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MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS (SBN: 226906) FILED 83:9
j.
N
HIEU T. WILLIAMS
GORDON REES
275 Battery Street,
San Francisco,
Telephone:
Facsimile:
MIsom@grsm.com
(SBN: 280585)
SCULLY MANSUKHANI,
Suite 2000
CA 94111
(415) 986-5900
(415) 986-8054
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Attorneys for Defendant
PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP, INC.
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LINDBERGH PORTER (SBN: 100091)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P. C.
333 Bush Street, 34 Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 433-1940
10 Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
LPorter@littler.com
11
MAIKO NAKARAI-KANIVAS (SBN: 271710)
2000
12 LITTLER MENDERLS 0N, RC.
94111
1255 Treat Blvd., Suite 600
LLP
Suite 13 Walnut Creek, CA 94597
CA
Telephone: (925) 932-2468
Recs
Street,
14 Facsimile: (925) 946-9809
& MNakaraikanivas@littler.com
Francisco,
15
Gordon
Battery Attorneys for Defendants
16 SUTTER HEALTH and PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION
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17 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
18 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ’
1‘9 DIANA P. BLUM, M.D., ) CASE NO. 115CV277582
)
20 Plaintiff, ) DEFENDAN TS’ JOINT MOTION IN
)
LIMINE T0 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
21 vs. REGARDING AND TO HAVE COURT
) DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS
22 SUTTER HEALTH, a California corporation; ) AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION
PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL ) 17200 ET SEQ. CLAIM
23 GROUP, INC., a California corporation; )
PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, a ) No. 3 of 16
24 California corporation; and DOES 1 through
20, ;
25 ) Trial Date: January 8, 2018
Defendants. ) Time: 8:45 am. Dept.' 16
26 )
) Complaint Filed: March 4, 2015
27
)
FAC Filed: August 7, 2015
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
I. INTRODUCTION
In her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff DIANA BLUM, M.D. (“Plaintiff”)
alleges that Defendants SUTTER HEALTH, PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, and
PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP (collectively, “Defendants”) engaged in both
unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section
WflCfim-PWN
17200, et seq. (“UCL”). However, for all but one of the alleged 1% business practices,
Plaintiff lacks standing because she was neither a consumer affected by the alleged practice nor a
competitor of any of the Defendants, and she did not suffer any economic injury as a result of the
\O alleged unfair business practices. Defendants therefore request that any evidence related to
10 unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge be excluded at trial, as such
11 evidence is irrelevant, and would result in confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, undue
12 prejudice to Defendants, and a waste of time. To the extent the Court determines Plaintiff has
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Suite 13 standing, and as to Plaintiff‘s allegation that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices,
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14 Defendants request that Plaintiff s UCL claim be tried by the Court because it is an equitable
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15 claim for which there is no right to ajury trial.
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16 I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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17 Plaintiff is a neurologist who was employed by the Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group
1s (“the Physician Group”), and treated patients at Palo Alto Medical Foundation’s (“PAMF”)
19 clinics, from 2008 to 2013. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Unfair Competition
20 Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., by engaging in unlawful
21 and unfair business practices. (See First Amended Complaint [“FAC”] 1189, Ex. 1 to Declaration
22 of Marcie I. Fitzsimmons in Support of Defendants’ Motions in Limine [“Fitzsimmons Decl.”]).
23 Plaintiffs claim for unlawful business practices is premised on her first through third causes of
24 action for wrongful termination, retaliation in violation of Business and Professions Code section
25 2056, and breach of contract. (FAC 1H} 89(a)—(g)). As for Plaintiff s Lian business practices
26 claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed mair competition by engaging in the
27 following business practices:
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DEFENDANT S’ JOINT MOTION IN LDvflNE N0. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
l. Threatening to destroy Plaintiff’s career;
Threatening to destroy the careers of other physicians;
3. Pressuring Plaintiff to engage in coding practices intended to
increase the amount Sutter Health and PAMF could charge
third party payers;
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4. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter referrals
outside of the Sutter network;
5. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter prescription
of brand name medications; and
6. Imposing policies and practices whereby invoices submitted to
third party payers listed someone other than the physician who
actually provided the service.
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(PAC, 1“] 89(h)—(m)). Following her resignation, Plaintiff went on to open a private neurology
10 practice, which is a concierge practice that does not accept any insurance. (See Declaration of
11 Maiko Nakarai- Kanivas in Support of Defendants’ Motions in Limine [“Nakarai Decl.”] 112,
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12 Exh. A, Deposition of Plaintiff [“Pl. Depo.”] 176:6-7).
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Suite 13 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
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14 A. Evidence Relating To Plaintiff’s Unfair Business Practices Claim Should Be
& Excluded
Francisco,
15
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Battery 1. Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Challenge The Alleged Unfair Business
16 Practices
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17 Defendants anticipate that Plaintiff will attempt to introduce evidence at trial relating to
18 her claim that the policies and practices she allegedly complained about (i.e., related to coding,
19 referrals, prescription drugs, billings, etc.) were unfair business practices that violated the UCL.
