Preview
1 MATTHEW J. BLASCHKE, SBN 281938
mblaschke@kslaw.com
2
DAVID P. MATTERN, pro hac vice
3 dmattern@kslaw.com
KING & SPALDING LLP
4 50 California Street, Suite 3300
San Francisco, CA 9411l
5 Tel.: 415-318-1200
6
GEOFFREY M. DRAKE, pro hac vice
7 gdrake@kslaw.com
KING & SPALDING LLP
8 1180 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30309
9 Tel.: 404-572-4600
10
Attorneys for Defendants TikTok Inc. and
11 ByteDance Inc.
12 [Additional parties and counsel listed on
signature pages]
13
14
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
16
17
COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION
18 TITLE [RULE 3.400] PROCEEDING NO. 5255
19 SOCIAL MEDIA CASES For Filing Purposes: 22STCV21355
20 Judge: Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: SSC-12
21
(Christina Arlington Smith, et al., v. TikTok DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
22 Inc., et al., Case No. 22STCV21355) DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND
23 AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-
(A.S. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO
24 No. 22STCV28202) WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’
MASTER COMPLAINT AND
25 (Glenn-Mills v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM
Case No. 23SMCV03371) COMPLAINTS
26
27 (J.S. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case Date: March 20, 2024
No. CV 2022-1472) Time: 1:45 p.m.
28 Dept.: SSC-12
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 (K.K. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al.,
Case No. 23SMCV03371)
2
3 (K.L. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case
No. CIV SB 2218921)
4
(N.S. et al. v. Snap Inc., Case No.
5 22CV019089)
6
(P.F. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case
7 No. 23SMCV03371)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................6
3
II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 6
4
A. PLAINTIFFS’ UNRUH ACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH
5 PREJUDICE. .......................................................................................................... 6
B. PLAINTIFFS’ NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS
6
ARE PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY DEFECTIVE. .................... 6
7 1. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF A
NON-PRODUCT-BASED CLAIM............................................................ 6
8
2. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE A NON-PRODUCT-BASED
9 DUTY. ........................................................................................................ 7
10 3. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD A DUTY TO WARN OF THIRD-
PARTY MISCONDUCT. ........................................................................... 8
11
4. SECTION 230 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT BAR PLAINTIFFS’
12 NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS. ........ 10
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 11
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3
Cases
4
Bill v. Superior Court.,
5 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1982) .................................................................................................11
6 Bride v. Snap Inc.,
2023 WL 2016927 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023) ..........................................................................10
7
Brown v. USA Taekwondo,
8 11 Cal. 5th 204 (2021) ...............................................................................................................8
9
Doe v. Internet Brands,
10 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................11
11 Doe v. Myspace, Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007)......................................................................................9
12
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc.,
13 2017 WL 5665670 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) ..........................................................................9
14 In re Facebook, Inc.,
15 625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021)......................................................................................................10
16 Godwin v. Facebook, Inc.,
160 N.E.3d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) .......................................................................................9
17
Herrick v. Grindr LLC,
18 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) .............................................................................................10
19 In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig
20 ⎯ F. Supp. 3d ⎯, 2023 WL 7524912 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023) ............................................9
21 Lee v. Amazon.com,
76 Cal. App. 5th 200 (2022) ....................................................................................................11
22
Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
23 82 Cal. App. 4th 592 (2000) ......................................................................................................7
24 Melton v. Boustred,
183 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2010) ....................................................................................................9
25
26 Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981) ...................................................................................................11
27
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct.,
28 4 Cal. 5th 607 (2018) .............................................................................................................8, 9
4
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 Tri-Continent Int’l Corp. v. Paris Sav. & Loan Assn.,
12 Cal. App. 4th 1354 (1993) ....................................................................................................6
2
3 V.V. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
2024 WL 678248 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2024) ................................................................10
4
Statutes
5
47 U.S.C. § 230 ...................................................................................................................... passim
6
Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 ............................................................................6, 11
7
Other Authorities
8
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm (2012) ............................................................8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiffs’ Opposition confirms that the Court should sustain Defendants’ Demurrer. Remarkably,
3 Plaintiffs once again asserted Unruh Act claims, defended the claims’ viability during the meet and confer
4 process, required Defendants to demur to those claims, and only then withdrew them. Those claims should
5 now be dismissed from this proceeding with prejudice. Moreover, the Opposition fails to refute
6 Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ non-product negligent failure to warn claims are improper because:
7 (1) Plaintiffs’ one-line assertion of the claims in the identified SFCs without identifying any supporting
8 allegations is insufficient even under the most liberal notice-pleading standards; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege
9 a non-product duty to warn; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege a duty to warn of third-party misconduct; and
10 (4) the claim is barred by Section 230 and the First Amendment.1
11 II. ARGUMENT
12 A. Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act Claims Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice.
13 Plaintiffs have now twice asserted Unruh Act claims in two sets of SFCs that Defendants have
14 been forced to demur to, only for Plaintiffs to abandon those claims in response to Defendants’
15 demurrers. Given that the Opposition expressly withdraws these claims both from the SFCs and the MC
16 (Opp. 6), and to prevent further gamesmanship, the Court should sustain the Demurrer with prejudice,
17 making clear that no further efforts to assert claims under the Unruh Act or similar state anti-discrimination
18 laws will be allowed in this proceeding. E.g., Tri-Continent Int’l Corp. v. Paris Sav. & Loan Assn., 12
19 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1359 (1993) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of withdrawn claim).
20 B. Plaintiffs’ Non-Product Negligent Failure to Warn Claims Are Procedurally and
21 Substantively Defective.
22 1. Plaintiffs Do Not Provide Adequate Notice of a Non-Product-Based Claim.
