Case Number: 23SMCV01704 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: I The court is still waiting for the Supreme Courts ruling. Argument was held on June 4, 2024, so a decision should come out shortly. The court is inclined to continue the matter for 90 days, which will assure that the Court has ruled and allow the parties to file supplemental briefs15 calendar days before the hearingaddressing the impact of the Courts ruling.

Case Number: 23AHCV00560 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT EBF HOLDINGS, LLC dba EVEREST BUSINESS FUNDING , Plaintiff(s), vs. CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV00560 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AN ORDER THAT THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND THE TRUTH OF MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION BE DEEMED ADMITTED, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC. Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2024 Plaintiff EBF Holdings, LLC dba Everest Business Funding (Plaintiff) moves for an order deeming admitted the genuineness of documents and truth of matters specified in its First Set of Requests for Admission served on defendant Corinthian Hospice, Inc. (Defendant) on October 16, 2023. The motion is unopposed. Where a party fails to timely respond to a request for admission, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Where a party fails to provide a timely response to requests for admission, [i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) The motion is unopposed and there is no dispute that Defendant failed to serve responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests. It also does not appear that Defendant has served substantially compliant proposed responses. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant in the reduced amount of $385, consisting of .5 hours at Plaintiffs counsels hourly rate and a $60 filing fee, payable within 20 days of the date of this Order. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

20CV01416 VALLEY FRESH PRODUCE, INC. v. BARRAGAN (UNOPPOSED) MOTIONS TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL The unopposed motions to be relieved as counsel filed by Dianna L. Albini are granted as they comply with California Rules of Court, Rule, 3.1362. The court will sign the proposed orders. Page 1 of 3 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Case Number: 22STCV13089 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Case Name: Densley v. California State Lottery Commission Case No.: 22STCV13089 Matter: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Moving Party: Mark Quigely, counsel for Plaintiff James Densley Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: If a fully filled-out Form MC-053 is provided, the Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mark Quigely seeks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff James Densley. If counsel brings a fully filled-out proposed order on form MC-053 to the hearing, the Court would rule as follows: the Motion is granted because it meets all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362. The proposed order must have the correct hearing date on it. Moving party to give notice. Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service for the Court order (form MC-053) upon the client. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 24STCV10095 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING JUAN JOSE HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV10095 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Calendar Number: 14 Defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Galpin Motors, Inc. dba Galpin Ford (Galpin) (collectively, Defendants) demur to the fifth and sixth claims in the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Juan Jose Hernandez (Plaintiff). The Court OVERRULES the demurrer. Background This is a Song-Beverly action. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer. On December 15, 2021, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Ford for a 2021 Ford Ranger (the Subject Vehicle). Plaintiff alleges that defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested within the warranty period. Plaintiff alleges that these defects included transmission defects and engine defects. Plaintiff filed this action on April 22, 2024, raising claims for (1) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (d); (2) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (b); (3) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement concealment. Defendants demurred to the Complaint on May 22, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply. Legal Standard As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Ibid. ) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). Discussion Negligent Repair Fifth Claim In order to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. ( McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Damages Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not pay any out-of-pocket costs for the repair attempts because they were covered under warranty, and that, as a result, Plaintiff did not suffer any damages. However, Plaintiff does not allege this fact. Because this fact does not appear on the face of the Complaint, it is not a basis to sustain the demurrer. Economic Loss Rule [A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense. ( McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 79.) Here, the Complaint does not affirmatively disclose that Plaintiffs damages are purely economic losses, and do not include property damage to the car resulting from the alleged negligent repairs. California decisional law has long recognized that the economic loss rule does not necessarily bar recovery in tort for damage that a defective product (e.g., a window) causes to other portions of a larger product (e.g., a house) into which the former has been incorporated. ( Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 483.) A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action. ( PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.) Because the face of the Complaint does not show that Plaintiffs losses from the repairs were purely economical, the economic loss rule does not compel dismissal of this claim. The Court therefore overrules the demurrer to this claim. Fraudulent Concealment Sixth Claim [T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. ( Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 151, 157158.) A duty to disclose arises when [1] a defendant owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff & [2] when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; [3] when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or [4] when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. ( Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted; cleaned up].) Each of the [latter] three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be actionable presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. ( LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336337.) [S]uch a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties. ( Id . at p. 337.) Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement. ( Ibid .) Specificity Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not specifically identify the defects in question that Defendants allegedly concealed. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant [Ford] knew that vehicles equipped with the same 10-speed transmission as the Vehicle suffered from one or more defects that can cause the vehicles and their 10-speed transmissions to experience hesitation and/or delayed acceleration; harsh and/or hard shifting; jerking, shuddering, and/or juddering (Transmission Defect). These conditions present a safety hazard and are unreasonably dangerous to consumers because they can suddenly and unexpectedly affect the driver's ability to control the vehicle's speed, acceleration, deceleration, and/ or overall responsiveness of the vehicle in various driving conditions. (Complaint at p. 15:2-8.) Plaintiffs related allegations add further specificity to the defects: on September 27, 2021, Defendant issued TSB 21-2315, entitled 10R80 Harsh Engagement/Harsh Shift/Delayed Shift With or Without DTCs, which covers 2017 2020 Ford vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle. The TSB advised that Some 2017-20220 F-150 & vehicles equipped with a 10R80 automatic transmission may exhibit a harsh engagement/harsh shift/delayed shift&This may be due to incompatibility of the adaptive calibration to adapt to hardware wear-in over time. (Complaint at p. 6:23-28.) In Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (review granted), the Court of Appeal found that the following allegations of defect were adequate for a fraudulent inducement claim: The CVT is defective in that it causes hesitation from a stop before acceleration; sudden, hard shaking during deceleration; sudden, hard shaking and violent jerking (commonly known as juddering or shuddering) during acceleration; and complete failure to function, each and all of which prevent a CVT-equipped vehicle from operating as intended by the driver, especially during acceleration from a complete stop. ( Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 833834, 844, review granted February 1, 2023.) Plaintiffs allegations in this case are similar in their level to specificity to those permitted in Dhital . While the California Supreme Court has granted review in Dhital , and it is therefore not binding on the Court, it may be considered as persuasive authority. (Cal. R. Ct. Rules 8.1105 and 8.1115.) The Court does find it persuasive, barring any contrary ruling by the California Supreme Court. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has specifically alleged defects and Fords knowledge thereof. Plaintiff has specifically alleged the defects in question and that Ford knew about them. Duty to Disclose Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a duty to disclose because Plaintiff fails to plead a transactional relationship. A contractual relationship is not necessary to give rise to a buyer-seller relationship for the purposes of establishing a duty to disclose. Under California law, a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold. ( OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859 [emphasis in original]; see also Dhital , supra , 84 Cal. App.5th at p. 884 [Plaintiffs allegations against Nissan sufficient at pleading stage where plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissans authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers].) While an affirmative misrepresentation might not be repeated & a nondisclosure must necessarily be passed on. Only Smith knew what his soils engineers had found and it was unlikely that others would find out on their own. &. Under these circumstances it would be anomalous if liability for damages resulting from fraudulent concealment were to vanish simply because of the fortuitous event of an intervening resale. Ultimately in such a case it is the subsequent purchaser who is directly damaged by the initial nondisclosure. ( Barnhouse v. City of Pinole (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 171, 192.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a warranty contract with Ford for the Subject Vehicle. Fords warranty policy issued to Plaintiff was designed to be issued through a dealer in other words, Ford knew that the cars that it manufactured were to be resold from dealers to end users. The Court therefore cannot rule in Fords favor on this issue at the demurrer stage. Exclusive Knowledge Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead that Ford had exclusive knowledge in order to establish a duty to disclose. Plaintiff alleges that Ford gained knowledge of the transmission defects through pre-production testing, pre-production design failure mode and analysis data, production failure mode and analysis data, early consumer complaints made exclusively to Ford, aggregate warranty data compiled from Fords network of dealers, testing conducted by Ford in response to consumer complaints, and repair order and parts data from Fords network of dealers. (Complaint at p. 15:26-16:9.) Plaintiff has adequately pled that Ford had exclusive knowledge which Plaintiff could not have reasonably accessed. Further, in addition to pleading ultimate facts, Plaintiff has pled evidentiary facts showing knowledge namely, the issuance of a technical service bulletin relating to the transmission issue mere months after Plaintiffs purchase. Such a service bulletin would necessarily be preceded by the collection of information, and the bulletins brief nature indicates that Ford possessed more facts which were condensed into the bulletin. While the bulletin is not a judicial admission, it is adequate to support an allegation of knowledge at the pleading stage. Economic Loss Rule Defendant argues that the economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort where a plaintiffs damages consist solely of economic loss, leaving a plaintiff with only contractual remedies. [F]raudulent inducement of contractas the very phrase suggestsis not a context where the traditional separation of tort and contract law obtains. To the contrary, this area of the law traditionally has involved both contract and tort principles and procedures. For example, it has long been the rule that where a contract is secured by fraudulent representations, the injured party may elect to affirm the contract and sue for the fraud. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [internal citation and quotation marks omitted].) Tort damages have been permitted in contract cases & where the contract was fraudulently induced. In each of these cases, the duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm. ( Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552 [internal citations omitted].) [C]oncealment-based claims for fraudulent inducement are not barred by the economic loss rule. ( Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 840, review granted February 1, 2023 [declining to apply economic loss rule where plaintiff pled concealment of automobile defects by manufacturer].) Accordingly, the Court does not sustain the demurrer on the basis of the economic loss rule at the pleading stage. The Court therefore overrules the demurrer to this claim.

Case Number: 23SMCV00855 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 CRISTINA DINULESCU , Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 SMCV0 0855 Hearing Date: Ju ly 9 , 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT FORD MOTOR COMPANYS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BACKGROUND This case arises from a dispute over an allegedly defective 2018 Ford Mustang . In 2018, Plaintiff Cristina Di nulescu entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Company regarding a 2018 Ford Mustang, which was manufactured and or distributed by Ford . ( Compl . ¶ 10 .) The warranty contract contained various warranties including a bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty and emission warranty . ( Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff claims there were defects to the car during the applicable express warranty period including electrical system defects, engine defects, transmission defects, and body defects . ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges Ford failed to promptly replace the car or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act (SBA) . ( Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff seeks incidental, consequential and general damages resulting from Fords alleged failure to comply with the SBA . ( Id. ¶ 25.) Based on these allegations, t he operative complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3), (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and (5) negligent repair . The first to fourth causes of action are alleged against Ford, while the fifth cause of action is alleged against the dealer, Santa Monica Ford Lincoln . This hearing is on Fords motion for judgment on the pleadin g s . Ford argues that Plaintiffs SBA claims fail because Plaintiff cannot bring claims under the Act against a manufacturer based on the purchase of a used car . LEGAL STANDARD A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.] ( Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed . Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (citations omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . ( Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).) Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be addressed to the pleading as a whole or to separate counts . If addressed to the pleading as a whole, the motion must be denied if even one count is good . ( Lora v. Garland (1946) 27 Cal.2d 840, 850 ; Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1345 , 1358. ) If addressed to separate counts, the motion may be granted as to some counts and denied as to others . ( Steiner v. Rowley (1950) 35 Cal.2d 713 , 720 ; Heredia , 228 Cal.App.3d at 1358. ) MEET AND CONFER A party moving for¿ judgment on the pleadings must¿ meet and confer in person or telephonically with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised in the motion. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a) .) The moving party must file a declaration detailing the¿ meet and confer efforts . ( Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a)(3) .) Ford submits the Declaration of Teresa Alarcon which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone . T his satisfies the meet and confer requirements of § 439 . REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Ford requests judicial notice of the 2020 retail installment sales contract ( Sales Contract ) for Plaintiffs purchase of the car . The C ourt denies the request . Ford seeks judicial notice on the ground that it claims the 2020 Sales Contract is referenced in the Complaint . Where a plaintiff references a document in her complaint, but fails to attach a copy of that document to the complaint, the Court may take judicial notice of the document.¿( See, e.g. ,¿ Ingram v. Flippo ¿(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285 n.3 ¿(judicial notice appropriate where complaint referenced to, and excerpted quotes from, documents not attached as exhibits to the complaint) . Here, t he Complaint does not reference the 2020 sales contract . Rather, it references and relies on a 2018 warranty contract . ( Compl . ¶ 10.) Accordingly , the Court cannot take judicial notice of the 2020 contract . DISCUSSION Ford argues that Plaintiffs SBA claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot bring claims under the SBA against a manufacturer for a used car . In doing so, Ford relies on the 2020 Sales Contract which the Court has declined to judicially notice . Absent the S ales C ontract, there is no basis for Fords motion for judgment on the pleadings . Accordingly , the Court denies the motion for judgment on the pleadings . CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Ford Motor Company s motion for judgment on the pleadings . DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

The Demurrer filed by Defendant by Al Toccoli Construction Inc. [“Toccoli”] to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation in the First Amended Complaint is DROPPED AS MOOT. Plaintiff has dismissed its second cause of action for Intentional misrepresentation as to all defendants on May 24, 2024. The Unopposed Motion to Strike by Toccoli to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is GRANTED. Since the only basis for punitive damages was the second cause of action for Intentional misrepresentation, which Plaintiff dismissed as to all defendants on May 24, 2024, the request for punitive damages is STRICKEN. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1312(a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Jayne C. Lee Judge of the Superior Court of California Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling: Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org that they intend to appear remotely or in person in Dept. 10C no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. Should counsel/parties prefer to appear remotely in Dept. 10C, follow the instructions below. To attend the remote hearing in Dept. 10C: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6937 and Pin # 6822.

Case Number: 19STCV30580 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Case Name: Middleton, et al. v. Lee, et al. Case No.: 19STCV30580 Matter: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Moving Party: Marc Rohatiner, counsel for Plaintiffs John P. Middleton and The John Powers Middleton Companies, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Marc Rohatiner seeks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs John P. Middleton and The John Powers Middleton Companies, LLC. The Motion is granted because it meets all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362. Moving party to give notice. Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service for the Court order (form MC-053) upon the client. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.