20 However, except for the claim that Defendants threatened to destroy Plaintiff’s career, Plaintiff
21 does not have standing to challenge the alleged unfair business practices because she was neither
22 a consumer affected by the alleged practices nor a competitor of any of the defendants. “A
23 litigant’s standing to sue is a threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on
24 the merits.” Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. ofLos Angeles (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 993,
25 1000. To satisfy the standing requirement under the UCL, Plaintiff must establish that she
26 “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”
27 Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. The economic injury must be “(a) concrete and particularized, and
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF ’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
(b) actual or imminent, not conj ectural or hypothetical,” and there must be a causal connection
between the unfair competition and the economic injury. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322, 326 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge Defendants’ policies and practices as unfair
business practices. Her FAC makes clear that her claimed economic injury is the loss of her
employment with the Physician Group. That economic injury (i.e., loss of employment) was
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allegedly caused by retaliation for complaining about certain policies and practices. There is
nothing about the underlying policies and practices themselves that Plaintiff identifies as causing
her economic harm. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that because of Defendants’ coding,
10 referral or generic prescription policies, she earned less money than she could have. Nor does
11 Plaintiff allege that she was a consumer (i. e., patient) who suffered economic injury as a result of
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12 Defendants" policies and practices. Notably, in her FAC, Plaintiff does not allege she suffered
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compare with 1111 65, 76, 106 (expressly alleging
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14 (alleging no economic injury); 87, 101,
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15 economic injury in excess of $10 million due to wrongful termination, retaliation, breach of
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16 contract, and interference with prospective economic advantage), Ex. 1 to Fitzsimmons Decl.).
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17 Judge Armstrong’s holding in Tanner v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (N .D. Cal.
1s Aug. 1, 2016) 2016 WL 4076116, is instructive. There, a pharmacist sued his purported former
19 employers, alleging, in part, that they engaged in unlawfiil business practices by earning profits
2o through a 501(c)(3) tax—exempt entity and funneling those profits to its related for-profit entities,
21 which in turn inured to the benefit of private individuals. Id. at *1, 8. The only economic injury
22 the plaintiff alleged was failure to pay wages. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs UCL claim,
23 reasoning that even if the defendants had engaged in the alleged unlawful business practices, the
24 plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to establish “a causal connection between Defendants’
25 purported [Internal Revenue Code] violations (i.e., siphoning profits to private entities) and his
26 economic injury (i.e., unpaid compensation).” Id. at 8.
27 l//
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
Similarly, like the plaintiff in Tanner, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants imposed various
policies and practices in order to increase revenues at the expense of patient care, but she wholly
fails to establish how any of the policies or practices caused her economic injury. Because there
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is no causal connection between the alleged unfair business practices and Plaintiffs economic
injury of loss of employment, Plaintiff cannot establish standing under the UCL to challenge the
alleged unfair policies and practices. Kwikset Corp. , 51 Cal. 4th at 326 (“[P]1aintift’s economic
injury [must]
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come ‘as a result of the unfair competition . . . [which] requires a showing of a
causal connection .. ..” (quotations omitted».
2. Evidence Related To The Alleged Unfair Business Practices Is
Irrelevant
As discussed above, Plaintiff lacks standing under the UCL to challenge Defendants’
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12 policies and practices as unfair business practices. Evidence relating to such policies and
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14 irrelevant and should be excluded. Evid. Code § 350 (“no evidence is admissible except relevant
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15 evidence”); Id. § 210 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence .. .having any tendency in reason
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16 to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action”).
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17 Defendants recognize that many of the policies and practices Plaintiff seeks to challenge
18 under the UCL are policies and/or practices Plaintiff claims she complained about in connection
19 with her Business and Professions Code section 2056 retaliation claim. However, the focus of a
20 Section 2056 claim is whether Plaintiff protested policies and practices she reasonably believed
21 impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare, and whether she was retaliated
22 against as a result of those protests. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2056(b)—(c). It is not whether the
23 policies and practices in fact impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare,
24 much less whether the policies and practices were unfair business practices. Indeed, the
25 determination of whether a policy or practice constitutes an “unfair” business practice for
26 purposes of the UCL is very different from whether the policy or practice was one that a
27 physician reasonably believed impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare.
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
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The standard under the UCL is whether the policy or practice threatens to Violate antitrust law or
public policy, or is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to
consumers.” Cal-Tech Comm ’ns v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163,
I
186-87; Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Lh-FWN
Co. (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 719.
Evidence relating to whether Defendants’ policies and practices were unfair business practices
because they prioritized revenue over patient care can therefore be excluded as irrelevant without
infringing on any of the parties’ abilities to prosecute or defend against Plaintiff’s retaliation
\DOOQON
claim.
