Preview
1 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
MATTHEW J. MATERN (SBN 159798)
2 DEANNA S. LEIFER (SBN 265840)
OLIVIA GREEN (SBN 334128)
3 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
4 Tel: (310) 531-1900
Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
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Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN
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10 SANDRA GAETA, an individual, CASE NO.: BCV-21-101362
11 [Assigned for all purposes to the
Plaintiff, Honorable Thomas S. Clark, Dept. 17]
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vs. PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN
13 SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
JBBC, INC. D/B/A THE BROKEN YOLK DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE
14 CAFÉ, a California corporation; ABRAHAM FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S
AYALA, an individual; and DOES 1 through SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
15 50, inclusive,
16 Date: March 8, 2022
Defendants. Time: 8:30 a.m.
17 Dept.: 17
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Action Filed: June 15, 2021
19 Trial Date: September 26, 2022
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 Prior to filing the instant motion to compel, plaintiff Sandra Gaeta (“Plaintiff”) and
4 defendant JBBC, Inc. (“Defendant”) engaged in extensive meet and confer efforts regarding
5 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me-too” evidence, specifically, complaints of alleged sexual
6 harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation by any employee of Defendant, other than Plaintiff,
7 at any of Defendant’s locations in California from January 1, 2018 to the present. Throughout these
8 meet and confer efforts, Defendant’s position was that allegations of sexual harassment, sex
9 discrimination, and retaliation that occurred after Plaintiff’s separation of employment from
10 Defendant were irrelevant.
11 Defendant now contends, for the first time, that the requests seeking “me too” evidence are
12 overbroad because they seek information regarding employees that are not “similarly situated” to
13 Plaintiff. However, Defendant’s contention is entirely unsupported. In its opposition, Defendant
14 cites to a number of non-binding federal cases to support its arguments. Not only does Defendant
15 fail to provide any relevant California case law—which is quite clear that plaintiffs in sexual
16 harassment cases are entitled to “me-too” evidence of sexual harassment against other employees—
17 Defendant fails to point to a single case which imposes the “similarly situated” standard in a
18 factually similar circumstance. Thus, Defendant has failed to put forth any authority which negates
19 Plaintiff’s entitlement to the requested “me too” evidence.
20 As Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence and arguments negating Plaintiff’s
21 entitlement to the requested information, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant
22 Plaintiff’s motion to compel in its entirety.
23 II. ARGUMENT
24 A. Defendant’s “Similarly Situated” Standard Is Not Applicable to the Instant
25 Case And Does Negate Plaintiff’s Right to “Me Too” Evidence
26 Defendant’s argument that Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 are overbroad because they
27 seek information that includes individuals who are not similarly situated to Plaintiff utterly fails.
28 Defendant cites to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 804 to support its
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 argument that, in order to obtain “me too” evidence, “Plaintiff must establish that Defendant
2 treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category, in similar circumstances,
3 more favorably than her.” Opposition, p. 3, lines 9-13. However, not only is McDonnell a non-
4 binding federal case, it is both factually and procedurally distinct from the instant case.
5 Furthermore, McDonnell simply does not support the proposition for which Defendant attempts to
6 use it.
7 In McDonnell, the respondent was a black civil rights activist who was employed as a
8 mechanic and laboratory technician by the petitioner, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer.
9 McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794. Approximately 8 years into the respondent’s employment, the
10 petitioner laid off the respondent, claiming a general reduction in workforce. Id. In protest of his
11 discharge, which the respondent claimed was racially motivated, he orchestrated illegal
12 demonstrations, including stalling cars on roads leading to the petitioner’s plant, and organizing a
13 “lock in” to prevent some of petitioner’s employees from leaving the plant. Id. at 794-795. When
14 the petitioner subsequently advertised for qualified mechanics, the respondent re-applied for his
15 job with petitioner, but was rejected. Id. at 796. The petitioner claimed that the rejection was
16 based on the respondent’s prior “stall in” and “lock in” demonstrations. Id. at 796-797.
17 The District Court found that the petitioner’s refusal to rehire the respondent was based on
18 the respondent’s participation in illegal demonstrations. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794 at 797.
19 On appeal, the case was remanded as to the respondent’s claim that the petitioner refused to hire
20 him because of his race and civil rights activism. Id. at 797-798. The Supreme Court then granted
21 certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the standards governing an action challenging employment
22 discrimination. Id at 798. The Supreme Court concluded that, after a complainant in a Title VII
23 trial establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to
24 establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802-803. The
25 Supreme Court then clarified that, on remand, the respondent must be afforded an opportunity to
26 show that petitioner's stated reason for its refusal to re-hire the respondent was pretext, and
27 “[e]specially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or
2 rehired.” Id. at 804.
3 Thus, McDonnell does not address or even relate to the issue of whether a plaintiff in a
4 sexual harassment case brought under the Fair Employment and House Act may obtain “me too”
5 evidence of other complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or retaliation by other
6 employees of the same defendant employer through discovery, nor does it support Defendant’s
7 proposition that Plaintiff must establish that Defendant treated similarly situated employees more
8 favorably. Instead, the precise questions at issue in McDonnell relate to “the proper order and
9 nature of proof” and the timing and “allocation of proof” at trial in discrimination actions under
10 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792, 793-794, 800-804.
11 Defendant’s use of McDonnell to support its argument that Plaintiff must show that
12 Defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category and in similar
13 circumstances more favorably than her is an improper attempt to mislead this Court into applying
14 a standard that simply does not apply under California law in these circumstances, and certainly
15 does not govern the determination of whether Plaintiff is entitled to the “me too” evidence sought
16 here. McDonnell is inapposite here and has no impact whatsoever on the determination as to
17 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me too” evidence in discovery.
18 As a result, the remainder of Defendant’s analysis regarding what constitutes “similarly
19 situated” employees, and the cases to which Defendant cites to support its arguments for the
20 “similarly situated” standard and insistence on a narrow interpretation of “similarly situated” are
21 absolutely irrelevant here1. Moreover, the federal cases on which Defendant relies are not binding
22 on this Court, and they largely relate to factually and procedurally distinguishable discrimination
23 cases and therefore are not instructive in this case.
24 1
For instance, Defendant cites to Guz v. Betchel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 369; McGrory v.
25 Applied Signal Tech (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1536; Josephs v. Pac. Bell (9th Cir. 2006) 443
F.3d 1050, 1065, relying on Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2004) 349 F.3d 634, 641;
26 Harris v. Winter (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 2007 WL 2900168, at *16, aff'd sub nom. Harris v.
Penn (9th Cir. 2009) 323 F. App'x 619; Guruwaya v. Montgomery Ward, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1988)
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119 F.R.D. 36, 39; McKinney v. Am. Airlines (C.D. Cal. 2009) 641 F.Supp.2d 962, 974-75. See
28 Opposition, pp. 3-5.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 In addition, Defendant cites to McCoy v. Pacific Martime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
2 283, 288-89 for the contention that “sexual harassment complaints involving non-party employees
3 are only relevant if the individuals held a job similar to Plaintiff (i.e., a non-supervisory associate)
4 and were harassed for the same reasons as Plaintiff or bore the same characteristics as Plaintiff.”
5 Opposition, p. 4, lines 21-25. However, McCoy does not stand for this proposition. In another
6 attempt to mislead this Court into applying inapplicable standards, Defendant conveniently omits
7 the necessary context and fails to explain that the court in McCoy excluded “me too” evidence of
8 other instances of sexual harassment and race discrimination because the plaintiff’s sole remaining
9 cause of action at trial was retaliation, and the court thought the evidence of other instances of
10 sexual harassment and discrimination would be prejudicial to the extent it would confuse the jury
11 regarding the sole remaining retaliation claim at issue. McCoy, 216 Cal.App.4th 283 at 296.
12 Here, Plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, among
13 other claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s special interrogatories seeking information related to other
14 complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation are proper. As Defendant has
15 failed to provide any relevant, binding authority negating Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the requested
16 “me too” evidence, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel.