23 In response to the Court’s Demurrer ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ product liability claims, Plaintiffs
24 added a single-line “non-product negligent failure to warn” cause of action in a subset of SFCs. This
25 approach fails to provide adequate notice of the theory or allegations Plaintiffs believe support their claim,
26 Dem. 22–23, and is in contravention to this Court’s Order to “include … supporting allegations” when
27
1
28 All defined terms from Defendants’ Demurrer have the same meaning in this Reply.
6
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 pleading “additional Counts,” Case Mgmt. Order No. 4, Ex. A at 1, 6 (“CMO 4”). Plaintiffs neither
2 identified MC allegations supporting the claim nor even hinted at what Defendants failed to warn about.
3 Are Plaintiffs alleging a failure to warn of risks posed by third-party predators, cyberbullies, social media
4 “addiction,” sensitive content on defendants’ services, the absence of certain age-verification measures,
5 or some other theory altogether? Defendants do not know. And that is prejudicial.
6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition now attempts to fill in the gaps, but merely confirms that neither the MC
7 nor the identified SFCs provide Defendants with fair notice. Plaintiffs offer the blanket assertion that “all
8 the factual allegations that support the now-dismissed product liability failure-to-warn claim support the
9 non-product failure-to-warn claim identified in the SFCs.” Opp. 2–3 (emphases added).2 Plaintiffs’
10 repeated reliance on product-related allegations in asserting a purported “non-product” claim belies their
11 argument (Opp. 3) that Defendants should have known their allegations do not sound in product liability.
12 Indeed, the mixing of product and non-product theories makes the scope of the new claim all the more
13 unclear, underscoring that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to plead “with particularity sufficient
14 to acquaint [Defendants] with the nature, source and extent of [their] cause of action.” Ludgate Ins. Co.
15 v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 82 Cal. App. 4th 592, 608 (2000); see Dem. 22–23. And Plaintiffs have no
16 answer to the prejudice that their inadequate pleadings impose by having made it impossible for
17 Defendants to move to strike allegations Plaintiffs now contend—for the first time in opposition to a
18 demurrer—support this claim. The claim should be dismissed, or, at minimum, the Court should order
19 Plaintiffs to plead it in the manner required by CMO 4, so that Defendants may properly challenge the
20 specific allegations supporting it, whether via demurrer or motion to strike.
21 2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Non-Product-Based Duty.
22 Plaintiffs cannot base their new non-product claim on their product-based allegations for
23
2
24 Notably, Plaintiffs’ Opposition invokes sections of the Master Complaint that classify Defendants’
services as “products.” MC ¶¶ 212, 222–35, 238–67, 283–92, 294 (referring to Facebook and Instagram
25 as “products”); ¶¶ 418–38, 514–22 (similar as to Snap); ¶¶ 535–56, 652–55 (similar as to ByteDance);
¶¶ 699–722, 768, 803–10 (similar as to Google). Plaintiffs identify only one allegation that is not
26 expressly product-related. Opp. 1, 3 (citing MC ¶ 474). That allegation relates to warnings about third-
party misconduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Snap could, but does not, warn users, including
27 children and teenagers, that Snaps may not necessarily disappear” because some third-party actor might
record them. MC ¶ 474. But Plaintiffs nowhere allege that any such recordings ever actually happened,
28 much less that they were harmed because of them, and in any event. as explained below, Plaintiffs fail to
plead a cognizable duty to warn of harms caused by third parties. See Section II.B.3, infra.
7
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 substantive reasons as well. Plaintiffs admit that they are relying on “allegations that support the
2 now-dismissed product liability negligent failure-to-warn claim[s].” Opp. 2–3. But Plaintiffs do not even
3 try to explain how those product allegations can be read to support a non-product claim. Nor could they,
4 because in California, outside the product context, negligent failure to warn claims are limited to the
5 specific context where a defendant owes a duty to warn about the potential for third parties to cause harm,
6 either because of a special relationship or because the defendant created the plaintiff’s peril. Dem. 23–
7 24. The Opposition identifies no California authority recognizing failure to warn claims beyond that
8 context. Instead, Plaintiffs cite: (1) a case finding no duty to warn and (2) Section 18 of the Third
9 Restatement, which no California court has ever adopted. Opp. 2 (citing Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church,
10 3 Cal. 5th 1077, 1088 (2017); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 18 (2010)). Plaintiffs
11 do not—and cannot—refute that recognizing a negligent failure to warn claim outside the third-party harm
12 context would circumvent established California law refusing to recognize negligent concealment claims.
13 Dem. 23 (citing Order 81). Plaintiffs’ “non-product negligent failure to warn” claim is a negligent
14 concealment claim by another name, and whatever the label, the claim is not cognizable.
15 3. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Duty to Warn of Third-Party Misconduct.
16 To the extent Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims purport to rest on alleged harms from third-party
17 misconduct (see Opp. 3 n.7), it also fails for lack of a legal duty. A failure to warn of potential harms
18 inflicted by third parties is actionable only when: (1) a special relationship exists; or (2) a defendant has
19 affirmatively “created a peril” by “perform[ing] an act that increases the risk” of third-party harm. Brown
20 v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 214, 216, 218 (2021). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged either
21 of those conditions. See Dem. 24–25.
22 First, Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants have a legally cognizable special relationship with
23 millions of minor users (Opp. 2–4) is unsupportable. Special relationships involve a “limited community,
24 not the public at large.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 607, 621 (2018). Plaintiffs’
25 proposed dramatic expansion of tort duties has been rejected by every court that has considered the
26 argument. See, e.g., Dem. 24. Instead of responding to the cases Defendants cited, Plaintiffs analogize
27 their relationship with Defendants to that between a host and invitee. MTS Opp. at 5–6 (citing cases).