3. Evidence Related To The Alleged Unfair Business Practices Should Be
Excluded Under Evidence Code Section 352
10
11 Evidence relating to alleged unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks standing to
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12 challenge should also be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, as its probative value
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Suite 13 is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will necessitate an undue consumption
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14 of time, create a danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, and mislead the jury. Evid. Code
& Francisco,
15 § 352. Litigating the issue of whether each of Defendants’ policies and practices that Plaintiff
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16 challenges is, in fact, an unfair business practice is a waste of time if Plaintiff lacks standing
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17 under the UCL. Moreover, evidence relating to and argument about how Defendants’ policies
18 and practices are improper and intended to increase revenue at the expense of patient care is
19 likely to prejudice the jury against Defendants. Indeed, there is no easier way for Plaintiff to
2o prejudice a jury against Defendants than to attempt to portray them as greedy healthcare
21 organizations that have no regard for the welfare of their patients. If the Court permits Plaintiff
22 to introduce evidence regarding the alleged unfair business practices, it is more likely that the
23 jury will unfairly hold Defendants liable for retaliation or on the other claims, even if it is not
24 supported by the evidence. Finally, given that many of the same policies and practices are
25 implicated by Plaintiff’s retaliation and UCL claims, but there are different elements and legal
26 standards for each claim, permitting evidence relating to the UCL claim for unfair business
27 practices is likely to confuse the issues and mislead thejury. Plaintiff and her counsel should be
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIIVHNE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF ’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
ordered not to introduce any evidence regarding, or make any reference to, the alleged unfair
N business practices that Plaintiff does not have standing under the UCL to challenge.
B. The Court — And Not The Jury — Must Rule 0n Plaintiffs UCL Claim
To the extent the Court determines Plaintiff has standing to challenge Defendants’
policies and practices as Lian business practices, and as to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants
engaged in unlawful business practices, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s‘UCL claim be tried
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l
by the Court because it is an equitable claim for which there is no right to a jury trial.
While parties have the right to a jury trial in civil cases as to legal claims, they have no
such right as to equitable claims. C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d
10 1, 8. Claims under the UCL are equitable in nature, not legal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203
11 (describing injunctive relief available for violations of the UCL); see also In re Tobacco 11 Cases
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12 (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (“A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be
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Suite 13 recovered.” (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144)).
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14 California courts have therefore found that there is no entitlement to ajury trial on UCL claims.
& Francisco,
15 C & K Eng'g Contractors, 23 Cal.3d at 11; see also Hodge v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.
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16 App. 4th 278, 284-85 (no right to jury trial on UCL claim because “[p]laintiffs seek relief from
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17 alleged unfair competition, not to enforce the Labor Code .. .[and] those remedies are solely
18 equitable”); People v.First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 721, 732—33 (“in
19 UCL cases there is no right to a jUry trial”).
. . . The Court, and not the jury, must make its own
2o independent findings about the facts and law regarding Plaintiff’s claim under the UCL. A—C Co.
21 V.See. Pac. Nat. Bank (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 462, 474 (reversible error to permit jury to decide
22 equitable issue); Raedeke v. Gilbraltar Savings & Loan Ass ’n (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 665, 671 (1974)
23 (court may try equitable issues, while jury tries legal issues); Estate of Fincher (1981) 199 Cal.
24 App. 3d 343, 352 (“a trial court may try equitable issues separately even when legal issues in the
25 case are tried to the jury”). Any ruling on Plaintiff’s UCL cause of action must be made by the
26 Court, and not a jury, as a matter of law.
27 Ill
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3
T0 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF'S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM
III. CONCLUSION
N For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their
motion in limine to exclude any evidence relating to unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks
standing to challenge under the UCL. Specifically, Defendants request that the Court exclude
evidence relating to the following alleged unfair business practices:
\oooflOxUI-bw
1. Threatening to destroy the careers of other physicians;
2. Pressuring Plaintiff to engage in coding practices intended to
increase the amount Sutter Health and PAMF could charge
third party payers;
3. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter referrals
outside of the Sutter network;
4. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter prescription
10
of brand name medications; and
11 5. Imposing policies and practices whereby 1nvoices submitted to
third party payers listed someone other than the physician who
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12 actually provided the service.
Defendants also request that the Court, and not the jury, decide Plaintiff‘s UCL claim
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14 both as to her allegation that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices, and as to any
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15 policies and practices of Defendants that the Court determines Plaintiff has standing to challenge
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16 as unfair business practices — as it is an equitable claim that must be tried by the Court.
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l7
Dated: January 5, 2018 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
18
19 By:
MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS
20 HIEU T. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Defendant
21 PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL
GROUP, INC.
22
23
24
25
26
Dated: January 5, 2018 LITTLER MENDELSON,
By: 4' z A
INDBERGH PORTER
»
MAIKO NAKARAI-KANIVAS
Attorneys for Defendants
P.C.
I;
PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION and
27 SUTTER HEALTH
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DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION EN LEVINE NO. 3
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE‘PLAINTIFF’S
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM