Preview
PLD-PI-001
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY STATE BAR NUMBER: 325770 FOR COURT USE ONLY
NAME: Uriel Gdolian, Esq.
FIRM NAME: OAKWOOD LEGAL GROUP, LLP
STREET ADDRESS: 8124 W Third Street, 2nd Floor
CITY: Los Angeles STATE: CA ZIP CODE: 90048
TELEPHONE NO.: 310-205-2525 FAX NO.: 310-773-5573
EMAIL ADDRESS: ugdolian@oakwoodlegal.com
ATTORNEY FOR (name): Plaintiff, VANESSA AGUILAR and HEATHER ATKISSON
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF KERN
STREET ADDRESS: 1215 Truxton Ave
MAILING ADDRESS: 1215 Truxton Ave
CITY AND ZIP CODE: Bakersfield, CA 93301
BRANCH NAME: METRO DIVISION JUSTICE BUILDING
PLAINTIFF: VANESSA AGUILAR, an individual; and HEATHER ATKISSON, an individual
DEFENDANT: CITY OF RIDGECREST; and ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual
[KJ DOES 1 TO 25, INCLUSIVE
CASE NUMBER:
COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Damage, Wrongful Death
D AMENDED (Number):
Type (check all that apply):
[KJ MOTOR VEHICLE D OTHER (specify):
[KJ Property Damage D Wrongful Death
[KJ Personal Injury D Other Damages (specify):
Jurisdiction (check all that apply):
D ACTION IS A LIMITED CIVIL CASE (does not exceed $35,000)
Amount demanded D does not exceed $10,000
D exceeds $10,000
[KJ ACTION IS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE (exceeds $35,000)
D ACTION IS RECLASSIFIED by this amended complaint
D from limited to unlimited
D from unlimited to limited
1. Plaintiff (name or names): VANESSA AGUILAR, an individual; HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual
alleges causes of action against defendant (name or names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST; ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual
2. This pleading, including attachments and exhibits, consists of the following number of pages: 5
3. Each plaintiff named above is a competent adult
a. D except plaintiff (name):
(1) D a corporation qualified to do business in California.
(2) D an unincorporated entity (describe):
(3) D a public entity (describe):
(4) D a minor D an adult
(a) D for whom a guardian or conservator of the estate or a guardian ad litem has been appointed.
(b) D other (specify):
(5) D other (specify):
b. D except plaintiff (name):
(1) D a corporation qualified to do business in California.
(2) D an unincorporated entity (describe):
(3) D a public entity (describe):
(4) D a minor D an adult
(a) D for whom a guardian or conservator of the estate or a guardian ad litem has been appointed.
(b) D other (specify):
(5) D other (specify):
D Information about additional plaintiffs who are not competent adults is shown in Attachment 3.
Page 1 of 3
Form Approved for Optional Use
Judicial Council of California
COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.12
www.courts.ca.gov
PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] Damage, Wrongful Death
PLD-PI-001
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al.
4. D Plaintiff (name):
is doing business under the fictitious name (specify):
and has complied with the fictitious business name laws.
5. Each defendant named above is a natural person
a. [KJ except defendant (name): CITY OF RIDGECREST c. D except defendant (name):
(1) D a business organization, form unknown. (1) D a business organization, form unknown.
(2) D a corporation. (2) D a corporation.
(3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe):
(4) [KJ a public entity (describe): (4) D a public entity (describe):
(5) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify):
b. D except defendant (name): d. D except defendant (name):
(1) D a business organization, form unknown. (1) D a business organization, form unknown.
(2) D a corporation. (2) D a corporation.
(3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe):
(4) D a public entity (describe): (4) D a public entity (describe):
(5) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify):
D Information about additional defendants who are not natural persons is contained in Attachment 5.
6. The true names of defendants sued as Does are unknown to plaintiff.
a. [KJ Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 1-12 were the agents or employees of other
named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment.
b. [KJ Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 13-25 are persons whose capacities are unknown to
plaintiff.
7. D Defendants who are joined under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 are (names):
8. This court is the proper court because
a. D at least one defendant now resides in its jurisdictional area.
b. D the principal place of business of a defendant corporation or unincorporated association is in its jurisdictional area.
c. [KJ injury to person or damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area.
d. D other (specify):
9. D Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute, and
a. D has complied with applicable claims statutes, or
b. D is excused from complying because (specify):
PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 2 of 3
Damage, Wrongful Death
PLD-PI-001
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al.
10. The following causes of action are attached and the statements above apply to each (each complaint must have one or more
causes of action attached):
a. Motor Vehicle
DDDDEJEJ
b. General Negligence
c. Intentional Tort
d. Products Liability
e. Premises Liability
f. Other (specify):
11. Plaintiff has suffered (check all that apply)
a. wage loss.