28 While a child in someone’s physical home could be in a “relation[ship] of dependence,” Regent, 4 Cal.
8
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 5th at 621, courts have rejected attempts to extend that reasoning to websites and their users. See, e.g.,
2 Godwin v. Facebook, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 372, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
3 2d 843, 851 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
4 Second, Plaintiffs’ Opposition confirms that they fail to allege that Defendants affirmatively
5 increased a risk of third-party harm to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend (Opp. 4) that because this Court found
6 they adequately alleged, at the pleading stage, that some of “Defendants’ conduct directly harmed
7 Plaintiffs,” Order 49, the same conduct also necessarily increased the risk of third-party harm. That is
8 illogical. This Court noted in its prior ruling that it was not addressing Plaintiffs’ alleged harm by third-
9 parties, id. 11 n.1—and Plaintiffs cannot point to any surviving allegation in the MC that Defendants’
10 affirmative actions “ma[de] plaintiff[s’] position worse” in relation to third-party harms. See Dyroff v.
11 Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 5665670, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (“neutral tools and
12 functionalities on [defendant’s] website did not create a risk of harm that imposes an ordinary duty of
13 care”), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019).3 Indeed, the MDL court found near-identical allegations
14 wholly lacking. In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig. (“In re Soc. Media”),
15 —F. Supp. 3d—,2023 WL 7524912, at *37–39 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023).
16 Plaintiffs’ suggestion—in footnotes—that Defendants increased a risk of third-party misconduct
17 by seeking to increase Plaintiffs’ time spent on Defendants’ services (see Opp 3 n.7; MTS Opp. 5 n.5) is
18 contradicted by their pleadings, which make clear that “addiction” to social media is distinct from the
19 alleged third-party misconduct (see, e.g., MC ¶¶ 365–402, 494–513, 666–82, 774–802 (separately alleging
20 harms from “CSAM and child exploitation”)). In any event, the MDL court rejected this very argument,
21 which conflates mere foreseeability of some abstract harm with affirmative misfeasance as to specific
22 third-party misconduct. See In re Soc. Media, 2023 WL 7524912, at *36 (allegations “that defendants
23 sought to increase minors’ use of their platforms while ‘knowing or having reason to know’ that adult
24 predators also used the sites” and “insufficient to show misfeasance”).
25
26
3
27 In addition, to establish liability under a misfeasance theory, Plaintiffs would have had to allege that the
third party’s misconduct was “a necessary component” of a defendant’s service. Melton v. Boustred, 183
28 Cal. App. 4th 521, 535 (2010). There are no such allegations in the MC.
9
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 4. Section 230 and the First Amendment Bar Plaintiffs’ Non-Product Negligent
2 Failure to Warn Claims.
3 Section 230 and the First Amendment would also bar any non-product failure to warn claim, which
4 (as discussed in Section II.B.2) could only be based on third-party misconduct under California law. To
5 the extent Plaintiffs assert that their (unpleaded) allegations for failure to warn go beyond third-party
6 misconduct, there is no such claim, but the Court should, at minimum, require Plaintiffs to re-plead their
7 claim with actual supporting allegations that Defendants may challenge (including based on Section 230
8 and the First Amendment) via a motion to strike—as they are doing for the claims pleaded in the MC.
9 Plaintiffs argue that their failure to warn claims escape Section 230 because they only require
10 Defendants to post a warning about potential harms without any duty to monitor, alter, or remove any
11 piece of content. Opp. 5. That misses the point. As other courts have held, “a warning about third-party
12 content is a form of editing, just as much as a disclaimer printed at the top of a page of classified ads in a
13 newspaper would be.” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 94 (Tex. 2021).
14 For example, in Bride v. Snap Inc., 2023 WL 2016927 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023), appeal docketed,
15 No. 23-55134 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023), Section 230 barred a failure to warn claim challenging anonymous
16 messaging because the plaintiffs’ theory “essentially reduce[d] to holding Defendants liable for publishing
17 content created by third parties.” Id. at *5. Plaintiffs seek to limit Bride to claims concerning “failing to
18 adequately regulate [an] end-user’s abusive messaging,” Opp. 6, but the court dismissed plaintiffs’ failure
19 to warn claim because it was “predicated on allegations concerning activity immunized by Section 230.”
20 Bride, 2023 WL 2016927, at *7. In other words, the “warnings Plaintiffs seek would only be necessary
21 because of [defendants’] allegedly inadequate policing of third-party content transmitted via [their]
22 platforms.” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d at 94.4 And if plaintiffs could evade Section 230 by merely
23 recasting content publication claims as “failure to warn” about publication of such content claims, the
24
25
4
See also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019) (Section 230 barred failure to
26
warn claim because it was “inextricably linked to Grindr’s alleged failure to edit, monitor, or remove …
27 offensive content”); V.V. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 678248, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16,
2024) (“[A]llegations of failure to warn of an application’s potential danger do not remove the ‘publisher’
28 status.”).
10
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 exception would swallow the rule, rendering Section 230 all but meaningless.
2 Plaintiffs rely on Lee v. Amazon.com, 76 Cal. App. 5th 200, 256 (2022), where the plaintiff brought
3 claims based on Amazon’s failure to provide a warning required by state law about products known to
4 contain certain chemicals, and Doe v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016), where plaintiff
5 brought claims “based on [the defendant’s] knowledge of [a] rape scheme” from an outside source and
6 wholly unrelated to content posted by the rapists. Both cases are distinguishable. Here, Plaintiffs seek to
7 impose a duty to warn of third-party misconduct involving improper content or communications on
8 Defendants’ services—even when Defendants do not have knowledge of the specific conduct at issue. To
9 satisfy this duty, Defendants would necessarily have to monitor users’ content to determine when a
10 warning is necessary. Neither Doe nor Lee suggests that Section 230 would permit such a claim.
11 Similarly, the First Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims because they implicate Defendants’ role as
12 publishers of lawful user speech. Plaintiffs cite no case that imposes a duty to warn on publishers for the
13 harm that speech they disseminate may cause certain viewers or listeners. Plaintiffs are wrong in asserting
14 that the Court rejected Defendants’ reliance on Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d
15 488, 492 (1981) (holding that the First Amendment bars claims that a television broadcaster showed a
16 film “without proper warning in an effort to obtain the largest possible viewing audience”), and Bill v.
