Summons: PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES LLC V MURPH, KERI LASHELLE

23CV-04276 Gary Kidgell v. County of Merced Demurrer by Defendant County of Merced to first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action in Second Amended complaint The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s First Cause of Action for Cancellation of a Written Instrument for failure to state a claim not barred by the statute of limitations is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to plead around the statute of limitations. The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Third cause of Action for failure to allege a fiduciary duty that was breached by the County of Merced is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state facts establishing a fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff by the City of Merced. The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Fourth cause of Action for failure to allege a statutory basis for liability against the County of Merced is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state a statutory basis for Plaintiff’s claim. The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Fifth cause of Action for failure conduct a fraud investigation of recorded documents is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state fact establishing a duty to conduct an investigation of recorded documents. The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Sixth cause of Action for breach of duty is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state fact establishing a duty to breached by the recording of the subject deed. Motion to Strike Proofs of Service and Punitive Damages Claims in Second Amended Complaint by Defendant City of Merced The Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Claims is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state a cause of action and grounds for an award of punitive damages. The Motion to Strike Proof of Service filed with the Court is DENIED AS MOOT given that Defendant has made a general appearance in this action by filing a demurrer addressing the merits of various causes of action therein. (See e.g. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Company v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.)

Case Number: 23STCV11783 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT FLORIDALMA AGUSTIN, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. GARY GILLMAN, et al. , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV11783 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PETITIONS FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE OF CLAIM OR ACTION OF DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF JUDGMENT FOR MINOR Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Floridalma Agustin (Petitioner) The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 1005, subdivision (b). BACKGROUND Petitioner, individually and as guardian ad litem for minor claimants Kayro Jehiel Carranza-Agustin (10); Loida Jocabed Carranza (8); and Elimelec Aliel Carranza-Agustin (4) (collectively, Minor Claimants), and Plaintiff Hugo Adolfo Carranza (collectively Plaintiffs), initiated this action against Defendants Gary Gillman; Debbie Gillman; and Encino Management Services (collectively, Defendants). This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. The complaint alleges: (1) breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligence; and (4) breach of contract. Petitioner filed the instant petitions to approve the compromise of disputed claim on behalf of Minor Claimants (collectively, the Petitions). DISCUSSION If an action is pending and settlement is effected prior to trial, the minors compromise must be approved by the court. (CCP § 372.) A petition to approve a minors compromise is governed by California Rules of Court (CRC) , rules 7.950, et seq . and Probate Code sections 3500 and 3600 et seq . The trial court is authorized to approve and allow payment of reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney fees in an action concerning the compromise of a minors claim. (Prob. Code, § 3601, subd. (a); Curtis v. Estate of Fagan (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 270, 277-79; see also CCP § 373.5.) Attorneys Fees Unless the court has approved the fee agreement in advance, the court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor or a person with a disability. (CRC, r. 7.955(a).) The court must give consideration to the terms of the agreement between the attorney and minors representative and must evaluate the agreement based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was made. (CRC, r. 7.955(a)(2).) CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) sets out nonexclusive factors the court may consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees in connection with a petition for minors compromise. Under CRC Rule 7.955(c), the petition must include a declaration by the attorney addressing the factors set forth in CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) that are applicable to the matter that is before the Court. Here, the Minor Claimants, by and through Petitioner, their guardian ad litem, have agreed to settle their claims against Defendants in exchange for $5,000 each. Upon approval, $1,250 of each settlement payment will be allocated towards attorneys fees, and $725.61 will be used to reimburse the fees and costs advanced by Plaintiffs' counsel, leaving a balance of $3,024.39 to be disbursed to Petitioner for each minor claimant. The Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Further, the Court considers the requested amount in attorneys fees, which amounts to 25% of each settlement payment, to be fair and reasonable. For these reasons and because they are unopposed, the Court provisionally GRANTS the Petitions, conditioned on Petitioner appearing (either remotely or in person) at the hearing. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 23, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT EASTWOOD DEVELOPMENT INC., LUCAS EASTWOOD, 4028 25TH STREET, LLC DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is continued to August 23, 2024 on Court's own motion. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23STCV28108 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. CASE NO.: 23STCV28108 MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE MOVING PARTY : Defendant Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Atlantic Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 11/15/23: Complaint filed. · 05/21/24: Dismissal entered without prejudice as to all parties and all causes of action. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to timely vacate the premises after failing to exercise an option to renew or extend the commercial lease agreement between the parties. Defendant moves to consolidate this action with three other actions. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. DISCUSSION: Defendant to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc ., Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. Legal Standard for Consolidation When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay . (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(a), bold emphasis added.) Requests for Judicial Notice Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Request for Dismissal in this action and (2) the Request for Dismissal in the identically titled action with Case No. 23STUD14911. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). Procedural Requirements A motion to consolidate must satisfy the requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.350, which provides, in relevant part: (a) Requirements of motion (1) A notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) List all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) Contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. (2) The motion to consolidate: (A) Is deemed a single motion for the purpose of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) Must be served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) Must have a proof of service filed as part of the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a).) Under Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.3(g), cases must be related into the same department prior to consolidation. Defendant seeks to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. , Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. The moving party has not listed the parties who have appeared in each case in the notice of motion, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). Defendant merely recites the abbreviated case names with docket numbers for each of the cases at issue. (See Notice of Motion pp.1-2.) The moving party also has not listed the names of the respective attorneys of record, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). The motion does not contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(B), nor has it been filed in any of the other actions as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(C). Further, Defendant has neglected to include a proof of service or provide any evidence that the motion was served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all cases, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(2)(B)-(C). Moreover, the other three actions have not been related into this department, as required by Local Rule 3.3(g). While the parties are identical across the three unlawful detainer actions and have retained the same counsel in all three cases, the civil action (Case No. 24STCV13007) names an additional party, Sergio Gutierrez, as a defendant, who is not accounted for in any of the papers. The Court therefore cannot find that Defendant has complied with the procedural requirements for a motion to consolidate. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

24CV47310 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT POSSESSION OF PROPERY This is an action in eminent domain where Pacific Gas and Electric (“PG&E”) seeks to take certain property (“Property”) located at 4150 Carson Street, in an unincorporated area of Calaveras County, near Vallecito, California, also known as Calaveras County Assessor's Parcel No. 066-025-04. DKM, LLC (“DKM”) is the fee simple interest holder of the Property. Calaveras County Water District (“District”) and Northern California Power Agency (“NCPA”) both hold easements on the Property. PG&E seeks this property for the purpose of replacing and upgrading a tower and transmission conductor as part of a larger scope of work that involves replacing approximately 410 existing electrical transmission structures with new steel structures (referred to as the Project). The Complaint states that the “new tower and conductor replacement necessitates a wider span of easement to accommodate sway in the electrical lines to ensure that PG&E's operations fall within its existing easements.” (Complaint ¶ 6.) PG&E seeks the following interests (the Easement Interests) in portions of the Property: a. Plaintiff seeks to modify its existing electric transmission easement rights in the Owner's real property described in EXHIBIT C, which modified easement rights are described as STRIP on EXHIBIT and depicted on EXHIBIT "A-l" and EXHIBIT "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein as though set forth in full by this reference. b. PG&E seeks to modify PG&E'S existing electric distribution pole line easement rights in the Owner's real property described in EXHIBIT C, which modified distribution easement rights are described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-2, attached hereto and incorporated herein as though set forth in full by this reference, as STRIP ONE, STRIP TWO, STRIP THREE, STRIP FOUR, STRIP FIVE, AND STRIP SIX. c. The right to excavate for, construct, reconstruct, replace, remove, maintain, inspect, use facilities and associated equipment for public utility purposes, including but not limited to electric and communication facilities over and across the lands described in EXHIBIT "C" and shown on EXHIBIT "C-l" as PG&E shall from time to time deem to be reasonably required for the transmission and distribution of electric energy, and for communication purposes within the STRIPS of lands described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-Z". d. The right of ingress to and egress from the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2" over and across the lands described in EXHIBIT "C" and shown on EXHIBIT "C-l" by means of roads and lanes thereon, if such there be, otherwise by such route or routes as shall occasion the least practicable damage and inconvenience, provided, that such right of ingress and egress shall not extend to any portion of the lands which is isolated from said STRIPS of lands by any public road or highway, now crossing or hereafter crossing said lands. e. The right from time to time to enlarge, improve, reconstruct, relocate and replace any facilities constructed with any other number or type of facilities either in the