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  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
  • Diana Blum, MD vs Sutter Health et al Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36)  document preview
						
                                

Preview

MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS (SBN: 226906) FILED 83:9 j. N HIEU T. WILLIAMS GORDON REES 275 Battery Street, San Francisco, Telephone: Facsimile: MIsom@grsm.com (SBN: 280585) SCULLY MANSUKHANI, Suite 2000 CA 94111 (415) 986-5900 (415) 986-8054 LLP mum-s. I s c RK Wow-m mm or A 33911 THE COURFA ERIOR counro OF SANTAL CID HWilliams@grsm.com -;~ 9 ”of, Attorneys for Defendant PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP, INC. \oooqoxmem .CIH LINDBERGH PORTER (SBN: 100091) LITTLER MENDELSON, P. C. 333 Bush Street, 34 Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 433-1940 10 Facsimile: (415) 399-8490 LPorter@littler.com 11 MAIKO NAKARAI-KANIVAS (SBN: 271710) 2000 12 LITTLER MENDERLS 0N, RC. 94111 1255 Treat Blvd., Suite 600 LLP Suite 13 Walnut Creek, CA 94597 CA Telephone: (925) 932-2468 Recs Street, 14 Facsimile: (925) 946-9809 & MNakaraikanivas@littler.com Francisco, 15 Gordon Battery Attorneys for Defendants 16 SUTTER HEALTH and PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION San 275 17 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 18 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ’ 1‘9 DIANA P. BLUM, M.D., ) CASE NO. 115CV277582 ) 20 Plaintiff, ) DEFENDAN TS’ JOINT MOTION IN ) LIMINE T0 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 21 vs. REGARDING AND TO HAVE COURT ) DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS 22 SUTTER HEALTH, a California corporation; ) AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL ) 17200 ET SEQ. CLAIM 23 GROUP, INC., a California corporation; ) PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, a ) No. 3 of 16 24 California corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, ; 25 ) Trial Date: January 8, 2018 Defendants. ) Time: 8:45 am. Dept.' 16 26 ) ) Complaint Filed: March 4, 2015 27 ) FAC Filed: August 7, 2015 28 -1- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM I. INTRODUCTION In her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff DIANA BLUM, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants SUTTER HEALTH, PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, and PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP (collectively, “Defendants”) engaged in both unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section WflCfim-PWN 17200, et seq. (“UCL”). However, for all but one of the alleged 1% business practices, Plaintiff lacks standing because she was neither a consumer affected by the alleged practice nor a competitor of any of the Defendants, and she did not suffer any economic injury as a result of the \O alleged unfair business practices. Defendants therefore request that any evidence related to 10 unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge be excluded at trial, as such 11 evidence is irrelevant, and would result in confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, undue 12 prejudice to Defendants, and a waste of time. To the extent the Court determines Plaintiff has 2000 94111 LLP Suite 13 standing, and as to Plaintiff‘s allegation that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices, CA Rees 14 Defendants request that Plaintiff s UCL claim be tried by the Court because it is an equitable Street, & Francisco, 15 claim for which there is no right to ajury trial. Gordon Battery 16 I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND San 275 17 Plaintiff is a neurologist who was employed by the Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group 1s (“the Physician Group”), and treated patients at Palo Alto Medical Foundation’s (“PAMF”) 19 clinics, from 2008 to 2013. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Unfair Competition 20 Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., by engaging in unlawful 21 and unfair business practices. (See First Amended Complaint [“FAC”] 1189, Ex. 1 to Declaration 22 of Marcie I. Fitzsimmons in Support of Defendants’ Motions in Limine [“Fitzsimmons Decl.”]). 23 Plaintiffs claim for unlawful business practices is premised on her first through third causes of 24 action for wrongful termination, retaliation in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25 2056, and breach of contract. (FAC 1H} 89(a)—(g)). As for Plaintiff s Lian business practices 26 claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed mair competition by engaging in the 27 following business practices: 28 -2- DEFENDANT S’ JOINT MOTION IN LDvflNE N0. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM l. Threatening to destroy Plaintiff’s career; Threatening to destroy the careers of other physicians; 3. Pressuring Plaintiff to engage in coding practices intended to increase the amount Sutter Health and PAMF could charge third party payers; UI-PWN 4. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter referrals outside of the Sutter network; 5. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter prescription of brand name medications; and 6. Imposing policies and practices whereby invoices submitted to third party payers listed someone other than the physician who actually provided the service. \DOOQON (PAC, 1“] 89(h)—(m)). Following her resignation, Plaintiff went on to open a private neurology 10 practice, which is a concierge practice that does not accept any insurance. (See Declaration of 11 Maiko Nakarai- Kanivas in Support of Defendants’ Motions in Limine [“Nakarai Decl.”] 112, 2000 12 Exh. A, Deposition of Plaintiff [“Pl. Depo.”] 176:6-7). 94111 LLP Suite 13 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT CA Rees Street, 14 A. Evidence Relating To Plaintiff’s Unfair Business Practices Claim Should Be & Excluded Francisco, 15 Gordon Battery 1. Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Challenge The Alleged Unfair Business 16 Practices San 275 17 Defendants anticipate that Plaintiff will attempt to introduce evidence at trial relating to 18 her claim that the policies and practices she allegedly complained about (i.e., related to coding, 19 referrals, prescription drugs, billings, etc.) were unfair business practices that violated the UCL. 20 However, except for the claim that Defendants threatened to destroy Plaintiff’s career, Plaintiff 21 does not have standing to challenge the alleged unfair business practices because she was neither 22 a consumer affected by the alleged practices nor a competitor of any of the defendants. “A 23 litigant’s standing to sue is a threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on 24 the merits.” Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. ofLos Angeles (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 993, 25 1000. To satisfy the standing requirement under the UCL, Plaintiff must establish that she 26 “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” 27 Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. The economic injury must be “(a) concrete and particularized, and 28 -3- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF ’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM (b) actual or imminent, not conj ectural or hypothetical,” and there must be a causal connection between the unfair competition and the economic injury. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322, 326 (citations and quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge Defendants’ policies and practices as unfair business practices. Her FAC makes clear that her claimed economic injury is the loss of her employment with the Physician Group. That economic injury (i.e., loss of employment) was \OOOQONUI-b allegedly caused by retaliation for complaining about certain policies and practices. There is nothing about the underlying policies and practices themselves that Plaintiff identifies as causing her economic harm. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that because of Defendants’ coding, 10 referral or generic prescription policies, she earned less money than she could have. Nor does 11 Plaintiff allege that she was a consumer (i. e., patient) who suffered economic injury as a result of 2000 12 Defendants" policies and practices. Notably, in her FAC, Plaintiff does not allege she suffered 94111 LLP Suite 13 any economic injury as a result of the alleged unfair business practices. (See PAC 1} 94 CA compare with 1111 65, 76, 106 (expressly alleging Rees Street, 14 (alleging no economic injury); 87, 101, & Francisco, 15 economic injury in excess of $10 million due to wrongful termination, retaliation, breach of Gordon Battery 16 contract, and interference with prospective economic advantage), Ex. 1 to Fitzsimmons Decl.). San 275 17 Judge Armstrong’s holding in Tanner v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (N .D. Cal. 1s Aug. 1, 2016) 2016 WL 4076116, is instructive. There, a pharmacist sued his purported former 19 employers, alleging, in part, that they engaged in unlawfiil business practices by earning profits 2o through a 501(c)(3) tax—exempt entity and funneling those profits to its related for-profit entities, 21 which in turn inured to the benefit of private individuals. Id. at *1, 8. The only economic injury 22 the plaintiff alleged was failure to pay wages. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs UCL claim, 23 reasoning that even if the defendants had engaged in the alleged unlawful business practices, the 24 plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to establish “a causal connection between Defendants’ 25 purported [Internal Revenue Code] violations (i.e., siphoning profits to private entities) and his 26 economic injury (i.e., unpaid compensation).” Id. at 8. 