17 B. Defendant’s Privacy Objection Should Not Prevent Plaintiff from Obtaining
18 the Relevant Evidence Sought Through Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32
19 Defendant argues that its privacy objection is proper, but fails to address the fact that its
20 purported privacy concerns can be alleviated by a protective order, which Plaintiff has already
21 offered to enter into. Defendant bears the burden of justifying its failure to respond to Special
22 Interrogatories Nos. 27-32, and of justifying its privacy objections, and has failed to do so. See
23 Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-2. The “me too” evidence at issue is directly
24 relevant, and discoverable. See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation
25 of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of
26 Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110.
27 Thus, Defendant’s privacy objections fails and Defendant must provide the requested “me too”
28 information.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 C. Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause to Obtain the Requested Discovery
2 Despite Defendant’s contrary contentions regarding Pantoja and Johnson, neither Pantoja
3 nor Johnson contain any limitation whatsoever which would preclude Plaintiff from obtaining the
4 “me too” evidence sought as to other employees of Defendant during the relevant time period.
5 Further, both Pantoja and Johnson are instructive here. Pantoja stands for the proposition that
6 “me too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiff’s presence and at times other than when
7 plaintiff was employed, is both relevant and discoverable, and the failure to include such “me too”
8 evidence is prejudicial to the plaintiff. Pantoja, 198 Cal.App.4th at 92. Johnson supports the
9 proposition that “me too” evidence is admissible to show, among other things, discriminatory
10 animous. Johnson, 173 Cal.App.4th at 767.
11 Compliant responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 will help Plaintiff establish
12 whether Defendant changed any of its policies or practices related to sexual harassment, sex
13 discrimination, and retaliation, and whether Defendant was negligent in its hiring, supervision,
14 and/or retention of defendant Ayala. Additionally, evidence of other complaints of sexual
15 harassment by Defendant’s employees will establish that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work
16 environment during her employment with Defendant, and that Defendant failed to prevent or
17 correct the sexual harassment. Thus, Plaintiff has established good cause for the evidence sought.
18 In sum, Defendant failed to set forth any arguments which justify its refusal to provide
19 complete responses to the special interrogatories at issue here. In fact, it is unclear what
20 Defendant is even arguing. Defendant originally objected to the time period for which Plaintiff
21 sought the “me too” evidence (See Declaration of Olivia Green, ¶ 8, Exh. A), and Defendant now
22 seemingly concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to certain “me too” evidence, but asks the Court to
23 apply a “similarly situated” standard while providing no authority which would permit the Court
24 to do so in this case. As set forth above, Defendant’s arguments are irrelevant, Defendant’s cited
25 case law is inapposite, and Defendant’s objections do not justify its failure to provide complete
26 responses.
27 Accordingly, Defendant must provide complete responses to Special Interrogatories Nos.
28 27-32.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Based on the foregoing argument and authority, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
3 Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Responses to Plaintiff’s
4 Special Interrogatories Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 (Set One) in its entirety.
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6 DATED: March 1, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
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MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
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10 By:
MATTHEW J. MATERN
11 DEANNA S. LEIFER
OLIVIA GREEN
12 Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age
of 18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 1230 Rosecrans Avenue,
3 Suite 200, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
4 On March 1, 2022, I served the following document or documents:
5 PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S
6 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
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By e-mail or electronic transmission. I caused the documents to be sent to the
8 person at the e-mail addresses listed below. I did not receive, within a reasonable
time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the
9 transmission was unsuccessful.
10
Lyne A. Richardson, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant JBBC, INC.
11 Steven Mannix, Esq. DBA THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE
Carolina Martis
12 lyne.richardson@ogletree.com
steven.mannix@ogletree.com
13 carolina.martis@ogletreedeakins.com
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
14 SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
19191 S. Vermont Avenue, Suite 950
15 Torrance, CA 90502
Telephone: (310) 217-8191
16 Facsimile: (310) 217-8184
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
18 foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 1, 2022 at Manhattan Beach, California.