original location or at any alternate location or locations within the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2". f. The right, from time to time, to trim or to cut down, without PG&E paying compensation, any and all trees and brush now or hereafter within the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A- l" EXHIBIT "A-2", and shall have the further right, from time to time, to trim and cut down trees and brush along each side of said STRIPS of lands which now or hereafter in the opinion of PG&E may interfere with or be hazard to PG&E facilities, or as PG&E deems necessary to comply with applicable state or federal regulations. g. The right to use such portion of said said lands contiguous to the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2" as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the excavation, construction, reconstruction, replacement, removal, maintenance and inspection of PG&E facilities. h. The right to install, maintain and use gates in all fences which now cross or shall hereafter cross the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2". I. The right to mark the location of the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2" by suitable markers set in the ground. Plaintiff also seeks the enjoin the owner from: a. Placing or constructing any building or other structures, storing flammable substances, drill or operate any well, constructing any reservoir or other obstruction, diminishing or substantially adding to the ground level within the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A-l" EXHIBIT "A-2", or construct any fences that will interfere with the maintenance and operation of PG&E facilities. b. Depositing or allowing to be deposited, earth, rubbish, debris or any other substance or material whether combustible or noncombustible within the STRIPS of lands as described in EXHIBIT "A" and shown on EXHIBIT "A- l" EXHIBIT "A-2", which not or hereafter in the opinion of PG&E may interfere with or be hazard to the PG&E facilities installed. Now before the Court is PG&E’s motion for prejudgment possession of the Property. NCPA has filed a timely opposition to the motion. On July 9, 2024, DKM filed a notice of joinder in NCPA’s opposition. The notice of joinder was filed more than thirty days after PG&E’s notice of its intent to seek prejudgment possession. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 1255.410(d), all defendants needed to oppose the motion within 30 days of April 4, 2024. As DKM’s notice of joinder was untimely, NCPA’s opposition is the only one that will be considered by the Court. I. Legal Standard and Analysis Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410, a moving party may seek immediate possession of the property to be taken or condemned. Where the motion for immediate possession is opposed, as in this case, the Court may order prejudgment possession after a hearing on the motion if the Court finds each of the following: 1) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain; 2) The plaintiff has deposited an amount that satisfies the legal requirements; 3) There is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited and 4) The hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession. (Code Civ. Proc. §1255.410(d)(2).) Plaintiff claims all four necessary elements for prejudgment possession are satisfied. A. Entitled to Take Property By Eminent Domain Generally, to establish entitlement to take property for a project, a plaintiff must establish, all of the following: (a) the public interest and necessity require the project, (b) the project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and (c) the property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.” (Code of Civil Procedure section 1240.030.) In support of its claim that it is entitled to take the property by eminent domain, PG&E provides the declaration of Sanjeev S. Bhatawadekar, who is a Senior Consulting Project Manager for PG&E. (Declaration of Sanjeev S. Bhatawadekar (“SB Decl.” ¶ 4.) Mr. Bhatawadekar oversees the implementation of complex transmission system projects. (Ibid.) According to Mr. Bhatawadekar, the Project is part of PG&E’s goal of improving and enhancing the safety of its operations and the reliability of utility service because they are upgrading and replacing hundreds of transmission structures. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Project is necessary in order for PG&E to continue providing safe and reliable electric service the public. (Id. ¶10.) Mr. Bhatawadekar further states that there is little risk of private injury because there are no residences within the easement area and any risk to grazing livestock will be mitigated. (Id. ¶ 13.) Finally, Mr. Bhatawadekar states that the location has been chosen because PG&E already has existing structures in that area. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Project only needs “a wider span of easement to accommodate overhead sway in the electrical lines to ensure PG&E's operations fall within its existing easements.”(Ibid.). In opposition, Defendants argue that PG&E has failed to meet this first required element because Plaintiff has not made a showing that it is entitled to take the property by eminent domain as a compatible use with the Defendants’ existing public use. (Code Civ. Proc. §1240.520). Pursuant to section 1240.510: Any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire for that use property appropriated to public use if the proposed use will not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance of the public use as it then exists or may reasonably be expected to exist in the future. Pursuant to section 1240.520, if it is established that the property is appropriated to public use, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof that its proposed use satisfies the requirements of Section 1240.510. Defendants argue PG&E acknowledges that the Property is already appropriated to public use and that Plaintiff has failed to bear its burden of showing that it the proposed use will not “unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance” of the Defendants’ current public use. Defendants argue that Mr. Bhatawadekar’s conclusory statement that “PG&E has no evidence or reason to believe that early possession will unreasonably displace or affect anyone in lawful possession of the Property” (SB Decl. ¶ 13) is insufficient. In support of its opposition, NCPA submits the declaration of Jake Eymann who is employed by NCPA as the Hydroelectric Manager. (Declaration of