17 Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1006 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment bars claims that
18 film producers have a duty to warn about the likelihood “that violence might occur at or near theaters
19 showing [their] film”). The Court addressed Olivia N. and Bill in the context of Plaintiffs’ general
20 negligence count and held they did not bear on that claim because the count concerned Defendants’ own
21 conduct, not only third-party misconduct. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ non-product failure to warn claim is
22 necessarily limited to, at most, allegations that Defendants should have warned Plaintiffs about content
23 created and shared by third parties on Defendants’ services.
24 III. CONCLUSION
25 Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Unruh Act claims with prejudice and
26 sustain their Demurrer as to the non-product negligent failure to warn claims. Alternatively, the Court
27 should order Plaintiffs to actually plead their non-product negligent failure to warn claims with specific
28 supporting allegations and permit Defendants to challenge the viability of the new allegations.
11
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 DATED: February 29, 2024 KING & SPALDING LLP
2
3
By: /s/ Matthew J. Blaschke
4 Matthew J. Blaschke
5 MATTHEW J. BLASCHKE, SBN 281938
6 mblaschke@kslaw.com
DAVID P. MATTERN, pro hac vice
7 dmattern@kslaw.com
KING & SPALDING LLP
8 50 California Street, Suite 3300
San Francisco, CA 9411l
9 Tel.: 415-318-1200
10
GEOFFREY M. DRAKE, pro hac vice
11 gdrake@kslaw.com
KING & SPALDING LLP
12 1180 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30309
13 Tel: 404-572-4600
14
15
DATED: February 29, 2024 FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
16
17
18 By: /s/ Tarifa B. Laddon
Tarifa B. Laddon
19
TARIFA B. LADDON, SBN 240419
20 tarifa.laddon@faegredrinker.com
21 DAVID P. KOLLER, SBN 328633
david.koller@faegredrinker.com
22 FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
LLP
23 1800 Century Park East, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA 90067
24 Tel.: 310-203-4000
25
26
27
28
12
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 ANDREA R. PIERSON, pro hac vice
andrea.pierson@faegredrinker.com
2
FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE
3 & REATH LLP
300 N. Meridian Street, Suite 2500
4 Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: 317-237-1424
5
Attorneys for Defendants TikTok Inc. and ByteDance
6
Inc.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 DATED: February 29, 2024 COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
2
3
By: /s/ Ashley M. Simonsen
4 Ashley M. Simonsen
5 ASHLEY M. SIMONSEN, SBN 275203
asimonsen@cov.com
6
ALEXANDER L. SCHULTZ, SBN 340212
7 aschultz@cov.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
8 1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
9 Tel.: 424-332-4800
10
EMILY JOHNSON HENN, SBN 269482
11 ehenn@cov.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
12 3000 El Camino Real
5 Palo Alto Square, 10th Floor
13 Palo Alto, CA 94306
14 Tel.: 650-632-4700
15 MARK W. MOSIER, pro hac vice
mmosier@cov.com
16 PHYLLIS A. JONES, pro hac vice
pajones@cov.com
17 PAUL W. SCHMIDT, pro hac vice
18 pschmidt@cov.com
MICHAEL X. IMBROSCIO, pro hac vice
19 mimbroscio@cov.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
20 One City Center
850 Tenth Street, NW
21
Washington, DC 20001
22 Tel.: 202-662-6000
23 Attorneys for Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc.
f/k/a Facebook, Inc.; Facebook Holdings, LLC;
24 Facebook Operations, LLC; Facebook Payments,
Inc.; Facebook Technologies, LLC;
25
Instagram, LLC; and Siculus, Inc.
26
27
28
14
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 DATED: February 29, 2024 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
2
3
By: /s/ Christopher Chiou
4 Christopher Chiou
5 CHRISTOPHER CHIOU, SBN 233587
6 cchiou@wsgr.com
SAMANTHA MACHOCK, SBN 298852
7 smachock@wsgr.com
MATTHEW K. DONOHUE, SBN 302144
8 mdonohue@wsgr.com
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
9 633 W 5th Street
10 Los Angeles, CA 90071
Tel.: 323-210-2900
11
LAUREN GALLO WHITE, SBN 309075
12 lwhite@wsgr.com
ANDREW KRAMER, SBN 321574
13 akramer@wsgr.com
14 CARMEN SOBCZAK, SBN 342569
csobczak@wsgr.com
15 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
One Market Plaza, Spear Tower, Suite 3300
16 San Francisco, CA 94105
Tel.: 415-947-2000
17
18 BRIAN M. WILLEN, pro hac vice
bwillen@wsgr.com
19 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
20 New York, New York 10019
Tel.: 212-999-5800
21
22 Attorneys for Defendants YouTube, LLC and Google
LLC
23
24
25
26
27
28
15
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 DATED: February 29, 2024 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
2
3
By: /s/ Jonathan H. Blavin
4 Jonathan H. Blavin
JONATHAN H. BLAVIN, SBN 230269
5 jonathan.blavin@mto.com
6 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
7 San Francisco, CA 94105
Tel.: 415-512-4000
8
ROSE L. EHLER, SBN 29652
9 Rose.Ehler@mto.com
10 VICTORIA A. DEGTYAREVA, SBN 284199
Victoria.Degtyareva@mto.com
11 ARIEL T. TESHUVA, SBN 324238
Ariel.Teshuva@mto.com
12 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
13 Los Angeles, CA 90071
14 Tel.: 213-683-9100
15 LAUREN A. BELL, pro hac vice pending
Lauren.Bell@mto.com
16 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
601 Massachusetts Ave., NW St.
17
Suite 500 E
18 Washington, D.C. 20001
Tel.: 202-220-1100
19
Attorneys for Defendant Snap Inc.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
16
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed
in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 50 California Street, Suite
3 3300, San Francisco, CA 94111.
4 On February 29, 2024, I caused to be served true copies of the following document(s) described
as:
5
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE
6 DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED
IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
7
on the interested parties in this action pursuant to the most recent Master Service List as follows:
8
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE VIA CASE ANYWHERE: In accordance with the
9
Court’s Order Authorizing Electronic Service requiring all documents to be served upon
10 interested parties via the Case Anywhere System.
