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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PALM BEACH
COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION 7 oY 28 i
CASENO: Bp ra cH O
CITIMORTGAGE, INC. AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST BY "2
MERGER TO ABN AMRO MORTGAGE GROUP, INC.
PLAINTIFF
vs.
BRIAN K, GRIFFITH, STRAWBERRY LAKES MASTER
CORPORATION, INC.; AMY GRIFFITH; ANY AND ALL
UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, UNDER, OR
AGAINST THE HEREIN NAMED INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANT(S) WHO ARE NOT KNOWN TO BE DEAD OR
ALIVE, WHETHER SAID UNKNOWN PARTIES MAY CLAIM
AN INTEREST AS SPOUSES, HEIRS, DEVISEES, GRANTEES,
S23
OR OTHER CLAIMANTS; JOHN TENANT and JANE TENANT ss 3
whose names are fictitious to account for parties in possession ese 2
DEFENDANT(S) / go= = 7
SUMMONS SS or
PERSONAL SERVICE ON AN INDIVIDUAL on8
IMPORTANT 232 2.0.
rae oO
TO DEFENDANT: — AMY GRIFFITH wwe &
6031 STRAWBERRY LAKES CIRCLE as ff
LAKE WORTH, FL 33463-6510 rx
or
7528 SALLY LYN LN
LAKE WORTH, FL 33467-7304
IMPORTANT
A lawsuit has been filed against you. You have 20 calendar days after this Summons is served on you to file a written
response to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of this Court. A phone call will not protect you. Your written
response, including the case number given above and the names of the parties, must be filed if you want the court to
hear your side of the case. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case, and your wages, money,
and property may thereafter be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You
may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may call an attorney referral service or a
legal aid office (listed in the phone book).
If you choose to file a written response yourself, at the same time you file your written response to the court you must
also mail or take a copy of your written response to the "Plaintiff's Attorney" named below.
If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to
participate in a court proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of
certain assistance. Please contact Krista Garber, ADA Coordinator, in the
Administrative Office of the Court, Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205 North Dixie
Highway, Room 5.2500, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401; telephone number (561)
355-4380 within two (2) working days of your receipt of this Notice; if you are hearing
or voice impaired, call 1-800-955-8770.
IMPORTANTE
Usted ha sido demandado legalmente. Tiene 20 dias, contados a partir del recibo de esta notificacion, para contestar la
demanda adjunta, por escrito, y presentarla ante este tribunal. Una llamada telefonica no lo protegera. Si usted desea
que el tribunal considere su defensa, debe presentar su respuesta por escrito, incluyendo el numero del caso y los
nombres de las partes interesadas. Si usted no contesta la demanda a tiempo, pudiese perder el caso y podria ser
despojado de sus ingresos y propiedades, o privado de sus derechos, sin previo aviso del tribunal. Existen otros
requisitos legales. Si lo desea, puede usted consultar a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede
llamar a una de las oficinas de asistencia legal que aparecen en la guia telefonica.Si desea responder a la demanda por su cuenta, al mismo tiempo en que presenta su respuesta ante el tribunal, debera
usted enviar por correo o entregar una copia de su respuesta a la persona denominada abajo como "Plaintiff/Plaintiff's
Attorney" (Demandante o Abogado del Demandante).
Si usted es una persona con una discapacidad que necesita cualquier tipo de lugar con
el fin de participar en un procedimiento judicial, tiene derecho, sin costo alguno para
usted, para la prestacién de asistencia determinadas. Péngase en contacto con Krista
Garber, coordinador de la ADA, en la Oficina Administrativa de la Corte, Palacio de
Justicia de Palm Beach County, 205 Norte Dixie Highway, Sala de 5.2500, West Palm
Beach, Florida 33401, teléfono (561) 355 hasta 4380 el plazo de dos (2) de trabajo dias
de su recibo de esta notificacién, si usted esta oyendo o voz alterada, llame al 1-800-
955-8770.
IMPORTANT
Des poursuites judiciares ont ete entreprises contre vous. Vous avez 20 jours consecutifs a partir de la date de
lassignation de cette citation pour deposer une reponse ecrite a la plainte ci jointe aupres de ce tribunal. Un simple
coup de telephone est insuffisant pour vous proteger. Vous etes oblige de deposer votre reponse ecrite, avec mention
du numero de dossier ci dessus et du nom des parties nommees ici, si vous souhaitez que le tribunal entende votre
cause. Si vous ne deposez pas votre reponse ecrite dans le relai requis, vous risquez de perdre la cause ainsi que votre
salaire, votre argent, et vos biens peuvent etre saisis par la suite, sans aucun preavis ulterieur du tribunal. Il y a d’autras
obligations juridiques et vous pouvez requerir les services immediats d'un avocat. Si vous ne connaissez pas d'avocat,
vous pourriez telephoner a un service de reference d'avocats ou a un bureau d'assistance juridique (figurant a l'annuaire
de telephones).
Si vous choisissez de deposer vous meme une reponse ecrite, il vous faudra egalement, en meme temps que cette
formalite, faire parvenir ou expendier une copie de votre reponse ecrite au "Plaintiff/Plaintiff's Attorney" (Plaignant ou
a son avocat) nomme ci dessous.