DEJEJEJEJEJEJ
b. loss of use of property.
c. hospital and medical expenses.
d. general damage.
e. property damage.
f. loss of earning capacity.
g. other damage (specify):
12. The damages claimed for wrongful death and the relationships of plaintiff to the deceased are
DD □
a. listed in Attachment 12.
b. as follows:
13. The relief sought in this complaint is within the jurisdiction of this court.
14. Plaintiff prays for judgment for costs of suit; for such relief as is fair, just, and equitable; and for
a. (1) compensatory damages.
DB DB
(2) punitive damages.
b. The amount of damages is (in cases for personal injury or wrongful death, you must check (1)):
(1) according to proof.
(2) in the amount of: $
D
15. The paragraphs of this complaint alleged on information and belief are as follows (specify paragraph numbers):
Date: 5/20/2024
~
t..
,,...
C
~
Uriel Gdolian, Esq.
~
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PLAINTIFF OR ATTORNEY)
PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 3 of 3
Damage, Wrongful Death
PLD-PI-001(1)
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al.
ONE CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle
(number)
ATTACHMENT TO Complaint Cross - Complaint
(Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.)
Plaintiff (name): VANESSA AGUILAR, an Individual and HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual
MV- 1. Plaintiff alleges the acts of defendants were negligent; the acts were the legal (proximate) cause of injuries
and damages to plaintiff; the acts occurred
on (date): 09/13/2023
at (place):
1400 Second St/ W. Orchard Ave , Inyokern, CA, 93527
MV- 2. DEFENDANTS
a. [KJ The defendants who operated a motor vehicle are (names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON
[KJ Does 1 to 25
b. [KJ The defendants who employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment are
(names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON
[KJ Does 1 to 25
c. [KJ The defendants who owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission are (names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON
[KJ Does 1 to 25
d. [KJ The defendants who entrusted the motor vehicle are (names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON
[KJ Does 1 to 25
e. [KJ The defendants who were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the
agency were (names):
CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON
[KJ Does 1 to 25
f. D The defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons and the reasons for the liability are
D listed in Attachment MV-2f D as follows:
D Does to
Page
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure 425.12
Judicial Council of California CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle www.courts.ca.gov
PLD-PI-001(1) [Rev. January 1, 2007]
PLD-PI-001(2)
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al.
TWO CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence Page 5
(number)
ATTACHMENT TO CKJ Complaint D Cross - Complaint
(Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.)
GN-1. Plaintiff (name): VANESSA AGUILAR, an Individual; HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual
alleges that defendant (name): CITY OF RIDGECREST; ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual
[KJ Does 1 to 25
was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to plaintiff. By the following acts or omissions to act, defendant
negligently caused the damage to plaintiff
on (date): 09/13/2023
at (place): 1400 Second St/ W. Orchard Ave , Inyokern, CA, 93527
(description of reasons for liability):
Defendant Robert Henderson while in course and scope of his employment with Defendant City of Ridgecrest, rear-ended
Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant Robert Henderson caused the collision in violation of CVC 22350 – unsafe speed.
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure 425.12
Judicial Council of California CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence www.courts.ca.gov
PLD-PI-001(2) [Rev. January 1, 2007]
Related Content
in Kern County
Ruling
HERNANDEZ, KEIRA vs VALLEY HOME JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Jul 18, 2024 |
CV-24-001951
CV-24-001951 – HERNANDEZ, KEIRA vs VALLEY HOME JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendants Valley Home Joint School District and Sara Vivian Decavit’s Demurrer to Complaint - OVERRULED. Requests for judicial notice are DENIED as the Court can consider the complaint and law without such notice.
Defendant district’s primary argument is that there is a failure to meet statutory requirements. But as Defendant quotes Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809 for: “Every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded.”
Defendant cites to State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848 for the proposition that the statute which establishes a duty must be identified in the pleading. The Court read the entire opinion and searched for “statute” and “identified,” and was unable to find this proposition in this case. In any event, Plaintiff asserts a bus ran into a bridge and that various Government Codes permit pursuit of these claims against a government agency.
The facts of the bus crash are sufficient to avoid uncertainty. Defendant district has sufficient notice of the alleged facts.
Ruling
Castellanos-Claudio VS Rizzo-Gutierrez
Jul 18, 2024 |
Civil Unlimited (Motor Vehicle - Personal Inju...) |
HG20062148
HG20062148: Castellanos-Claudio VS Rizzo-Gutierrez
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Notice of Motion and Motion to Set Aside Notice of
Settlement and Request to Re-Set case for Trial; filed by Wendy Castellanos-Claudio
(Plaintiff) in Department 517
Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Karin Schwartz
The Motion re: PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND SET THE CASE FOR TRIAL filed by Wendy Castellanos-
Claudio on 06/05/2024 is Granted.