11 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
true and correct.
12
Executed on February 29, 2024, at San Francisco, California.
13
14
UV
15 Tran Le
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
17
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS
Preview
1 MATTHEW J. BLASCHKE, SBN 281938 mblaschke@kslaw.com 2 DAVID P. MATTERN, pro hac vice 3 dmattern@kslaw.com KING & SPALDING LLP 4 50 California Street, Suite 3300 San Francisco, CA 9411l 5 Tel.: 415-318-1200 6 GEOFFREY M. DRAKE, pro hac vice 7 gdrake@kslaw.com KING & SPALDING LLP 8 1180 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1600 Atlanta, GA 30309 9 Tel.: 404-572-4600 10 Attorneys for Defendants TikTok Inc. and 11 ByteDance Inc. 12 [Additional parties and counsel listed on signature pages] 13 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 15 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 16 17 COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION 18 TITLE [RULE 3.400] PROCEEDING NO. 5255 19 SOCIAL MEDIA CASES For Filing Purposes: 22STCV21355 20 Judge: Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: SSC-12 21 (Christina Arlington Smith, et al., v. TikTok DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 22 Inc., et al., Case No. 22STCV21355) DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND 23 AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON- (A.S. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO 24 No. 22STCV28202) WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND 25 (Glenn-Mills v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM Case No. 23SMCV03371) COMPLAINTS 26 27 (J.S. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case Date: March 20, 2024 No. CV 2022-1472) Time: 1:45 p.m. 28 Dept.: SSC-12 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 (K.K. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case No. 23SMCV03371) 2 3 (K.L. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case No. CIV SB 2218921) 4 (N.S. et al. v. Snap Inc., Case No. 5 22CV019089) 6 (P.F. et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case 7 No. 23SMCV03371) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................6 3 II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 6 4 A. PLAINTIFFS’ UNRUH ACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH 5 PREJUDICE. .......................................................................................................... 6 B. PLAINTIFFS’ NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS 6 ARE PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY DEFECTIVE. .................... 6 7 1. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF A NON-PRODUCT-BASED CLAIM............................................................ 6 8 2. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE A NON-PRODUCT-BASED 9 DUTY. ........................................................................................................ 7 10 3. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD A DUTY TO WARN OF THIRD- PARTY MISCONDUCT. ........................................................................... 8 11 4. SECTION 230 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT BAR PLAINTIFFS’ 12 NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS. ........ 10 III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page(s) 3 Cases 4 Bill v. Superior Court., 5 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1982) .................................................................................................11 6 Bride v. Snap Inc., 2023 WL 2016927 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023) ..........................................................................10 7 Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 8 11 Cal. 5th 204 (2021) ...............................................................................................................8 9 Doe v. Internet Brands, 10 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................11 11 Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007)......................................................................................9 12 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 13 2017 WL 5665670 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) ..........................................................................9 14 In re Facebook, Inc., 15 625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021)......................................................................................................10 16 Godwin v. Facebook, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) .......................................................................................9 17 Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 18 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) .............................................................................................10 19 In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig 20 ⎯ F. Supp. 3d ⎯, 2023 WL 7524912 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023) ............................................9 21 Lee v. Amazon.com, 76 Cal. App. 5th 200 (2022) ....................................................................................................11 22 Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 23 82 Cal. App. 4th 592 (2000) ......................................................................................................7 24 Melton v. Boustred, 183 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2010) ....................................................................................................9 25 26 Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981) ...................................................................................................11 27 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 28 4 Cal. 5th 607 (2018) .............................................................................................................8, 9 4 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 Tri-Continent Int’l Corp. v. Paris Sav. & Loan Assn., 12 Cal. App. 4th 1354 (1993) ....................................................................................................6 2 3 V.V. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 678248 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2024) ................................................................10 4 Statutes 5 47 U.S.C. § 230 ...................................................................................................................... passim 6 Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 ............................................................................6, 11 7 Other Authorities 8 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm (2012) ............................................................8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Plaintiffs’ Opposition confirms that the Court should sustain Defendants’ Demurrer. Remarkably, 3 Plaintiffs once again asserted Unruh Act claims, defended the claims’ viability during the meet and confer 4 process, required Defendants to demur to those claims, and only then withdrew them. Those claims should 5 now be dismissed from this proceeding with prejudice. Moreover, the Opposition fails to refute 6 Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ non-product negligent failure to warn claims are improper because: 7 (1) Plaintiffs’ one-line assertion of the claims in the identified SFCs without identifying any supporting 8 allegations is insufficient even under the most liberal notice-pleading standards; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege 9 a non-product duty to warn; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege a duty to warn of third-party misconduct; and 10 (4) the claim is barred by Section 230 and the First Amendment.1 11 II. ARGUMENT 12 A. Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act Claims Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice. 13 Plaintiffs have now twice asserted Unruh Act claims in two sets of SFCs that Defendants have 14 been forced to demur to, only for Plaintiffs to abandon those claims in response to Defendants’ 15 demurrers. Given that the Opposition expressly withdraws these claims both from the SFCs and the MC 16 (Opp. 6), and to prevent further gamesmanship, the Court should sustain the Demurrer with prejudice, 17 making clear that no further efforts to assert claims under the Unruh Act or similar state anti-discrimination 18 laws will be allowed in this proceeding. E.g., Tri-Continent Int’l Corp. v. Paris Sav. & Loan Assn., 12 19 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1359 (1993) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of withdrawn claim). 20 B. Plaintiffs’ Non-Product Negligent Failure to Warn Claims Are Procedurally and 21 Substantively Defective. 22 1. Plaintiffs Do Not Provide Adequate Notice of a Non-Product-Based Claim. 23 In response to the Court’s Demurrer ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ product liability claims, Plaintiffs 24 added a single-line “non-product negligent failure to warn” cause of action in a subset of SFCs. This 25 approach fails to provide adequate notice of the theory or allegations Plaintiffs believe support their claim, 26 Dem. 22–23, and is in contravention to this Court’s Order to “include … supporting allegations” when 27 1 28 All defined terms from Defendants’ Demurrer have the same meaning in this Reply. 6 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 pleading “additional Counts,” Case Mgmt. Order No. 4, Ex. A at 1, 6 (“CMO 4”). Plaintiffs neither 2 identified MC allegations supporting the claim nor even hinted at what Defendants failed to warn about. 3 Are Plaintiffs alleging a failure to warn of risks posed by third-party predators, cyberbullies, social media 4 “addiction,” sensitive content on defendants’ services, the absence of certain age-verification measures, 5 or some other theory altogether? Defendants do not know. And that is prejudicial. 6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition now attempts to fill in the gaps, but merely confirms that neither the MC 7 nor the identified SFCs provide Defendants with fair notice. Plaintiffs offer the blanket assertion that “all 8 the factual allegations that support the now-dismissed product liability failure-to-warn claim support the 9 non-product failure-to-warn claim identified in the SFCs.” Opp. 2–3 (emphases added).2 Plaintiffs’ 10 repeated reliance on product-related allegations in asserting a purported “non-product” claim belies their 11 argument (Opp. 3) that Defendants should have known their allegations do not sound in product liability. 12 Indeed, the mixing of product and non-product theories makes the scope of the new claim all the more 13 unclear, underscoring that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to plead “with particularity sufficient 14 to acquaint [Defendants] with the nature, source and extent of [their] cause of action.” Ludgate Ins. Co. 15 v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 82 Cal. App. 4th 592, 608 (2000); see Dem. 22–23. And Plaintiffs have no 16 answer to the prejudice that their inadequate pleadings impose by having made it impossible for 17 Defendants to move to strike allegations Plaintiffs now contend—for the first time in opposition to a 18 demurrer—support this claim. The claim should be dismissed, or, at minimum, the Court should order 19 Plaintiffs to plead it in the manner required by CMO 4, so that Defendants may properly challenge the 20 specific allegations supporting it, whether via demurrer or motion to strike. 21 2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Non-Product-Based Duty. 22 Plaintiffs cannot base their new non-product claim on their product-based allegations for 23 2 24 Notably, Plaintiffs’ Opposition invokes sections of the Master Complaint that classify Defendants’ services as “products.” MC ¶¶ 212, 222–35, 238–67, 283–92, 294 (referring to Facebook and Instagram 25 as “products”); ¶¶ 418–38, 514–22 (similar as to Snap); ¶¶ 535–56, 652–55 (similar as to ByteDance); ¶¶ 699–722, 768, 803–10 (similar as to Google). Plaintiffs identify only one allegation that is not 26 expressly product-related. Opp. 1, 3 (citing MC ¶ 474). That allegation relates to warnings about third- party misconduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Snap could, but does not, warn users, including 27 children and teenagers, that Snaps may not necessarily disappear” because some third-party actor might record them. MC ¶ 474. But Plaintiffs nowhere allege that any such recordings ever actually happened, 28 much less that they were harmed because of them, and in any event. as explained below, Plaintiffs fail to plead a cognizable duty to warn of harms caused by third parties. See Section II.B.3, infra. 7 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 substantive reasons as well. Plaintiffs admit that they are relying on “allegations that support the 2 now-dismissed product liability negligent failure-to-warn claim[s].” Opp. 2–3. But Plaintiffs do not even 3 try to explain how those product allegations can be read to support a non-product claim. Nor could they, 4 because in California, outside the product context, negligent failure to warn claims are limited to the 5 specific context where a defendant owes a duty to warn about the potential for third parties to cause harm, 6 either because of a special relationship or because the defendant created the plaintiff’s peril. Dem. 23– 7 24. The Opposition identifies no California authority recognizing failure to warn claims beyond that 8 context. Instead, Plaintiffs cite: (1) a case finding no duty to warn and (2) Section 18 of the Third 9 Restatement, which no California court has ever adopted. Opp. 2 (citing Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church, 10 3 Cal. 5th 1077, 1088 (2017); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 18 (2010)). Plaintiffs 11 do not—and cannot—refute that recognizing a negligent failure to warn claim outside the third-party harm 12 context would circumvent established California law refusing to recognize negligent concealment claims. 13 Dem. 23 (citing Order 81). Plaintiffs’ “non-product negligent failure to warn” claim is a negligent 14 concealment claim by another name, and whatever the label, the claim is not cognizable. 15 3. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Duty to Warn of Third-Party Misconduct. 