Si ou se yon moun ki gen yon andikap ki bezwen aranjman nenpot nan léd yo
patisipe nan yon pwosedi tribinal, ou gen dwa, a pa koute ou, pwovizyon pou
asistans pou séten. Tanpri kontakte Krista Garber, Lwa ADA-Coordinator, nan
Biwo Administratif la nan Tribinal la, Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205
North Dixie Highway, Room 5,2500, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401; nimewo
telefon (561) 355-4380 nan espas de (2) k ap travay jou de resi w Avi sa a; si ou
ap tande oswa ki gen pwoblém vwa, rele nan 1-800-955-8770.Phelan Hallinan, PLC
William S. Isenberg, Esq., Florida Bar No. 192762
Emilio R. Lenzi, Esq., Florida Bar No. 0668273
Owei Z. Belleh, Esq., Florida Bar No. 617598
Attorney for Plaintiff
2727 West Cypress Creek Road
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309
THE STATE OF FLORIDA:
To Each Sheriff of the State:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to serve the Summons and a copy of the Complaint in this lawsuit on
the above-named Defendant(s). . MAR 1 8 13
Dated this day of »20__
(SEAL)
SHARON R. BOCK | Ye
Clerk & Comptroller NEG
. Box 4667 .
West Palm Beach, Floride -
33402-4667 h, Floride
Related Content
in Palm Beach County
Ruling
HOF REO 1 LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS ANTHONY MARCIANO, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 |
11/28/2022 |
24SMCV00625
Case Number:
24SMCV00625
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
N TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC to give notice.
REASONING
Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the Deed of Trust recorded November 6, 2019, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20191198681; the Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded February 12, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210247143; and the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded March 3, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210348502. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).
Analysis Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment or adjudication in its favor on the grounds that Defendants Eliyahu Marciano and Anthony Marciano (Defendants) have not paid any rent to Plaintiff since the time Plaintiff acquired and perfected its title to the property; the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 does not apply to this action or the tenancy because the more restrictive local ordinance applies instead, and Plaintiff has complied with all provisions of the local ordinance; and any contention that service of the complaint was defective is inapposite where Defendants appeared in the action and filed an answer.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) [T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it owns the premises at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard in Venice, and Defendants entered into a written fixed-term lease with Palms Blvd. Venice Beach, LLC for the period of November 30, 2020 to May 31, 2022 with monthly rent at $4,500, payable on the seventh day of each calendar month. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-8.) Plaintiff acquired title and ownership of the property following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and title was perfected on March 3, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants failed to pay any rent after Plaintiff acquired title to the property, and Defendants comply with the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, which expired on January 26, 2024, a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, a second 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, or a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. Plaintiff seeks past-due rent of $162,000 under four notices, holdover damages, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-19.) The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed. (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16.)
Plaintiff provides evidence that it acquired title to the subject real property at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard, Venice, California 90291 following a foreclosure sale that went forward on February 4, 2021, and Plaintiff perfected its title to the property by recording a Trustees Deed Upon Sale on March 21, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The property consists of a five-bedroom main residence with an additional guesthouse containing two additional bedrooms. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 3.)
Shortly after acquiring the property, on April 7, 2021, Defendants presented Plaintiff with a copy of a residential lease purportedly entered into by Defendants and the prior owner, Palms Blvd Venice Beach, LLC (Palms, LLC). (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states it was unaware, prior to April 7, 2021, that any lease existed for any tenants or occupants of the property. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 7.) The lease reflects that, on November 30, 2020, Defendants entered into a residential lease for the property with Palms, LLC, providing that Defendants were to pay $4,500.00 per month, beginning on November 30, 2020, payable on the seventh day of each month, for a term expiring on May 31, 2022. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has not received any rent from Defendants since acquiring title to the property on or about February 4, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 9.)
On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff proceeded with a civil lawsuit against Defendants, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 21STCV16332 (HOF REO 1 LLC v. Marciano) to ascertain the validity of the lease, but Plaintiff ultimately dismissed the civil suit and concedes here that the lease is a bona fide lease between Defendants and the prior owner, Palms, LLC. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 10.) However, Plaintiff contends there was never any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants directly to occupy the property, whether in writing, oral, or otherwise. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff served a total of four separate notices to pay rent to quit as follows: (1) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, totaling $31,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) (2) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, totaling $76,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) (3) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning February 7, 2023, through November 7, 2023, totaling $45,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) (4) On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning January 7, 2024, through February 7, 2024, totaling $9,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) The time for Defendants to cure under each of the notices expired, and no payment was received, nor was there any attempt to make payment. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 12; Labarre Decl. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff also provides evidence that it has complied with Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, which applies in place of Civil Code section 1946.2 because the local ordinance is more protective (see Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B; Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, Exs. A-E), and Defendants answered the complaint on March 8, 2024, thereby waiving any argument that service of the complaint was incomplete (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers].)