Jake Eymann (“Eymann Decl.”) ¶ 1.) NCPA acquired the generation tie line at issue in this case in 1988. (Id. ¶ 3.) Mr. Eymann declares: NCPA operates the Collierville & Spicer Meadow Transmission Line Project (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC] No. 11197, "Collierville TL Project"). NCPA's rights are "project property" under NCPA's FERC license for the Collierville TL Project, which comprises the primary transmission lines that connect CCWD's North Fork Stanislaus River Hydroelectric Project (FERC No. 2409) to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) controlled grid. NCPA must protect its rights, use, and ability to operate and maintain the Collierville TL Project to ensure compliance with its FERC license and to ensure its line remains safe and operational. Mr. Eymann further submits photos that show that PG&E’s and NCPA’s lines are near each other on the Property. (Eymann Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.). Finally, Mr. Eymann avers that based on the information provided by PG&E, “I am unable to conclude that PG&E's Project and proposed easement will not interfere with or impact NCPA's operation and maintenance of the Collierville TL Project.” (Id. ¶ 5.) NCPA argues that until PG&E can establish compatibility with NCPA’s uses, the motion for prejudgment possession must be denied. However, Mr. Eymann does not state any specific concerns about how PG&E’s proposed Project would impact NCPA’s existing public use nor how it could impact its FERC compliance. In Reply, PG&E details the extensive communication between itself and NCPA regarding the Project. In April of 2021, PG&E and NCPA entered into confidential, nondisclosure agreements (NDA) to provide free and full disclosure of information by PG&E to NCPA and NCPA's technical representatives about the Project. (Declaration of Randy Kihara (“Kihara Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Over the ensuing months and years, PG&E provided NCPA with specific information and drawings of the Project for NCPA’s review. (Id. ¶ 6.) In April of 2024, PG&E and NCPA entered into another NDA to allow NCPA to “review all technical engineering and electrical transmission aspects of the project.” (Id. ¶ ¶ 7, 9.) When NCPA raised concerns about whether there were sufficient clearances between the varying structures, PG&E provided information which it believed had been accepted as sufficient to show there would be no interference with NCPA’s lines. (Id. ¶ ¶ 10-11.) Specifically, PG&E’s lines after the Project “will not extend beyond the boundary of PG&E’s existing easement at rest conditions (no wind). Even with maximum calculated sway conditions, PG&E’s lines will not come into physical contact with NCPA’s lines.” (Id. ¶ 14.) NCPA also argues NCPA is federally mandated to protect the property rights of a FERC-licensed project. (Opposition p. 4.) NCPA states that NCPA is thus required to seek prior FERC approval of any transfer of “project property” via condemnation. NCPA further argues that FERC would not likely transfer its property rights to PG&E and even if the Court ordered such transfer, FERC would condemn the rights back from PG&E pursuant to its federal eminent domain powers. Accordingly, NCPA argues that this would be an ultimate waste of judicial resources. In Reply, PG&E points out that over the months and years of discussing this Project, NCPA has never raised any concerns about its FERC-license. Further, it is unclear how the Project would impact FERC’s property interests. PG&E already has a concurrent easement on the Property. (Declaration of Trevor R. LaTurner (“LaTurner Decl.”) ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) This easement preceded NCPA’s easement. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 3.) PG&E’s easement specifically states that it has authority to enter the property to maintain, operate, repair or reconstruct the transmission lines. (Id., Ex. 1.) PG&E has sufficiently met it’s burden to show that its proposed use will not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance NCPA’s use as it then exists or may reasonably be expected to exist in the future. Accordingly, PG&E has demonstrated that it is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. B. Plaintiff’s Deposit Under Section 1255.010(a), PG&E is required to deposit “the probable amount of compensation, based on an appraisal, that will be awarded in the proceeding.” Here, PG&E states that it has deposited with the State Condemnation Deposit Fund “probable just compensation for the easement rights being acquired.” (SB Decl. ¶ 10.) According to the declaration of appraiser Michelle Patton, the just compensation for the Property is $12,300.00. (Declaration of Michelle Patton ¶ 6, Ex. A.) NCPA does not object to the amount of the deposit. C. Whether Plaintiff has demonstrated overriding need and substantial hardship. PG&E argues it has an overriding need to take the Property immediately and begin its Project because it is a “priority project” for PG&E. (BS Decl. ¶ 11.) PG&E argues that construction at this location and other Project locations “must be planned, coordinated and implemented (as to materials, workers, equipment, securing necessary permit(s), etc.) in an orderly fashion.” (Id. ¶ 11.) PG&E further argues that any delay in obtaining possession of the Property “may result in major delays with completion of this part of the Project and other segments of the Project.” (Id. ¶12.) NCPA does not address PG&E’s arguments about overriding need and substantial hardship. The Court finds the PG&E has demonstrated an overriding need to begin the Project. D. Balancing of the hardships between Plaintiff and Defendants. PG&E argues that NCPA will not suffer any hardships if the motion is granted because prejudgment possession will not “displace or unreasonably affect any person in actual and lawful possession of the subject property interests being acquired.” (MPA p. 6.) In contrast, PG&E states that without prejudgment possession it cannot plan and finalize contracts, materials, and personnel and the delayed project could cause “great expense and potential harm to PG&E and the public at large.” (Ibid.) The Court finds that PG&E has demonstrated that its hardships will outweigh any hardships to others. The Motion for Prejudgment Possession is GRANTED. The parties are ordered to come to the hearing prepared to discuss whether they can reach an agreement on the terms and conditions pursuant to CCP section 1240.530 or whether the Court will need to fix the terms and conditions.