The hearing on Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the notice of settlement is GRANTED. Plaintiff did
not provide her counsel with express authority to settle this case for the amount previously
agreed upon during the February 2024 mediation. (Masihi Dec. Paras. 7-8.) Thus, settlement has
not been effectuated.
The 2/13/24 Notice of Settlement is set aside.
Parties are ORDERED TO APPEAR to re-set trial and pre-trial dates.
HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?
THROUGH ECOURT
Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 p.m. (but by Noon if possible) at least
one (1) court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue
through the following steps:
1. Log into eCourt Public Portal
2. Case Search
3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search”
4. Select the Case Name
5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab
6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling”
7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting
8. Select “Proceed”
BY EMAIL
Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4pm (but by
Noon if possible) at least one (1) court day before the scheduled hearing.
BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.
ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 517 IS BELOW.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
HG20062148: Castellanos-Claudio VS Rizzo-Gutierrez
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Notice of Motion and Motion to Set Aside Notice of
Settlement and Request to Re-Set case for Trial; filed by Wendy Castellanos-Claudio
(Plaintiff) in Department 517
Join ZoomGov Meeting
https://www.zoomgov.com/j/16181989812
Meeting ID: 161 8198 9812
One tap mobile
+16692545252,,16181989812# US (San Jose) 16692161590,,16181989812# US
+(San Jose)
Dial by your location
+1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)
+1 669 216 1590 US (San Jose)
+1 551 285 1373 US
+1 646 828 7666 US (New York)
833 568 8864 US Toll-free
Meeting ID: 161 8198 9812
Find your local number: https://www.zoomgov.com/u/ad6x1ZH23d
Join by SIP
16181989812@sip.zoomgov.com
Join by H.323
161.199.138.10 (US West)
161.199.136.10 (US East)
Meeting ID: 161 8198 9812
Ruling
MICHAEL LEVINE, ET AL. VS MONTALBA ARCHITECTS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 18, 2024 |
19SMCV01966
Case Number:
19SMCV01966
Hearing Date:
July 18, 2024
Dept:
207 TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT
207
HEARING DATE
July 18, 2024
CASE NUMBER
19SMCV01966
MOTION
Continue Trial
MOVING
PARTY
Defendant Gilberto Rios dba Betos Drywall & Plaster Interior Finishes
OPPOSING PARTY
none
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Michael Levine and Zorbey Ozdilek (Plaintiffs) filed the operative Fourth Amended Complaint on June 30, 2022 against Defendants Montalba Architects, Inc.; David Desire Montalba, AIA; Jonathan Eric Handzo, AIA; Denver Thomas Dale IV; Temperature Equipment Corporation; Sure Light Electric, Inc.; Fabie Tile & Marble, Inc.; Folger Roofing & Construction Company, Inc.; Heritage Woodworks, Inc.; L.A. Overhead Door, Inc.; PBS Engineers, Inc. (fka Doe 1); WMW, Inc. dba Weather Masters Waterproofing (fka Doe 2); Rapid Duct Testing & Air Balancing, Inc. (fka Doe 3); Ben McDonald (fka Doe 4); Michael Knopoff (fka Doe 5); David Trumbull dba Sure Light Electric (fka Doe 6); Gilberto Rios dba Betos Drywall & Plaster Interior Finishes (fka Roe 1); E&J Lopez Plumbing, Inc. (fka Roe 2); and M&F Hardwood Floors, Inc. (fka Roe 3) alleging eleven causes of action for (1) professional negligence; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of the implied covenant to perform work in a good and competent manner; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; (7) fraud and deceit; (8) aiding and abetting fraud and deceit; (9) negligence; (10) conversion; and (11) violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 17200
et seq.
Several cross-complaints have been filed, including one by Denver Thomas Dale, IV, which also names Defendant Gilberto Rios dba Betos Drywall & Plaster Interior Finishes (Betos).
As the Court noted at the last status conference on May 30, although Betos has answered this cross-complaint, Betos has not yet filed an answer to Plaintiffs operative Fourth Amended Complaint.
Betos now moves for a short continuance of the September 3, 2024 trial date to sometime on or after October 21, 2024 because counsel is out of the country when the current trial is set.
Betos motion is unopposed.
ANALYSIS
Trial and Discovery Cut-Off Dates
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c), provides:
Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits.
The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.
Circumstances that may indicate good cause include:
(1)
The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(2)
The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(3)
The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(4)
The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice;
(5)
The addition of a new party if:
(A)
The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or
(B)
The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case;
(6)
A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or
(7)
A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial.
Factors the Court considers in ruling on a motion for continuance include:
(1)
The proximity of the trial date;
(2)
Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party;
(3)
The length of the continuance requested;
(4)
The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance;
(5)
The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;
(6)
If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;
(7)
The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials;
(8)
Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial;
(9)
Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance;
(10)
Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and
(11)
Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).)
