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NOTICE: THIS DOCUMENT
CONTAINS SENSITIVE DATA
NO. 19-10876-442
IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT
LACLYN GRACE MCENTIRE 442ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
A CHILD DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS
COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Discovery Level
Discovery in this case is intended to be conducted under level 2 of rule 190 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2. Parties and Order to Be Modified
This suit to modify a prior order is brought by David McEntire, Counterpetitioner. The last
three numbers of David McEntire's Arkansas driver's license number are 884. The last three numbers
of David McEntire's Social Security number are 409. Counterpetitioner is the father of the child and
has standing to bring this suit. The requested modification will be in the best interest of the child.
Counterrespondent is Jennifer Hasler.
The first order to be modified is entitled “ORDER” and was rendered on October 14, 2019
(attached as Exhibit 1).
‘The second order to be modified is entitled “ORDER” and was rendered on Match 8, 2019
(attached as Exhibit 2)
3. Jurisdiction
On January 23, 2020 Counterpetitioner filed a Special Appearance, Plea to the Jurisdiction,
Request fot Court to Decline Jurisdiction, and General Denial to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction.
ESE SS RISE BIT SL Le AL RN ES A a SE
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 11
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
4. Child
The following child is the subject of this suit:
Name: Laclyn Grace McEntire
Sex: Female
Birth date: 05/19/2017
County of residence: Jefferson, Kentucky
5. Parties Affected
The following parties may be affected by this suit:
Name: Jennifer Hasler
Relationship: Mother
Service of this document may be had in accordance with Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, by serving Counterrespondent's attorney of record, Victor Rivera, 2220 San Jacinto Blvd,
Suite 230, Denton, TX 76205.
6. Insurance Information
Information required by section 154.181(b) and section 154.1815 of the Texas Family Code
will be exchanged by the parties privately.
7. Child's Property
‘There has been no change of consequence in the status of the child's property since the prior
order was rendered.
8. Protective Order Statement
No protective order under title 4 of the Texas Family Code, protective order under Chapter
7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, or order for emergency protection under Article 17.292
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is in effect in regard to a party to this suit or a child of a
EG A RO AL I TE ES ST
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 7%2
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
party to this suit and no application for any such order is pending.
9 Modification of Conservatorship, Possession and Access
The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement
agreement. The circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order to be
modified have materially and substantially changed since the date of rendition of the order to be
modified.
The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement
agreement. This suit to modify the designation of the person having the exclusive right to designate
the primary residence of the child is filed within one year after the date of the rendition of the order
to be modified.
Counterpetitioner requests that he be appointed as the person who has the right to designate
the primary residency of the child.
Counterpetitioner requests that the terms and conditions for access to or possession of the
child be modified to provide as follows: reasonable periods of electronic communication between the
children and Counterpetitioner to supplement Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the
children.
Counterrespondent's change of residence has caused Counterpetitioner to incur increased
costs. Counterpetitioner requests that the increased costs incurred by the Counterpetitioner to
exercise Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the child be allocated in a manner deemed by
the Court to be fair and equitable, taking into account the cause of the increased costs and the best
interest of the child. Counterpetitioner requests that any increase be made retroactive to the earlier
time of service of citation on Counterrespondent or the appearance of Counterrespondent in this
modification action.
EER ST TSE 2 RI LE RRS EE TT
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The requested modification is in the best interest of the child.
10. Support
The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement
agreement. The circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order have materially and
substantially changed since the date of the rendition of the order to be modified, and ordering
Countertespondent to provide support for the child, including the payment of child support and
medical and dental support in the manner specified by the Court. Counterpetitioner requests that
Counterresondent’s obligation to pay be made retroactive to the earlier of the time of service of
citation on Counterrespondent or the appearance of Counterrespondent in this modification action.
The requested modification is in the best interest of the child.
i. Request for Temporary Orders
Counterpetitioner requests the Court, after notice and hearing, to make temporary orders for
the safety and welfare of the child, including but not limited to the following:
Appointing Counterpetitioner and Counterrespondent temporary joint managing
conservators and designating Counterpetitioner as the conservator who has the exclusive right to
designate the primary residence of the child. In the alternative, appointing the parties as joint managing
conservators with neither parent having exclusive right to designate primary residence and ordering
the 50/50 possession and access schedule to continue.
Ordeting Counterrespondent to provide support for the child, including the payment of child
support and medical and dental support in the manner specified by the Court, while this case is
pending.
Ordering reasonable periods of electronic communication between the child and
Counterpetitioner to supplement Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the child.
EL
TTP
AM A A I
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Awarding Counterpetitioner the exclusive right to enroll the child in school.
Ordering the parties to attend a parent education and family stabilization course.
Ordering the parties to participate in an alternative dispute resolution process before trial of
this matter.
Ordering Counterrespondent to produce copies of income tax returns for tax yeats 2017-2019,
a financial statement, and current pay stubs by a date certain.
Ordering a pretrial conference to simplify the issues in this case and determine the stipulations
of the parties and for any other matters the Court deems appropriate.
With regard to the requested temporary order for orders for managing conservatorship,
Counterpetitioner would show the Court the following: it is in the child’s best interest to appoint
Counterpetitioner and Counterrespondent temporary joint managing conservators and to designate
Counterpetitioner as the conservator who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence
of the child. In the alternative, it’s in the child’s best interest that neither parent has exclusive right to
designate primary residence and that the parties continue the existing 50/50 possession and access
schedule.
22. Request for Temporary Orders and Injunction
Counterpetitioner requests the Court to dispense with the necessity of a bond, and
Counterpetitioner requests that, after notice and hearing, Counterrespondent be further restrained and
enjoined, pending the further order of the Court, from:
Disturbing the child or Counterpetitioner or interfering in any way with Counterpetitioner's
possession of the child by taking or attempting to take possession of the child, directly or through any
other person, from the residence, school, or any other place.
Withdrawing the child from enrollment in the school or day-cate facility where the child is
REE SE REST AE BS I SN SEE A BE NE SOT SO
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 5«
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
presently enrolled.
Hiding or secreting the child from Counterpetitioner.
Making disparaging remarks regarding Counterpetitioner or Counterpetitioner's family in the
presence or within the hearing of the child.
Discussing any litigation concerning the child in the presence or within the hearing of the
child.
Consuming alcohol within the 12 hours before or during the period of possession of or access
to the child.
Canceling, altering, failing to renew or pay premiums on, or in any manner affecting the level
of coverage that existed at the time this suit was filed of, any health or dental insurance policy insuring
the child.
13. Request for Attorney's Fees, Expenses, Costs, and Interest
It was necessary for Counterpetitioner to secure the services of Rachel Roland, a licensed
attorney, to preserve and protect the child's rights. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement on
all issues, Counterrespondent should be ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs
through trial and appeal, and a judgment should be rendered in favor of this attorney and against
Counterrespondent and be ordered paid directly to Counterpetitioner's attorney, who may enforce the
judgment in the attorney's own name. Counterpetitioner requests postjudgment interest as allowed
by law.
14, Prayer
Counterpetitioner prays that citation and notice issue as required by law and that the Court
enter its orders in accordance with the allegations contained in this counterpetition.
Counterpetitioner prays that the Court, after notice and hearing, grant a temporary injunction
RSE A ES PE a ESE
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION, TO MODIFY
€
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
enjoining Counterrespondent, in conformity with the allegations of this counterpetition, from the acts
set forth above while this case is pending.