The lease agreement provided with the motion shows that Defendants entered into the lease with the prior owner, Palms, LLC, which Plaintiff does not dipsute. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 5.) The lease agreement includes information on how to pay rent; specifically, lease payments must be made at the landlords address stated in the notices provision of the lease in paragraph 46. (Ibid.) Notably, Plaintiff provided no evidence with its initial motion that it informed Defendants of the name, telephone number, and address of the person or entity to whom rent payment must be made after Plaintiff became owner of the property, which is required under Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c). The statute states that an owner shall not serve a notice to pay rent or quit or otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during a period of noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 (ibid.), and merely making contact with Defendants is insufficient to show compliance with the statute.
The Court continued the hearing on the motion, despite Defendants nonappearance at the hearing, and required Plaintiff to show compliance with the statute. In its supplemental filing, Plaintiff provides evidence that on November 22, 2023, it served a Notice Regarding Residential Lease, which provided Defendants with Plaintiffs name, a copy of the Trustees Deed Upon Sale through which Plaintiff acquired title, provided contact information for Plaintiffs agents, included information for service of process, provided the name and address for payments to be made, and included a copy of the lease agreement. (Labarre Supplemental Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. F.)
While compliance with Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c), makes it such that Defendants may be liable for unpaid rent during the earlier noncompliance period, it is axiomatic that there is a one-year ceiling on a rent demand, i.e., a three-day notice can only demand rent accrued within one year prior to its service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) Plaintiff states that the first notice was served on December 22, 2023, seeking rent owing from March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, which clearly exceeds the one-year limit, and the second notice, served on the same day, sought rent owing from October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, also exceeding the one-year limit. While Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.05 tolled the one-year limitations period if the landlord was prohibited by COVID-19 related authority from demanding payment of rent, Plaintiff has not alleged any such tolling under this statute or any other statute. Thus, Plaintiff has not clearly established its claim for unlawful detainer as to the first two notices, and Plaintiff has moved only for summary judgment, not adjudication. Thus, the burden does not shift to Defendants to create a triable issue of material fact. For these reasons, Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Evidentiary Objections Defendants object to certain statements within the declarations of Kevin Holliday and Olivier J. Labarre. Defendants objections are OVERRULED.
Ruling
CERRITOS RETAIL CENTERCAL, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS WOKCANO CERRITOS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Jul 09, 2024 |
24NWCV00981
Case Number:
24NWCV00981
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
C
Cerritos Retail Centercal, LLC vs. Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, Case No. 24NWCV00981
This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendant moves ex parte to advance the hearing on the motion to set aside, which is currently set for August 7, 2024.
Default judgment was entered on June 14, 2024.
Defendant was served a five-day notice to vacate on July 2, 2024.
Defendant filed the instant motion on Monday, July 8, 2024.
Defendant argues that it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware that it had to answer within five days.
On May 29, 2024, the Court issued the following order:
[T]he Court conferred with Plaintiffs Counsel, Nahal Zarnighian. There was no appearance by Defendant. The Court stated that it had reviewed Defendants motion to set aside default and was inclined to grant the motion under CCP § 473, subd. (b). Defendant appears to argue that it relied upon a tentative ruling posted by the Court which granted Defendant an opportunity to file a Supplemental Reply by May 14, 2024. Defendant denies having received notice of the Courts final order requiring Defendant to Answer within 5 days. Given the Courts inclination with respect to Defendants motion to set aside default, and in an effort to expedite these proceedings, Plaintiffs Counsel had no opposition to the Court advancing Defendants motion to be heard today. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendants motion to set aside default is ADVANCED to todays date and GRANTED. The demurrer filed on May 20, 2024 is STRICKEN because it was filed when Defendant was still in default. The hearing on Defendants demurrer is ADVANCED to todays date and taken OFF-CALENDAR. Defendant is ORDERED to file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading within 5 days. Clerk to give notice. The Court orders the default entered on 05/16/2024 as to Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, a California limited liability company vacated. Certificate of Mailing is attached. (5/29/24 Minute Order.)
In the instant ex parte application, Defendant claims it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware it had to answer within 5 days. However, the minute order reflects that the Clerk provided notice of the Courts ruling to the parties. Moreover, the argument Defendant makes here is the same one it made in its previous motion to set aside default. The Court granted the previous ex parte application. With respect to the instant motion, the Court determines that Defendants claim of ignorance is not supported by the record and is made solely for the purpose of delay.
Accordingly, the ex parte application is DENIED.
Clerk to give notice.
Ruling
MARIA GONZALEZ SANCHEZ VS LIDIA PACHECO
Jul 09, 2024 |
23STCV18797
Case Number:
23STCV18797
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
45
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Monica Gonzalez Sanchez,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Lidia Pacheco,
Defendants.
Case No.:
23STCV18797
DEPARTMENT 45
[TENTATIVE] RULING
Action Filed: 08/08/2023
[1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A]
Trial Date: None Set
Hearing date:
07/09/2024
Moving Party:
Defendant Lidia Pacheco
Responding Party:
Plaintiff Maria Sanchez
Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint
The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition.
Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is
SUSTAINED
in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.
Background
This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58
th
Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. (
Id.
)
Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. (
Id
. at ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. (
Id.
at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. (
Id.
at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. (
Id.
) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. (
Id.
at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. (
Id.
at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. (
Id.
) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action:
1.
Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4
2.
Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability
3.
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
4.
Nuisance
5.
Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.
6.
Negligence
7.
Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation
8.
Fraud Concealment
9.
Landlord Harassment
10.
Constructive Eviction
11.
Retaliatory Eviction
12.
Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
13.
Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act
The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed.
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer.
Discussion
Legal Standard
[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (
Lewis v. Safeway, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See
Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (
Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Analysis
Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend.
A.
The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract
Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. (
Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. (
Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer.
B.
The Complaint is Vague
As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.)
Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below).
C.
Statute of Limitations
Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. (
Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5
th
508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety.
Leave to Amend
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See
Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is
SUSTAINED
in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend.
It is so ordered.
Dated: July 9, 2024
_______________________
MEL RED RECANA
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
AGUINA vs CRAWFORD REAL ESTATE SERVICES
Jul 10, 2024 |
MCC1901351
AGUINA VS CRAWFORD
MCC1901351 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REAL ESTATE SERVICES
AGUINA VS CRAWFORD JOINDER TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
MCC1901351
REAL ESTATE SERVICES JUDGMENT
Tentative Ruling: Grant Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. Deny Plaintiff’s requests for
judicial notice. Grant the motion as to all five causes of action.
Deny Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Corporation’s motion for joinder as it is untimely.
I. Late Opposition
Plaintiff’s opposition was not filed until July 2 and 3 – only four and five days before the
hearing, respectively. No memorandum of points and authorities was filed at all. Under CCP
§437c(b)(2), all opposition papers must be served on the moving party and filed with the court at
least 14 days before the date set for hearing on the motion, unless the court shortens the time for
good cause shown. Here, no good cause has been shown and the court did not shorten the time
required to file an opposition. Thus, Plaintiff’s opposition is untimely.
A court has discretion to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline
without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) If the court decides to consider late-filed papers, circumstances may
require a continuance of the hearing to allow the moving party an opportunity to reply to matters
contained therein. (See Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA4th 614, 623 (dictum)
(disapproved on other grounds by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 C4th
1019, 1031, fn. 6).)
The court does consider the late-filed papers as even with these documents, the motion is still
properly granted. Thus, there is no prejudice to Defendants if the court considers the documents
filed in Opposition.
The documents filed in Opposition do not provide any admissible evidence. The issues with
the requests for judicial notice are discussed in the next section. The response to the separate
statement indicates where Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ assertions, but there is no
evidence provided in support. Plaintiff references documents (which are not properly judicially
noticed) and makes various statements that are unsupported by a declaration or any other
evidence. As a result, no evidence is provided in support of the Opposition meaning Plaintiff has
not shown any triable issues of material fact.
II. Joinder
Defendants Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Service Corporation filed a joinder to the
MSJ on June 20, 2024. This joinder includes a memorandum of points and authorities, a separate
statement 1, a list of exhibits, request for judicial notice, and declaration of Leonel Tapia. However,
75 days’ notice is required on a motion for summary judgment. (CCP §437c(a).) The motion and
accompanying documents were not mailed until June 5, 2024. This does not comply with the 75-
day notice requirement. Accordingly, the court does not grant the joinder.
Where the moving party notices the hearing in less than the required time, notice must begin
anew. The court cannot cure this defect by continuing the hearing for the missing number of days.
(Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 CA4th 1258, 1268.) Deny.
III. Request for Judicial Notice
Generally, a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, the date it was recorded
and executed, the parties to the transaction and the legally operative language as long as there
is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
(2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 755.) The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’
requests 1-8. The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 9-11 under
Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). GRANTED.
Plaintiff makes sixteen (16) requests for judicial notice. Requests 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and
15 are properly judicially noticed under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). However, a party
requesting judicial notice of any materials under Evid. Code §§ 452 or 453 must provide the court
and each opposing party with copies of the material to be so noticed. (CRC 3.1306(c); see Evid.
Code § 453; Creed-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 CA4th 488, 519-520—although ordinance
qualified for judicial notice under Evid. Code § 452, request properly denied due to insufficient
information given under Evid. Code § 453.) Plaintiff did not provide copies of any of the documents
they request the court to take judicial notice of. The remaining requests (not court records) are
not properly subject to judicial notice. The court therefore denies all of Plaintiff’s requests.
IV. First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract
“A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance
or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.”
(Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031.) A
contact will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite for the court to ascertain the parties’ obligations
and to determine whether there has been a breach. (Bustamante v. Intuit Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.
App. 4th 199, 209.) To plead a cause of action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may attach
a copy of the written contract and incorporate it by reference or plead the terms verbatim or the
legal effect of the contract. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)
In the Fifth Amended Complaint (FAC), plaintiff alleges he entered into a written contract with
Defendants on November 7, 2013, whereby Defendants agreed to and loaned Plaintiff $500,000
to develop the property. (¶13.) Then, in “mid 2016,” Plaintiff requested and received an extension
on the loan, as well as an additional loan to be securitized by the property in the amount of
$275,000. (¶15.) Plaintiff asserts Defendants agreed to the loan if Plaintiff met three conditions:
(1) an appraisal of the property; (2) Plaintiff obtain a dismissal of a recorded abstract of judgment
from a Family Law matter; and (3) Plaintiff acquire title insurance for the new loan. (¶16.) The
FAC alleges all of these conditions were met. (¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “breached
their promise and commitment to give Plaintiff the additional funding and denied the loan.” (¶16.)