27 l// 28 -4- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM Similarly, like the plaintiff in Tanner, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants imposed various policies and practices in order to increase revenues at the expense of patient care, but she wholly fails to establish how any of the policies or practices caused her economic injury. Because there 4>~UJN is no causal connection between the alleged unfair business practices and Plaintiffs economic injury of loss of employment, Plaintiff cannot establish standing under the UCL to challenge the alleged unfair policies and practices. Kwikset Corp. , 51 Cal. 4th at 326 (“[P]1aintift’s economic injury [must] OKDOONQVJI come ‘as a result of the unfair competition . . . [which] requires a showing of a causal connection .. ..” (quotations omitted». 2. Evidence Related To The Alleged Unfair Business Practices Is Irrelevant As discussed above, Plaintiff lacks standing under the UCL to challenge Defendants’ 2000 12 policies and practices as unfair business practices. Evidence relating to such policies and 94111 LLP 13 practices — and in particular, whether they constituted unfair business practices — is therefore Suite CA Rees Street, 14 irrelevant and should be excluded. Evid. Code § 350 (“no evidence is admissible except relevant & Francisco, 15 evidence”); Id. § 210 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence .. .having any tendency in reason Gordan Battery San 16 to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action”). 275 17 Defendants recognize that many of the policies and practices Plaintiff seeks to challenge 18 under the UCL are policies and/or practices Plaintiff claims she complained about in connection 19 with her Business and Professions Code section 2056 retaliation claim. However, the focus of a 20 Section 2056 claim is whether Plaintiff protested policies and practices she reasonably believed 21 impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare, and whether she was retaliated 22 against as a result of those protests. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2056(b)—(c). It is not whether the 23 policies and practices in fact impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare, 24 much less whether the policies and practices were unfair business practices. Indeed, the 25 determination of whether a policy or practice constitutes an “unfair” business practice for 26 purposes of the UCL is very different from whether the policy or practice was one that a 27 physician reasonably believed impaired her ability to provide medically appropriate healthcare. 28 -5. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM A» ,4’ ~.J The standard under the UCL is whether the policy or practice threatens to Violate antitrust law or public policy, or is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Cal-Tech Comm ’ns v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, I 186-87; Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Lh-FWN Co. (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 719. Evidence relating to whether Defendants’ policies and practices were unfair business practices because they prioritized revenue over patient care can therefore be excluded as irrelevant without infringing on any of the parties’ abilities to prosecute or defend against Plaintiff’s retaliation \DOOQON claim. 3. Evidence Related To The Alleged Unfair Business Practices Should Be Excluded Under Evidence Code Section 352 10 11 Evidence relating to alleged unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks standing to 2000 12 challenge should also be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, as its probative value 94111 LLP Suite 13 is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will necessitate an undue consumption CA Rees Street, 14 of time, create a danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, and mislead the jury. Evid. Code & Francisco, 15 § 352. Litigating the issue of whether each of Defendants’ policies and practices that Plaintiff Gordon Battery San 16 challenges is, in fact, an unfair business practice is a waste of time if Plaintiff lacks standing 275 17 under the UCL. Moreover, evidence relating to and argument about how Defendants’ policies 18 and practices are improper and intended to increase revenue at the expense of patient care is 19 likely to prejudice the jury against Defendants. Indeed, there is no easier way for Plaintiff to 2o prejudice a jury against Defendants than to attempt to portray them as greedy healthcare 21 organizations that have no regard for the welfare of their patients. If the Court permits Plaintiff 22 to introduce evidence regarding the alleged unfair business practices, it is more likely that the 23 jury will unfairly hold Defendants liable for retaliation or on the other claims, even if it is not 24 supported by the evidence. Finally, given that many of the same policies and practices are 25 implicated by Plaintiff’s retaliation and UCL claims, but there are different elements and legal 26 standards for each claim, permitting evidence relating to the UCL claim for unfair business 27 practices is likely to confuse the issues and mislead thejury. Plaintiff and her counsel