Counterpetitioner prays for attorney's fees, expenses, costs, and interest as requested above.
Counterpetitioner prays for general relief.
Respectfully submitted,
Law Office of Gregory C. Goline, PLLC
1413 E. McKinney Street
Denton, Texas 76209
Tel: (940) 465-9872
Pax: (940) 435-7022
Rachel Roland
State Bar No. 24084897
tachel@gcgolinelaw.com
Gregory C. Goline
State Bar No 24048501
gree@gcgolinelaw.com
Attorney for Counterpetitioner
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true copy of this document was served in accordance with rule 21a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure on the following on February 25, 2020:
Victor Rivera by electronic filing manager.
Rachel Roland
Attorney for David McEntire
MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY
PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP
@
NO. 18-CI-502220 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY DIVISION THREE
DAVID MCENTIRE PETITIONER
VS. ORDER
JENNIFER HASLER. RESPONDENT
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This matter is under submission from Petitioner’s September 21, 2019 Motion to Alter,
Amend, or Vacate this Court’s Order of September 1], 2019. The Petitioner, David McEntire
(“David”), was represented by counsel, Denise Helline. The Respondent, Jennifer [asler
(“Jennifer”), was represented by counsel, Krsna Tibbs. Having reviewed the pleadings, exhibits,
and the Court’s record in this matter; and being otherwise sufficiently advised the Court enters
this Order. WHEREFORE, the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ordered and
adjudged that:
1. On September 2!, 2019 the Petitioner filed his Motion to Amend/Aller or Vacate this
Court’s Order of September 11, 2019 (hereafter “the Order”). This Court will amend-the Order.
‘The Petitioner correctly notes that the Order erroneously failed to credit him with the amount
paid for L.M.’s health insurance, The total monthly support obligation is $1,375, the Petitioner
earns 73% of the total parental income. He pays $150 per month for L.M.’s health insurance, so
his monthly support obligation is $853.75.
EXHIBIT
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@ @
2. The Petitioner next complains that the Court’s limited deviation—making each party
individually responsible for the childcare costs they incur-—‘‘does not fairly and reasonably take
into consideration that David has the parties’ daughter 50% of the time.” Motion to Amend/Alter
or Vacate, September 21. 2019, pp.2, The Petitioner is correct that a request to deviate was made
in his Notice of Filing filed June 25, 2019. The discussion at the hearing centered around
childcare costs, and the Court did not address the Petitioner’s broader request for deviation. The
Petitioner’s request is DENIED. The Court found that his yearly gross income available for child
support was $227,000. This is 274% of the Respondent’s income, The parties have a combined
monthly income $10,819.92 above the top end of the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines. If this
Court were to deviate from the Guidelines with respect to the base support amount, both of those
facts would be factors to weigh, not just the shared custody of the parties’ child-in-common,
Because of the countervalent factors, this Court does not believe a deviation is appropriate. There
being no just cause for delay, this is a final and appealable Order.
DEBORAI DEWEESE, JUDGE
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36" Judicial Circuit
Jefferson Circuit Court, Faniily Division Three
cer
2 bho
Denise M. Helline Krsna Tibbs
Celebrezze & Helline 214 South 8'* Street, Suite 20!
The Normandy Building Louisville, Kentucky 40202
101 North 7" Street ‘Olnsel for Respondent
QU.
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 DA DL NICHO LSON, CLERK
Counsel for Petitioner
oct 16 20h CERTIFIED COPY OF RECORD
OF JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
SEPNTY CLERK, DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK
DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK
BY. D.C.
NO. 18-C1-502220 OV 1s COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
a\g\4 PAMILY DIVISION THREE
DAVID MCENTIRE PETTFIONER
VS.
ORDER
JENNIFER HASLER, RESPONDENT
do eok kek sak ie
This matter is under submission from the January 11,2019 hearing of issues relating to
the parties’ child-in-common. The Petitioner, David McEntire (“David”), was present at the
hearing with counsel, Denise Helline. The Respondent, Jennifer Hasler (“Jennifer”), was present
at the hearing with counsel, Krsna ‘Tibbs. Both parties gave sworn testimony. The Court also
heard swom testimony from the Petitioner’s father, James McEntire, and from the Respondent’s
private investigator, John Hagan. Having heard the testimony of the parties and the arguments of
counsel; having reviewed the pleadings, exhibits, and the Court’s record in this matter; and being
otherwise sufficiently advised the Court enters this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The parties appeared before the Court on January 11, 2019 to hear issues relating to their
child-in-common, L.M., born May 19, 2017. The parties were not martied at the time of L.M.’s
birth, There is no question as to paternity, and the Petitioner is acknowledged as both natural and
legal father of the child. The parties also agree as a preliminary matter that joint legal custody of
EXHIBIT
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the child is appropriate. The question before the Court is primarily one of parenting time.
Unfortunately, despite the narrow scope of issues, there are substantial difficulties presented in
the facts.
As a preliminary matter, the Respondent filed with the Court a Post Trial Memorandum
and an Amended Post Trial Memorandum on February 8, 2019 and February 11, 2019. On
February 12, 2019 the Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike those memoranda on the basis that: 1)
the Respondent failed to file her pre-trial memorandum as mandated by this Court’s hearing
order; 2) that the memoranda were filed after the time which the Court allowed for their entry,
and 3) that they contain arguments and evidence which were not presented at trial. The
Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED IN PART, This Court will disregard the elements of the
Respondent’s memoranda that were not introduced at trial. It is within the Court’s discretion to
permit the memoranda into the record, and the Court will do so.
The parties, though never married, were together for four years before they scparated on
August |, 2018. They each have two prior-born children from previous relationships. The
Respondent’s prior-born daughter, age 14, is the sole child of those four still under the age of
majority. For the majority of the parties’ relationship they did not reside in the Louisville area.
The Petitioner works as a vice president for FFO Home Furniture. Around the beginning of 2018
he was offered a position in the Louisville area. The Petitioner characterized this as a promotion,
while the Respondent suggested it was a lateral move. Regardless, in February the parties bought
a home in the Louisville area, Between February and May, the Petitioner split his time between
their previous residence and Louisville. Thereafter, both parties lived in Louisville with L.M.
Unfortunately, their relationship had been deteriorating. On August 8, 2018, the Respondent
packed a bag, took L.M. and her prior-born daughter, and moved to Texas, Although she had not
previously lived in Texas, her brother lives there and the Respondent was able to find
employment relatively quickly.
The question before the Court is how to create a parenting schedule that is in the best
interest of the child. Under KRS 403.270 (2) there is a presumption that equal parenting time is
in the best interest of the child. In order to overcome the presumption, a party must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that equal parenting time is not in the best interest of the child. Id.
‘The Petitioner has requested an equal parenting time schedule. Given the distance between the
parties, he would prefer that the parties alternate three week blocks of parenting time with the
child, although he would, in the alternative, accept two week blocks. For her part, the
Respondent does not believe an equal parenting schedule is appropriate. To support her position
she made a number of allegations in her Post Trial Memorandum that the Court will not
consider, including that: 1) the Petitioner’s infidelity caused the end of their relationship; 2) the
Petitioner was “mentally abusive” to her during their relationship; and 3) the Petitioner was an
absent father by choice. The first two allegations do not bear addressing. With respect to the
third, the Court notes that the complained-of absence appears to be largely the result of the
Petitioner being required to move for work. As a result, the Pctitioner spent a period of several
months where he would work and stay in Louisville, then return home for the weekend to see the
Respondent and L.M. This accusation is particularly unsporting as the Court heard unopposed
testimony that the primary reason the Petitioner did this was to allow the Respondent’s prior-
born daughter to finish out the school year.