Betos requests a trial continuance because Betos counsel purchased tickets for an overseas trip in December 2023 which would take us out of the country for the first three weeks of September.
(Wilton Decl. ¶ 6.)
This was before the February 2, 2024 status conference where the Court set the trial date for September 3.
Counsel advised the Court at the status conference of his unavailability for trial on September 3 due to his preplanned vacation, but the Court set the trial date anyway.
The Court finds that Betos has not provided any legal basis demonstrating that counsels vacation constitutes other excusable circumstances warranting a continuance under Rule 3.1332(c)(3).
The Court also finds it concerning that counsel has still not filed an answer on behalf of Betos when the parties are so close to trial, despite being alerted by the Court of this issue on May 30.
With regard to the factors the Court considers when determining whether a continuance is warranted, Betos concedes that the trial is imminent, and that there have been previous continuances due to the large number of parties and cross-complaints at issue.
The Court also notes that this case is extremely aged, with the original complaint having been filed on November 8, 2019, meaning that the parties are running up against the five-year rule, and the Courts trial calendar is very impacted.
The Court further notes that although no party has opposed the motion, the requested continuance was not presented as a stipulation.
Moreover, counsel declares,
Discovery to date has shown Betos Drywall to be a peripheral party at best with minimal accusations of wrongdoing against him.
(Wilton Decl. ¶ 7.)
As such, in the absence of a stipulation, without other excusable circumstances or other good cause shown
, and in view of Betos lack of diligence in filing an answer to the operative complaint, the Court does not find a trial continuance is warranted to accommodate the vacation of counsel to a peripheral party in such a complex and aged action.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court denies Betos unopposed motion to continue the trial without prejudice.
Betos shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED:
July 18, 2024
___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
Mason vs. Contech Engineered Solutions LLC, et al.
Jul 18, 2024 |
22CV-0201012
AL.
Case Number: 22CV-0201012
This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. A Notice of
Settlement was filed on April 15, 2024 which indicates that the case would be dismissed within 45
days. No dismissal is on file. The Court intends to dismiss this case pursuant to California Rule
of Court 3.1385(b) unless the parties appear at today’s hearing and show good cause why the case
should not be dismissed.
Ruling
CHAVEZ vs CORONA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Jul 15, 2024 |
CVRI2205135
CHAVEZ VS CORONA
CVRI2205135 REGIONAL MEDICAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CENTER
Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
CMC and OSC is continued to 8/15/24.
A motion for reconsideration under CCP § 1008, is the exclusive means to modify, amend, or
revoke a court order. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499.) A motion for
reconsideration must be filed within 10 days after service of the written notice of ruling on the
order at issue. (CCP § 1008(a).) (Dr. French’s ex parte application was heard on 5/14/24. The
motion for reconsideration was filed three days later on 5/17/24.) A party’s motion for
reconsideration must be based on new or different facts or circumstances of law. (Ibid.) A motion
for reconsideration must be accompanied by an affidavit stating what application was made
before, what judge heard the matter, what orders were made, and what new or different facts,
circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Ibid.) When a party seeks reconsideration, he or
she must show a “satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier, which can
only be described as a strict requirement of diligence.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
674, 690.) Facts known by the party seeking reconsideration when the original ruling was made
are not considered “new or different.” (In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.)
Notably, the legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where
a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered, and some valid
reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) The
burden is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence; that is, the information must be such that the moving party could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered or produced it at trial. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005)
135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.)
Here, Plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration of the Court’s 5/14/24 ruling granting Dr. French’s ex
parte application for an order of dismissal of the SAC based on new or different facts or
circumstances, or law. Plaintiffs argue that new case authority (Mantel v. South Nassau
Communities Hospital dba Mount Sinai South Nassau, Supreme Court of the State of New York,
County of Nassau, Index No. 607604/23) published on 5/17/24 allows for reconsideration of the
ex parte application. Plaintiffs assert that this new law is directly on point with the claim against
Dr. French as well as other Defendants in this case as to their respective affirmative defenses
based on the PREP Act immunity. They argue that this new law requires the ex parte application
for an order dismissing the SAC as to Dr. French, with prejudice, be reconsidered, and granted.
To the contrary, Dr. French argues that this motion actually seeks reconsideration of the Court’s
ruling on Dr. French’s demurrer to the SAC, which was heard on 3/11/24, and is therefore,
untimely. (CCP § 1008.) The Court issued a tentative ruling on the demurrer on 3/8/24 sustaining
the demurrer with 20 days leave to amend. (Dec. Hummasti ¶ 5.) No request for oral argument
was made, the tentative ruling was adopted, and became the final ruling on 3/11/24. (Id. ¶ 6, Ex.
“A”.) The deadline for Plaintiffs’ to amend their Complaint was 4/1/24, but Plaintiffs failed to file
and serve an amended Complaint. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s 3/11/24 ruling on the demurrer, which would nonetheless, have been untimely.