Defendants argue this claim fails for five distinct reasons.
First, Defendants assert it is undisputed that no lender ever spoke a word to Plaintiff, either
before or after the $500,000 loan was funded, during the foreclosure process, or after the
1
“Each moving party shall support [the] motion for summary judgment with a separate statement.” Frazee v. Seely
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 636. Here, Crawford and Shoshone filed their own separate statement and evidence so
this was complied with.
foreclosure process. Thus, there was no agreement between Plaintiff and lenders for an additional
$275,000 loan. (SUMF No. 11.) The evidence Defendants provide in support of this material fact
is sufficient to meet Defendants’ initial burden. As noted above, Plaintiff has not provided any
admissible evidence in support of the Opposition. As a result, the motion is properly granted.
Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff did not meet the second requirement to obtain the
additional loan because he failed to obtain a dismissal or release of the abstract of judgment in
the family law case. Defendants provide evidence in support of this material fact which, again, is
not rebutted by Plaintiff.
Third, Defendants argue the alleged oral agreement to loan money is not enforceable under
the Statute of Frauds. Civil Code §1624(a)(7) states: “The following contracts are invalid, unless
they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged or by the party’s agent… A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money
or to grant or extend credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000),
not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in the
business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit. For purposes of this
section, a contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money secured solely by
residential property consisting of one to four dwelling units shall be deemed to be for personal,
family, or household purposes.” The FAC notes the property was undeveloped and not residential
in nature. (¶8.) Thus, the statute of frauds applies and any alleged oral agreement to the purported
loan is unenforceable.
Fourth, Defendants argue the alleged loan for $275,000 is not specific enough to be an
enforceable agreement. Defendants note there is no allegation as to the terms of repayment,
making it too uncertain to enforce under Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991)
233 CalApp.3d 103, 115. 2 There is no evidence before the court of any terms of repayment of the
alleged $275,000 loan, making it unenforceable.
Fifth, Defendants argue the claim is outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations for a
breach of oral contract under CCP §339(1). The FAC alleges Defendants breached their promise
to loan Plaintiff the additional $275,000 on May 3, 2017. The initial Complaint was not filed under
October 29, 2019. This is outside the statute of limitations and makes the claim improper.
For all of these reasons, the motion is granted as to the breach of contract claim.
V. Second Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel is a doctrine that employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement
that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. (Kajima/Ray
Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.)
A promissory estoppel claim requires proof of the same elements as a cause of action for breach
of contract, except for consideration. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 887, 903.) The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (1) a promise clear and
unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance
must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured
by his reliance.” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
1661, 1672.)
2
“’[a] loan commitment is not binding on the lender unless it contains all of the material terms of the loan, and either
the lender's obligation is unconditional or the stated conditions have been satisfied. When the commitment does not
contain all of the essential terms ... the prospective borrower cannot rely reasonably on the commitment, and the lender
is not liable for either a breach of the contract or promissory estoppel.’ (9 Miller & Starr, op. cit. supra, § 28.4, at p.
8, fn. omitted.) The material terms of a loan include the identity of the lender and borrower, the amount of the loan,
and the terms for repayment.”
This claim also fails for many of the same reasons stated above. The terms of the alleged
loan agreement are uncertain as there are no specified repayment terms. There is evidence no
lender ever communicated with Plaintiff in making this alleged loan agreement. This claim also
falls outside the two-year statute of limitations. Since the claim for breach of contract fails, the
claim for promissory estoppel also fails.
VI. Third Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Contract
The elements of a cause of action for the intentional interference contractual relations are: (1)
a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3)
defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual
relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) “To establish
the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary purpose of disrupting
the contract, but must show the defendant's knowledge that the interference was certain or
substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action.” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.
4th 1140, 1148.) It is well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on
behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract.
(Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24.) “The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls
only on strangers – interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the
contract’s performance.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
503, 513.)
Plaintiff alleges he entered into a valid purchase agreement with Robert S. Dickens for the
purchase of the lots on September 4, 2019, for a purchase price of $675,000. (FAC ¶46.) Plaintiff
alleges he gave actual notice of the opened escrow and purchase agreement to Defendants on
September 10, 2019. (¶47.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants intentionally submitted
excessive payment demands to escrow to thwart the closing of escrow and effectuate a non-
judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. (¶48.)
Defendants present evidence that escrow’s closing date was set for December 4, 2019, which
was after the scheduled Trustee’s sale on November 1, 2019. Defendants present evidence that
the lenders did not agree to accept the purchase price of $675,000 as payment of the balance
due under the loan which was in excess of $713,000. (Hermansen Decl. ¶22.) The evidence
before the court shows the lenders carried out the Trustee’s sale as planned, which was lawful.
