Motion to Enforce Settlement in CHARLES A. JONES TRUST| Trellis.Law

On December 19, 2017 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Grays-Jones, Helen, and Spencer, Sandra, for Trust in the District Court of San Mateo County.

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ANTHONY K. REID, ESQ. (SBN#127815)
Law Offices of Anthony K. Reid
440 North First Street, Suite 100
FILED
SAN marge counrrv
San Jose, California 95112
Telephone: (408) 428-1709 JAN 29 *013

Attorney for Petitioner Helen Grays-J ones

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

PROBATE DIVISION

10 THE ESTATE OF CHARLES A. JONES: CASE NO. 17-PRO-01298

11 HELEN GRAYS-J ONES, Veriﬁed Reply to Respondent’s Response to
Petition to Enforce Omitted Spouse’s Share
12 Petitioner of the Decedent’s Estate Pursuant to
Probate Code Section 21610; for
V. Temporary and Permanent Stay of
Eviction from Family Residence; for
SANDRA SPENCER, Trustee of the Estate of Reimbursement of Funeral Expenses; for
Charles'A. Jones, an Accounting; for Removal of Trustee;
15 and for Attorney Fees
Respondent -

Hearing Date! January 31, 2018

KEV/A
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Time: 9:00 am.
17 Dept: 28, Room 2F
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SEES“— APJ: Honorable George A. Miram
18

__ 323382“
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INTRODUCTION
21
The Respondent Sandra Spencer (“Sandra”) ﬁled and served a response in opposition to
22 Petitioner’s Spousal Petition on January 24, 2018 (the “Response”). The Response is completely
23
inaccurate in its facts, conclusions of law, and exhibits. This Reply will focus on only those
24
matters that are paramount for the Court to render a decision on the disputed issues and
25
understand why the Petitioner ﬁled this action in good fath to remove a self-interested trustee
26
from administering the Charles Jones Trust Estate and to secure an order for Petitioner’s omitted
27
spousal interest.
28
There are areas of agreement between Petitioner and Respondent. Trial should be set in

Page 1 of 9
four to six months to allow for discovery. Respondent paid Petitioner a total of $29,586.96
between December 19, 2017 and January 17, 2018, to reimburse Petitioner’s'for her $43,802.21

payment of funeral expenses, and $14,215.25 is still owed. Petitioner agrees that Respondent

should provide Petitioner with an accounting in thirty days, buy February 28, 2018.
DISCUSSION

The Petitioner Began Reg nesting Reimbursement of the Funeral Expenses and
Acknowledgment of Her Spousal Interest on September 7, 2017
Aﬁer Helen paid all of Charles’ ﬁmeral expenses, Helen began requesting reimbursement
from Sandra on September 7, 2017. Helen also requested to meet with Sandra concerning issues
lo that were arising since Sandra became the trustee of Charles’ estate. Sandra ignored Helen’s

ll concerns and refused to meet with Helen to discuss her concerns. Helen was forced to hire an
12 attorney because Sandra was disrupting Helen’s living situation and refusing to honor her

promise to reimburse Helen for the funeral expenses.

On September 14, 2017, Helen’s attorney, Anthony Reid, emailed a letter to Sandra

regarding Helen’s rights in Charles’ property, Helen’s reimbursement claims, and Helen’s

agreement to allow Sandra and her two kids to move into the Family Residence. A copy of Mr.
Reid’s letter to Sandra is attached hereto as “Exhibit A.”
No action was taken on Mr. Reid’s letter until October 26, 2017 when Sandra’s attorney,
Calvin Louie, responded to Mr. Reid’s letter with a refusal to honor Helen’s spousal interest and

20 a demand that Helen move out of the Family Residence. A copy of Mr. Louie’s letter is attached
21 hereto as “Exhibit B.”
22 Mr. Reid responded to Mr. Louie’s letter on November 9, 2017, and a copy of that letter is
attached hereto as “Exhibit C.” The Trustee’s response was to ﬁlrther delay reimbursement of
24 Helen’s funeral payments, and a denial of Helen’s spousal interest. As a result, Helen was forced

25 to ﬁle her Petition on December 19, 2017.