Plaintiffs do not assert that they are challenging the prior demurrer. Nonetheless, the “new law”
presented by them addresses the merits of Dr. French’s demurrer, which relied on an affirmative
defense concerning the PREP Act immunity. But, when the Court subsequently granted Dr.
French’s ex parte application, it explicitly dismissed the case against Dr. French based on
Plaintiffs’ failure to timely file a SAC. Plaintiffs do not address this point in their motion. Moreover,
there is no dispute that the new law (Mantel, supra.) was not decided under California law, it was
decided under New York law, which is not binding authority on this Court.
As such, Plaintiff’s motion fails to present a proper basis for the Court to reconsider the ex parte
application. Plaintiffs have not offered the Court any new or different facts or circumstances or
law not previously considered. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established that they are entitled to have
the Court reconsider the prior ex parte application.
Ruling
KEVIN MARTIN CRUZ, ET AL. VS JESUS ALEJANDRO NAVARETTE
Jul 15, 2024 |
23STCV00750
Case Number:
23STCV00750
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Dept:
32
PLEASE NOTE
:
Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.
If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at
sscdept32@lacourt.org
indicating that partys intention to submit.
The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.
If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.
Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPT
:
32
HEARING DATE
:
July 15, 2024
CASE NUMBER
:
23STCV00750
MOTIONS
:
(1) Compel Plaintiff Tiffany Cruzs Responses to Special Interrogatories
(2) Compel Plaintiff Tiffany Cruzs Responses to Form Interrogatories
(3) Compel Plaintiff Ryan Cruzs Responses to Requests for Production, Set One
(4) Compel Plaintiff Ryan Cruzs Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One
MOVING PARTY:
Defendant Jesus Alejandro Navarette
OPPOSING PARTY:
Plaintiffs Tiffany Cruz and Ryan Cruz
BACKGROUND
Defendant Jesus Alejandro Navarette (Defendant) moves to compel Plaintiff Tiffany Cruz to serve verified responses, without objections, to Special Interrogatories, Set One and Form Interrogatories, Set One. Defendant also moves to compel Plaintiff Ryan Cruz to serve verified responses, without objections, to Requests for Production, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One. Defendant seeks monetary sanctions for all motions. Plaintiffs oppose and Defendant replies.
LEGAL STANDARD
Interrogatories
If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290 (b).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product, unless [t]he party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance and [t]he partys failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290 (a)(1), (a)(2).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served and no meet and confer is required when a party does not respond to discovery requests. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.)
If a motion to compel responses is filed, the Court shall impose a monetary sanction against the losing party unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290 (c).) Further, [t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)
Requests for Production
Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2031.300, if a party fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (Code Civ. Pro § 2031.300 (b).) The party who fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection waives any objection to the demand unless the court finds that the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance or partys failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 (a)(1)- (2).)
Courts shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection unless the party acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 (c).) Further, [t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)
DISCUSSION
Here, on March 7, 2024, Defendant served Special and Form Interrogatories, Set One, on Plaintiff Tiffany Cruz and Requests for Production, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One on Plaintiff Ryan Cruz. (English Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) Defendant never granted extensions and Plaintiffs failed to serve timely responses. (
Id.
¶ 15.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs Tiffany Cruz and Ryan Cruz contend that they served verified responses on June 12, 2024. Defendant does not dispute this is reply, but still seeks monetary sanctions.
Defendant requests $1,250 in monetary sanctions for each motion, against Plaintiffs and their counsel of record, representing an hourly rate of $250. (English Decl. ¶ 16.) The Court finds sanctions are warranted because Plaintiffs failed to timely respond or provide specific facts showing that they acted with substantial justification or that imposing sanctions would be unjust. However, the amount requested is excessive given the type of motion and the fact counsel can appear at the hearing remotely.
Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the total amount of $1,120 against Tiffany Cruz and counsel; and $1,120 against Ryan Cruz and counsel (2 hours of attorney time for each motion plus the filing fees).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff
Tiffany Cruz and her counsel of record, jointly and severally,
in the reduced amount of
$1,120
. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff
Ryan Cruz and his counsel of record, jointly and severally,
in the reduced amount of
$1,120
.
Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such.
Ruling
MALVINA MKHCHYAN VS MARGARET MARY LEWIS
Jul 15, 2024 |
21STCV31743
Case Number:
21STCV31743
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Dept:
28
Having reviewed the moving and supplemental papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff Malvina Mkchyan (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Margaret Mary Lewis (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence.
On May 15, 2023, Defendant filed an answer.
On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, and (2) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions.
The motions were set to be heard on April 22, 2024.
On April 22, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to May 16, 2024 and ordered Defendant to file supplemental declarations or briefs explaining whether her motions were timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file responsive declarations or briefs.
On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed supplemental briefs. The Court continued the hearing to July 15, 2024.