At the January 11, 2019 trial the parties traded allegations of problematic alcohol use.
The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent got drunk once while the child was in her care, while
the Respondent alleged that the Petitioner occasionally drove home drunk from an after-work
happy hour. The evidence before the Court is not sufficient to find that either party would be an
inappropriate caretaker due to issues with alcohol.
The Respondent expressed concern that the Petitioner was not able to properly care for
the child’s medical needs because he apparently failed to take the child to the pediatrician during
a visit when she had an ear infection. Even accepting the Respondent’s version of events, there is
not sufficient evidence to find that the Petitioner opted for a medically inappropriate or
dangerous course of action. The child evidently has a problem with ear infections. Ear infections
.
in young children do not always present a clear set of symptoms. When the child is too young to
accurately report their own medical condition, ear infections are sometimes not easy to diagnose.
The Petitioner testified that he believed the child was having allergies and administered her
allergy medication The Court does not find this incident problematic.
Finally, the Respondent made several ailegations during the hearing that need to be
addressed but do not directly bear on their parenting ability. The Respondent presented the
testimony of John Hagan, a private investigator, in an attempt to prove that the Petitioner had
driven drunk and also was in a relationship involving prostitution. As to the first allegation, Mr.
Hagan observed the Petitioner, over a period of at least an hour, consuming three drinks at a
restaurant before driving home. There is no evidence to show that the Petitioner was over the
legal limit at that time, nor does it have direct bearing on the issue at hand. With respect to the
second allegation, Mr. Hagan presented testimony that the Petitioner was visited at his home by a
young lady. Mr. Hagan indicated to the Court that the lady had no criminal record, but that he
nevertheless believed she was engaged in prostitution with the Petitioner. The finds no merit in
this allegation either,
The Court finds that the Respondent has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that an unequal parenting schedule would be in the best interest of the child. Therefore. the
Petitioner's motion for an equal parenting schedule is GRANTED. Fortunately for ail involved,
the parties each make a relatively good living and have the financial mearis to provide a
comfortable home for the child, as well as appropriate childcare. Unfortunately, the parties
clearly have a great deal of acrimony between them. Equally important, they have a .reat deal of
distance between them. By car, the trip between Louisville and Dallas takes approximately
twelve hours. The parties have been exchanging the child in Memphis, Tennessee, but each time
the child has to be transferred between a parent represents a hardship for the child. Therefore,
despite the young age of the child, the Court finds it appropriate to operate on a rotating three
week schedule. That schedule shall begin upon the first scheduled exchange of the child
subsequent to the entry of this Order. Furthermore, the parties are strongly encouraged where
possible to fly with the child to make the exchange rather than drive.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ordered and adjudged
that the parties shall behave in conformity with the foregoing Order. There being no just cause
for delay, this is a final and appealable Order.
ENTERED IN COURT. |
DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK| a me
DEBORAH DEWEES DGE
<8 2019 Commonwealth of Kentucky, 30" Judicial Circuit
BY. Jefferson C)reuit Coprt, Family Division Three
219
DEPI CLERK
cai
CERTIFIESON D COP IREGORD ATE
OF JEFFER FAMILY COUR
CLERK
DAVID L. NICHOLSON,
AVID L. NIC!
SON, CLERK
BY.
ce:
Denise M. Heiline
Celebrezze & Helline
The Normandy Building,
101 North 7 Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Counsel for Petitioner
Krsna Tibbs
214 South 8'" Street, Suite 201
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Counse} for Respondent
FILED
ar_1:42 orcLock_A_M
FEB 15 2019
DENTON COUNTY STANDING ORDER DISTRICT CLERK
REGARDING CHILDREN, PROPERTY AND CONDUCT OF THE PART! is
THIS DENTON COUNTY STANDING ORDER REGARDING CHILDREN, PR eRTY-ANDCONDUCTO
OF THE PARTIES IS BINDING ON (1) THE PARTIES, (2) THE PARTIES’ OFFICERS, AGENTS, SERVANTS,
EMPLOYEES, AND ATTORNEYS, AND (3) ANY OTHER PERSON WHO ACTS IN CONCERT WITH THE
PARTIES OR THEIR AGENTS AND WHO RECEIVES ACTUAL NOTICE OF THESE ORDERS, AND IS
ENFORCEABLE BY CONTEMPT, INCLUDING A FINE OF UP TO $500, CONFINEMENT IN THE COUNTY
JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS, OR BOTH SUCH A FINE AND CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR EACH VIOLATION,
AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
No party to this lawsuit has requested this order. Rather, this order is a standing order of the Denton County District
Courts that applies in every divorce suit and every suit affecting the parent-child relationship, including a suit for
modification or enforcement of a prior order, filed in Denton County, Texas. The Denton County District Courts have
adopted this order pursuant to Texas Family Code §§6.501-6.503, 105.001, and 105.009 because the parties and their
children should be protected and their property preserved while the lawsuit is pending before the court. IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED:
I NO DISRUPTION OF CHILDREN, All parties are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts
concerning any children who are subjects of this cause:
ll Removing the children from the State of Texas for the purpose of changing the children’s domicile or
residence, acting directly or in concert with others, without the written agreement of all parties or an order
of this Court; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from so removing
the children if an active prior court order gives that party the right to designate the children’s primary
residence outside the State of Texas or without regard to geographic location.
122 Disrupting or withdrawing the children from the school or day-care facility where the children are presently
enrolled without the written agreement of all parties or an order of this Court; provided, however, that this
paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from so withdrawing the children from a school or day-care
facility if that party is changing the children’s domicile or residence within that party’s rights pursuant to an
active prior court order as described in $1.1 above.
13 Hiding or secreting the children from any other party.
14 Changing the children’s current place of abode without the written agreement of all parties or an order of
this Court; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from changing such
place of abode if an active prior court order gives that party the right to designate the children’s primary
residence without geographic restriction, or if the new place of abode lies within the geographic limits
established by that active prior court order.
1.5 Disturbing the peace of the children.
1.6 Making disparaging remarks in the presence of the children about another party or another party’s family
members, including but not limited to the child’s grandparents, aunts, uncles, stepparents, or anyone with
whom the party has a dating relationship.
Le Discussing with the children, or with any other person in the presence of the children, any litigation related
to the children or the other party.
1.8 If this is an original divorce action, allowing anyone with whom the party has a dating relationship to be in
the same dwelling or on the same premises overnight while in possession of the child. Overnight is defined
from 10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m,
2 CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES DURING THE CASE. All parties are ORDERED to refrain from doing the
following acts with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another party:
2.1 Using vulgar, profane, obscene, coarse, offensive, or indecent language to communicate with another party,
whether in person, by telephone, or in writing, including by email, text message, or any other electronic
communication.
22 Threatening another party in person, by telephone, or in writing, including by email, text message, or any
other electronic communication, to take unlawful action against the party, a member of the party’s family,
including but not limited to anyone with whom the party has a dating relationship, or the party’s property.
23. Placing or transmitting one or more telephone calls, emails, text messages, or other electronic
communications to another party at an unreasonable hour, in an offensive or repetitious manner,
anonymously, or without a legitimate purpose of communication.
