiff were culled from
the Tampa Bay Times wherein a link was provided in the blog. Plaintiff doesn’t make a
similar claim against the Tampa Bay Times as that entity has the wherewithal to aggressively
push back against Plaintiff's frivolous claim. What Plaintiff is attempting to do is force those
he has sued to take down their posts about Plaintiff as a means of taking the path of least
resistance. In his attempt to peddle his book to the masses, Plaintiff is attempting to eradicate
any bad press about him even if that “press” is factual. Plaintiff is using this Court as a
machine gun which to take down anyone who has written any negative comments on blogs
that could be viewed by potential purchasers of his book.
Plaintiff, as a disbarred attorney, claims to submit his complaint as a pro se litigant yet he
includes in his signature block the name of a law firm, i.e. Segal & Schuh Law Group, P.L.
Plaintiff muddies his claim as a pro se litigant by using a law firm as his address when Plaintiff
is not an attorney at that firm nor has that firm entered its appearance on Plaintiff's behalf.
Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 2.515(b), a pro se litigant “shall sign any
document and state the party’s address and telephone number, including area code.” Plaintiff
has failed to comply with the very basic rules of civil procedure by failing to include his
address in the signature block.
Plaintiff further obfuscates the situation as to his status as a disbarred attorney by leaving
his website on the internet available for view that states his is an attorney at the Stopa Law
Firm. That link can be found here: http://www.stopalawfirm.com/markstopa.htm. Plaintiff is
advertising as a practicing attorney in Florida at a time when the Florida judiciary has permanently
disbarred him. Plaintiff appears to be attempting to engage in the unauthorized practice of law as
he is a disbarred attorney in Florida.
Plaintiff's website peddling his book “People v Money” states that Stopa is “both famous and
infamous in the Florida legal community — a hero and a villain, depending on whom you ask”.
Plaintiff makes claims of “corrupt judges [that] conspired against me, hoping their false attacks
would silence me, conceal their bad acts” and “instead these corrupt actors emboldened me to dig
deeper, work harder, and reveal more”. See https://peoplevmoneybook.com/.
What is clear is that this disbarred, disgraced attorney is attempting to re-write history in his
attempt to wipe the internet clean of any blogs that have reported and commented on his fall from
grace so that he can sell more books. Plaintiff cannot quantify any damages suffered by the posting
of facts on Defendant’s website. Any damages suffered by Plaintiff were cause by Plaintiff's own
actions that led to his disbarment. It is time for Plaintiff to act like an adult, take responsibility of
his actions and recognize that his downfall and demise was due to his own actions; his posting on
social media; his filings in court and; his interviews with media outlets.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion to
dismiss this action with prejudice or in the alternative transfer venue of this action to the Circuit
Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District for Broward County, Florida and grant Defendant such
further relief as this Court deems just.
Dated: March 2, 2020
Respectfully Submitted
LF
eee
-Stephe: A Dib
265 South Federal Highway
Deerfield Beach, FL 33441
(561) 317-9978
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed on
March 2, 2020 to Mark P. Stopa c/o Segal & Schuh Law Group, P.L., 18167 U.S. Highway
19 North, Suite 100, Clearwater, FL 33764 and at markstopa@gmail.com.
LEEOe ma
5
oe hey Pibert
10
Exhibit 4
3/1/2020 Detail
by Entity Name
Diviston oF ConPorarions
ng
{song \. . ae
Depatimentof State ! Division of Corporations / Search Records / Dela 8y Document Number /
Detail by Entity Name
Florida Limited Liability Company
MFL-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC
Filing Information
Document Number L1s000259142
FEVEIN Number NONE
Date Filed 10/15/2019
Effective Date 40/10/2019
State FL
Status ACTIVE
Ponelpal Address
265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY
#279
DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 3341
Mailing Address.
265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY
#279
DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 3341
‘Registered
Agent Name & Address
DIBERT, STEPHEN J
265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279
DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33441
Authorized Person(s) Detail
Name
& Address
Title MGR:
DIBERT, STEPHEN J
265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279
DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33441
Annual Reports
No Annual Reports Filed
Document images:
40/15/2019
— Florida Limited Liability View image
in PDF format
ara 0 orn at,
search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/CorporationSearch/SearchResultDetail
?inquirytype=EntityName&direction Type=tnitial&searchNameOrder=MFIMIAMIHOLDI... Ww"
Exhibit B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THE FLORIDA BAR, Supreme Court Case
No. SC-
Complainant,
The Florida Bar File
Vv. Nos. 2015-10,414 (6C)
2015-10,633 (6C)
MARK P. STOPA, 2015-10,755 (6C)
2016-10,066 (6C)
Respondent.
/
COMPLAINT
The Florida Bar, Complainant, files this Complaint against Mark P. Stopa,
Respondent, pursuant to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and alleges:
1 Respondent is, and at all times mentioned in the Complaint was,
member of The Florida Bar, admitted on April 23, 2002, and is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida.
2. The Sixth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee “C” found probable
cause to file this Complaint, pursuant to Rule 3-7.4, of the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar, and this Complaint has been approved by the presiding member of
that committee.
COUNT I: TFB FILE NO. 2015-10,414 (6C)
3 Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
4 Respondent represented the defendants in the foreclosure matter,
Morequity, Inc. v. De La Cruz, et al., Case No. 51-2010-CA-003602-ES, in the
Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County, Florida.
5 On August 11, 2014, the court issued an Order Setting Non-Jury Trial
and Pre-Trial Conference, setting the pre-trial for September 24, 2014, and non-
jury trial for October 21, 2014. The order directed that counsel must attend the
hearings in person.
6. On or about October 20, 2014, Respondent filed a Petition for Writ of
Prohibition with the Second District Court of Appeal (Second D.C.A.) in case no.
2D14-4882.
7 By order dated October 21, 2014, the Second D.C.A. denied the
Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
8 On October 21, 2014, Respondent failed to appear for the trial or
contact the court to explain his absence.
9 Respondent advised the Bar that he was unaware at the time that the
Second D.C.A. had denied the Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
10. In another case, Respondent represented the defendants in the
foreclosure matter, Fed. Nat’! Mortgage Ass’n v. Gagnon, et al., Case No. 51-
2013-CA-000176-WS, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County,
Florida.
