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THERESA J.BARTA (State Bar No. 150995)
BARTA LAW
4041 MacArthur Blvd, Suite 280
Newport Beach, California 92660
Tel. (949) 833-3383
Fax (949) 209-2530
Email: theresa@baita‘-law.gm
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Diana P. Blum, M.D.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
DIANA P. BLUM. MD“ ) Case No. llS-CV-277582
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Plaintiffi PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION T0
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11 ) DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN
vs. ) LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, AND TESTIMOINY
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SUTTER HEALTH, a California corporation; l REGARDING CERTAIN THIRD PARTY
) PATIENT WITNESSES
PALO ALTO FOUNDATION MEDICAL
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GROUP, a California corporation; PALO )
ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION, a ) Trial Date: January 8, 2018
California corporation; and DOES through )
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20,
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3:11:
1245““
BY FAX
Defendants. Judge: l-Ion.Drew C. Takaichi
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Plaintiffhereby Opposes Defendants’ Motion in Limine on the grounds that, to the extent
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Plaintiff is precluded from calling any witness at trial,Defendants should also be similarly
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precluded from doing 50; Opposition is also made on the further ground that because they are
hearsay. the depositions ofthird—party witnesses sought to be introduced by Defendants are
inadmissible and Defendants have failed tO provide admissible evidence establishing that those
witnesses are unavailable as required under Evidence Code sections 1290, 1291; 240; 702.
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
INTRODUCTION
This motion in limine contains numerous unwarranted efforts to disparage Plaintiff and her
counsel by attacking their refusal toagree to certain requests — while wholly ignoring the factthat
neither Plaintiff nor her counsel had any ethical, legal or other obligation to do so.
For example, Defendants' motion berates Plaintiff and her counsel for failing to expedite
Defendants' efforts to serve a deposition subpoena on athird-party witness, K.S., even though
Plaintiff‘s counsel had previously been in contact with that witness. Tellingly, however,
Defendants cite to no authority requiring any such cooperation — nor is there any such authority.
In point of fact, after Defendants attempted to serve her, K.S. reached out to Plaintiff‘s counsel,
asking that she assist in stopping Defendants’ harassment in making 15 attempts to serve her with
a deposition subpoena. (Barta Decl..1120.) In fact, KS. isso disabled that although she was home
when those attempts were made, she could not answer the door. (Barta Decl., ll 20.) So that
Defendants would cease harassing K.S ,and only for that reason. Plaintiff‘s counsel ultimately
stipulated to not call KS. at trial.
(Barta Decl., ll 20.)
18 There is also a critical misrepresentation made by Defendants with respect to KS.
19 Essentially, they assert that by mailing the deposition subpoena to her in a "pink envelope." she
20 was obligated to appear for her deposition, but failed to do so. Again. it is tellingthat Defendants
21 cite to no authority for that proposition — because there is none. Rather. the statutes require that a
deposition subpoena must be personally served. (Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.220(b)( l ).)
23 That statute does not include a “substituted” service provision like that applicable to summonses.
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS‘ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
And even ifit did, substituted personal service cannot be made by way ofa mere mailing. absent
leaving a copy ofthe with a person at the residence or business ofthe party and a subsequent
mailing. (Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20) Defendants failed to even comply with those
requirements. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, KS. had no legal obligation to appear for
deposition.
As another example of Defendants’ erroneous and unwarranted effort to besmirch Plaintiff
and her counsel, Defendants assert that Plaintiff refused to stipulate to the use ofthe videotaped
depositions ofthe third-party patients who were, in fact, deposed. Defendants assert — without
providing any admissible evidence to support their assertion — that those patients are elderly and/or
infirm and unable to attend trial and that Plaintiff should therefore have stipulated to use their
deposition transcripts rather than forcing them to personally appear at trial. Again, however,
Defendants provide no authority whatsoever to support their assertion that Plaintiff should have
entered into such a stipulation — nor is there any, And Defendants’ effort to imply that Plaintiffis
being unreasonable in that regard isironic in light ofthe fact that the Defendants subpoenaed
those witnesses and forced then to appear for deposition at Defendants‘ corporate headquarters
where, in fact, there was not even any handicapped parking available for them. (Barta Dec|., 1121.)
17 Ifthe witnesses were healthy enough to appear for those depositions, they are clearly healthy
18 enough to appear at trial and Defendants have provided no admissible evidence to the contrary.
19 Two additional points must be made here with respect to Defendants’ attempt to limit what
patient/witnesses will be called at trial. First,Defendants have failed to identify precisely which
patients they are referring to and seeking to exclude. This is in direct violation ofthe mandates set
forth in Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1 996) 49 Cal.App‘4th 659, 670-671 and fn. 3.
requiring that a motion in limine set forth precisely what evidence is sought to be excluded. Thus,
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PLAINTIFF‘S OPPOSITION T0 DEFENDANTS‘ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
unless and until Defendants precisely identify (by initials) thespecific patients to which they are
referring, their motion is too vague and imprecise to be granted.
And, second, Defendants' motion seeks to preclude Plaintifffrom calling those patients as
witnesses, but Defendants provide no assurance that they, inturn, will not do so. This isimportant
because, while Plaintiff‘s counsel signed a stipulation regarding 16 patients that Plaintiff agreed
not to call at trial. Defendants never signed that stipulation. (Barta Dec|.. fil22, Exhibit R.) Thus.
fairness requires that to the extent Defendants’ motion is granted. it must be reciprocal am!
mutual. In other words, bath parties must be precluded from calling these witnesses.
II.