Denton County Standing Order Regarding
Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 2/19/19 Page 1 of4
3 PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY AND USE OF FUNDS DURING DIVORCE CASE, If this is a divorce
case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain from the following conduct:
3.1 Destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise harming or reducing the value
of the property of one or both of the parties, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real
property and regardless of whether it is claimed as separate or community property.
3.2 Misrepresenting or refusing to disclose to the other party or to the Court, on proper request, the existence,
amount, or location of any property, including electronically stored or recorded information, of one or both
of the parties, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of whether it
is claimed as separate or community property.
33 Damaging, destroying or tampering with the tangible or intellectual property of one or both of the parties,
including any document or electronically stored or recorded information that represents or embodies
anything of value, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of
whether it is claimed as separate or community property.
34 Selling, transferring, assigning, mortgaging, encumbering, or in any other manner alienating any of the
property of either party, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of
whether it is claimed as separate or community property, except as specifically authorized by this order or a
subsequent order of this Court.
3.5 Incurring any indebtedness, including cash advances from a credit card or line of credit, other than legal
expense in connection with this suit, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of
this Court.
3.6 Making withdrawals from any account in any financial institution for any purpose, except as specifically
authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court.
37 Spending any sum of cash in either party’s possession or subject to either party’s control for any purpose,
except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court.
3.8 Withdrawing or borrowing in any manner for any purpose from any retirement, profit-sharing, pension,
death, or other employee benefit plan or employee savings plan or from any individual retirement account
or Keogh account, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court.
39 Signing or endorsing the others party’s name on any negotiable instrument, check, or draft, such as tax
refunds, insurance payments, and dividends, or attempting to negotiate any negotiable instrument payable
to the other party without the personal signature of the other party. This includes affixing the other party’s
digital signature to any electronic document.
3.10 Taking any action to terminate, close, restrict, or limit lines of credit, credit cards, charge cards, or financial
accounts in the name of or subject to the control of the other party, whether owned individually or jointly,
except by subsequent court order or written agreement signed by each party permitting such action.
3.01 Entering, operating, or exercising contro! over the motor vehicle in the possession of the other party.
3.12 Discontinuing or altering the withholding for federal income taxes on wages or salary while this suit is
pending.
3.13 Terminating or in any manner affecting the service of water, electricity, gas, telephone, cable television, or
other contractual services, such as security, pest control, landscaping, or yard maintenance at the other
party’s residence or in any manner attempting to withdraw any deposits for service in connection with such
services,
3.14 Unlawfully intercepting or recording the other party’s electronic communications.
3.15 Opening or diverting mail, email, or any other electronic communication addressed to the other party.
3.16 Excluding @ spouse from the use and enjoyment of the marital residence in which the spouse had been
residing within the thirty (30) day period prior to the date the original petition for divorce was filed.
3.17 Communicating with the other party’s employer or a person with whom the other party has a business
relationship without a legitimate purpose.
3.18 Entering any safe deposit box in the name of or subject to the control of a party, whether owned
individually or jointly, except by subsequent court order or written agreement signed by each party
permitting such entrance.
3.19 Desiroying, disposing of, or altering any e-mail, text message, video message, or chat message or other
electronic data or electronically stored information relevant to the subject matter of the divorce suit,
regardless of whether the information is stored on a hard drive, in a removable storage device, in cloud
storage, or in another electronic storage medium.
3.20 Modifying, changing, or altering the native format or metadata of any electronic data or electronically
stored information relevant to the subject matter of the suit for dissolution of marriage, regardless of
whether the information is stored on a hard drive, in a removable storage device, in cloud storage, or in
another electronic storage medium. This prohibition shall likewise apply to any suit affecting the parent-
Denton County Standing Order Regarding
Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 2/19/19 Page 2 of4
child relationship with regard to any electronic data or electronically stored information relevant to the
subject matter of the suit affecting the parent-child relationship.
3.21 Deleting any data or content from any social network profile used or created by either party or a child of
the parties.
3.22 Using any password or personal identification number to gain access to the other party’s email account,
bank account, social media account, or any other electronic account
4 PERSONAL AND BUSINESS RECORDS IN DIVORCE CASE. If this is a divorce case, both parties to the
marriage are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts
4 Concealing, destroying, disposing of, or altering any of the parties’ family records, property records,
financial records, business records or any records of income, debts, or other obligations, including, but not
limited to, a canceled check, deposit slip, other records from a financial institution, records of credit
purchases or cash advances, tax returns, and financial statements.
4.2 Falsifying any writing or record relating to the property of either party.
43 “Records” includes e-mail or other digital or electronic data, whether stored on a computer hard drive,
diskette or other electronic storage device.
5, INSURANCE IN DIVORCE. CASE, If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain
from doing the following acts, except by written agreement signed by each party permitting such acts:
5 Withdrawing or borrowing in any manner all or any part of the cash surrender value of life insurance
policies on the life of either party, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of
this Court.
$.2 Changing or in any manner altering the beneficiary designation on any life insurance on the life of either
party or the parties’ children.
5.3 Canceling, altering, or in any manner affecting any casualty, automobile, or health insurance policies
insuring the parties’ property or persons including the parties’ minor children.
6 SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATIONS IN DIVORCE CASE. If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are
specifically authorized to da the following:
6.1 To engage in acts reasonably and necessary to the conduct of that party’s usual business and occupation.
6.2 To make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable attomey’s fees and expenses in connection
with this suit.
6.3 To make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable and necessary living expenses commensurate
with such expenditures and indebtedness incurred for the past six months,
64 To make withdrawals from accounts in financial institutions only for the purposes authorized by this order.
SERVICE AND APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER.
The Petitioner shall attach a Copy of this order to the original petition and to each copy of the petition, At
the time an original petition is filed by non-electronic means, if the Petitioner has failed to attach a copy of
this order to the petition and any copy of the petition, the Clerk shall ensure that a copy of this order is
attached to the petition and every copy of the petition presented. At the time an original petition is filed
electronically, if the Petitioner has failed to attach a copy of this order to the petition and any copy of the
petition, the Clerk shall decline to issue citation until the petition is resubmitted with a copy of this order
attached in conformity with this section. Additionally, the Court may decline to grant temporary ex parte
relief, decline to set a hearing in the case, or strike the petition without further notice if the Petitioner fails
to resubmit the petition with a copy of this order attached in conformity with this section.
72 This order is effective upon the filing of the original petition and shall remain in full force and effect as a
temporary restraining order for fourteen days after the date of service of the original petition. The
requirement of a bond is waived. If no party contests this order within fourteen days after the date of
service of the original petition, this order shall continue in full force and effect as a temporary injunction
until further order of this court. This entire order will terminate and will no longer be effective only upon
further order of the court, entry ofa final order or dismissal of the case.
73 In addition to any other remedies available for the enforcement of this order, at the Court’s discretion, the
Court may award reasonable and necessary attorney fees and court costs against a party found to have
violated a provision of this order.
8 EFFECT OF O THER COURT ORDERS. If any part of this order is different from any part ofa protective order
that has already been entered or is later entered, the protective order provisions prevail. Any part of this order not changed by
some later order remains in full force and effect until the court signs a final decree.
Denton County Standing Order Regarding
Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 29/9 Page 3 of 4
9 PARTIE: §_ ENCOURAGED TO MEDIATE/COLLABORATE. The parties are encouraged to settle their
disputes amicably without court intervention. The parties are encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution methods, such
as mediation or the collaborative law process, to resolve the conflicts that may arise in this lawsuit.
10. ARENT EDUCATION AND STABILIZATION, If this is a suit affecting or seeking modification of the parent-
child relationship, all parties are ORDERED to attend one of the following parent education and stabilization programs
within sixty (60) days of the date of filing or service of the suit, as applicable:
10.1 Children in the Middle (www.childreninthemiddle.com or 800-239-3971).
10.2 Divorce Sanity Co-Parenting (www.ccdcounseling.com/divorce-sanity or 800-897-7068).
Preview
NOTICE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE DATA NO. 19-10876-442 IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT LACLYN GRACE MCENTIRE 442ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT A CHILD DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP Discovery Level Discovery in this case is intended to be conducted under level 2 of rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. Parties and Order to Be Modified This suit to modify a prior order is brought by David McEntire, Counterpetitioner. The last three numbers of David McEntire's Arkansas driver's license number are 884. The last three numbers of David McEntire's Social Security number are 409. Counterpetitioner is the father of the child and has standing to bring this suit. The requested modification will be in the best interest of the child. Counterrespondent is Jennifer Hasler. The first order to be modified is entitled “ORDER” and was rendered on October 14, 2019 (attached as Exhibit 1). ‘The second order to be modified is entitled “ORDER” and was rendered on Match 8, 2019 (attached as Exhibit 2) 3. Jurisdiction On January 23, 2020 Counterpetitioner filed a Special Appearance, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Request fot Court to Decline Jurisdiction, and General Denial to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction. ESE SS RISE BIT SL Le AL RN ES A a SE MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 11 PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP 4. Child The following child is the subject of this suit: Name: Laclyn Grace McEntire Sex: Female Birth date: 05/19/2017 County of residence: Jefferson, Kentucky 5. Parties Affected The following parties may be affected by this suit: Name: Jennifer Hasler Relationship: Mother Service of this document may be had in accordance with Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, by serving Counterrespondent's attorney of record, Victor Rivera, 2220 San Jacinto Blvd, Suite 230, Denton, TX 76205. 6. Insurance Information Information required by section 154.181(b) and section 154.1815 of the Texas Family Code will be exchanged by the parties privately. 7. Child's Property ‘There has been no change of consequence in the status of the child's property since the prior order was rendered. 8. Protective Order Statement No protective order under title 4 of the Texas Family Code, protective order under Chapter 7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, or order for emergency protection under Article 17.292 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is in effect in regard to a party to this suit or a child of a EG A RO AL I TE ES ST MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 7%2 PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP party to this suit and no application for any such order is pending. 9 Modification of Conservatorship, Possession and Access The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement agreement. The circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order to be modified have materially and substantially changed since the date of rendition of the order to be modified. The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement agreement. This suit to modify the designation of the person having the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child is filed within one year after the date of the rendition of the order to be modified. Counterpetitioner requests that he be appointed as the person who has the right to designate the primary residency of the child. Counterpetitioner requests that the terms and conditions for access to or possession of the child be modified to provide as follows: reasonable periods of electronic communication between the children and Counterpetitioner to supplement Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the children. Counterrespondent's change of residence has caused Counterpetitioner to incur increased costs. Counterpetitioner requests that the increased costs incurred by the Counterpetitioner to exercise Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the child be allocated in a manner deemed by the Court to be fair and equitable, taking into account the cause of the increased costs and the best interest of the child. Counterpetitioner requests that any increase be made retroactive to the earlier time of service of citation on Counterrespondent or the appearance of Counterrespondent in this modification action. EER ST TSE 2 RI LE RRS EE TT MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP The requested modification is in the best interest of the child. 10. Support The order to be modified is not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement agreement. The circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the date of the rendition of the order to be modified, and ordering Countertespondent to provide support for the child, including the payment of child support and medical and dental support in the manner specified by the Court. Counterpetitioner requests that Counterresondent’s obligation to pay be made retroactive to the earlier of the time of service of citation on Counterrespondent or the appearance of Counterrespondent in this modification action. The requested modification is in the best interest of the child. i. Request for Temporary Orders Counterpetitioner requests the Court, after notice and hearing, to make temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the child, including but not limited to the following: Appointing Counterpetitioner and Counterrespondent temporary joint managing conservators and designating Counterpetitioner as the conservator who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child. In the alternative, appointing the parties as joint managing conservators with neither parent having exclusive right to designate primary residence and ordering the 50/50 possession and access schedule to continue. Ordeting Counterrespondent to provide support for the child, including the payment of child support and medical and dental support in the manner specified by the Court, while this case is pending. Ordering reasonable periods of electronic communication between the child and Counterpetitioner to supplement Counterpetitioner's periods of possession of the child. EL TTP AM A A I MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP Awarding Counterpetitioner the exclusive right to enroll the child in school. Ordering the parties to attend a parent education and family stabilization course. Ordering the parties to participate in an alternative dispute resolution process before trial of this matter. Ordering Counterrespondent to produce copies of income tax returns for tax yeats 2017-2019, a financial statement, and current pay stubs by a date certain. Ordering a pretrial conference to simplify the issues in this case and determine the stipulations of the parties and for any other matters the Court deems appropriate. With regard to the requested temporary order for orders for managing conservatorship, Counterpetitioner would show the Court the following: it is in the child’s best interest to appoint Counterpetitioner and Counterrespondent temporary joint managing conservators and to designate Counterpetitioner as the conservator who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child. In the alternative, it’s in the child’s best interest that neither parent has exclusive right to designate primary residence and that the parties continue the existing 50/50 possession and access schedule. 22. Request for Temporary Orders and Injunction Counterpetitioner requests the Court to dispense with the necessity of a bond, and Counterpetitioner requests that, after notice and hearing, Counterrespondent be further restrained and enjoined, pending the further order of the Court, from: Disturbing the child or Counterpetitioner or interfering in any way with Counterpetitioner's possession of the child by taking or attempting to take possession of the child, directly or through any other person, from the residence, school, or any other place. Withdrawing the child from enrollment in the school or day-cate facility where the child is REE SE REST AE BS I SN SEE A BE NE SOT SO MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY 5« PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP presently enrolled. Hiding or secreting the child from Counterpetitioner. Making disparaging remarks regarding Counterpetitioner or Counterpetitioner's family in the presence or within the hearing of the child. Discussing any litigation concerning the child in the presence or within the hearing of the child. Consuming alcohol within the 12 hours before or during the period of possession of or access to the child. Canceling, altering, failing to renew or pay premiums on, or in any manner affecting the level of coverage that existed at the time this suit was filed of, any health or dental insurance policy insuring the child. 13. Request for Attorney's Fees, Expenses, Costs, and Interest It was necessary for Counterpetitioner to secure the services of Rachel Roland, a licensed attorney, to preserve and protect the child's rights. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement on all issues, Counterrespondent should be ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs through trial and appeal, and a judgment should be rendered in favor of this attorney and against Counterrespondent and be ordered paid directly to Counterpetitioner's attorney, who may enforce the judgment in the attorney's own name. Counterpetitioner requests postjudgment interest as allowed by law. 14, Prayer Counterpetitioner prays that citation and notice issue as required by law and that the Court enter its orders in accordance with the allegations contained in this counterpetition. Counterpetitioner prays that the Court, after notice and hearing, grant a temporary injunction RSE A ES PE a ESE MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION, TO MODIFY € PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP enjoining Counterrespondent, in conformity with the allegations of this counterpetition, from the acts set forth above while this case is pending. Counterpetitioner prays for attorney's fees, expenses, costs, and interest as requested above. Counterpetitioner prays for general relief. Respectfully submitted, Law Office of Gregory C. Goline, PLLC 1413 E. McKinney Street Denton, Texas 76209 Tel: (940) 465-9872 Pax: (940) 435-7022 Rachel Roland State Bar No. 24084897 tachel@gcgolinelaw.com Gregory C. Goline State Bar No 24048501 gree@gcgolinelaw.com Attorney for Counterpetitioner Certificate of Service I certify that a true copy of this document was served in accordance with rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the following on February 25, 2020: Victor Rivera by electronic filing manager. Rachel Roland Attorney for David McEntire MCENTIRE—COUNTERPETITION TO MODIFY PARENT CHILD RELATIONSHIP @ NO. 18-CI-502220 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY DIVISION THREE DAVID MCENTIRE PETITIONER VS. ORDER JENNIFER HASLER. RESPONDENT fedsk dkdok dedok adbak dedeok This matter is under submission from Petitioner’s September 21, 2019 Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate this Court’s Order of September 1], 2019. The Petitioner, David McEntire (“David”), was represented by counsel, Denise Helline. The Respondent, Jennifer [asler (“Jennifer”), was represented by counsel, Krsna Tibbs. Having reviewed the pleadings, exhibits, and the Court’s record in this matter; and being otherwise sufficiently advised the Court enters this Order. WHEREFORE, the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that: 1. On September 2!, 2019 the Petitioner filed his Motion to Amend/Aller or Vacate this Court’s Order of September 11, 2019 (hereafter “the Order”). This Court will amend-the Order. ‘The Petitioner correctly notes that the Order erroneously failed to credit him with the amount paid for L.M.’s health insurance, The total monthly support obligation is $1,375, the Petitioner earns 73% of the total parental income. He pays $150 per month for L.M.’s health insurance, so his monthly support obligation is $853.75. EXHIBIT | —-- @ @ 2. The Petitioner next complains that the Court’s limited deviation—making each party individually responsible for the childcare costs they incur-—‘‘does not fairly and reasonably take into consideration that David has the parties’ daughter 50% of the time.” Motion to Amend/Alter or Vacate, September 21. 2019, pp.2, The Petitioner is correct that a request to deviate was made in his Notice of Filing filed June 25, 2019. The discussion at the hearing centered around childcare costs, and the Court did not address the Petitioner’s broader request for deviation. The Petitioner’s request is DENIED. The Court found that his yearly gross income available for child support was $227,000. This is 274% of the Respondent’s income, The parties have a combined monthly income $10,819.92 above the top end of the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines. If this Court were to deviate from the Guidelines with respect to the base support amount, both of those facts would be factors to weigh, not just the shared custody of the parties’ child-in-common, Because of the countervalent factors, this Court does not believe a deviation is appropriate. There being no just cause for delay, this is a final and appealable Order. DEBORAI DEWEESE, JUDGE Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36" Judicial Circuit Jefferson Circuit Court, Faniily Division Three cer 2 bho Denise M. Helline Krsna Tibbs Celebrezze & Helline 214 South 8'* Street, Suite 20! The Normandy Building Louisville, Kentucky 40202 101 North 7" Street ‘Olnsel for Respondent QU. Louisville, Kentucky 40202 DA DL NICHO LSON, CLERK Counsel for Petitioner oct 16 20h CERTIFIED COPY OF RECORD OF JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT SEPNTY CLERK, DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK BY. D.C. NO. 18-C1-502220 OV 1s COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT a\g\4 PAMILY DIVISION THREE DAVID MCENTIRE PETTFIONER VS. ORDER JENNIFER HASLER, RESPONDENT do eok kek sak ie This matter is under submission from the January 11,2019 hearing of issues relating to the parties’ child-in-common. The Petitioner, David McEntire (“David”), was present at the hearing with counsel, Denise Helline. The Respondent, Jennifer Hasler (“Jennifer”), was present at the hearing with counsel, Krsna ‘Tibbs. Both parties gave sworn testimony. The Court also heard swom testimony from the Petitioner’s father, James McEntire, and from the Respondent’s private investigator, John Hagan. Having heard the testimony of the parties and the arguments of counsel; having reviewed the pleadings, exhibits, and the Court’s record in this matter; and being otherwise sufficiently advised the Court enters this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The parties appeared before the Court on January 11, 2019 to hear issues relating to their child-in-common, L.M., born May 19, 2017. The parties were not martied at the time of L.M.’s birth, There is no question as to paternity, and the Petitioner is acknowledged as both natural and legal father of the child. The parties also agree as a preliminary matter that joint legal custody of EXHIBIT zZ the child is appropriate. The question before the Court is primarily one of parenting time. Unfortunately, despite the narrow scope of issues, there are substantial difficulties presented in the facts. As a preliminary matter, the Respondent filed with the Court a Post Trial Memorandum and an Amended Post Trial Memorandum on February 8, 2019 and February 11, 2019. On February 12, 2019 the Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike those memoranda on the basis that: 1) the Respondent failed to file her pre-trial memorandum as mandated by this Court’s hearing order; 2) that the memoranda were filed after the time which the Court allowed for their entry, and 3) that they contain arguments and evidence which were not presented at trial. The Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED IN PART, This Court will disregard the elements of the Respondent’s memoranda that were not introduced at trial. It is within the Court’s discretion to permit the memoranda into the record, and the Court will do so. The parties, though never married, were together for four years before they scparated on August |, 2018. They each have two prior-born children from previous relationships. The Respondent’s prior-born daughter, age 14, is the sole child of those four still under the age of majority. For the majority of the parties’ relationship they did not reside in the Louisville area. The Petitioner works as a vice president for FFO Home Furniture. Around the beginning of 2018 he was offered a position in the Louisville area. The Petitioner characterized this as a promotion, while the Respondent suggested it was a lateral move. Regardless, in February the parties bought a home in the Louisville area, Between February and May, the Petitioner split his time between their previous residence and Louisville. Thereafter, both parties lived in Louisville with L.M. Unfortunately, their relationship had been deteriorating. On August 8, 2018, the Respondent packed a bag, took L.M. and her prior-born daughter, and moved to Texas, Although she had not previously lived in Texas, her brother lives there and the Respondent was able to find employment relatively quickly. The question before the Court is how to create a parenting schedule that is in the best interest of the child. Under KRS 403.270 (2) there is a presumption that equal parenting time is in the best interest of the child. In order to overcome the presumption, a party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that equal parenting time is not in the best interest of the child. Id. ‘The Petitioner has requested an equal parenting time schedule. Given the distance between the parties, he would prefer that the parties alternate three week blocks of parenting time with the child, although he would, in the alternative, accept two week blocks. For her part, the Respondent does not believe an equal parenting schedule is appropriate. To support her position she made a number of allegations in her Post Trial Memorandum that the Court will not consider, including that: 1) the Petitioner’s infidelity caused the end of their relationship; 2) the Petitioner was “mentally abusive” to her during their relationship; and 3) the Petitioner was an absent father by choice. The first two allegations do not bear addressing. With respect to the third, the Court notes that the complained-of absence appears to be largely the result of the Petitioner being required to move for work. As a result, the Pctitioner spent a period of several months where he would work and stay in Louisville, then return home for the weekend to see the Respondent and L.M. This accusation is particularly unsporting as the Court heard unopposed testimony that the primary reason the Petitioner did this was to allow the Respondent’s prior- born daughter to finish out the school year. At the January 11, 2019 trial the parties traded allegations of problematic alcohol use. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent got drunk once while the child was in her care, while the Respondent alleged that the Petitioner occasionally drove home drunk from an after-work happy hour. The evidence before the Court is not sufficient to find that either party would be an inappropriate caretaker due to issues with alcohol. The Respondent expressed concern that the Petitioner was not able to properly care for the child’s medical needs because he apparently failed to take the child to the pediatrician during a visit when she had an ear infection. Even accepting the Respondent’s version of events, there is not sufficient evidence to find that the Petitioner opted for a medically inappropriate or dangerous course of action. The child evidently has a problem with ear infections. Ear infections . in young children do not always present a clear set of symptoms. When the child is too young to accurately report their own medical condition, ear infections are sometimes not easy to diagnose. The Petitioner testified that he believed the child was having allergies and administered her allergy medication The Court does not find this incident problematic. Finally, the Respondent made several ailegations during the hearing that need to be addressed but do not directly bear on their parenting ability. The Respondent presented the testimony of John Hagan, a private investigator, in an attempt to prove that the Petitioner had driven drunk and also was in a relationship involving prostitution. As to the first allegation, Mr. Hagan observed the Petitioner, over a period of at least an hour, consuming three drinks at a restaurant before driving home. There is no evidence to show that the Petitioner was over the legal limit at that time, nor does it have direct bearing on the issue at hand. With respect to the second allegation, Mr. Hagan presented testimony that the Petitioner was visited at his home by a young lady. Mr. Hagan indicated to the Court that the lady had no criminal record, but that he nevertheless believed she was engaged in prostitution with the Petitioner. The finds no merit in this allegation either, The Court finds that the Respondent has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an unequal parenting schedule would be in the best interest of the child. Therefore. the Petitioner's motion for an equal parenting schedule is GRANTED. Fortunately for ail involved, the parties each make a relatively good living and have the financial mearis to provide a comfortable home for the child, as well as appropriate childcare. Unfortunately, the parties clearly have a great deal of acrimony between them. Equally important, they have a .reat deal of distance between them. By car, the trip between Louisville and Dallas takes approximately twelve hours. The parties have been exchanging the child in Memphis, Tennessee, but each time the child has to be transferred between a parent represents a hardship for the child. Therefore, despite the young age of the child, the Court finds it appropriate to operate on a rotating three week schedule. That schedule shall begin upon the first scheduled exchange of the child subsequent to the entry of this Order. Furthermore, the parties are strongly encouraged where possible to fly with the child to make the exchange rather than drive. ORDER WHEREFORE, the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the parties shall behave in conformity with the foregoing Order. There being no just cause for delay, this is a final and appealable Order. ENTERED IN COURT. | DAVID L. NICHOLSON, CLERK| a me DEBORAH DEWEES DGE <8 2019 Commonwealth of Kentucky, 30" Judicial Circuit BY. Jefferson C)reuit Coprt, Family Division Three 219 DEPI CLERK cai CERTIFIESON D COP IREGORD ATE OF JEFFER FAMILY COUR CLERK DAVID L. NICHOLSON, AVID L. NIC! SON, CLERK BY. ce: Denise M. Heiline Celebrezze & Helline The Normandy Building, 101 North 7 Street Louisville, Kentucky 40202 Counsel for Petitioner Krsna Tibbs 214 South 8'" Street, Suite 201 Louisville, Kentucky 40202 Counse} for Respondent FILED ar_1:42 orcLock_A_M FEB 15 2019 DENTON COUNTY STANDING ORDER DISTRICT CLERK REGARDING CHILDREN, PROPERTY AND CONDUCT OF THE PART! is THIS DENTON COUNTY STANDING ORDER REGARDING CHILDREN, PR eRTY-ANDCONDUCTO OF THE PARTIES IS BINDING ON (1) THE PARTIES, (2) THE PARTIES’ OFFICERS, AGENTS, SERVANTS, EMPLOYEES, AND ATTORNEYS, AND (3) ANY OTHER PERSON WHO ACTS IN CONCERT WITH THE PARTIES OR THEIR AGENTS AND WHO RECEIVES ACTUAL NOTICE OF THESE ORDERS, AND IS ENFORCEABLE BY CONTEMPT, INCLUDING A FINE OF UP TO $500, CONFINEMENT IN THE COUNTY JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS, OR BOTH SUCH A FINE AND CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS. No party to this lawsuit has requested this order. Rather, this order is a standing order of the Denton County District Courts that applies in every divorce suit and every suit affecting the parent-child relationship, including a suit for modification or enforcement of a prior order, filed in Denton County, Texas. The Denton County District Courts have adopted this order pursuant to Texas Family Code §§6.501-6.503, 105.001, and 105.009 because the parties and their children should be protected and their property preserved while the lawsuit is pending before the court. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: I NO DISRUPTION OF CHILDREN, All parties are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts concerning any children who are subjects of this cause: ll Removing the children from the State of Texas for the purpose of changing the children’s domicile or residence, acting directly or in concert with others, without the written agreement of all parties or an order of this Court; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from so removing the children if an active prior court order gives that party the right to designate the children’s primary residence outside the State of Texas or without regard to geographic location. 122 Disrupting or withdrawing the children from the school or day-care facility where the children are presently enrolled without the written agreement of all parties or an order of this Court; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from so withdrawing the children from a school or day-care facility if that party is changing the children’s domicile or residence within that party’s rights pursuant to an active prior court order as described in $1.1 above. 13 Hiding or secreting the children from any other party. 14 Changing the children’s current place of abode without the written agreement of all parties or an order of this Court; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not prohibit or restrict a party from changing such place of abode if an active prior court order gives that party the right to designate the children’s primary residence without geographic restriction, or if the new place of abode lies within the geographic limits established by that active prior court order. 1.5 Disturbing the peace of the children. 1.6 Making disparaging remarks in the presence of the children about another party or another party’s family members, including but not limited to the child’s grandparents, aunts, uncles, stepparents, or anyone with whom the party has a dating relationship. Le Discussing with the children, or with any other person in the presence of the children, any litigation related to the children or the other party. 1.8 If this is an original divorce action, allowing anyone with whom the party has a dating relationship to be in the same dwelling or on the same premises overnight while in possession of the child. Overnight is defined from 10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m, 2 CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES DURING THE CASE. All parties are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another party: 2.1 Using vulgar, profane, obscene, coarse, offensive, or indecent language to communicate with another party, whether in person, by telephone, or in writing, including by email, text message, or any other electronic communication. 22 Threatening another party in person, by telephone, or in writing, including by email, text message, or any other electronic communication, to take unlawful action against the party, a member of the party’s family, including but not limited to anyone with whom the party has a dating relationship, or the party’s property. 23. Placing or transmitting one or more telephone calls, emails, text messages, or other electronic communications to another party at an unreasonable hour, in an offensive or repetitious manner, anonymously, or without a legitimate purpose of communication. Denton County Standing Order Regarding Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 2/19/19 Page 1 of4 3 PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY AND USE OF FUNDS DURING DIVORCE CASE, If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain from the following conduct: 3.1 Destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both of the parties, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of whether it is claimed as separate or community property. 3.2 Misrepresenting or refusing to disclose to the other party or to the Court, on proper request, the existence, amount, or location of any property, including electronically stored or recorded information, of one or both of the parties, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of whether it is claimed as separate or community property. 33 Damaging, destroying or tampering with the tangible or intellectual property of one or both of the parties, including any document or electronically stored or recorded information that represents or embodies anything of value, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of whether it is claimed as separate or community property. 34 Selling, transferring, assigning, mortgaging, encumbering, or in any other manner alienating any of the property of either party, regardless of whether it is intellectual, personal, or real property and regardless of whether it is claimed as separate or community property, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. 3.5 Incurring any indebtedness, including cash advances from a credit card or line of credit, other than legal expense in connection with this suit, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. 3.6 Making withdrawals from any account in any financial institution for any purpose, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. 37 Spending any sum of cash in either party’s possession or subject to either party’s control for any purpose, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. 3.8 Withdrawing or borrowing in any manner for any purpose from any retirement, profit-sharing, pension, death, or other employee benefit plan or employee savings plan or from any individual retirement account or Keogh account, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. 39 Signing or endorsing the others party’s name on any negotiable instrument, check, or draft, such as tax refunds, insurance payments, and dividends, or attempting to negotiate any negotiable instrument payable to the other party without the personal signature of the other party. This includes affixing the other party’s digital signature to any electronic document. 3.10 Taking any action to terminate, close, restrict, or limit lines of credit, credit cards, charge cards, or financial accounts in the name of or subject to the control of the other party, whether owned individually or jointly, except by subsequent court order or written agreement signed by each party permitting such action. 3.01 Entering, operating, or exercising contro! over the motor vehicle in the possession of the other party. 3.12 Discontinuing or altering the withholding for federal income taxes on wages or salary while this suit is pending. 3.13 Terminating or in any manner affecting the service of water, electricity, gas, telephone, cable television, or other contractual services, such as security, pest control, landscaping, or yard maintenance at the other party’s residence or in any manner attempting to withdraw any deposits for service in connection with such services, 3.14 Unlawfully intercepting or recording the other party’s electronic communications. 3.15 Opening or diverting mail, email, or any other electronic communication addressed to the other party. 3.16 Excluding @ spouse from the use and enjoyment of the marital residence in which the spouse had been residing within the thirty (30) day period prior to the date the original petition for divorce was filed. 3.17 Communicating with the other party’s employer or a person with whom the other party has a business relationship without a legitimate purpose. 3.18 Entering any safe deposit box in the name of or subject to the control of a party, whether owned individually or jointly, except by subsequent court order or written agreement signed by each party permitting such entrance. 3.19 Desiroying, disposing of, or altering any e-mail, text message, video message, or chat message or other electronic data or electronically stored information relevant to the subject matter of the divorce suit, regardless of whether the information is stored on a hard drive, in a removable storage device, in cloud storage, or in another electronic storage medium. 3.20 Modifying, changing, or altering the native format or metadata of any electronic data or electronically stored information relevant to the subject matter of the suit for dissolution of marriage, regardless of whether the information is stored on a hard drive, in a removable storage device, in cloud storage, or in another electronic storage medium. This prohibition shall likewise apply to any suit affecting the parent- Denton County Standing Order Regarding Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 2/19/19 Page 2 of4 child relationship with regard to any electronic data or electronically stored information relevant to the subject matter of the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 3.21 Deleting any data or content from any social network profile used or created by either party or a child of the parties. 3.22 Using any password or personal identification number to gain access to the other party’s email account, bank account, social media account, or any other electronic account 4 PERSONAL AND BUSINESS RECORDS IN DIVORCE CASE. If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts 4 Concealing, destroying, disposing of, or altering any of the parties’ family records, property records, financial records, business records or any records of income, debts, or other obligations, including, but not limited to, a canceled check, deposit slip, other records from a financial institution, records of credit purchases or cash advances, tax returns, and financial statements. 4.2 Falsifying any writing or record relating to the property of either party. 43 “Records” includes e-mail or other digital or electronic data, whether stored on a computer hard drive, diskette or other electronic storage device. 5, INSURANCE IN DIVORCE. CASE, If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts, except by written agreement signed by each party permitting such acts: 5 Withdrawing or borrowing in any manner all or any part of the cash surrender value of life insurance policies on the life of either party, except as specifically authorized by this order or a subsequent order of this Court. $.2 Changing or in any manner altering the beneficiary designation on any life insurance on the life of either party or the parties’ children. 5.3 Canceling, altering, or in any manner affecting any casualty, automobile, or health insurance policies insuring the parties’ property or persons including the parties’ minor children. 6 SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATIONS IN DIVORCE CASE. If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are specifically authorized to da the following: 6.1 To engage in acts reasonably and necessary to the conduct of that party’s usual business and occupation. 6.2 To make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable attomey’s fees and expenses in connection with this suit. 6.3 To make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable and necessary living expenses commensurate with such expenditures and indebtedness incurred for the past six months, 64 To make withdrawals from accounts in financial institutions only for the purposes authorized by this order. SERVICE AND APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER. The Petitioner shall attach a Copy of this order to the original petition and to each copy of the petition, At the time an original petition is filed by non-electronic means, if the Petitioner has failed to attach a copy of this order to the petition and any copy of the petition, the Clerk shall ensure that a copy of this order is attached to the petition and every copy of the petition presented. At the time an original petition is filed electronically, if the Petitioner has failed to attach a copy of this order to the petition and any copy of the petition, the Clerk shall decline to issue citation until the petition is resubmitted with a copy of this order attached in conformity with this section. Additionally, the Court may decline to grant temporary ex parte relief, decline to set a hearing in the case, or strike the petition without further notice if the Petitioner fails to resubmit the petition with a copy of this order attached in conformity with this section. 72 This order is effective upon the filing of the original petition and shall remain in full force and effect as a temporary restraining order for fourteen days after the date of service of the original petition. The requirement of a bond is waived. If no party contests this order within fourteen days after the date of service of the original petition, this order shall continue in full force and effect as a temporary injunction until further order of this court. This entire order will terminate and will no longer be effective only upon further order of the court, entry ofa final order or dismissal of the case. 73 In addition to any other remedies available for the enforcement of this order, at the Court’s discretion, the Court may award reasonable and necessary attorney fees and court costs against a party found to have violated a provision of this order. 8 EFFECT OF O THER COURT ORDERS. If any part of this order is different from any part ofa protective order that has already been entered or is later entered, the protective order provisions prevail. Any part of this order not changed by some later order remains in full force and effect until the court signs a final decree. Denton County Standing Order Regarding Children, Property and Conduct of the Parties 29/9 Page 3 of 4 9 PARTIE: §_ ENCOURAGED TO MEDIATE/COLLABORATE. The parties are encouraged to settle their disputes amicably without court intervention. The parties are encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution methods, such as mediation or the collaborative law process, to resolve the conflicts that may arise in this lawsuit. 10. ARENT EDUCATION AND STABILIZATION, If this is a suit affecting or seeking modification of the parent- child relationship, all parties are ORDERED to attend one of the following parent education and stabilization programs within sixty (60) days of the date of filing or service of the suit, as applicable: 10.1 Children in the Middle (www.childreninthemiddle.com or 800-239-3971). 10.2 Divorce Sanity Co-Parenting (www.ccdcounseling.com/divorce-sanity or 800-897-7068).