On the court’s own motion, the Plaintiff's (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories and Sanctions and (2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admissions are CONTINUED to August 1, 2024 at 9:00 am in Dept. 10B. No further briefing allowed. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court of California

HULL, ET AL. VS. THE CADLE COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200159 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions (“OSC”) issued on May 17, 2024, to Plaintiffs James Hull and Shirley Hull for failure to abide by California Rule of Court 3.110. Defendant Tri Counties Bank was amended into the Complaint on January 24, 2024. There has been no summons issued for Tri Counties Bank, and they have not been served. The matter is not at issue. No response to the OSC has been filed. Plaintiff remains in violation of CRC 3.110. Sanctions will be imposed in the amount of $250. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m.

20CV-03476 Parkash Pabla et al. v. Gursharn Pabla, et al. Motion By Defendant Dual Arch International Inc. for Prevailing Party Attorney’s fees of $136,421.03 pursuant to CCP § 1717 on Breach of Contract Claim Remittitur was issued on July 15, 2024 returning jurisdiction to this court and establishing that the Court of Appeal Opinion filed May 14, 2024 is now final. That Opinion affirmed this Court’s May 9, 2023 Order adopting the tentative ruling issued on April 25, 2023 granting the motion to tax costs and providing: “Attorney’s fees claimed (Item 9) are not provided for by statute or contract and are therefore not permissible costs.” The Court of Court of Appeal opinion addressed each argument that one or more documents in the case established a right by which Plaintiffs could obtain attorney’s fees against Defendant Dual Arch International, Inc. and found that there was no legal basis to support a right to attorney’s fees by Plaintiffs against Defendant Dual Arch. That there is no contractual basis for an award of attorney fees by Plaintiffs against Dual Arch is now the law of the case and binding on all the parties. Defendant Dual Arch now seeks an award of $136,421.03 on the grounds that it is the prevailing party by defeating a contract claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to a non- existant contract. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128-129; Pacific Custom Pools v. Turner Construction Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1268; Linear Technology Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Ltd. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1538; M. Perez Co. Inc. v. Base Camp Condominium Assn. No. One (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 456, 466; International Billing Services, Inc. Emigh (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1178-1179.) The gist of that argument is while there was no right to attorney’s fees before Plaintiffs brought, appealed, and ultimately lost their motion for attorney’s fees based on contract, such motion, appeal and loss created Defendant Dual Arch’s right to attorney’s fees as prevailing party on an unsuccessful contract claim for attorney’s fees by Plaintiffs due to the mutuality requirements of CCP § 1717. Controlling Case Law supports the position of Defendant Dual Arch and is contrary to the argument raised by Plaintiffs in opposition. Accordingly this Court finds that Defendant Dual Arch is the prevailing party on the Attorney’s fee claim, that it is entitled to an award of prevailing party attorneys fees pursuant to CCP § 1717 notwithstanding the fact that the law of the case establishes that no applicable contract privudes a right to attorney’s fees, and that the claim for attorney’s fees of $136,421.03 is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. . Order to Show Cause re Entry of Proposed Judgment There having been no response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause why the proposed judgment following by Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Jaswinder Kaur and Parkash Pabla on the Cross-Complaint, that judgment is approved and will be signed by the Court.