This is evidence that Defendants’ actions were not designed to induce a breach or disruption of
the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and the alleged buyer. Defendants have met their
initial burden and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show a triable issue of material fact.
VII. Fourth Cause of Action – Quiet Title
A quiet title action seeks to establish an interest in real property as between adverse claimants.
(Deutsche Bank National Trust v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 201) The elements are: (1)
the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land; and (2) defendant claims an interest
adverse to the plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 740-
741.) A quiet title complaint must be verified and must include: (a) a description of the property;
(b) the title of the plaintiff as which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (c) the
adverse claims to the title of plaintiff against which a determination is sought; (d) the date as of
which the determination is sought; and (e) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff
against adverse claims. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §761.020.) Tender is generally a necessary element
for a mortgagor to maintain a cause of action to quiet title against the mortgagee. (See Fonteno
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1372; Lueras v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86-87.)
The FAC seeks a declaration that Plaintiff is the title owner of record for the property as to the
effective date of November 4, 2019. (¶53.) The FAC asserts Plaintiff is willing and able to tender
the amount owed to Defendants. (¶54.)
“The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title.
[Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable
period of limitations. [Citations.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify
the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2
Cal. App. 5th 421, 428.) As discussed above, the underlying theory of Plaintiff’s case (breach of
contract/promissory estoppel) violates the two-year statute of limitations for an oral agreement.
Thus, this claim also is barred by the statute of limitations.
VIII. Fifth Cause of Action – Wrongful Foreclosure
The elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim are: (1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an
illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a
mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or
mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges
the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was
excused from tendering. (Lona v.Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104.) A party
challenging a foreclosure must make full tender to establish his or her ability to purchase the
property. (United States Cold Storage v. Greater Western Savings & Loan (1985) 165 Cal. App.
3d 1214, 1225.) While it is not always necessary to establish tender to prevent a foreclosure, the
borrower must show that he or she tendered the full amount of indebtedness in order to set aside
a foreclosure sale that has already occurred. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013)
214 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1053-1054.)
Plaintiff’s claim that the foreclosure was improper is rooted in the purported $275,000 loan
commitment. As discussed, any alleged agreement of this loan is not enforceable. Accordingly,
the unfounded allegation of breach of contract cannot be the basis for the wrongful foreclosure
claim. The evidence before the court shows the foreclosure was properly executed. (SUMF 54-
59.) There is no admissible evidence included with the Opposition, so Plaintiff has not rebutted
the presumption.
Ruling
Andrew Muray et al vs Karen Lantz et al
For Plaintiffs Andrew Muray and Kerri Marshall: Richard I. Wideman
For Defendants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas: James B. Devine
RULING
For the reasons set forth below, a preliminary injunction will issue pending final determination of this action or further order of the Court.
Background
This action commenced on May 29, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiffs Andrew Muray and Kerri Marshall against Defendants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas. The complaint is for injunction and damages for forcible entry and trespass, self-help, and quiet title based on adverse possession.
As alleged in the complaint:
Plaintiffs are the owners of real property known as 922 Roble Lane in Santa Barbara. Defendants are the owners of real property known as 916 Roble Lane in Santa Barbara, adjacent to Plaintiffs’ property.
On May 20, 2024, while Plaintiffs were away from their property, Defendants used bulldozers and other heavy construction equipment to remove a portion of Plaintiffs’ property, claiming that that portion of Plaintiffs’ property trespassed on Defendants’ property. Defendants removed a portion of the balcony, fencing, and foundation footings that had been present for approximately 40 years.
Sometime between 1979 and 1982, the prior owners of Plaintiffs’ property had made permitted additions to the property including the potions removed by Defendants. Defendants plan to construct improvements on the property including the area formerly occupied by the portions of Plaintiffs’ property that was removed by Defendants.
On June 7, 2024, Plaintiffs were granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants from entering onto or constructing any improvements on property that Plaintiffs claim was formerly occupied by 922 Roble Lane prior to Defendants’ removal of the wall, portions of the balcony, and footings. At that time, the current order to show cause re: preliminary injunction was scheduled.
Analysis
As an initial matter, all of Defendants’ evidentiary objections are overruled. The Court notes that, other than the photographs, maps, and plans (which are sufficiently authenticated), none of the statements objected to have any bearing on the Court’s ruling. Also, Defendants themselves have submitted photographs, maps, and plans showing substantially similar conditions of the disputed property. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendants’ statements and evidence are overruled.
“A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposing party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).)
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. (Casmalia Resources, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 827, 832.) The burden is on the Plaintiff to show that it is entitled to the relief sought. (Id. at p. 838.)
A preliminary injunction requires “a complaint which states a sufficient cause of action for injunctive relief of the character embraced in the preliminary injunction.” (Handyspot Co. of Northern Cal. v. Buegeleisen (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 191, 194.) A cause of action is based on the invasion of a primary right. (Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 860–861.)