Trial is currently scheduled for August 22, 2024.
DISCUSSION
A.
Informal Discovery Conference
The Los Angeles Superior Courts Eighth Amended Standing Order for Procedures in the Personal Injury Hub Courts Effective October 10, 2022 (filed September 20, 2022) (Eighth Amended Standing Order), ¶ 9E, provides: PI Hub Courts will not hear Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Discovery until the parties have engaged in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC). PI Hub Courts may deny or continue a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery if parties fail to schedule and complete an IDC before the scheduled hearing on a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery.
Defendant scheduled and attended an IDC on February 20, 2024.
Plaintiff did not attend the IDC. The Court took the IDC off calendar and ruled that Defendant could proceed with motions to compel further discovery responses.
B.
Timeliness
Unless notice of [a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).)
The statutory deadline for a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is mandatory and the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a belated motion to compel. (See
Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 137 (
Golf & Tennis Pro Shop
);
Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 683, 685 (
Vidal Sassoon
).)
On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and request for sanctions, and (2) a motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and request for sanctions. The motions stated that Defendants counsel received Plaintiffs responses to Defendants special and form interrogatories on November 3, 2023. The motions also stated that although Defendants counsel asked Plaintiffs counsel for an extension of time to file a motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories, Plaintiffs counsel did not respond to the request.
On April 22, 2024, the Court issued an order observing that the 45-day deadline to file a motion to compel further responses begins to run only when verified responses are served and it was not clear if the responses which Defendants counsel received on November 3, 2023 were verified.
The Court continued the hearing to May 16, 2024 and ordered Defendant to file supplemental declarations or briefs explaining whether her motions were timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file responsive declarations or briefs.
On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed supplemental briefs stating that Plaintiff served verifications to the discovery responses on November 7, 2023.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs counsel agreed to extend Defendants time to file motions to compel further responses to January 12, 2024 and then for an additional three weeks. (Defendants Supplemental Brief p. 6.) Based on Defendant's representations, Defendant's deadline to file motions to compel further responses would have been February 2, 2024.
On January 19 and 30, 2024, Defendants counsel asked Plaintiffs counsel for a 60-day extension of time to file motions to compel further responses to the special and form interrogatories. (Defendants Supplemental Brief p. 6.) Plaintiffs counsel did not respond to the request.
As noted, Defendant filed motions to compel further responses on February 22, 2024, after the February 2, 2024 deadline.
Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the Court instructed Defendant to file motions to compel further discovery and tolled all motion deadlines related to the discovery at issue in doing so at the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference.
(Supplement Brief pp. 2-3.)
As support for this argument, Defendant cites the Courts February 20, 2024 minute order, which stated that notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to appear at the informal discovery conference, Counsel for Defendant may move forward with filing the Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses and the Court will rule on the Motions on their scheduled dates of 4/22 and 4/23/22024 at 1:30 p.m. in this Department.
The timeliness issue was not before the Court at the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference and the Court did not address it. In stating that Defendant could proceed with filing her motion, the Court meant only that Defendant had complied with the Eighth Amended Standing Orders requirement that a party participate in an informal discovery conference before the Court will hear the partys motion to compel further discovery responses. Indeed, the Court has no authority to waive the timeliness requirement.
(See
Golf & Tennis Pro Shop
,
supra
, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 137;
Vidal Sassoon
,
supra
, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 683, 685.)
If Defendant relied on the language of the Courts February 20, 2024 minute order to support a belief that that the Court tolled all motion deadlines related to the discovery (Supplemental Brief p. 3), Defendants reliance was misplaced.
Defendant also argues that [a]t the February 20, 2024, IDC hearing, the court necessarily tolled the applicable motion deadlines under former Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.080(c)(2) by giving Defendant permission to file her Motions at the Informal Discovery Conference.
(Supplemental Brief p. 4.) But as Defendant acknowledges, former Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.080, subdivision (c)(2), was not in effect when the February 20, 2024 informal discovery conference took place.
Defendant also relies on the Eighth Amended Standing Orders statements that (1) parties are encouraged to stipulate to extend the deadline for filing a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses by 60 days in order to allow time to participate in an IDC and to informally resolve the pending discovery issues and (2) [a] partys failure to stipulate to extend the time to bring a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses so that an IDC may be held may subject the parties and/or counsel to the imposition of sanctions.
(Eight Amended Standing Order ¶ 9 E.)
Defendant does not mention the Eighth Amended Standing Orders warning that [r]eserving or scheduling an IDC
does not extend the time to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses.
(
Ibid
., bold in original.)
The Eighth Amended Standing Order suggests that [i]f parties do not stipulate to extend the deadline(s) to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses, the moving/propounding party may file the motion to avoid it being deemed untimely.
(
Ibid
.)
Defendant did not follow this suggestion.