11. On August 22, 2014, the court issued its Order Setting Non-Jury Trial
and Pre-Trial Conference, setting the pre-trial for October 30, 2014, and the non-
jury trial for November 13, 2014.
12. The order directed counsel to attend the hearings in person, and to
immediately notify the court in the event of settlement and submit a stipulation for
an order of dismissal and a final disposition form.
13. Prior to the pre-trial conference, Respondent’s firm reached a
settlement with opposing counsel and the pre-trial conference was removed from
Respondent’s calendar.
14. On October 30, 2014, Respondent failed to appear for the pre-trial
conference or explain his absence.
15. Respondent failed to immediately notify the court of the settlement
pursuant to the court’s order so that any pending hearings could be canceled.
16. Respondent knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal in violation of Rule 4-3.4(c), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
17. In another case, Respondent represented the defendants in the
foreclosure matter, CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Baker, et al., Case No. 2012-CA-008976-
NC, in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota County, Florida, before the
Honorable Nancy Kane Donnellan.
18. On November 25, 2014, Judge Donnellan removed Respondent from
the courtroom for disrespectful and disruptive behavior in the Baker matter.
19. Respondent’s conduct included, but was not limited to, lecturing the
Judge and opposing counsel on procedure, throwing his arms up when the Judge
ruled in a manner contrary to Respondent’s wishes, arguing with the Judge on
multiple occasions after the Judge made a ruling in the case, and turning his back
on the Judge to make a proffer on the record after the Judge ruled against him.
20. On November 26, 2014, Respondent returned to the Judge’s
courtroom for another matter.
21. The bailiff approached Respondent in the hallway and advised him
that loud and disrespectful behavior would not be tolerated.
22. Respondent became agitated and the bailiff removed Respondent from
the courthouse.
23. Additionally, the Honorable Thomas M. Gallen, a Senior Circuit
Judge in Manatee County, Florida, voluntarily recused himself from all cases
involving Respondent due to Respondent’s abusive and disruptive behavior toward
the judiciary and others in the courtroom.
24, On one occasion, Judge Gallen ordered the sheriff's deputy to escort
Respondent out of the courtroom as a result of Respondent’s statements impugning
Judge Gallen’s character, and loud outbursts towards individuals in the courtroom.
25. Respondent engaged in conduct in connection with the practice of law
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 4-8.4(d),
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
26. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel: A lawyer must not knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal); and Rule 4-8.4(d) (Misconduct: A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice).
COUNT II: 2015-10,633 (6C)
27. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
28. On June 11, 2012, Maria G. Said retained Respondent to defend her in
her foreclosure matter, Bank of America v. Said, et al., Case No. 2011-CA-011635-
O, in the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Orange County, Florida.
29. Respondent charged and collected a $1,575 non-refundable yearly fee
from Ms. Said for the representation in 2012, 2013, and 2014.
30. By Order dated July 17, 2014, the court ordered the defendants to file
an Answer within ten (10) days.
31. Respondent failed to file an Answer within ten (10) days.
32. On or about August 12, 2014, opposing counsel filed a motion for
default requesting the entry of an order of judicial default against Ms. Said.
33. On or about August 15, 2014, Respondent filed an Answer on behalf
of Ms. Said.
34, By Order dated September 12, 2014, the court scheduled a non-jury
trial in the matter for November 17, 2014.
35. In October 2014, Respondent charged and collected an additional
$3,500 for the trial from Ms. Said.
36. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Said until November
2014.
37. On or about November 13, 2014, counsel for Bank of America
advised Respondent of its offer for a cash-for-keys settlement in the amount of
$15,000, in exchange for Ms. Said’s consent to final judgment. The offer also
extended the foreclosure sale date by 120 days.
38. On or about November 13, 2014, Bank of America filed a motion to
continue the trial due to their extended review of foreclosure matters in order to
comply with National Mortgage Settlement.
39. On November 14, 2014, Respondent advised Ms. Said of Bank of
America’s cash-for-keys settlement offer, and gave Ms. Said 30 minutes to decide
whether to accept or reject the offer.
40. Respondent failed to advise Ms. Said of the motion to continue trial.
41. As a result, Ms. Said believed that the trial was going forward on
Monday, November 17, 2014, if she did not agree to the offer.
42. Respondent failed to give Ms. Said an adequate amount of time to
consider her options, and she reluctantly accepted the cash-for-keys offer.
43. By letter dated November 13, 2014, the Bank of America Home Loan
Team notified Respondent that they were sending information to him to provide to
his client. A letter directed to Ms. Said from Bank of America was attached which
stated that she was approved to start a trial period plan for a new loan assistance
program which included a significant forgiveness of principal and an affordable
monthly payment. To accept the trial plan, the first trial payment had to be
received by December 1, 2014.
44. Respondent failed to inform Ms. Said of the November 13, 2014,
letter or that she was approved to start a trial period plan for a loan modification.
45. Also on November 14, 2014, counsel for Bank of America followed
up with Respondent’s office regarding its offer to modify Ms. Said’s home loan.
The terms of the modification offer including lowering Ms. Said’s monthly home
loan payment, interest rate, and loan principal balance.
46. Respondent failed to advise Ms. Said of Bank of America’s loan
modification offer.
47. Respondent directed his office to proceed with the $15,000 cash-for-
keys offer without first consulting with Ms. Said about the loan modification offer.
48. On November 14, 2014, Respondent’s office advised counsel for
Bank of America that Ms. Said would like to proceed with the cash-for-keys offer
and not the loan modification.
49. Respondent proposed to retain $4,000 as his attorney’s fee from the
$15,000 cash-for-keys settlement.
50. Respondent did not communicate his proposed fee to Ms. Said.
51. Respondent and his office falsely led Ms. Said to believe that the
cash-for-keys offer from Bank of America was for $11,000 total.
52. On November 14, 2014, Respondent, on behalf of Ms. Said, executed
a Stipulated Consent to the Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure with Bank of
America’s counsel.
53. On November 17, 2014, the court entered its final judgment of
foreclosure.
34. Despite multiple requests by Ms. Said, Respondent’s office failed to
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information regarding the
settlement.
55. On December 9, 2014, the court entered a Notice of Sale, scheduling
the foreclosure sale for January 20, 2015.
56. In January 2015, after receiving notice that Ms. Said was terminating
Respondent’s representation, counsel for Bank of America communicated with Ms
Said, at which time Ms. Said first learned about the loan modification offer.
