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  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
  • SMITH, MATTHEW vs. MICROVAST INC Other Employment document preview
						
                                

Preview

TH For reasons known only to which are unexplained in the motion being served and almost four weeks after deadline for responding to the thirdparty subpoena d passed motion for protection. A motion for pr must be filed bef to respond to the In re GreCon, Inc. 542 S.W.3d 774, 7 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 1A party who waits almost to file a motion for pro does not need to be objections are without meri objections were y are frivolous. documents are not overbroad or unduly is an attorney and the former general counsel of Microvast. Defendants lured Plaintiff into accepting employment at Microvast by promising to grant him stock options immediately upon his employment. Microvast does not dispute that it made a promise to grant tions. Rather, Microvast that its promise was conditional that it only agreed to grant Plaintiff options on the condition that Microvast went through an initial public Plaintiff has asserted causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the Texas Securities Act, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, fraud, and promissory estoppel. Ex. A, A motion for protection must be filed deadline for ng to R. Civ. P. 192.6(a) (stating that a on affected by discovery request may move for protection “within the time permitted for response to the discovery request”). s Defendants conce in their they were served with the notice tigroup and JPMorgan on May 17, 2019 for Duff& Phelps and Deloi May 22, 2019. (Defs. Mot. for Protection at 5.) the response nes were June 1 , respectively. Indeed, all but Del responded by the See, e » Ex. erved on June 7 But Defendants did not file motion until July 8 notified that Plaintiff sought the ved their ability Defendants contend the subpoenas to third parties are “overly broad,” “unduly burdensome,” and “seek documents that are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of Defendants are correct that evidence is not necessary to support an objection if the discovery requests themselves demonstrate overbreadth as a matter of law. In re Union Pac. Res. Co.,22 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.1999) (orig. However, a reasonably tailored discovery request is not overbroad merely because it may include informatio that is of doubtful relevance, and “parties must have some latitude in fashioning proper discovery requests.” Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. produced no evidence to support resistance to discovery, a reviewing court is “limited to the wording of the requests in determining In re Memorial Hermann Healthcare Sys., 274 8.W.3d 195, 202 (Tex. [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (emphasis added) A request is facially overbroad when there is no apparent connectio claims in the lawsuit if it is not li ited in tim at 202 Here, the requests are not “facially overbroad.” This is not a case where the requests have no apparent connection to the dispute, or are not limited in time, “on their face.” As Defendants conced all of the requests are limited in time and scope, and all have some connection to the claims asserted by Plaintiff because Defendants have not demonstrated that would capture irrelevant documen this objection must be overruled. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. CV, 2015 WL 6759153, at * Christi Nov. 3, 2015, orig. (mem. op.) (holding that requests were not facially overbroad when the text of the requests showed that they were limited to documents created “since March 2012”); see also In re Memorial Hermann Healthcare Sys.,274 S.W.3d at 204 (“In this case, Memorial Hermann has not demonstrated that Stealth's request would capture irrelevant documents. . Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Memorial Hermann's objections In any event, even if Plaintiff somehow had the burden of proving that the scope of the was not overbroad why documents d two years before he joined and all of the years since are relevant to this case hecoulddoso First, documents relating to Microvast’s he joined the company are relevant to fraud claim. Smith was hired in 2016, but Microvast made representations to him before he j the company other things, its revenues in 2014 and 2015. Dep. of Leon Zheng, at documents relating to events that happened in 2014 and 2015 are clearly relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Second, documents relating to the value of the company are also relevant. Plaintiffs breach of contract and statutory fraud claims share the same damages analysis. Under both claims, Mr. Smith is entitled to the present value of the stock options. Roustan v. ,No. 02 CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7827, 2011 WL 4502265, at *24 26 (Tex. Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the term “actual damages” in Section 27.01 includes benefit Thus, documents relating to the value of The party seeking a protective order must show particular, specific and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify a protective order. Jn re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. 2009) cannot simply make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome or unnecessarily harassing. Jn re Alford Chevrolet , 997 S.W.2d 173, 181 attached no evidence to motion to quash that would demonstrate that the requests are unduly burdensome or harassing. Nor could they: No undue burden would be placed because the documents have been party witnesses, not Without evidence supporting claim of undue bu , this Court would Respectfully submitted, STURM LAW, PLLC /s/ Charles Sturm Charles Sturm Texas Bar No. 24003020 OBERTI SULLIVAN LLP s/ Mark J. Oberti w/perm. by Charles Sturm Mark J. Oberti State Bar No. Edwin Sullivan State Bar No. 24003024 712 Main Street, Suite 900 Houston, TX 77002 Telephone mark@osattorneys.com ed@osattorneys.com TTORNEYS FOR LAINTIFF ERTIFICATE OF _ERVICE I certify that on July , a copy of the foregoing document was sent to counsel of record via the Court’s electronic filing system Glenn A. Ballard, Jr. Laura Gibson Mukul S. Kelkar DENTONS US LLP 1221 McKinney Street, Suite 1900 Houston, TX glenn.ballard@dentons.com laura.gibson@dentons.com mukul.kelkar@dentons.com TTORNEYS FOR EFENDANT /s/ Charles A. Sturm