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Christian Lopez
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Preview
1 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC MATTHEW J. MATERN (SBN 159798) 2 DEANNA S. LEIFER (SBN 265840) OLIVIA GREEN (SBN 334128) 3 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 4 Tel: (310) 531-1900 Facsimile: (310) 531-1901 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN 9 10 SANDRA GAETA, an individual, CASE NO.: BCV-21-101362 11 [Assigned for all purposes to the Plaintiff, Honorable Thomas S. Clark, Dept. 17] 12 vs. PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN 13 SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL JBBC, INC. D/B/A THE BROKEN YOLK DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE 14 CAFÉ, a California corporation; ABRAHAM FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S AYALA, an individual; and DOES 1 through SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) 15 50, inclusive, 16 Date: March 8, 2022 Defendants. Time: 8:30 a.m. 17 Dept.: 17 18 Action Filed: June 15, 2021 19 Trial Date: September 26, 2022 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -1- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I. INTRODUCTION 3 Prior to filing the instant motion to compel, plaintiff Sandra Gaeta (“Plaintiff”) and 4 defendant JBBC, Inc. (“Defendant”) engaged in extensive meet and confer efforts regarding 5 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me-too” evidence, specifically, complaints of alleged sexual 6 harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation by any employee of Defendant, other than Plaintiff, 7 at any of Defendant’s locations in California from January 1, 2018 to the present. Throughout these 8 meet and confer efforts, Defendant’s position was that allegations of sexual harassment, sex 9 discrimination, and retaliation that occurred after Plaintiff’s separation of employment from 10 Defendant were irrelevant. 11 Defendant now contends, for the first time, that the requests seeking “me too” evidence are 12 overbroad because they seek information regarding employees that are not “similarly situated” to 13 Plaintiff. However, Defendant’s contention is entirely unsupported. In its opposition, Defendant 14 cites to a number of non-binding federal cases to support its arguments. Not only does Defendant 15 fail to provide any relevant California case law—which is quite clear that plaintiffs in sexual 16 harassment cases are entitled to “me-too” evidence of sexual harassment against other employees— 17 Defendant fails to point to a single case which imposes the “similarly situated” standard in a 18 factually similar circumstance. Thus, Defendant has failed to put forth any authority which negates 19 Plaintiff’s entitlement to the requested “me too” evidence. 20 As Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence and arguments negating Plaintiff’s 21 entitlement to the requested information, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant 22 Plaintiff’s motion to compel in its entirety. 23 II. ARGUMENT 24 A. Defendant’s “Similarly Situated” Standard Is Not Applicable to the Instant 25 Case And Does Negate Plaintiff’s Right to “Me Too” Evidence 26 Defendant’s argument that Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 are overbroad because they 27 seek information that includes individuals who are not similarly situated to Plaintiff utterly fails. 28 Defendant cites to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 804 to support its -2- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 argument that, in order to obtain “me too” evidence, “Plaintiff must establish that Defendant 2 treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category, in similar circumstances, 3 more favorably than her.” Opposition, p. 3, lines 9-13. However, not only is McDonnell a non- 4 binding federal case, it is both factually and procedurally distinct from the instant case. 5 Furthermore, McDonnell simply does not support the proposition for which Defendant attempts to 6 use it. 7 In McDonnell, the respondent was a black civil rights activist who was employed as a 8 mechanic and laboratory technician by the petitioner, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer. 9 McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794. Approximately 8 years into the respondent’s employment, the 10 petitioner laid off the respondent, claiming a general reduction in workforce. Id. In protest of his 11 discharge, which the respondent claimed was racially motivated, he orchestrated illegal 12 demonstrations, including stalling cars on roads leading to the petitioner’s plant, and organizing a 13 “lock in” to prevent some of petitioner’s employees from leaving the plant. Id. at 794-795. When 14 the petitioner subsequently advertised for qualified mechanics, the respondent re-applied for his 15 job with petitioner, but was rejected. Id. at 796. The petitioner claimed that the rejection was 16 based on the respondent’s prior “stall in” and “lock in” demonstrations. Id. at 796-797. 17 The District Court found that the petitioner’s refusal to rehire the respondent was based on 18 the respondent’s participation in illegal demonstrations. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794 at 797. 