57. Counsel for Bank of America informed Ms. Said that when the Bank
received notification from Respondent that Ms. Said did not want a loan
modification, the Bank extended another offer.
58. Contrary to Respondent’s representation, Ms. Said did want a loan
modification.
59. On January 15, 2015, counsel for Bank of America filed a motion to
vacate the final judgment of foreclosure stating that subsequent to the entry of final
judgment plaintiffs counsel received an email from Ms. Said’s counsel which
indicated that the settlement may not have been authorized or agreed to by Ms.
Said, and as such, plaintiff requested that the final judgment of foreclosure be
vacated and the case be reset for trial.
60. Thereafter, Respondent withdrew as Ms. Said’s counsel, and Ms. Said
negotiated with Bank of America on her own.
61. Respondent directed Ms. Said to sign a release discharging
Respondent from all claims arising from Respondent’s representation to get her
$3,500 trial fee refunded.
62. Ms. Said refused to sign Respondent’s release.
63. In February 2015, after Ms. Said filed her complaint with the Bar,
Respondent refunded Ms. Said’s $3,500 trial fee.
64. Respondent failed to abide by his client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, and failed to reasonably consult with the client as to
the means by which they were to be pursued in violation of Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4,
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
65. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing Ms. Said in violation of Rule 4-1.3, Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar.
66. Respondent failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent was required in
violation of Rule 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
67. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of
Representation); Rule 4-1.3 (Diligence); and Rule 4-1.4 (Communication).
COUNT Hl: 2015-10,755 (6C)
68. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference
69. On August 5, 2013, Rosalie A. Coyne retained Respondent to defend
her in her foreclosure matter, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coyne, et al., Case No.
12-012799-CI, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida.
10
70. Respondent charged and collected a $1,575 fee for the first year of
representation.
71. Ms. Coyne was led to believe by Respondent’s staff that Respondent’s
representation would entail negotiating a loan modification on her behalf.
72. Respondent did not attempt to negotiate a loan modification for Ms.
Coyne.
7B. Respondent never met with or spoke to Ms. Coyne, despite her
repeated attempts to speak with Respondent.
74. In September 2014, Ms. Coyne gave Respondent six (6) post-dated
checks, each in the amount of $275, representing Respondent’s fee for the
following year. Ms. Coyne stopped payment on the last two (2) checks because
she believed Respondent was not acting in her best interests.
75. In January 2015, Ms. Coyne communicated with Respondent’s office
that it was her intention to keep the property.
76. Respondent’s office advised Ms. Coyne not to appear for the
foreclosure trial scheduled for February 13, 2015.
77. Unbeknownst to Ms. Coyne, on February 12, 2015, Respondent and
his associate, attorney Christopher Hixson, contacted counsel for Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), and agreed to settle the foreclosure case.
ll
78. The terms of the settlement agreement included waiving a deficiency
judgment, extending the foreclosure sale date for 60 days, and a cash-for-keys
payment of $1,500.
79. Mr. Hixson instructed counsel for Wells Fargo that the $1,500 cash-
for-keys payment was to go to the firm and not the homeowner, Ms. Coyne.
80. Respondent never communicated with Ms. Coyne about the terms of
the settlement agreement.
81. Respondent falsely advised Wells Fargo’s attorney that Ms. Coyne
was unable to sign the settlement paperwork, but that she had agreed to the terms
of the settlement agreement.
82. Respondent misrepresented to opposing counsel that he was
authorized to sign on Ms. Coyne’s behalf.
83. Thereafter, Respondent executed a Settlement Agreement and
Consent to Entry of Foreclosure Judgment with Wells Fargo on Ms. Coyne’s
behalf on February 12, 2015.
84. Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of Rule 4-8.4(c), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
85. Additionally, Respondent ordered Mr. Hixson’s conduct or, with
knowledge thereof, ratified Mr. Hixson’s conduct.
12
86. On February 13, 2015, counsel for Wells Fargo appeared at trial and
advised the presiding judge that the parties had settled.
87. On February 13, 2015, Ms. Coyne also appeared at trial; however,
Respondent did not appear.
88. Ms. Coyne discovered that Respondent had settled her case without
her authorization, and that she had 60 days to vacate her home.
89. Ms. Coyne rejected the settlement agreement at trial, and attempted to
reach Respondent during the trial, but was unsuccessful.
90. Ms. Coyne terminated Respondent’s representation during the trial,
and proceeded to negotiate with the bank on her own.
91. Respondent failed to abide by his client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, and failed to reasonably consult with the client as to
the means by which they were to be pursued in violation of Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4,
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
92. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing Ms. Coyne in violation of Rule 4-1.3, Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar.
93. Respondent failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent was required in
violation of Rule 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
13
94. Respondent engaged in conduct in connection with the practice of law
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 4-8.4(d),
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
95. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of
Representation); Rule 4-1.3 (Diligence); Rule 4-1.4 (Communication); Rule 4-
8.4(c) (Misconduct: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 4-8.4(d) (Misconduct: A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice).
COUNT IV: 2016-10,066 (6C)
96. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
97. On March 31, 2015, April 1, 2015, and April 2, 2015, Process Server
Michelle Howard unsuccessfully attempted to effectuate service of two subpoenas
upon Respondent at his office in the matter Aurora Loan Services, LLC v.