26 A review of Mr. Reid’s and Mr. Louie’s letters will reveal that Helen’s Petition '-was
27 necessary to secure reimbursement of her funeral expenses and to have the Court decide on
28 Helen’s interest in the Trust Estate. On the same day that Helen ﬁled her Petition, December 19,

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2017, Mr. Reid received a partial reimbursement of Helen’s funeral payments. That payment was
made over three months aﬁer Helen began requesting reimbursement. Sandra acknowledges that

she planned Charles’ funeral, so it was completely unnecessary for Helen to provide receipts and
invoices to Sandra’s attorney since Sandra had those same receipts and invoices, the products and

services were delivered throughout the three days of the memorial and ﬁineral services, and

Sandra knew that Helen paid for each and every expense.

Any claim that Helen or her attorney delayed resolution of this matter or delayed the actual
reimbursement of the funeral expenses is meritless.

The Petitioner has Standing to Reg uest that the Court Remove Sandra Spencer as the
10 DEER—e

ll Pursuant to Probate Code Sections 6401 and 21610, Petitioner is a beneﬁciary of the Trust

12 Estate and is entitled to 50% of all property owned by Charles Jones and 100% of all community
property Charles and Helen owned at the time of Charles’ death. Petitioner has standing to
14 petition the Court to remove Sandra Spencer pursuant to Section 15642 of the Probate Code. That ,

15 section provides, in part, that a trustee may be removed in accordance with the trust instrument,

l6 by the court on its own motion, or on petition of a settlor, cotrustee, or beneﬁciary under Section

17 17200. Based on the facts stated in Petitioner’s Petition, which form the basis for Petitioner’s

18 request for removal, it will become clear at trial why Petitioner removal request was absolutely
19 necessary to remain in the family residence where Petitioner lived for more than eleven years, to

20 receive the $43,802.21 that Respondent promised to reimburse, and mostly to be treated fairly

21 when a more appropriate trustee would peacefully and professionally work with the Petitioner to

22 administer her late husband’s estate.
23 Probate Code Section 17200 provides, in part, that a beneﬁciary of a trust may petition the
24 court to ascertain beneﬁciaries and determining to whom property shall pass or be delivered upon

25 ﬁnal or partial termination of the trust, to the extent the determination is not made by the trust
26 instrument, and to appoint or remove a trustee. [P.C. §§ 17200(a), 17200(b)(4) and 17200(b)(10)]
27 Clearly, Petitioner, as the omitted spouse of the decedent has standing to petition the Court to
28 remove Sandra Spencer on the facts and grounds provided.
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The Prenuptial Agreement Attached to Respondent’s Response as “Exhibit A” is a Forgery
Respondent signed a veriﬁcation under penalty of perjury that her Response contained
facts that to her knowledge or belief were true, and claimed that the Prenuptial Agreement

attached to her Response was authentic. The Petitioner knows in fact that the document attached

as “Exhibit A” to the Response is a forgery because the actual» Prenuptial Agreement that Charles
gave Petitioner on December 27, 2005 had no ﬁnancial schedules. In addition, the “draft

Prenuptial Agreement” that Charles received ﬁ‘om his attorney on or about December 27, 2005

had no schedules. Petitioner never gave Charles’ attorney any schedule of her assets and debts,
and Petitioner never had a conversation with Charles’ attorney about the Prenuptial Agreement.

10 Exhibit A is a forgery and it should not be relied upon by the Court.
11' The Court Should Not Permit an Invalid Unenforceable Prenuptial Agreement under .

'14
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Family Code Section 1615(a)(1) to Become Valid and Enforceable under Any Provision of
'

The Respondent seeks to have the Court ignore the speciﬁc requirements set forth in

Family Code Section 1615(a)(1) and enforce a section of an unenforceable Prenuptial Agreement
under Probate Code Sections 143 or 144. There was no waiver of Petitioner’s spousal interest in

any independent separate agreement- The disputed waiver that Respondent relies on to deny

18 Petitioner’s spousal interest was buried along other sophisticated provisions in the Prenuptial

19 Agreement. That disputed waiver was neither reviewed, discussed between Charles and Helen,

20 nor explained by an independent attorney. Charles gave that draft Prenuptial Agreement to Helen
21 on their way to the airport and pressured Helen to sign it the very next day. Also important is that
Charles repeatedly told Helen that the prenuptial agreement would only matter if they got a
divorce, and Charles assured Helen that a divorce was never going to happen. If the Court
24 determines that the Prenuptial Agreement is ,unenforceable under the facts of this case and
25 pursuant to Family Code Section 1615(a)(1), then the Court should not allow any part of that