19 On appeal, the case was remanded as to the respondent’s claim that the petitioner refused to hire 20 him because of his race and civil rights activism. Id. at 797-798. The Supreme Court then granted 21 certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the standards governing an action challenging employment 22 discrimination. Id at 798. The Supreme Court concluded that, after a complainant in a Title VII 23 trial establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to 24 establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802-803. The 25 Supreme Court then clarified that, on remand, the respondent must be afforded an opportunity to 26 show that petitioner's stated reason for its refusal to re-hire the respondent was pretext, and 27 “[e]specially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts 28 -3- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or 2 rehired.” Id. at 804. 3 Thus, McDonnell does not address or even relate to the issue of whether a plaintiff in a 4 sexual harassment case brought under the Fair Employment and House Act may obtain “me too” 5 evidence of other complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or retaliation by other 6 employees of the same defendant employer through discovery, nor does it support Defendant’s 7 proposition that Plaintiff must establish that Defendant treated similarly situated employees more 8 favorably. Instead, the precise questions at issue in McDonnell relate to “the proper order and 9 nature of proof” and the timing and “allocation of proof” at trial in discrimination actions under 10 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792, 793-794, 800-804. 11 Defendant’s use of McDonnell to support its argument that Plaintiff must show that 12 Defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category and in similar 13 circumstances more favorably than her is an improper attempt to mislead this Court into applying 14 a standard that simply does not apply under California law in these circumstances, and certainly 15 does not govern the determination of whether Plaintiff is entitled to the “me too” evidence sought 16 here. McDonnell is inapposite here and has no impact whatsoever on the determination as to 17 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me too” evidence in discovery. 18 As a result, the remainder of Defendant’s analysis regarding what constitutes “similarly 19 situated” employees, and the cases to which Defendant cites to support its arguments for the 20 “similarly situated” standard and insistence on a narrow interpretation of “similarly situated” are 21 absolutely irrelevant here1. Moreover, the federal cases on which Defendant relies are not binding 22 on this Court, and they largely relate to factually and procedurally distinguishable discrimination 23 cases and therefore are not instructive in this case. 24 1 For instance, Defendant cites to Guz v. Betchel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 369; McGrory v. 25 Applied Signal Tech (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1536; Josephs v. Pac. Bell (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3d 1050, 1065, relying on Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2004) 349 F.3d 634, 641; 26 Harris v. Winter (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 2007 WL 2900168, at *16, aff'd sub nom. Harris v. Penn (9th Cir. 2009) 323 F. App'x 619; Guruwaya v. Montgomery Ward, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1988) 27 119 F.R.D. 36, 39; McKinney v. Am. Airlines (C.D. Cal. 2009) 641 F.Supp.2d 962, 974-75. See 28 Opposition, pp. 3-5. -4- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 In addition, Defendant cites to McCoy v. Pacific Martime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 2 283, 288-89 for the contention that “sexual harassment complaints involving non-party employees 3 are only relevant if the individuals held a job similar to Plaintiff (i.e., a non-supervisory associate) 4 and were harassed for the same reasons as Plaintiff or bore the same characteristics as Plaintiff.” 5 Opposition, p. 4, lines 21-25. However, McCoy does not stand for this proposition. In another 6 attempt to mislead this Court into applying inapplicable standards, Defendant conveniently omits 7 the necessary context and fails to explain that the court in McCoy excluded “me too” evidence of 8 other instances of sexual harassment and race discrimination because the plaintiff’s sole remaining 9 cause of action at trial was retaliation, and the court thought the evidence of other instances of 10 sexual harassment and discrimination would be prejudicial to the extent it would confuse the jury 11 regarding the sole remaining retaliation claim at issue. McCoy, 216 Cal.App.4th 283 at 296. 12 Here, Plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, among 13 other claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s special interrogatories seeking information related to other 14 complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation are proper. As Defendant has 15 failed to provide any relevant, binding authority negating Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the requested 16 “me too” evidence, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel. 17 B. Defendant’s Privacy Objection Should Not Prevent Plaintiff from Obtaining 18 the Relevant Evidence Sought Through Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 19 Defendant argues that its privacy objection is proper, but fails to address the fact that its 20 purported privacy concerns can be alleviated by a protective order, which Plaintiff has already 21 offered to enter into. Defendant bears the burden of justifying its failure to respond to Special 22 Interrogatories Nos. 27-32, and of justifying its privacy objections, and has failed to do so. See 23 Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-2. The “me too” evidence at issue is directly 24 relevant, and discoverable. See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation 25 of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of 26 Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110. 27 Thus, Defendant’s privacy objections fails and Defendant must provide the requested “me too” 28 information. -5- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 C. Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause to Obtain the Requested Discovery 2 Despite Defendant’s contrary contentions regarding Pantoja and Johnson, neither Pantoja 3 nor Johnson contain any limitation whatsoever which would preclude Plaintiff from obtaining the 4 “me too” evidence sought as to other employees of Defendant during the relevant time period. 5 Further, both Pantoja and Johnson are instructive here. Pantoja stands for the proposition that 6 “me too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiff’s presence and at times other than when 7 plaintiff was employed, is both relevant and discoverable, and the failure to include such “me too” 8 evidence is prejudicial to the plaintiff. Pantoja, 198 Cal.App.4th at 92. Johnson supports the 9 proposition that “me too” evidence is admissible to show, among other things, discriminatory 10 animous. Johnson, 173 Cal.App.4th at 767. 11 Compliant responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 will help Plaintiff establish 12 whether Defendant changed any of its policies or practices related to sexual harassment, sex 13 discrimination, and retaliation, and whether Defendant was negligent in its hiring, supervision, 14 and/or retention of defendant Ayala. Additionally, evidence of other complaints of sexual 15 harassment by Defendant’s employees will establish that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work 16 environment during her employment with Defendant, and that Defendant failed to prevent or 17 correct the sexual harassment. Thus, Plaintiff has established good cause for the evidence sought. 18 In sum, Defendant failed to set forth any arguments which justify its refusal to provide 19 complete responses to the special interrogatories at issue here. In fact, it is unclear what 20 Defendant is even arguing. Defendant originally objected to the time period for which Plaintiff 21 sought the “me too” evidence (See Declaration of Olivia Green, ¶ 8, Exh. A), and Defendant now 22 seemingly concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to certain “me too” evidence, but asks the Court to 23 apply a “similarly situated” standard while providing no authority which would permit the Court 24 to do so in this case. As set forth above, Defendant’s arguments are irrelevant, Defendant’s cited 25 case law is inapposite, and Defendant’s objections do not justify its failure to provide complete 26 responses. 27 Accordingly, Defendant must provide complete responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 28 27-32. -6- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing argument and authority, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 3 Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Responses to Plaintiff’s 4 Special Interrogatories Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 (Set One) in its entirety. 5 6 DATED: March 1, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 7 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC 8 9 10 By: MATTHEW J. MATERN 11 DEANNA S. LEIFER OLIVIA GREEN 12 Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, 3 Suite 200, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 4 On March 1, 2022, I served the following document or documents: 5 PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S 6 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) 7 By e-mail or electronic transmission. I caused the documents to be sent to the 8 person at the e-mail addresses listed below. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the 9 transmission was unsuccessful. 10 Lyne A. Richardson, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant JBBC, INC. 11 Steven Mannix, Esq. DBA THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE Carolina Martis 12 lyne.richardson@ogletree.com steven.mannix@ogletree.com 13 carolina.martis@ogletreedeakins.com OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, 14 SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 19191 S. Vermont Avenue, Suite 950 15 Torrance, CA 90502 Telephone: (310) 217-8191 16 Facsimile: (310) 217-8184 17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 18 foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 1, 2022 at Manhattan Beach, California. 19 20 Christian Lopez 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -1- PROOF OF SERVICE