Decoursy, et al., Case No. 08-
Preview
Filing # 143127552 E-Filed 02/02/2022 11:39:22 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA MARK P. STOPA, Plaintiff CASE NO: 2019-CA-8558-Cl Vv, MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC and STEPHEN J. DIBERT, Defendants. / M FI-MIAMI HOLDING —— ——S, LLC.’S ETN VERIFIE —— D MOTION ITV TO STRIKE STRIKE SAN —— SHAM PLEADING PLEADING COMES NOW, MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC. pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.150(a) and (b) and moves to strike the entire Complaint located at Docket Entry # 2 — dated 12/31/2019, and in support of this Verified Motion to Strike Sham Pleading state as follows: STATE OF FLORIDA ) COUNTY OF BROWARD ) BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Stephen J. Dibert, both individually and as the former President and Registered Agent of MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC, who, after being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1, Stephen J. Dibert, individually and as President/Registered Agent of the now-defunct corporation of MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC.., verify the truth of all the information contained in the attached previous filings located as Docket Entry # 5 & # 6 (Attached to this Motion to Strike Sham Pleading as Exhibit A) and am making these statements based upon my personal knowledge of these matters with the intent that the trial court rely upon them as being true, under penalty of perjury. 1 | also swear or affirm to the following facts: a, MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC is not a proper party to this litigation because all blog posts were done by me individually (as previously verified) and | have personally been dismissed from this litigation by the Plaintiff. ***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 02/02/2022 11:39:22 AM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY*** Any blog posts that were posted by me personally regarding the trials and tribulations of Mr. Stopa and his fall from grace including his disbarment were done prior to me creating the corporate entity called MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC. Complaints to the Florida Bar about Mr. Stopa began in 2015 and ended on September 26, 2019, when he was permanently disbarred by the Florida Supreme Court. MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC. was not created as a business entity until October 2019 — long after my blog posts citing to major news outlets like the Tampa Bay Tribune, were posted online. At no time relevant to the events alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint has MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC ever been used by me to “hold” anything. MFI-MAIMI HOLDINGS, LLC. never had a bank account, did not obtain an EIN number from the Federal Government and although listed as a corporation with the State of Florida, never conducted any business in the State of Florida. Although I was originally intending to use this company as a true holding company, I never used it in this way. Instead, | allowed it to administratively dissolve because it had no useful business purpose after it was wrongfully sued by the Plaintiff in this case. As the Registered Agent of MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC., | was never served by process server. Instead, Plaintiff filed a service document that clearly and unequivocally states that a female named “Diane Persten Owner of UPS Store” was served with the Complaint. Diane Persten has never been affiliated in any way with my now defunct company, MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC. WHEREFORE, MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC asks this Honorable Court to Strike the Plaintiffs Complaint after declaring it a sham; enter an order of summary judgment on the merits on behalf of MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC and to conduct any additional proceedings regarding these matters as may be just and proper. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated February 1, 2022. SS seae LLL Stéphen Dibert STATE OF FLORIDA ) COUNTY OF BROWARD ) Sworn, acknowledged and witnessed before me on this 1* day of February 2022. BRENDA C. FAGUNDES ao Notary Public - State of Fiorida Commission = HH 040577 ._ hy Comm. Expires Sep 8, 2024 [Not! Signature: My commission Expires;Scotemter o8-24 Printed Name: re naa c- Fagundes CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served via email to markpstopa@gmail.com this 1** day of February 2022. Samantha Stevins Samantha Stevins, Esq. e-mail: stevinslawfirm@gmail.com 2681 Airport Road South, Suite C-104 Naples, Florida 34112 Phone (239) 300-4417 Filing # 104165501 E-Filed 03/02/2020 12:52:28 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA Civil Division MARK P. STOPA, Plaintiff, ve Case No. 19-008558-CI MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC AND STEPHEN J. DIBERT Defendants. AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN J. DIBERT STATE OF FLORIDA ) COUNTY OF BROWARD ) BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Stephen J. Dibert, who, after being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1 T am over the age of twenty-one and have personal knowledge of the information set forth in this Affidavit. Iam competent to testify to the matters stated herein. Iam a citizen of Florida residing in Palm Beach County, Florida. I have never resided in Pinellas County, Florida. Tam a named Defendant in the above referenced lawsuit. lam the sole owner of MFI Miami Holdings, LLC. MFI-Miami Holdings was incorporated in Broward County, FL on 10/15/2019 MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC has no ownership interest of the website https mfi- miami.com/. Exhibit A ***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 03/02/2020 12:52:28 PM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY*** 8. Ido not have a physical office located in Pinellas County, Florida. 9. I control the content on the website of https://mfi-miami.com/. 10. I have not posted any content to that website from Pinellas County, Florida. 11. https://mfi-miami.com/ is hosted in the State of Utah not Pinellas County, Florida. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Dated: 3/2/2020 a yy _ ct ge phwa pe cca soe Sieg n J. Dibert STATE OF FLORIDA ) ss. COUNTY OF Brawveca Acknowledged by before me on the 2nd day of March, 2020. Signature: Notarg! Bw FC Printed name: (Je y.21 3 farshe. Notary Public, State of Florida, County of 98a, DAVID J. PERSTEN og My commission expires: Matiz Q Jove MY COMMISSION # FF 962277 2, Ssx EXPIRES: May 9, 2020 Acting in the County of Boo Wart Pepe Bonded Thru Budget Notary Services Filing # 104164752 E-Filed 03/02/2020 12:45:40 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA Civil Division MARK P. STOPA, Plaintiff, ve Case No. 19-008558-CI MFI-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC AND STEPHEN J. DIBERT Defendants. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Defendant Stephen J. Dibert, Pro Se, (“Defendant”) files this Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion to Transfer Venue pursuant to Rule 1.140(b)(3), Rule 1.40(b)(6), and Rule 1.060(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as well as Fla. Stat. § 768.295, to respectfully move this Court to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Mark P. Stopa (“Plaintiff and/or “Stopa”) for improper venue, for filing a suit prohibited by Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, and for failure to state a cause of action, or, alternatively, to transfer venue of this action to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. Defendant MFI-Miami Holdings, LLC, was not an active entity until October 15, 2019 and therefore could not be a named party for actions prior to October 15, 2019 as claimed by Plaintiff. See attached Exhibit A as proof of formation of MFI Holdings, LLC. In support of this Motion, Defendant Dibert states as follows: ***ELECTRONICALLY FILED 03/03/2020 11:46:19 AM: KEN BURKE, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, PINELLAS COUNTY*** STATEMENT OF FACTS As alleged in his Complaint, Plaintiff is a former attorney who has been permanently disbarred. Complaint {7 and Exhibit B “Disbarment Order” dated September 26, 2019. Defendant’s website contains several blogs referencing Plaintiff as stated in Complaint 15. One such blog post contains a portion of a Tampa Bay Times article which described the Florida’s Bar decision to seek the immediate emergency suspension of Plaintiff for appearing “to be causing great harm” to the public by continuing to practice law. The Tampa Bay Times article is attached as Exhibit C. Defendant’s website provided a link to the Tampa Bay Times article. Plaintiff has filed the instant complaint asserting a single count under Florida Statute § 540.08 “Unauthorized publication of name or likeness”, alleging Plaintiff is entitled to royalty payments for articles discussing his ethical violations. Between December 31, 2019 and January 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed fifteen lawsuits in Pinellas County. This shotgun approach to filing complaints appears to be Plaintiffs attempt to harass those that posted on their websites the fact that Plaintiff had disciplinary proceedings against him recommending disbarment. The facts are Plaintiff's office was raided, Plaintiff's former law firm did file for bankruptcy and Plaintiff was disbarred. Defendant suspects that Plaintiff is motivated to use this Court in an attempt to collect monies from those posting stories about Stopa’s downfall on blogs is due to the failed marketing and lack luster sales of Plaintiff's recent book, “People v Money”. Plaintiff's lawsuits are also an attempt to silence Defendant’s rights of free speech as protected under the Frist Amendment. The complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the 1 People v. Money website states “This book is the biggest expose on the judicial system of our lifetime, revealing how corrupt judges aligned with big business for their own benefit, to the detriment of millions.of Americans they were elected to serve”. One would assume that Plaintiff has now had a change of heart in that he files his complaint in the court where he claims the judges are corrupt. The Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be sought as Defendant did not use Plaintiff's name or story to “directly promote” a product or service and an exemption pursuant to Florida Statute 504.08(4)(a) permits Defendant’s publication of material having a current and legitimate public interest. ARG T I The Complaint Should be Dismissed or Transferred Due to Improper Venue Pursuant to Rule 1.140(b)(3) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to move to dismiss an action based on the defense of improper venue. Florida. Statute § 47.011 clearly states, “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Florida Statute § 47.051 also provides: “Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. "Fla. Stat. § 47.051. The burden is on the plaintiff of alleging facts in the complaint to demonstrate that the action was filed in the proper venue. Woodson Elec. Sols., Inc. v. Port Royal Prop., LLC, 271 So.3d 111, 113-14 Fla. 3rd DCA 2019) (citing Drucker v. Duvall, 61 So.3d 468, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Defendant in this instant case contests that Plaintiff choice of venue is correct. Thereby challenging Plaintiffs choice of venue of Pinellas County. There is no property in litigation located in Pinellas County as Plaintiff's claims are based on the blogs of Defendant. As the blogs occupy the “space” on the internet, there is no fixed location that can be claimed as the residence or property of the internet to exist exclusively anywhere let alone Pinellas County. Defendant has no office or residence located in Pinellas County nor did any cause of action arise in Pinellas County. Defendant's website is hosted out of Maricopa County, Arizona. The burden is now on Plaintiff to establish why filing the complaint in Pinellas County is correct when Defendant does not reside in Pinellas County; when Defendant does not have an office in Pinellas County; when there is no physical property that is being litigated in Pinellas County and/or; when the claimed “action” did not occur Pinellas County. Plaintiff is claiming “damage” via blogs that occupy space via the internet, not a physical place such as Pinellas County. If the Court does find that Plaintiffs Complaint is with merit, which Defendant denies, then venue must transfer to where Defendant resides in Palm Beach County or where MFI-Miami is located. In this case, Broward County. Fla Rule of Civil Procedure 1.060 addresses the issue of improper venue: (b) Wrong Venue. When any action is filed laying venue in the wrong county, the court may transfer the action ...to the proper court in any county where it might have been brought in accordance with the venue statutes. When the venue might have been laid in 2 or more counties, the person bringing the action may select the county to which the action is transferred, but if no such selection is made, the matter shall be determined by the court. FlaR. Civ. P. 1.060(b). This rule grants the court authority to transfer a case when improper venue is sought; and transfer, rather than dismissal, is the preferred remedy in such a case. Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1214 (Fla. 2006). Therefore, if the Court agrees venue is improper and does not decide to dismiss the action, Defendant moves this Court in the alternative to transfer this matter to Broward County. IL Plaintiff's Complaint is Prohibited by the Anti-SLAPP? Statute and the Failure to State Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted In 2015, Florida’s Legislature’s expanded the state’s anti-SLAPP provisions allowing courts procedure tools to throw out lawsuits early if primarily used to attack comment on public matters. The 2015 law extends SLAPP to cover private plaintiffs suits and specified speech activities. As a background, SLAPPs are legal actions brought against concerned citizens, bloggers, journalists, businesses, and other entities involved in speaking out on issues of concern to the public. In these suits, the plaintiff sues a speaker alleging defamation or other civil wrong not for the purpose of pursuing a case for damages but, rather with the primary motivation to intimidate the target into silence by the sheer burden and expense of having to defend the lawsuit. If the target or others are silenced because of the lawsuit, the plaintiff “wins” in attacking defendant’s First Amendment tights of free speech and the consequence is a limited or warped debate on an issue of public concern. The purpose of anti-SLAPP laws is clear, to stop abusive lawsuits brought to chill speech. Florida’s current anti-SLAPP statute prohibits the filing of any suit or claim “against another person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue . . . as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and s. 5, Art. I of the State Constitution.” Fla Stat. § 768.295(3). It is Florida’s public policy that persons “not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of free speech in connection with public issues.” Fla. Stat § 768.295(1). In enacting the statute, it was the intent of the Legislature that these types of lawsuits be expeditiously disposed of ? SLAPPs is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. 5 by the Courts. “[T]he point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights”. WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov't, Inc. v. Materio, No 4D1 9-967, at *2 (Fla. 4 DCA Oct. 30, 2019) (quoting People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4" 1315, 1317). Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4) allows a SLAPP defendant to “move the court for an order dismissing the action”. In interpreting the statute and the policies behind it, the second district has held that a motion to dismiss brought under the anti-SLAPP statute requires the trial court to do more than accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the claimant. Gundel v. A VHomes, Inc., 264 So. 3d at 314. The SLAPP defendant bears the initial burden to set forth a prima facie case that the anti-SLAPP statute applies then the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the claims are not primarily based on First Amendment rights in connection with a public issue and not without merit in considering the motion to dismiss. The instant complaint must be dismissed as Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to show both that his claim is not primarily based on First Amendment rights in connection with a public issue and that his claim is not without merit. Defendant is a “blogger” and in Florida, bloggers are considered to be on the same platform as journalists and thereby they are held to the same standards. In an Opinion dated April 11, 2014, the Appellate Court for the Fifth District of Florida in Comins v. Vanboorhis, 135 So. 3d 545 stated the following: “The advent of the internet as a medium and the emergence of the blog as a means of free dissemination of news and public comment have been transformative . . . the impact of blogs has been so great that even terms traditionally well defined and understood in journalism are changing as journalists increasingly employ the tools and techniques of bloggers — and vice versa.” Plaintiff is not pursing Defendant for libel meaning that Defendant has not stated anything that was not true on his website. Defendant’s posts included his opinion which cannot be considered defamatory. Plaintiff is not claiming defamation as “public figures” have a higher burden of proof in cases of defamation and, by his own admission on the website for his book, Plaintiff claims himself as a public figure. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that any statement was made with actual malice. Disbarred attorney Stopa is basing his frivolous claim on Fla Stat § 540.08. However, that claim is without merit. Plaintiff makes a claim for damages under Fla Stat § 540.08 (Complaint at 412 and 419) claiming that Defendant published articles about Plaintiff on the MFI-Miami website (Complaint at 415). § 540.08 states that no person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for any advertising purpose the name of any natural person without express written or oral consent EXCEPT the publication or use of the name of any person in any newspaper, news broadcast or other news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name is not used for advertising purposes. Clearly the information posted on Defendant’s website are protected by his right to free speech and the issue is a “public issue”. The legitimate public interest served by Defendant’s website is to provide information to the public of an attorney that holds himself out to be a defender of homeowners against foreclosure when in fact the attorney was being investigated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Court. The court ultimately permanently disbarred Plaintiff. The information as to the disbarment action and the allegations made as to Plaintiff's failures to keep his clients informed among other allegations were all publicly available. Defendant posted publicly available information on his website regarding Plaintiff as well as adding his personal commentary which is protected under his right to free speech. The facts provided in Defendant’s blog about the downfall of Plaintiff were culled from the Tampa Bay Times wherein a link was provided in the blog. Plaintiff doesn’t make a similar claim against the Tampa Bay Times as that entity has the wherewithal to aggressively push back against Plaintiff's frivolous claim. What Plaintiff is attempting to do is force those he has sued to take down their posts about Plaintiff as a means of taking the path of least resistance. In his attempt to peddle his book to the masses, Plaintiff is attempting to eradicate any bad press about him even if that “press” is factual. Plaintiff is using this Court as a machine gun which to take down anyone who has written any negative comments on blogs that could be viewed by potential purchasers of his book. Plaintiff, as a disbarred attorney, claims to submit his complaint as a pro se litigant yet he includes in his signature block the name of a law firm, i.e. Segal & Schuh Law Group, P.L. Plaintiff muddies his claim as a pro se litigant by using a law firm as his address when Plaintiff is not an attorney at that firm nor has that firm entered its appearance on Plaintiff's behalf. Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 2.515(b), a pro se litigant “shall sign any document and state the party’s address and telephone number, including area code.” Plaintiff has failed to comply with the very basic rules of civil procedure by failing to include his address in the signature block. Plaintiff further obfuscates the situation as to his status as a disbarred attorney by leaving his website on the internet available for view that states his is an attorney at the Stopa Law Firm. That link can be found here: http://www.stopalawfirm.com/markstopa.htm. Plaintiff is advertising as a practicing attorney in Florida at a time when the Florida judiciary has permanently disbarred him. Plaintiff appears to be attempting to engage in the unauthorized practice of law as he is a disbarred attorney in Florida. Plaintiff's website peddling his book “People v Money” states that Stopa is “both famous and infamous in the Florida legal community — a hero and a villain, depending on whom you ask”. Plaintiff makes claims of “corrupt judges [that] conspired against me, hoping their false attacks would silence me, conceal their bad acts” and “instead these corrupt actors emboldened me to dig deeper, work harder, and reveal more”. See https://peoplevmoneybook.com/. What is clear is that this disbarred, disgraced attorney is attempting to re-write history in his attempt to wipe the internet clean of any blogs that have reported and commented on his fall from grace so that he can sell more books. Plaintiff cannot quantify any damages suffered by the posting of facts on Defendant’s website. Any damages suffered by Plaintiff were cause by Plaintiff's own actions that led to his disbarment. It is time for Plaintiff to act like an adult, take responsibility of his actions and recognize that his downfall and demise was due to his own actions; his posting on social media; his filings in court and; his interviews with media outlets. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion to dismiss this action with prejudice or in the alternative transfer venue of this action to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District for Broward County, Florida and grant Defendant such further relief as this Court deems just. Dated: March 2, 2020 Respectfully Submitted LF eee -Stephe: A Dib 265 South Federal Highway Deerfield Beach, FL 33441 (561) 317-9978 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE J HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed on March 2, 2020 to Mark P. Stopa c/o Segal & Schuh Law Group, P.L., 18167 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 100, Clearwater, FL 33764 and at markstopa@gmail.com. LEEOe ma 5 oe hey Pibert 10 Exhibit 4 3/1/2020 Detail by Entity Name Diviston oF ConPorarions ng {song \. . ae Depatimentof State ! Division of Corporations / Search Records / Dela 8y Document Number / Detail by Entity Name Florida Limited Liability Company MFL-MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC Filing Information Document Number L1s000259142 FEVEIN Number NONE Date Filed 10/15/2019 Effective Date 40/10/2019 State FL Status ACTIVE Ponelpal Address 265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279 DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 3341 Mailing Address. 265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279 DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 3341 ‘Registered Agent Name & Address DIBERT, STEPHEN J 265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279 DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33441 Authorized Person(s) Detail Name & Address Title MGR: DIBERT, STEPHEN J 265 SOUTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY #279 DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 33441 Annual Reports No Annual Reports Filed Document images: 40/15/2019 — Florida Limited Liability View image in PDF format ara 0 orn at, search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/CorporationSearch/SearchResultDetail ?inquirytype=EntityName&direction Type=tnitial&searchNameOrder=MFIMIAMIHOLDI... Ww" Exhibit B IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, Supreme Court Case No. SC- Complainant, The Florida Bar File Vv. Nos. 2015-10,414 (6C) 2015-10,633 (6C) MARK P. STOPA, 2015-10,755 (6C) 2016-10,066 (6C) Respondent. / COMPLAINT The Florida Bar, Complainant, files this Complaint against Mark P. Stopa, Respondent, pursuant to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and alleges: 1 Respondent is, and at all times mentioned in the Complaint was, member of The Florida Bar, admitted on April 23, 2002, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida. 2. The Sixth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee “C” found probable cause to file this Complaint, pursuant to Rule 3-7.4, of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and this Complaint has been approved by the presiding member of that committee. COUNT I: TFB FILE NO. 2015-10,414 (6C) 3 Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 4 Respondent represented the defendants in the foreclosure matter, Morequity, Inc. v. De La Cruz, et al., Case No. 51-2010-CA-003602-ES, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County, Florida. 5 On August 11, 2014, the court issued an Order Setting Non-Jury Trial and Pre-Trial Conference, setting the pre-trial for September 24, 2014, and non- jury trial for October 21, 2014. The order directed that counsel must attend the hearings in person. 6. On or about October 20, 2014, Respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Second District Court of Appeal (Second D.C.A.) in case no. 2D14-4882. 7 By order dated October 21, 2014, the Second D.C.A. denied the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. 8 On October 21, 2014, Respondent failed to appear for the trial or contact the court to explain his absence. 9 Respondent advised the Bar that he was unaware at the time that the Second D.C.A. had denied the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. 10. In another case, Respondent represented the defendants in the foreclosure matter, Fed. Nat’! Mortgage Ass’n v. Gagnon, et al., Case No. 51- 2013-CA-000176-WS, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County, Florida. 11. On August 22, 2014, the court issued its Order Setting Non-Jury Trial and Pre-Trial Conference, setting the pre-trial for October 30, 2014, and the non- jury trial for November 13, 2014. 12. The order directed counsel to attend the hearings in person, and to immediately notify the court in the event of settlement and submit a stipulation for an order of dismissal and a final disposition form. 13. Prior to the pre-trial conference, Respondent’s firm reached a settlement with opposing counsel and the pre-trial conference was removed from Respondent’s calendar. 14. On October 30, 2014, Respondent failed to appear for the pre-trial conference or explain his absence. 15. Respondent failed to immediately notify the court of the settlement pursuant to the court’s order so that any pending hearings could be canceled. 16. Respondent knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal in violation of Rule 4-3.4(c), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 17. In another case, Respondent represented the defendants in the foreclosure matter, CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Baker, et al., Case No. 2012-CA-008976- NC, in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota County, Florida, before the Honorable Nancy Kane Donnellan. 18. On November 25, 2014, Judge Donnellan removed Respondent from the courtroom for disrespectful and disruptive behavior in the Baker matter. 19. Respondent’s conduct included, but was not limited to, lecturing the Judge and opposing counsel on procedure, throwing his arms up when the Judge ruled in a manner contrary to Respondent’s wishes, arguing with the Judge on multiple occasions after the Judge made a ruling in the case, and turning his back on the Judge to make a proffer on the record after the Judge ruled against him. 20. On November 26, 2014, Respondent returned to the Judge’s courtroom for another matter. 21. The bailiff approached Respondent in the hallway and advised him that loud and disrespectful behavior would not be tolerated. 22. Respondent became agitated and the bailiff removed Respondent from the courthouse. 23. Additionally, the Honorable Thomas M. Gallen, a Senior Circuit Judge in Manatee County, Florida, voluntarily recused himself from all cases involving Respondent due to Respondent’s abusive and disruptive behavior toward the judiciary and others in the courtroom. 24, On one occasion, Judge Gallen ordered the sheriff's deputy to escort Respondent out of the courtroom as a result of Respondent’s statements impugning Judge Gallen’s character, and loud outbursts towards individuals in the courtroom. 25. Respondent engaged in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 4-8.4(d), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 26. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel: A lawyer must not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal); and Rule 4-8.4(d) (Misconduct: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). COUNT II: 2015-10,633 (6C) 27. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 28. On June 11, 2012, Maria G. Said retained Respondent to defend her in her foreclosure matter, Bank of America v. Said, et al., Case No. 2011-CA-011635- O, in the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Orange County, Florida. 29. Respondent charged and collected a $1,575 non-refundable yearly fee from Ms. Said for the representation in 2012, 2013, and 2014. 30. By Order dated July 17, 2014, the court ordered the defendants to file an Answer within ten (10) days. 31. Respondent failed to file an Answer within ten (10) days. 32. On or about August 12, 2014, opposing counsel filed a motion for default requesting the entry of an order of judicial default against Ms. Said. 33. On or about August 15, 2014, Respondent filed an Answer on behalf of Ms. Said. 34, By Order dated September 12, 2014, the court scheduled a non-jury trial in the matter for November 17, 2014. 35. In October 2014, Respondent charged and collected an additional $3,500 for the trial from Ms. Said. 36. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Said until November 2014. 37. On or about November 13, 2014, counsel for Bank of America advised Respondent of its offer for a cash-for-keys settlement in the amount of $15,000, in exchange for Ms. Said’s consent to final judgment. The offer also extended the foreclosure sale date by 120 days. 38. On or about November 13, 2014, Bank of America filed a motion to continue the trial due to their extended review of foreclosure matters in order to comply with National Mortgage Settlement. 39. On November 14, 2014, Respondent advised Ms. Said of Bank of America’s cash-for-keys settlement offer, and gave Ms. Said 30 minutes to decide whether to accept or reject the offer. 40. Respondent failed to advise Ms. Said of the motion to continue trial. 41. As a result, Ms. Said believed that the trial was going forward on Monday, November 17, 2014, if she did not agree to the offer. 42. Respondent failed to give Ms. Said an adequate amount of time to consider her options, and she reluctantly accepted the cash-for-keys offer. 43. By letter dated November 13, 2014, the Bank of America Home Loan Team notified Respondent that they were sending information to him to provide to his client. A letter directed to Ms. Said from Bank of America was attached which stated that she was approved to start a trial period plan for a new loan assistance program which included a significant forgiveness of principal and an affordable monthly payment. To accept the trial plan, the first trial payment had to be received by December 1, 2014. 44. Respondent failed to inform Ms. Said of the November 13, 2014, letter or that she was approved to start a trial period plan for a loan modification. 