should be 28 -5- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIIVHNE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF ’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM ordered not to introduce any evidence regarding, or make any reference to, the alleged unfair N business practices that Plaintiff does not have standing under the UCL to challenge. B. The Court — And Not The Jury — Must Rule 0n Plaintiffs UCL Claim To the extent the Court determines Plaintiff has standing to challenge Defendants’ policies and practices as Lian business practices, and as to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s‘UCL claim be tried \OOOVONUI-k l by the Court because it is an equitable claim for which there is no right to a jury trial. While parties have the right to a jury trial in civil cases as to legal claims, they have no such right as to equitable claims. C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 10 1, 8. Claims under the UCL are equitable in nature, not legal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203 11 (describing injunctive relief available for violations of the UCL); see also In re Tobacco 11 Cases 2000 12 (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (“A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be 94111 LLP Suite 13 recovered.” (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144)). CA Rees Street, 14 California courts have therefore found that there is no entitlement to ajury trial on UCL claims. & Francisco, 15 C & K Eng'g Contractors, 23 Cal.3d at 11; see also Hodge v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal. Gordon Battery San 16 App. 4th 278, 284-85 (no right to jury trial on UCL claim because “[p]laintiffs seek relief from 275 17 alleged unfair competition, not to enforce the Labor Code .. .[and] those remedies are solely 18 equitable”); People v.First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 721, 732—33 (“in 19 UCL cases there is no right to a jUry trial”). . . . The Court, and not the jury, must make its own 2o independent findings about the facts and law regarding Plaintiff’s claim under the UCL. A—C Co. 21 V.See. Pac. Nat. Bank (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 462, 474 (reversible error to permit jury to decide 22 equitable issue); Raedeke v. Gilbraltar Savings & Loan Ass ’n (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 665, 671 (1974) 23 (court may try equitable issues, while jury tries legal issues); Estate of Fincher (1981) 199 Cal. 24 App. 3d 343, 352 (“a trial court may try equitable issues separately even when legal issues in the 25 case are tried to the jury”). Any ruling on Plaintiff’s UCL cause of action must be made by the 26 Court, and not a jury, as a matter of law. 27 Ill 28 -7- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 T0 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE PLAINTIFF'S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM III. CONCLUSION N For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion in limine to exclude any evidence relating to unfair business practices that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge under the UCL. Specifically, Defendants request that the Court exclude evidence relating to the following alleged unfair business practices: \oooflOxUI-bw 1. Threatening to destroy the careers of other physicians; 2. Pressuring Plaintiff to engage in coding practices intended to increase the amount Sutter Health and PAMF could charge third party payers; 3. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter referrals outside of the Sutter network; 4. Imposing policies and practices intended to deter prescription 10 of brand name medications; and 11 5. Imposing policies and practices whereby 1nvoices submitted to third party payers listed someone other than the physician who 2000 12 actually provided the service. Defendants also request that the Court, and not the jury, decide Plaintiff‘s UCL claim 94111 — LLP Suite 13 CA Rees 14 both as to her allegation that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices, and as to any Street, & Francisco, 15 policies and practices of Defendants that the Court determines Plaintiff has standing to challenge Gordon Battery 16 as unfair business practices — as it is an equitable claim that must be tried by the Court. San 275 l7 Dated: January 5, 2018 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP 18 19 By: MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS 20 HIEU T. WILLIAMS Attorneys for Defendant 21 PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL GROUP, INC. 22 23 24 25 26 Dated: January 5, 2018 LITTLER MENDELSON, By: 4' z A INDBERGH PORTER » MAIKO NAKARAI-KANIVAS Attorneys for Defendants P.C. I; PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION and 27 SUTTER HEALTH 28 —8- DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION EN LEVINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING & TO HAVE COURT DECIDE‘PLAINTIFF’S BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 CLAIM