The Court denies the motions as untimely.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant
Margaret Mary Lewiss motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions.
The Court DENIES Defendant Margaret Mary Lewiss motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file proof of service of this ruling within five days.
Ruling
WILHELMINA QUISMUNDO VS SON THE VAN
Jul 18, 2024 |
23PSCV00745
Case Number:
23PSCV00745
Hearing Date:
July 18, 2024
Dept:
6
CASE NAME:
Wilhelmina Quismundo v. Son The Van
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is an auto accident case. On March 14, 2023, plaintiff Wilhelmina Quismundo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Son B Van (erroneously sued as Son The Van) (Defendant) and Does 1 through 26, alleging one cause of action for negligence.
On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff moved to compel responses to written discovery. The motion is unopposed.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (
Id.
, § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id.
, § 2030.290, subd. (c).)
When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id
., § 2031.300, subd. (c).)
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Although meeting and conferring is not required before bringing motions to compel, (
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404), the Court appreciates Plaintiffs meet-and-confer efforts. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.)
Analysis
Plaintiff indicates having served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, on Defendant on November 15, 2023. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 3.) Despite having been granted multiple extensions, Defendant failed to respond. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Defendant has not responded as of the filing of the motion. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 13.) The Court finds Plaintiff has shown it is entitled to responses from Defendant.
However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs motion contains no proof of service, nor is any proof of service on file with the Court evidencing that Plaintiff served this motion on Defendant. Such proof of service should have been filed by July 11, 2024, per Rule 3.1300, subdivision (c), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (c) [Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing.]) Accordingly, it is unclear to the Court if Defendant was ever properly served with this motion.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff combined all three sets of discovery requests into one motion. Each set of discovery requests requires its own motion and a separate filing fee. There is nothing here indicating that Plaintiff paid three separate motion filing fees.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice.
The Court also denies Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.
Preview
PLD-PI-001 ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY STATE BAR NUMBER: 325770 FOR COURT USE ONLY NAME: Uriel Gdolian, Esq. FIRM NAME: OAKWOOD LEGAL GROUP, LLP STREET ADDRESS: 8124 W Third Street, 2nd Floor CITY: Los Angeles STATE: CA ZIP CODE: 90048 TELEPHONE NO.: 310-205-2525 FAX NO.: 310-773-5573 EMAIL ADDRESS: ugdolian@oakwoodlegal.com ATTORNEY FOR (name): Plaintiff, VANESSA AGUILAR and HEATHER ATKISSON SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF KERN STREET ADDRESS: 1215 Truxton Ave MAILING ADDRESS: 1215 Truxton Ave CITY AND ZIP CODE: Bakersfield, CA 93301 BRANCH NAME: METRO DIVISION JUSTICE BUILDING PLAINTIFF: VANESSA AGUILAR, an individual; and HEATHER ATKISSON, an individual DEFENDANT: CITY OF RIDGECREST; and ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual [KJ DOES 1 TO 25, INCLUSIVE CASE NUMBER: COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Damage, Wrongful Death D AMENDED (Number): Type (check all that apply): [KJ MOTOR VEHICLE D OTHER (specify): [KJ Property Damage D Wrongful Death [KJ Personal Injury D Other Damages (specify): Jurisdiction (check all that apply): D ACTION IS A LIMITED CIVIL CASE (does not exceed $35,000) Amount demanded D does not exceed $10,000 D exceeds $10,000 [KJ ACTION IS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE (exceeds $35,000) D ACTION IS RECLASSIFIED by this amended complaint D from limited to unlimited D from unlimited to limited 1. Plaintiff (name or names): VANESSA AGUILAR, an individual; HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual alleges causes of action against defendant (name or names): CITY OF RIDGECREST; ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual 2. This pleading, including attachments and exhibits, consists of the following number of pages: 5 3. Each plaintiff named above is a competent adult a. D except plaintiff (name): (1) D a corporation qualified to do business in California. (2) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D a public entity (describe): (4) D a minor D an adult (a) D for whom a guardian or conservator of the estate or a guardian ad litem has been appointed. (b) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify): b. D except plaintiff (name): (1) D a corporation qualified to do business in California. (2) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D a public entity (describe): (4) D a minor D an adult (a) D for whom a guardian or conservator of the estate or a guardian ad litem has been appointed. (b) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify): D Information about additional plaintiffs who are not competent adults is shown in Attachment 3. Page 1 of 3 Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council of California COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.12 www.courts.ca.gov PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] Damage, Wrongful Death PLD-PI-001 SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER: AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al. 4. D Plaintiff (name): is doing business under the fictitious name (specify): and has complied with the fictitious business name laws. 5. Each defendant named above is a natural person a. [KJ except defendant (name): CITY OF RIDGECREST c. D except defendant (name): (1) D a business organization, form unknown. (1) D a business organization, form unknown. (2) D a corporation. (2) D a corporation. (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (4) [KJ a public entity (describe): (4) D a public entity (describe): (5) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify): b. D except defendant (name): d. D except defendant (name): (1) D a business organization, form unknown. (1) D a business organization, form unknown. (2) D a corporation. (2) D a corporation. (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) D an unincorporated entity (describe): (4) D a public entity (describe): (4) D a public entity (describe): (5) D other (specify): (5) D other (specify): D Information about additional defendants who are not natural persons is contained in Attachment 5. 