TO THE EXTENT THE MOTION IS GRANTED, IT MUST BE MUTUAL
AND, FURTHERMORE, DEFENDANTS CANNOT USE DEPOSITION
TESTIMONY IN LIEU OF LIVE TESTIMONY
Defendants’ motion raises four issues:
(1) Precluding Plaintiff from arguing that she was unable to contact patients because
Defendants did not provider her contact information for them;
(2) Precluding Plaintiff from calling an unidentified 23 patients at trial;
(3) Precluding Plaintiff from calling either KIL or K.S. at trial;and.
(4) Allowing Defendant to submit the deposition testimony of certain patients in lieu of
live testimony.
As to the first issue. Plaintiff does not intend to make any argument in that regard.
As to the second issue. as discussed above, itis absolutely necessary that Defendants
specifically identify which patients they are referring to, and assuming that the list isrestricted to
only those patients as to which Plaintiff did previously agree not to call at trial, Defendants must
also be prohibited from calling those witnesses as well.
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION T0 DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
T0 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
As to the third issue, Plaintiffdid agree “not to call” those witnesses and will not call them,
so long as Defendants are similarly prohibited from calling them.
The fourth issue, however, requires denial of Defendants’ request. Although the discovery
statutes permit the use ofaparty’s deposition at trialfor any purpose (Code of Civil Procedure
section 2025.620), no similar statute permits the use ofthe deposition ofa third-party witness for
purposes of providing direct testimony. In fact, section 2025.620 precludes the use ofthe
deposition ofa third party witness only in limited circumstances, eg. for impeachment or where
they are "unavailable” for trial,i.e.,they are dead, incapacitated or out ofthejurisdiction. (Code
of Civil Procedure section 2025.620(a), (c).) But apart from those exceptions, the discovery
statutes do not permit the use ofthe deposition testimony of an independent third party witness at
trial.
In establishing that a witness is “unavailable" under section 2025.620, the party offering
the hearsay testimony Defendants,
(i.e., in this case) must provide admissible evidence
14 demonstrating that the exception applies. (Evidence Code section 240.)
15 Although Defendants claim that these several witnesses are illor infirm, they provide no
16 admissible evidence supporting that contention. Indeed, all that Defendants provide in the way of
17 “evidence” is their counsel’s own declaration — but since their counsel is not a medical doctor or a
18 treating physician, there is no foundation for or personal knowledge to support that assertion.
I9 (Evidence Code section 702.)
And even assuming that a lay person’s assessment ofthe medical or mental condition ofthe
witnesses were admissible in this case, any such assessment is belied by the fact that all these
witnesses were, in fact, sufficiently healthy to be required by Defendants to travel to their
corporate offices for deposition, and Defendants have provided no evidence at all that their mental
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PLAINTIFF‘S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
or physical conditions have deteriorated since that time.‘
Accordingly, to the extent Defendants seek to use the witnesses’ depositions (whether in
transcript or videotape form) in lieu oftheir direct testimony, they are not permitted to do so and
their motion must be denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
To the extent the motion is granted with respect to the calling of witnesses attrial.or
arguments to be made at trial, it should be reciprocal and mutual, As to the use ofthe depositions
ofthird-party witnesses, the motion must be denied.
Dated: January 6, 2018
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:
ll Theresa
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1. Ba a
Attorney for Plaintiff, Dr. Diana Blum
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And, notably, despite the fact that Plaintiffhas no burden to show that these witnesses
are available, Plaintiff, in fact, does have “on-call“ letters signed by several ofthem agreeing to
appear at trial. (Barta Dec|.1l23.) This again, undermines Defendants’ assertion that the witnesses
are unavailable.
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PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES
FILED
PROOF OF SERVICE
21116JIll '6 m s
L, "5
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF OR/éNGE
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FPCA
. . , S . '
I am employed In the county ofOrange, State of California. bemfive e ag'eCdIfllIE and a
not a party to the within action; my business address is 5160 CaIEYJuS‘D each,
California 92660.
On January 8, 2018, I served the foregoing document(s) described as 1:.
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXC lDE-‘Y
EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT, AND TESTIMOINY REGARDING CERTAIN THIRD PARTY
PATIENT WITNESSES on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof
enclosed In a sealed envelope addressed as follows:
Attorneys for Sutter Health and Palo Alto Attorneys for Palo Alto Foundation Medical
Medical Foundation: Group, Inc.:
Lindbergh Porter, Esq. Marcie lson Fitzsimmons, Esq.
Maiko Nakarai—Kanivas, Esq. Gordon Rees LLP
Littler Mendelson, PC. 275 Battery St, #2000
333 Bush Street, 34'h Floor San Francisco, CA 941 l 1
San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel: (415) 986-5900
Tel: (415)433-1940 Fax: (415) 9868054
Fax: (415) 399—8490 Email: Mlsom@ gordonreesyggm
Email: Innakaraikanivas@littler.com
X (BY PERSONAL SERVICE)
A By
1
personally
caused to be
delivering copies to
delivered such
the person
envelope by
served
hand to the offices ofthe addressee pursuant
to C. C. P. § 101 1.
(BY MAIL) —I deposited such envelope in the mail at Newport Beach, California. The
envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. I am “readily familiar" with the firm‘s
l6 practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be
deposited with US. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Newport
l7 Beach, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party
served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date isor than one
l8 (1) day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
(BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) — Itransmitted a PDF version of this document
by electronic mail on to the party(s) identified on the attached service list using the e-mail
address(es) indicated.
I declare under penalty Of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
\IHW‘O :
Therésa J. Barta
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS‘ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE: CERTAIN THIRD PARTY PATIENT WITNESSES