16 To the extent Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims purport to rest on alleged harms from third-party 17 misconduct (see Opp. 3 n.7), it also fails for lack of a legal duty. A failure to warn of potential harms 18 inflicted by third parties is actionable only when: (1) a special relationship exists; or (2) a defendant has 19 affirmatively “created a peril” by “perform[ing] an act that increases the risk” of third-party harm. Brown 20 v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 214, 216, 218 (2021). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged either 21 of those conditions. See Dem. 24–25. 22 First, Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants have a legally cognizable special relationship with 23 millions of minor users (Opp. 2–4) is unsupportable. Special relationships involve a “limited community, 24 not the public at large.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 607, 621 (2018). Plaintiffs’ 25 proposed dramatic expansion of tort duties has been rejected by every court that has considered the 26 argument. See, e.g., Dem. 24. Instead of responding to the cases Defendants cited, Plaintiffs analogize 27 their relationship with Defendants to that between a host and invitee. MTS Opp. at 5–6 (citing cases). 28 While a child in someone’s physical home could be in a “relation[ship] of dependence,” Regent, 4 Cal. 8 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 5th at 621, courts have rejected attempts to extend that reasoning to websites and their users. See, e.g., 2 Godwin v. Facebook, Inc., 160 N.E.3d 372, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 3 2d 843, 851 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 4 Second, Plaintiffs’ Opposition confirms that they fail to allege that Defendants affirmatively 5 increased a risk of third-party harm to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend (Opp. 4) that because this Court found 6 they adequately alleged, at the pleading stage, that some of “Defendants’ conduct directly harmed 7 Plaintiffs,” Order 49, the same conduct also necessarily increased the risk of third-party harm. That is 8 illogical. This Court noted in its prior ruling that it was not addressing Plaintiffs’ alleged harm by third- 9 parties, id. 11 n.1—and Plaintiffs cannot point to any surviving allegation in the MC that Defendants’ 10 affirmative actions “ma[de] plaintiff[s’] position worse” in relation to third-party harms. See Dyroff v. 11 Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 5665670, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (“neutral tools and 12 functionalities on [defendant’s] website did not create a risk of harm that imposes an ordinary duty of 13 care”), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019).3 Indeed, the MDL court found near-identical allegations 14 wholly lacking. In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig. (“In re Soc. Media”), 15 —F. Supp. 3d—,2023 WL 7524912, at *37–39 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023). 16 Plaintiffs’ suggestion—in footnotes—that Defendants increased a risk of third-party misconduct 17 by seeking to increase Plaintiffs’ time spent on Defendants’ services (see Opp 3 n.7; MTS Opp. 5 n.5) is 18 contradicted by their pleadings, which make clear that “addiction” to social media is distinct from the 19 alleged third-party misconduct (see, e.g., MC ¶¶ 365–402, 494–513, 666–82, 774–802 (separately alleging 20 harms from “CSAM and child exploitation”)). In any event, the MDL court rejected this very argument, 21 which conflates mere foreseeability of some abstract harm with affirmative misfeasance as to specific 22 third-party misconduct. See In re Soc. Media, 2023 WL 7524912, at *36 (allegations “that defendants 23 sought to increase minors’ use of their platforms while ‘knowing or having reason to know’ that adult 24 predators also used the sites” and “insufficient to show misfeasance”). 25 26 3 27 In addition, to establish liability under a misfeasance theory, Plaintiffs would have had to allege that the third party’s misconduct was “a necessary component” of a defendant’s service. Melton v. Boustred, 183 28 Cal. App. 4th 521, 535 (2010). There are no such allegations in the MC. 9 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 4. Section 230 and the First Amendment Bar Plaintiffs’ Non-Product Negligent 2 Failure to Warn Claims. 3 Section 230 and the First Amendment would also bar any non-product failure to warn claim, which 4 (as discussed in Section II.B.2) could only be based on third-party misconduct under California law. To 5 the extent Plaintiffs assert that their (unpleaded) allegations for failure to warn go beyond third-party 6 misconduct, there is no such claim, but the Court should, at minimum, require Plaintiffs to re-plead their 7 claim with actual supporting allegations that Defendants may challenge (including based on Section 230 8 and the First Amendment) via a motion to strike—as they are doing for the claims pleaded in the MC. 9 Plaintiffs argue that their failure to warn claims escape Section 230 because they only require 10 Defendants to post a warning about potential harms without any duty to monitor, alter, or remove any 11 piece of content. Opp. 5. That misses the point. As other courts have held, “a warning about third-party 12 content is a form of editing, just as much as a disclaimer printed at the top of a page of classified ads in a 13 newspaper would be.” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 94 (Tex. 2021). 14 For example, in Bride v. Snap Inc., 2023 WL 2016927 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023), appeal docketed, 15 No. 23-55134 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023), Section 230 barred a failure to warn claim challenging anonymous 16 messaging because the plaintiffs’ theory “essentially reduce[d] to holding Defendants liable for publishing 17 content created by third parties.” Id. at *5. Plaintiffs seek to limit Bride to claims concerning “failing to 18 adequately regulate [an] end-user’s abusive messaging,” Opp. 6, but the court dismissed plaintiffs’ failure 19 to warn claim because it was “predicated on allegations concerning activity immunized by Section 230.” 20 Bride, 2023 WL 2016927, at *7. In other words, the “warnings Plaintiffs seek would only be necessary 21 because of [defendants’] allegedly inadequate policing of third-party content transmitted via [their] 22 platforms.” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d at 94.4 And if plaintiffs could evade Section 230 by merely 23 recasting content publication claims as “failure to warn” about publication of such content claims, the 24 25 4 See also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019) (Section 230 barred failure to 26 warn claim because it was “inextricably linked to Grindr’s alleged failure to edit, monitor, or remove … 27 offensive content”); V.V. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 678248, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2024) (“[A]llegations of failure to warn of an application’s potential danger do not remove the ‘publisher’ 28 status.”). 10 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 exception would swallow the rule, rendering Section 230 all but meaningless. 