26 Prenuptial Agreement to be enforceable under any other provision of the Probate Code.
27 The Undisclosed Waiver of Petitioner’s Snousal Interest in the Prenuptial Agreement is
28 Unenforceable under Probate Code Sections 143 and 144
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Even though the Prenuptial Agreement should be deemed invalid under California Law in

the Family Court of San Mateo County, some attorneys may argue that such precedent should not

apply to the Probate Court, and that the Probate Court should look to California Probate statutes
only to determine whether a spousal estate waiver set forth in an otherwise invalid prenuptial
agreement should be enforced. In such cases, the attorneys seek to focus the courts on only

Probate Code Sections 141, 142, 143 and 144.

Probate Code Section 141 provides, in relevant part, that the right of a surviving spouse
may be waived ‘in whole or in part by a waiver, including the right to take the statutory share of an
omitted spouse. [P.C. §141(a)(8)]

10 Probate Code Section 142 provides the following:

11 “(a) A waiver under this chapter shall be in writing and shall be signed by -

12 the surviving spouse.

(b) Subject to subdivision (c), a waiver under this chapter is enforceable only if
it satisﬁes the requirements of subdivision (a) and is enforceable under either
Section 143 or Section 144.

(c) Enforcement of the waiver against the surviving spouse is subject to the
same defenses as enforcement of a contract, except that:
(1) Lack of consideration is not a defense to enforcement of the waiver.

19 (2) A minor intending to marry may make a waiver under this chapter as
20 if married, but the waiver becomes effective only upon the marriage.”
21 [Ca. Prob. Code § 142]

22 Probate Code Section 143 provides the following:

“(a) Subject to Section 142, a waiver is enforceable under this section unless the

24 surviving spouse proves either of the following:

25 (1) A fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or ﬁnancial
26 obligations of the decedent was not provided to the surviving spouse
27 prior to the signing of the waiver unless the surviving spouse waived
28 such a fair and reasonable disclosure aﬁer advice by independent
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legal counsel.

(2) The surviving spouse was not represented by independent legal

counsel at‘the time of signing of the waiver.
(b) Subdivision (b) of Section 721 of the Family Code1 does not apply if the
waiver is enforceable under this section.
Under the facts of this case, the Prenuptial Agreement that was handed to Helen did not

provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of property or ﬁnancial obligations of Charles and Helen
priOr to their signing the Prenuptial Agreement. Helen was not represented by independent legal

counsel at the time it was signed. Clearly, no provision of the Prenuptial Agreement should be
10 nienforced under Probate Code Section 143.

ll Probate Code Section 144 provides the following:
“§ 144. Fair and reasonable disposition; adequate knowledge; waiver unconscionable
13
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(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), subject to Section 142, a waiver is

14 enforceable under this section if the court determines either of the following:
15 (1) The waiver at the time of signing made a fair and reasonable
disposition of the rights of the surviving spouse.

(2) The surviving spouse had, or reasonably should have had, an adequate

' Probate
Code Section 721 provides the following:
”(a) Subject to subdivision (b), either spouse may enter into any transaction with the other, or with any other person,
20
respecting property, which either might if unmarried.
(b) Except as provided in Sections 143, 144, 146, 16040, and 16047 of the Probate Code, in transactions between
themselves, spouses are subject to the general rules governing ﬁduciary relationships that control the actions of
21
persons occupying conﬁdential relations with each other. This conﬁdential relationship imposes a duty of the highest
good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This conﬁdential
22
relationship is a ﬁduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as
provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the
23
following:
(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of
24 inspection and copying. . .

(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction that concerns the
25 community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed
books and records of community property transactions.
26 (3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any beneﬁt or proﬁt derived from any transaction by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse that concerns the community property." lCa. Fam. Code
§
27
721]
28

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knowledge of the property and ﬁnancial obligations of the decedent and the
decedent did not violate the duty imposed by subdivision (b) of Section 721
of the Family Code.
(b) If, after considering all relevant facts and circumstances, the court ﬁnds that

enforcement of the waiver pursuant to subdivision (a) would be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time enforcement is

sought, the court may refuse to' enforce the waiver, enforce the remainder of
the waiver without the unconscionable provisions, or limit the application of
the unconscionable provisions to avoid an unconscionable result.