The grant or denial of an injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in a controversy, and merely determines that the Court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, exercise of the right claimed by the Defendant should or should not be restrained. (Jamison v. Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 361.)
In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial Court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the Plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the interim harm that the Plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied, as compared to the harm the Defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729,749.) The trial Court's determination must be guided by a mix of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the Plaintiffs’ showing on one, the less that must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a trial Court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the Plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Ibid.)
“The likelihood of Plaintiffs’ ultimate success on the merits “ ‘does affect the showing necessary to a balancing-of-hardships analysis. That is, the more likely it is that Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue. This is especially true when the requested injunction maintains, rather than alters, the status quo. [Citation.] . . . [I]t is the mix of these factors that guides the trial Court in its exercise of discretion.’ ” [Citations.] The presence or absence of these interrelated factors “ ‘is usually a matter of degree, and if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial Court has discretion to issue the injunction notwithstanding that party's inability to show that the balance of harms tips in his favor. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342.)
Plaintiffs have provided legal argument and evidence in support of their claims that Defendants engaged in self-help, forcible entry, trespass, and adverse possession. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs are “unlikely to succeed on the merits.” (Opp., p. 13, ll. 8-13.)
The Court has reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties, as well as considered the legal arguments made by the parties. The Court finds that there is a strong likelihood that Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on at least some of their causes of action.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence of imminent, irreparable harm. The Court disagrees. Photographs, survey maps, and plans have been submitted. The photographs show fairly extensive damage alleged to have been done to 922 Roble Lane by Defendants already. Defendants do not appear to dispute that they caused the removal of the wall and portions of the balcony. The plans appear to indicate that Defendants intend to make improvements to areas that were previously occupied by portions of 922 Roble Lane. If Defendants are not enjoined, and Plaintiffs ultimately prevail in the action, Plaintiffs will have been irreparably harmed by, among other things, being deprived of their use and enjoyment of the property, their personal property would potentially be destroyed or altered, and they would suffer continued trespass. Monetary, or other legal remedies are inadequate.
Plaintiffs argue “Defendants are obviously planning to construct [a] portion of their development on the land that was occupied by the improvements to the Plaintiffs’ residence they removed. That must be stopped to prevent the need for tearing down portions of Defendants’ new residence and restoring Plaintiffs’ residence.” (Ex Parte Application for TRO, p. 8, ll. 5-10.)
Finally, Defendants argue that because the fence has already been removed, there is no need for a preliminary injunction because the act has already taken place. (Opp., p. 11, l. 21.) This would imply that Defendants do not intend to do any more demolition, or construction, on the disputed portions of the property. If this is truly the case, Defendants should have absolutely no objection to a legal prohibition from doing so. Defendants are essentially conceding that they would suffer no harm if the preliminary injunction were issued.
The Court finds that the status quo should be maintained pending the final determination of this action or further order of the Court.
“On granting an injunction, the Court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Within five days after the service of the injunction, the person enjoined may object to the undertaking. If the Court determines that the applicant's undertaking is insufficient and a sufficient undertaking is not filed within the time required by statute, the order granting the injunction must be dissolved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).)
“Notwithstanding rule 3.1312, whenever an application for a preliminary injunction is granted, a proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with an undertaking in the amount ordered, within one Court day after the granting of the application or within the time ordered. Unless otherwise ordered, any restraining order previously granted remains in effect during the time allowed for presentation for signature of the order of injunction and undertaking. If the proposed order and the undertaking required are not presented within the time allowed, the TRO may be vacated without notice. All bonds and undertakings must comply with rule 3.1130.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150 (f).)
By way of their reply brief, Plaintiffs request that the bond be in the amount of $10,000.00. Defendants do not argue that it should be in a larger amount. As such, the undertaking will be in the amount of $10,000.00.
Plaintiffs will be given two Court days, or July 12, 2024, to file a proposed order and undertaking.
NOTICE: We may not have a court reporter for the trial of your case. We do have a court reporter for CMC and L&M Calendars. Check with the Court before you hire your own court reporter. If counsel wants to hire a court reporter, it will be your obligation to retain one for the trial. There can only be one official record of Court proceedings, and only a reporter appointed by the Court may report a Court proceeding. Only one reporter will be allowed to report a Court proceeding at any given time. If the parties cannot agree on a reporter, the Court will make the selection after you submit the name and address of the court reporter each counsel has engaged. Counsel will notify the Court 10 days in advance of the trial date if you are going to provide a court reporter. You may request that the electronic recording system that is already installed in the Courtroom be used. Information about that may be obtained from the Court’s website.
Ruling
DR DALIA NOSRATI VS MR FARHAD RASHTI ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 |
BC452244
Case Number:
BC452244
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
39
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT
39
HEARING DATE
July 9, 2024
CASE NUMBER
BC452244
MOTION
Motions to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas
MOVING
PARTY
Assignee Adam Harari
OPPOSING PARTIES
Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati
MOTION
In two separate motions, assignee Adam Harari (Harari) moves to compel compliance with subpoenas Harari purportedly served on Bank of America, N.A. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Deponents).
Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati (Nosrati) responds to the motions.
ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides, If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party or a witness] . . . may make an order . . . directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Assignee did not personally serve the motions on Deponents, as required.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1346 [A written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record].)
Accordingly, the motions are denied.
Further, the parties have apparently agreed Deponents are to produce responsive documents subject to the protective order this court entered in its July 1, 2024 order.
As such, the motions are moot and are denied on that basis as well.
Nosrati is to notify Deponents of the withdrawal of objections to the subpoenas within 30 days.
Harari is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.
Ruling
Jensen vs. Wells Fargo Realty Services Inc
Jul 10, 2024 |
22CV-0200623
JENSEN VS. WELLS FARGO REALTY SERVICES INC
Case Number: 22CV-0200623
This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. Defendant has been defaulted
in this case. A default prove-up hearing has not occurred. At the prior hearing on April 8, 2024,
Plaintiff’s Counsel appeared to inform the Court she was speaking with a bond company and to
request a continuance. The matter was continued to today but no status report has been filed. An
appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of the case and, if
appropriate, to re-set this mater for a default prove-up hearing.
Ruling
ENRIQUE BETANCOURT, ET AL. VS ANGEL BETANCOURT
Jul 10, 2024 |
22NWCV00350
Case Number:
22NWCV00350
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
C
BETANCOURT, JR., ET AL. v. ANGEL BETANCOURT
CASE NO.:
22
NWCV00350
HEARING:
7/10/24 @ 9:30 A.M.
#2
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Angel Betancourts motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED.
The order is STAYED until a hearing scheduled for September 11, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C.
If Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set Two) by the hearing date, or show good cause why responses have not been produced, the stay will be lifted and terminating sanctions will be ordered.
Moving Party to give NOTICE.
This is a dispute between family members over ownership of real property located at 9800 San Carlos Avenue, Units A, B, and C, in South Gate, California 90280. The parties are siblings. Plaintiffs Enrique Betancourt, Jr. and Maria Betancourt sue for the following: (1) resulting trust; (2) constructive trust; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) quiet title; and (5) accounting.
On July 11, 2023, the parties participated in a mandatory settlement conference. They did not settle the case.
Defendant Angel Betancourt moves for monetary and non-monetary sanctions against plaintiffs Maria Betancourt and Enrique Betancourt, Jr. based on disobeying the Courts October 12, 2023 discovery order.
Legal Standard
The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. (
Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.)
The following factors may also be relevant: (1) the time which has elapsed since written discovery was served; (2) whether the party served was previously given a voluntary extension of time; (3) the number of discovery requests propounded; (4) whether the unanswered questions sought information which was difficult to obtain; (5) whether the answers supplied were evasive and incomplete; (6) the number of questions which remained unanswered; (7) whether the questions which remain unanswered are material to a particular claim or defense; (8) whether the answering party has acted in good faith, and with reasonable diligence; (9) the existence of prior orders compelling discovery and the answering party's response thereto; (10) whether the party was unable to comply with the previous order of the court; (11) whether an order allowing more time to answer would enable the answering party to supply the necessary information, and; (12) whether a sanction short of dismissal or default would be appropriate to the dereliction. (
Deyo v. Kilbourne
(1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 79697.)
Generally, [a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (
Los Defensores, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) The court may impose a terminating sanction by an order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(1).)
Discussion
Defendant argues that the Court may grant terminating sanctions because Plaintiffs failed to obey the Courts October 12, 2023 order compelling discovery responses.
On October 12, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motions to compel Plaintiffs responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set Two. The Court also issued monetary sanctions of $1,475.00. According to Defendants counsel, Plaintiff has not responded to discovery to date or paid sanctions. (Decl. Lanphere, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff Maria Betancourt filed a declaration in opposition. She stated that given the financial condition she and her brother were in, she could no longer afford legal representation. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 8.) She said she tried to get her case file from her former counsel from December 8, 2023 to May 2024. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 11.) She also said that Attorney Santana told her that Attorney Mojarro stated that he had no notice of the October 12, 2023, sanctions. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 15.) She further states that Attorney Santana will request the file from Attorney Mojarro and upon receipt, she will be able to address the issues raised by the October 12, 2023 order. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff Enrique Betancourt, Jr. has not opposed the instant motion.
Defendants responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests were originally due in September 2022 and November 2022. (Decl. Lanphere,
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13, 14.) Defendants have now delayed responding to Plaintiffs discovery requests for 22 months.
Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs request and did not oppose the May 2023 discovery motions. Further, Defendants counsel granted multiple extensions at Plaintiffs request. (Decl. Lanphere,
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18, 21.) Further,
Attorney Santana has not substituted in as counsel for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs became pro per litigants in December 2023, and it is unclear if they will obtain their case file from their former counsel and continue litigating.
The Court is inclined to issue terminating sanctions.
Defendant should not have to defend a lawsuit which has remained dormant for as long as this one has, without just cause.
Defendant Angel Betancourts motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED.
The order is STAYED until a hearing scheduled for September 11, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C.
If Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set Two) by the hearing date, or show good cause why responses have not been produced, the stay will be lifted and terminating sanctions will be ordered.