45. Also on November 14, 2014, counsel for Bank of America followed up with Respondent’s office regarding its offer to modify Ms. Said’s home loan. The terms of the modification offer including lowering Ms. Said’s monthly home loan payment, interest rate, and loan principal balance. 46. Respondent failed to advise Ms. Said of Bank of America’s loan modification offer. 47. Respondent directed his office to proceed with the $15,000 cash-for- keys offer without first consulting with Ms. Said about the loan modification offer. 48. On November 14, 2014, Respondent’s office advised counsel for Bank of America that Ms. Said would like to proceed with the cash-for-keys offer and not the loan modification. 49. Respondent proposed to retain $4,000 as his attorney’s fee from the $15,000 cash-for-keys settlement. 50. Respondent did not communicate his proposed fee to Ms. Said. 51. Respondent and his office falsely led Ms. Said to believe that the cash-for-keys offer from Bank of America was for $11,000 total. 52. On November 14, 2014, Respondent, on behalf of Ms. Said, executed a Stipulated Consent to the Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure with Bank of America’s counsel. 53. On November 17, 2014, the court entered its final judgment of foreclosure. 34. Despite multiple requests by Ms. Said, Respondent’s office failed to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information regarding the settlement. 55. On December 9, 2014, the court entered a Notice of Sale, scheduling the foreclosure sale for January 20, 2015. 56. In January 2015, after receiving notice that Ms. Said was terminating Respondent’s representation, counsel for Bank of America communicated with Ms Said, at which time Ms. Said first learned about the loan modification offer. 57. Counsel for Bank of America informed Ms. Said that when the Bank received notification from Respondent that Ms. Said did not want a loan modification, the Bank extended another offer. 58. Contrary to Respondent’s representation, Ms. Said did want a loan modification. 59. On January 15, 2015, counsel for Bank of America filed a motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure stating that subsequent to the entry of final judgment plaintiffs counsel received an email from Ms. Said’s counsel which indicated that the settlement may not have been authorized or agreed to by Ms. Said, and as such, plaintiff requested that the final judgment of foreclosure be vacated and the case be reset for trial. 60. Thereafter, Respondent withdrew as Ms. Said’s counsel, and Ms. Said negotiated with Bank of America on her own. 61. Respondent directed Ms. Said to sign a release discharging Respondent from all claims arising from Respondent’s representation to get her $3,500 trial fee refunded. 62. Ms. Said refused to sign Respondent’s release. 63. In February 2015, after Ms. Said filed her complaint with the Bar, Respondent refunded Ms. Said’s $3,500 trial fee. 64. Respondent failed to abide by his client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and failed to reasonably consult with the client as to the means by which they were to be pursued in violation of Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 65. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Said in violation of Rule 4-1.3, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 66. Respondent failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent was required in violation of Rule 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 67. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of Representation); Rule 4-1.3 (Diligence); and Rule 4-1.4 (Communication). COUNT Hl: 2015-10,755 (6C) 68. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference 69. On August 5, 2013, Rosalie A. Coyne retained Respondent to defend her in her foreclosure matter, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coyne, et al., Case No. 12-012799-CI, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida. 10 70. Respondent charged and collected a $1,575 fee for the first year of representation. 71. Ms. Coyne was led to believe by Respondent’s staff that Respondent’s representation would entail negotiating a loan modification on her behalf. 72. Respondent did not attempt to negotiate a loan modification for Ms. Coyne. 7B. Respondent never met with or spoke to Ms. Coyne, despite her repeated attempts to speak with Respondent. 74. In September 2014, Ms. Coyne gave Respondent six (6) post-dated checks, each in the amount of $275, representing Respondent’s fee for the following year. Ms. Coyne stopped payment on the last two (2) checks because she believed Respondent was not acting in her best interests. 75. In January 2015, Ms. Coyne communicated with Respondent’s office that it was her intention to keep the property. 76. Respondent’s office advised Ms. Coyne not to appear for the foreclosure trial scheduled for February 13, 2015. 77. Unbeknownst to Ms. Coyne, on February 12, 2015, Respondent and his associate, attorney Christopher Hixson, contacted counsel for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), and agreed to settle the foreclosure case. ll 78. The terms of the settlement agreement included waiving a deficiency judgment, extending the foreclosure sale date for 60 days, and a cash-for-keys payment of $1,500. 79. Mr. Hixson instructed counsel for Wells Fargo that the $1,500 cash- for-keys payment was to go to the firm and not the homeowner, Ms. Coyne. 80. Respondent never communicated with Ms. Coyne about the terms of the settlement agreement. 81. Respondent falsely advised Wells Fargo’s attorney that Ms. Coyne was unable to sign the settlement paperwork, but that she had agreed to the terms of the settlement agreement. 82. Respondent misrepresented to opposing counsel that he was authorized to sign on Ms. Coyne’s behalf. 83. Thereafter, Respondent executed a Settlement Agreement and Consent to Entry of Foreclosure Judgment with Wells Fargo on Ms. Coyne’s behalf on February 12, 2015. 84. Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 4-8.4(c), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 85. Additionally, Respondent ordered Mr. Hixson’s conduct or, with knowledge thereof, ratified Mr. Hixson’s conduct. 12 86. On February 13, 2015, counsel for Wells Fargo appeared at trial and advised the presiding judge that the parties had settled. 87. On February 13, 2015, Ms. Coyne also appeared at trial; however, Respondent did not appear. 88. Ms. Coyne discovered that Respondent had settled her case without her authorization, and that she had 60 days to vacate her home. 89. Ms. Coyne rejected the settlement agreement at trial, and attempted to reach Respondent during the trial, but was unsuccessful. 90. Ms. Coyne terminated Respondent’s representation during the trial, and proceeded to negotiate with the bank on her own. 91. Respondent failed to abide by his client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and failed to reasonably consult with the client as to the means by which they were to be pursued in violation of Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 92. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Ms. Coyne in violation of Rule 4-1.3, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 93. Respondent failed to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent was required in violation of Rule 4-1.4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 13 94. Respondent engaged in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 4-8.4(d), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 95. Wherefore, by reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of Representation); Rule 4-1.3 (Diligence); Rule 4-1.4 (Communication); Rule 4- 8.4(c) (Misconduct: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 4-8.4(d) (Misconduct: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). COUNT IV: 2016-10,066 (6C) 96. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 97. On March 31, 2015, April 1, 2015, and April 2, 2015, Process Server Michelle Howard unsuccessfully attempted to effectuate service of two subpoenas upon Respondent at his office in the matter Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Decoursy, et al., Case No. 08-