10 (c) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), subdivision (b) of
ll Section 721 of the Family Code does not apply if the waiver is enforceable
12 under this section.” [Ca. Prob. Code § 144]

13‘ In this case, neither party made a fair and reasonable disposition of the rights of the other
14 surviving spouse in the Prenup. The only purpose of the Prenup according to Charles was that it
15 would apply only if they got a divorce. They remained married for over eleven years, and neither
16 party intended to divorce. There were no speciﬁc rights set forth in the Prenuptial Agreement
17 that fairly and reasonably dealt with how things would be handled if one of them predeceased the
18 other after a long-term marriage. There were no schedules of assets and debts attached to the
19 Prenuptial Agreement. Charles did not provide Helen with a $100,000.00 bank account and a

20 $40,000.00 life insurance policy as alleged by the Respondent.

21 Moreover, Charles unknowingly violated Family Code Section 721 (b) by unfairly dealing

22 with Helen when he insisted that Helen sign the Prenup within 24 hours of seeing it, without
23 counsel, on the eve of a New Years wedding where 60 guests planned to attend. Helen was
24 clearly under duress. However, given that Charles promised that the Prenuptial Agreement
25 would only apply if they got a divorce, and there was no divorce, no waiver in the Prenuptial
26 Agreement should apply.
27 As for other considerations, Helen helped to increase the value of all offers Charles
28 received for the purchase of his business property from $5.5 to $11.6 milliOn- using her network
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of professionals and contacts within the City of East Palo Alto. Helen reﬁnanced her property to
help Charles ﬁnance his Mortuary business when it was having severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties for
three years before Charles sold his business real property. There was no $100,000.00 account

given by Charles to Helen as alleged by theRespondent. There was no $40,000.00 life insurance

policy that Charles purchased for Helen as alleged by the Respondent. Contrary to Respondent’s
claim, Charles and Helen maintained a joint account throughout their marriage. Helen provided a
loving and nurturing home to Sandra and her four kids when things became difﬁcult for Sandra.
Helen also provided a home for two of Sandra’s kids when they needed to leave Sandra’s home
because of other difﬁculties. On Charles’ death bed, Charles expressed that he wanted Sandra

10 and Helen to work together to protect one another and his family, and Helen vowed to do so.

ll Now that moneyis involved, Sandra refused to work with Helen shortly after Helen paid over

12 $40,000.00 for Charles’ funeral, and Sandra had and has every intent to kick Helen out of her

l3 house, which Helen has lived in since year 2002, or four years prior to their marriage.

14 With all of the facts that the Court will hear at trial, it will become evident that Helen’s
15 claims and requests are reasonable and legally justiﬁed. Based on the facts and the laws that

apply under Family Code Section 1615 and Probate Code Sections 143 and 144, it is reasonable
and justiﬁed for the Court to invalidate the entire Prenuptial Agreement and grant Helen the items

22
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requested in her Petition pursuant to Probate Code Section 21610 and Section 6401

There Is No Factual or Legal Basis for 0rderingt_he Petitioner to Pay the Trustee to

The Respondent stated to the Court that Respondent will not pursue an unlawﬁil detainer

action against the Petition pending resolution of this action. However, Respondent wants the
23 Petition to pay the alleged fair market rent of $4,000.00 per month to remain in her house. This is
24 clearly another way that Respondent wants to kick Helen out of her house.
25 Currently, Helen is paying off a $210,000.00 mortgage on her rental property that she
26 secured to help Charles pay off his $214,000.00 mortgage on the Family Residence. Charles

27 needed the money for his failing mortuary and Helen helped Charles with that enormous expense.

28 The Mortuary failed to generate income for Charles during the last three years of his life, and

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Charles needed help from Helen to keep his business running. Respondent’s claim that Charles »

placed a $214,000 temporary mortgage on the Family Residence to provide funds for Helen’s son

is completely false and a reckless disregard for the truth. The fact is, Charles reﬁnanced his

residence to make an investment in real estate, which he could no longer afford.