6. The true names of defendants sued as Does are unknown to plaintiff. a. [KJ Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 1-12 were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment. b. [KJ Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 13-25 are persons whose capacities are unknown to plaintiff. 7. D Defendants who are joined under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 are (names): 8. This court is the proper court because a. D at least one defendant now resides in its jurisdictional area. b. D the principal place of business of a defendant corporation or unincorporated association is in its jurisdictional area. c. [KJ injury to person or damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area. d. D other (specify): 9. D Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute, and a. D has complied with applicable claims statutes, or b. D is excused from complying because (specify): PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 2 of 3 Damage, Wrongful Death PLD-PI-001 SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER: AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al. 10. The following causes of action are attached and the statements above apply to each (each complaint must have one or more causes of action attached): a. Motor Vehicle DDDDEJEJ b. General Negligence c. Intentional Tort d. Products Liability e. Premises Liability f. Other (specify): 11. Plaintiff has suffered (check all that apply) a. wage loss. DEJEJEJEJEJEJ b. loss of use of property. c. hospital and medical expenses. d. general damage. e. property damage. f. loss of earning capacity. g. other damage (specify): 12. The damages claimed for wrongful death and the relationships of plaintiff to the deceased are DD □ a. listed in Attachment 12. b. as follows: 13. The relief sought in this complaint is within the jurisdiction of this court. 14. Plaintiff prays for judgment for costs of suit; for such relief as is fair, just, and equitable; and for a. (1) compensatory damages. DB DB (2) punitive damages. b. The amount of damages is (in cases for personal injury or wrongful death, you must check (1)): (1) according to proof. (2) in the amount of: $ D 15. The paragraphs of this complaint alleged on information and belief are as follows (specify paragraph numbers): Date: 5/20/2024 ~ t.. ,,... C ~ Uriel Gdolian, Esq. ~ (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PLAINTIFF OR ATTORNEY) PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2024] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 3 of 3 Damage, Wrongful Death PLD-PI-001(1) SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER: AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al. ONE CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle (number) ATTACHMENT TO Complaint Cross - Complaint (Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.) Plaintiff (name): VANESSA AGUILAR, an Individual and HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual MV- 1. Plaintiff alleges the acts of defendants were negligent; the acts were the legal (proximate) cause of injuries and damages to plaintiff; the acts occurred on (date): 09/13/2023 at (place): 1400 Second St/ W. Orchard Ave , Inyokern, CA, 93527 MV- 2. DEFENDANTS a. [KJ The defendants who operated a motor vehicle are (names): CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON [KJ Does 1 to 25 b. [KJ The defendants who employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment are (names): CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON [KJ Does 1 to 25 c. [KJ The defendants who owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission are (names): CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON [KJ Does 1 to 25 d. [KJ The defendants who entrusted the motor vehicle are (names): CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON [KJ Does 1 to 25 e. [KJ The defendants who were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency were (names): CITY OF RIDGECREST and ROBERT HENDERSON [KJ Does 1 to 25 f. D The defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons and the reasons for the liability are D listed in Attachment MV-2f D as follows: D Does to Page Page 1 of 1 Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure 425.12 Judicial Council of California CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle www.courts.ca.gov PLD-PI-001(1) [Rev. January 1, 2007] PLD-PI-001(2) SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER: AGUILAR, et al. v. CITY OF RIDGECREST, et al. TWO CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence Page 5 (number) ATTACHMENT TO CKJ Complaint D Cross - Complaint (Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.) GN-1. Plaintiff (name): VANESSA AGUILAR, an Individual; HEATHER ATKISSON, an Individual alleges that defendant (name): CITY OF RIDGECREST; ROBERT HENDERSON, an Individual [KJ Does 1 to 25 was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to plaintiff. By the following acts or omissions to act, defendant negligently caused the damage to plaintiff on (date): 09/13/2023 at (place): 1400 Second St/ W. Orchard Ave , Inyokern, CA, 93527 (description of reasons for liability): Defendant Robert Henderson while in course and scope of his employment with Defendant City of Ridgecrest, rear-ended Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant Robert Henderson caused the collision in violation of CVC 22350 – unsafe speed. Page 1 of 1 Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure 425.12 Judicial Council of California CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence www.courts.ca.gov PLD-PI-001(2) [Rev. January 1, 2007]