Helen lives at the Family Residence and does not intend to move from it until there is a
’

proper division of the Family Residence between Helen and Sandra Spencer. Helen has a
$214,000.00 community interest in the Family Residence pursuant to a Moore/Marsden

apportionment, and she also has an omitted spousal interest of the remaining value of the
residence with Sandra Spencer. Helen’s interest is much greater than Sandra’s interest in the

10 Family Residence. There is no mortgage on the Family Residence. Helen is paying all of the
11 utilities and maintenance expenses for the property, and she would have paid all .of those
12 expenses after Charles’ death had Sandra not changed the address where the bills were mailed on.

13 August 21, 2017. Helen has lived with Charles in the Family Residence since 2002, for
14 approximately sixteen years, and there is no reasonable basis for ordering Helen to now pay rent

15 for a property that she owns.
CONCLUSION
17 Based on the foregoing facts and discussion, and the testimony to be presented at trial, the

18 Petitioner Helen Grays-Jones respectfully request that the Court enter the orders requested in her

original Petition, order Respondent to serve a full accounting on Petitioner by February 28, 2018,
20 and set this action for trial during the last two weeks in May 2018.

23 Dated: January 28, 201 :

26-

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EXHIBIT - A
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ANTHONY K. REID
ATTORNEY AT LAW
I) 440 North First Street, Suite 100
San Jose, California 95112
Phone: (408) 428-1709
Email: anthony@areidlaw.com

September 14, 2017

Ms. Sandra Spencer
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
Jones Mortuary, Inc.
660 Donohoe Street
East Palo Alto, CA 94303

Dear Ms. Spencer:

Please be advised that I serve as attorney for Helen Grays Jones with respect to her
legal and beneﬁcial interest in the Trust Estate of Charles A. Jones (the “Estate”). I
understand that you are the Successor Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust (the “Trust”),
which was dated August 19, 1999. I understand that there have been no amendments to the
Trust after it was executed in 1999. That resulted in Helen acquiring a ﬁfty-percent (50%)
interest in all property owned by Charles at his death, pursuant to Probate Code Section
21610.

As you know, Charles and Helen were married on January 1, 2006, and the rules of
Probate Code Section 21610 apply to the Trust and will affect your proper administration of
all assets and debts of the Trust. Probate Code Section 21610 states the following:

“Except provided in Section 21611, if a decedent fails to provide in a
as
testamentary instrument for the decedent's surviving spouse who married the
decedent after the execution of all of the decedent's testamentary instruments,
the omitted spouse shall receive a share in the decedent's estate, consisting of
the following property in said estate:

(a) The one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent
under Section 100.

(b) The one-half of the quasi-community property that belongs to the
decedent under Section 101.

(c) A share of the separate property of the decedent equal in value to that
‘
if
which the spouse would have received the decedent had died without
having executed a testamentary instrument, but in no event is the share
to be more than one-half the value of the separate property in the
estate.”
Ms. Sandra Spencer,
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
September 14, 2017
Page 2

Regarding Helen’s share of all property owned by Charles prior to his marriage to
Helen, Section 6401 of the Probate Code provides, in relevant part, the following:

“6401. Intestate share of surviving spouse:

(a) As to community property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse
is the one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent
under Section 100

(b) As to quasi-community property, the intestate share of the surviving
spouse is the one-half of the quasi-community property that belongs to
the decedent under Section 101.

( 1) The entire intestate estate if the decedent did not leave
any surviving issue, parent, brother, sister, or issue of a
deceased brother or sister.

(2) One-half of the intestate estate in the following cases:

(A) Where the decedent leaves only one
child or the issue of one deceased child.”
(Emphasis added.)

I understand from review of the Trust Agreement that you are the only child of
a
Charles Jones. Therefore, pursuant to Probate Code Sections 6401 and 21610, Helen owns
one hundred-percent (100%) of all community and quasi-community property acquired by
Helen and Charles during their marriage, and a fifty-percent (50%) interest in all property
owned by Charles prior to their marriage, including the property owned by Charles 1n the
State of Louisiana.

With respect to the exceptions provided in Section 21610, Probate Code Section
21611 provides the following:

“The spouse shall not receive a share of the estate under Section 21610 if any
of the following is established:
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Ms. Sandra Spencer,
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
September 14, 2017
Page 3

(a) The decedent's failure to provide for the spouse in the decedent's
testamentary instruments was intentional and that intention appears
from the testamentary instruments.

(b) The decedent provided for the spouse by transfer outside of the estate
passing by the decedent's testamentary instruments and the intention
that the transfer be in lieu of a provision in said instruments is shown
by statements of the decedent or from the amount of the transfer or by
other evidence.

(0) The spouse made a valid agreement waiving the right to share in the
decedent's estate.” ,

Upon my review of all available documents and the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement, dated December 28, 2005, the‘exceptions set forth
in Section 21611 of the Probate Code do not apply because there are no additional
testamentary documents that speciﬁcally precluded Helen from having her Section 22610
postmortem spousal interest; ﬁnancial transactions that were made for Helen outside of the
Estate; or valid agreements that precluded the division of Charles’ Estate as set forth in
Probate Code Section 21610.

In particular, the Pre-Nuptial Agreement (“Pre-Nup”) signed by Charles and Helen
on December 28, 2005 is invalid and would have no legal effect on Helen’s share of the
Estate pursuant to Family Code Section 1615(a)(1). Helen was not represented by an
attorney and she was given only one day to talk with Charles about the document before she
signed it. Moreover, Charles made it clear to Helen before she signed it that the Pre-Nup
only protected their separate property in case they got a divorce. Section 1615 provides, in
relevant part, the following:

(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom
enforcement is sought proves either of the following:

(1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily.

(c) For purposes of subdivision (a), it shall be deemed that apremarital agreement
was not executed voluntarily unless the court ﬁnds in writing or on the record
a_ll of the following:
( C

Ms. Sandra Spencer,
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
September 14, 2017
Page 4

(l) The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by
independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or,
after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expreSsly
waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.

(2) The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven
calendar days between the time that party was ﬁrst presented with the
agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time
the agreement was signed.

(3) The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by
legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the
agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or she was giving up
by signing the agreement, and was proﬁcient in the language in which
the explanation of the party's rights was conducted and in which the
agreementwas written. The explanation of the rights and obligations
relinquished shall be memorialized in writing and delivered to the
party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party
shall, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute
a document declaring that he or she received the information
required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that

(4) The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to paragraphs (1)
'
and (3) were not executed under duress, fraud, or undue inﬂuence, and
the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.

(5) Any other factors the court deems relevant.” (Emphasis added.)

Helen was not represented by an attorney and she did not have seven days in which
to review the document or have an attorney review it and advise her about its terms and legal
effect. The Pre-Nup indicates in Article VII. B, beginning at page 14, that there was no
attorney listed as Helen’s counsel. In fact, Charles ﬁrst handed the Pre-Nup to Helen on
December 27, 2005 at a time when they were leaving for the airport to ﬂy to Las Vegas for
their wedding. According to the Transmittal Letter from 'William Green and Associates,
which is attached, the Pre-Nup was mailed to Charles on December 23, 2005, and was
intended only to be a ﬁrst-draft for Charles to review and make changes to, before Helen and
‘

her attorney would receive the Pre-Nup for review, negotiation and execution.
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Ms. Sandra Spencer,
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
September 14, 2017
Page 5

Essentially, the Pre-Nup is not enforceable against Helen because it was not executed
voluntarily as deﬁned by Family Code Section 1615(c) and required by Family Code Section
1615(a)(1). The Pre-Nup does not preclude Helen from acquiring her 50% postmortem
spousal interest in all of the assets and properties owned by Charles at his death. As a result,
I respectfully request that you, as Trustee of the Estate, protect and satisfy Helen’s share of
the Estate as set forth in Section 21612 of the Probate Code, which states the following:

“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), in satisfying a share provided by
this chapter:

(1) The share will first be taken from the decedent's estate not
disposed of by will or trust, if any.

(2) If that is not sufﬁcient, so much as may be necessary to satisfy
the share shall be taken from all beneficiaries of decedent's
testamentary instruments in proportion to the value they may
respectively receive. The proportion of each beneﬁciary's share
that may be taken pursuant to this subdivision shall be
determined based on values as of the date of the decedent's
death.” (Emphasis added.)

In addition, I understand that Helen Grays paid approximately $45,000.00 in funeral
expenses for Charles’ funeral, which you agreed to pay from the Estate, and which the Trust
Agreement so provides. She is therefore a creditor of the Estate, and she wants to receive
all of the money that she paid for Charles’ funeral by no later than September 20, 2017. I
understand that Charles had more than $100,000.00 in his bank accounts. As Trustee, you
should now have access to those funds, and there is a clear ability for you to pay Helen by
Wednesday of next week.

The third issue of immediate importance is that none of Charles’ property has been
legally transferred from the Trust to any beneﬁciary of the Trust. 1 wish to inform you that
as the Trustee of the Estate, and as a beneﬁciary of the Estate, you have absolutely no legal
authority to move your property into Helen’s house located at 2286 Cooley Avenue, East
Palo Alto, CA 94303 (the “Family Residence”). Although you have a 50% beneﬁcial interest
in all property owed by Charles at his death, until ﬁnal administration and distribution of the
Family Residence by grant deed, in which the Family Residence may or may not be
transferred to you or Helen or sold to a third-party, you have absolutely no right to invade
Helen’s privacy, open any doors to her property, or take an inventory of any prOperty
belonging to Charles at the Family Residence without ﬁrst securing Helen’s permission. You
also have the same restrictions for all of Charles’ rental properties until you secure the
tenant’s permission.
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Ms. Sandra Spencer,
Trustee of the Charles A. Jones Trust
September 14, 2017
Page 6

It is my understanding that one day after Charles' death, you asked about transitioning
from your current residence to Helen's house at 2286 Cooley Avenue, East Palo Alto, CA
94303 (the “Family Residence”). Although Helen responded that you and your two children
could move into the two vacant bedrooms of the house after September 15, 2017, I want to
inform you that Helen is under no obligation to allow you to move into her house. She is
allowing you to move into her house to eliminate your rent and reduce your other rental
expenses to honor her husband’s and your father's wishes that you work together in the
administration and oversight of his estate.

I have been instructed to share Helen’s intent with respect to you moving into her
house. Helen will allow you and your two children to move into the two vacant bedrooms
of the Family Residence provided that it remains peaceful and secure for Helen. She
understands that you have intense ﬁnancial constraints that limit your ability to live in the
if
house that you actually own with your husband. However, you and Helen do not get along
or you don’ t follow Charles’ wishes that you and Helen work peacefully together to facilitate
a smooth transition of his Estate and legacy, then you will need to ﬁnd other living
accommodations for yourself and your children.

As you know, I served as one of Charles’ attorneys shortly after his marriage to Helen
in 2006. I have maintained a conﬁdential relationship and friendship with Charles ever since.
I am conﬁdent that he wanted you and Helen to work together and protect each other after
his death. I just hOpe, as Charles did, that you follow his wishes, make the sale of the
mortuary move efﬁciently to its conclusion, and work diligently and peaceﬁilly with Helen
on all matters required to protect Charles’ legacy and Charles’ family. Helen has made it
clear to me that she wants to honor Charles’ wishes and work with you to administer the
Trust and protect Charles’ family. I hope that you will endeavor to do the same and work
peacefully with Helen.

Please let me know by Monday, September 18, 2017, whether you will honor Helen’s
interest in the Estate of Charles A. Jones as set forth above. I certainly look forward to
working with you and your attorneys to complete a smooth transition of Charles’ property.

Encl.
cc: Helen Grays Jones
Scott Jordan, Esq.
D. Leon Clinton, MS PFP
ﬂ\

EXHIBIT - B
p“ v

Calvin S. Louie. Esq. .

.
The Garden Alameda Tel: 408.289.1118
'
Mari Kitsuse, Esq. Fax: 408.289.1119

_—___ 1520 The Alameda

‘ ‘
admin@llrlaw.org
3" rte 100
Christine E. Louie, Esq. wwwlklaworg

Hsiao-Jung Kuo. Esq. San Jose. California 95l26 wwnzlkiamilylaworg
LOUIE &
KITSUSE
A Professional
law Corporation

October 26, 2017
VIA EMAIL ONLY

Anthony K. Reid
440 North 1St Street, Suite 100
San Jose, CA 95112
AnthonyGareidlaw.com

RE: Trust of Charles A. Jones
Our Client : Sandra Spencer
Our File No.: 09.17.30556

Dear Mr. Reid:

I have now had an opportunity to review this matter.
Your client always realized that she would have no interest in the
Jones Estate/Trust, etc. Mr. Jones also agreed .with this
proposition. All of his written documents support the foregoing
conclusion.
Your position is based on technical issues that have nothing to do
with honoring Mr. Jones’ legacy or his desires. Your client signed
a document on December 28, 2005, which included a testamentary
disposition to her which constituted her entire “right" to any
assets from the Jones Estate/Trust. The technical validity of the
Pre-Nuptial Agreement, as defining the rights and duties of the
parties with respect to acquisitions made during marriage, is
irrelevant. The expressed, written desires of both of our clients
appears in the December 28, 2005 Agreement. This Agreement was
made after Mr. Jones restated his 1999 Trust on December 22, 2005.
If your client believes the parties acquired community assets,
please advise immediately. 'We can assess the community interests,
if any, and make arrangements to resolve this matter.
At present, your client remains in the real property owned by the
Trust, in which she appears to have no ownership interest. I
believe provisions should be made for her to remove herself within
a reasonable time. ,

I am hopeful that you can provide some time lines that make sense
within the next seven (7) days. Any personal property in the

if if
residence should be appraised, necessary, so that an appropriate
division or,
can be made; the personal property is separate, the
same can remain at the residence after your client vacates.
As your client continues to solely occupy the residence, this will
serve as notice that Ms. Spencer will no longer pay the PG&E bill
or any other costs associated with the residence as of October 31,
2017. If
there are any other services besides the PG&E under
client’s name, she will terminate them as of October 31, 2017. my
Finally, your client has also taken possession. of a vehicle
belonging to Jones Mortuary LLC, which is currently parked in the
garage. Arrangements must be made forthwith to access and return
the vehicle. Please advise your client that she must make the
vehicle available immediately.
I look forward to hearing from you on these urgent matters.
Very truly yours,

CALVIN S. LOUIE

CSL:C

cc: client
Spencer—C02_Wills\Reid2-Aty Settlmt
(‘

EXHIBIT - C
,/\\ (”V

ANTHONY K. REID
ATTORNEY AT LAW
440 North First Street, Suite 100
San Jose, California 95112
Phone: (408) 428-1709
Email: anthony@areidlaw.com

November 9, 2017

Mr. Calvin S. Louie, Esq.
Louie & Kitsuse
1520 The Alameda, Suite 100
‘

San Jose, CA 95126

Re: Response to Letter dated October 26, 2017

Dear Mr. Louie:

I have read your letter dated October 26, 2017, and understand that Ms. Spencer will not honor
Ms. Grays-Jones’s spousal interest in the Estate of Charles Jones. Your letter also indicates that
Ms. Spencer wants Ms. Grays-J ones to immediately move from the house where she has lived for
the last 12 years, located at 2286 Cooley Avenue, East Palo Alto, CA 94303. Ms. Spencer also
wants to take possession of Ms. Grays-Jones’s personal car that is parked in Ms. Grays-Jones’s
garage.

Your client’s position has no legal or factual merit. Your client has refused to follow the law set
forth in Probate Code Section 21610. Given the Restated Trust that was emailed to me by your
firm, if Mr. Jones entered into the Restated Trust on December 22, 2005, that is still prior to his
marriage to Ms. Grays-Jones on January 1, 2006. Clearly, the spousal interest provisions of
Probate Code Section 21610 still apply. Furthermore, there were no schedules attached to the
prenuptial agreement that was shown to Ms. Grays-J ones prior to their marriage, so there was no
adequate representation of Mr. Jones’s assets and liabilities. Moreover, Ms. Grays-J ones was
given no opportunity to consult with an attorney regarding the terms of the prenuptial agreement.
That agreement, and the waivers included in that agreement, would never be

Case Info

Judge

George A. Miram Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

January 29, 2018

Case Filing Date

December 19, 2017

County

Parties

GRAYS-JONES, HELEN Petitioner
JONES, CHARLES A. Decedent
LOUIE, CALVIN S. Attorneys for Defendants
REID, ANTHONY K. Attorneys for Plaintiffs
SPENCER, SANDRA Respondent
Christine Louie Attorneys for Defendants
Donald Dowling Attorneys for Defendants
Molly Edgar Attorney
Mari Kitsuse Attorney
Hsiao-Jung Kuo Attorney
Steven Li Attorney
Andrea Nguyen Attorney
Levon Sagatelyan Attorney
Spencer Jones Attorney
Elizabeth Zamora Attorney
Scott Jordan Attorney
Charles Stanley Attorney

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Motion-Secondary: CHARLES A. JONES TRUST

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