2 Plaintiffs rely on Lee v. Amazon.com, 76 Cal. App. 5th 200, 256 (2022), where the plaintiff brought 3 claims based on Amazon’s failure to provide a warning required by state law about products known to 4 contain certain chemicals, and Doe v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016), where plaintiff 5 brought claims “based on [the defendant’s] knowledge of [a] rape scheme” from an outside source and 6 wholly unrelated to content posted by the rapists. Both cases are distinguishable. Here, Plaintiffs seek to 7 impose a duty to warn of third-party misconduct involving improper content or communications on 8 Defendants’ services—even when Defendants do not have knowledge of the specific conduct at issue. To 9 satisfy this duty, Defendants would necessarily have to monitor users’ content to determine when a 10 warning is necessary. Neither Doe nor Lee suggests that Section 230 would permit such a claim. 11 Similarly, the First Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims because they implicate Defendants’ role as 12 publishers of lawful user speech. Plaintiffs cite no case that imposes a duty to warn on publishers for the 13 harm that speech they disseminate may cause certain viewers or listeners. Plaintiffs are wrong in asserting 14 that the Court rejected Defendants’ reliance on Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 15 488, 492 (1981) (holding that the First Amendment bars claims that a television broadcaster showed a 16 film “without proper warning in an effort to obtain the largest possible viewing audience”), and Bill v. 17 Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1006 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment bars claims that 18 film producers have a duty to warn about the likelihood “that violence might occur at or near theaters 19 showing [their] film”). The Court addressed Olivia N. and Bill in the context of Plaintiffs’ general 20 negligence count and held they did not bear on that claim because the count concerned Defendants’ own 21 conduct, not only third-party misconduct. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ non-product failure to warn claim is 22 necessarily limited to, at most, allegations that Defendants should have warned Plaintiffs about content 23 created and shared by third parties on Defendants’ services. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Unruh Act claims with prejudice and 26 sustain their Demurrer as to the non-product negligent failure to warn claims. Alternatively, the Court 27 should order Plaintiffs to actually plead their non-product negligent failure to warn claims with specific 28 supporting allegations and permit Defendants to challenge the viability of the new allegations. 11 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 DATED: February 29, 2024 KING & SPALDING LLP 2 3 By: /s/ Matthew J. Blaschke 4 Matthew J. Blaschke 5 MATTHEW J. BLASCHKE, SBN 281938 6 mblaschke@kslaw.com DAVID P. MATTERN, pro hac vice 7 dmattern@kslaw.com KING & SPALDING LLP 8 50 California Street, Suite 3300 San Francisco, CA 9411l 9 Tel.: 415-318-1200 10 GEOFFREY M. DRAKE, pro hac vice 11 gdrake@kslaw.com KING & SPALDING LLP 12 1180 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1600 Atlanta, GA 30309 13 Tel: 404-572-4600 14 15 DATED: February 29, 2024 FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP 16 17 18 By: /s/ Tarifa B. Laddon Tarifa B. Laddon 19 TARIFA B. LADDON, SBN 240419 20 tarifa.laddon@faegredrinker.com 21 DAVID P. KOLLER, SBN 328633 david.koller@faegredrinker.com 22 FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP 23 1800 Century Park East, Suite 1500 Los Angeles, CA 90067 24 Tel.: 310-203-4000 25 26 27 28 12 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 ANDREA R. PIERSON, pro hac vice andrea.pierson@faegredrinker.com 2 FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE 3 & REATH LLP 300 N. Meridian Street, Suite 2500 4 Indianapolis, IN 46204 Tel: 317-237-1424 5 Attorneys for Defendants TikTok Inc. and ByteDance 6 Inc. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 DATED: February 29, 2024 COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 2 3 By: /s/ Ashley M. Simonsen 4 Ashley M. Simonsen 5 ASHLEY M. SIMONSEN, SBN 275203 asimonsen@cov.com 6 ALEXANDER L. SCHULTZ, SBN 340212 7 aschultz@cov.com COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 8 1999 Avenue of the Stars Los Angeles, CA 90067 9 Tel.: 424-332-4800 10 EMILY JOHNSON HENN, SBN 269482 11 ehenn@cov.com COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 12 3000 El Camino Real 5 Palo Alto Square, 10th Floor 13 Palo Alto, CA 94306 14 Tel.: 650-632-4700 15 MARK W. MOSIER, pro hac vice mmosier@cov.com 16 PHYLLIS A. JONES, pro hac vice pajones@cov.com 17 PAUL W. SCHMIDT, pro hac vice 18 pschmidt@cov.com MICHAEL X. IMBROSCIO, pro hac vice 19 mimbroscio@cov.com COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 20 One City Center 850 Tenth Street, NW 21 Washington, DC 20001 22 Tel.: 202-662-6000 23 Attorneys for Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc. f/k/a Facebook, Inc.; Facebook Holdings, LLC; 24 Facebook Operations, LLC; Facebook Payments, Inc.; Facebook Technologies, LLC; 25 Instagram, LLC; and Siculus, Inc. 26 27 28 14 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 DATED: February 29, 2024 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC 2 3 By: /s/ Christopher Chiou 4 Christopher Chiou 5 CHRISTOPHER CHIOU, SBN 233587 6 cchiou@wsgr.com SAMANTHA MACHOCK, SBN 298852 7 smachock@wsgr.com MATTHEW K. DONOHUE, SBN 302144 8 mdonohue@wsgr.com WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC 9 633 W 5th Street 10 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Tel.: 323-210-2900 11 LAUREN GALLO WHITE, SBN 309075 12 lwhite@wsgr.com ANDREW KRAMER, SBN 321574 13 akramer@wsgr.com 14 CARMEN SOBCZAK, SBN 342569 csobczak@wsgr.com 15 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC One Market Plaza, Spear Tower, Suite 3300 16 San Francisco, CA 94105 Tel.: 415-947-2000 17 18 BRIAN M. WILLEN, pro hac vice bwillen@wsgr.com 19 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor 20 New York, New York 10019 Tel.: 212-999-5800 21 22 Attorneys for Defendants YouTube, LLC and Google LLC 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 DATED: February 29, 2024 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 2 3 By: /s/ Jonathan H. Blavin 4 Jonathan H. Blavin JONATHAN H. BLAVIN, SBN 230269 5 jonathan.blavin@mto.com 6 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor 7 San Francisco, CA 94105 Tel.: 415-512-4000 8 ROSE L. EHLER, SBN 29652 9 Rose.Ehler@mto.com 10 VICTORIA A. DEGTYAREVA, SBN 284199 Victoria.Degtyareva@mto.com 11 ARIEL T. TESHUVA, SBN 324238 Ariel.Teshuva@mto.com 12 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor 13 Los Angeles, CA 90071 14 Tel.: 213-683-9100 15 LAUREN A. BELL, pro hac vice pending Lauren.Bell@mto.com 16 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 601 Massachusetts Ave., NW St. 17 Suite 500 E 18 Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel.: 202-220-1100 19 Attorneys for Defendant Snap Inc. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 50 California Street, Suite 3 3300, San Francisco, CA 94111. 4 On February 29, 2024, I caused to be served true copies of the following document(s) described as: 5 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE 6 DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS 7 on the interested parties in this action pursuant to the most recent Master Service List as follows: 8 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE VIA CASE ANYWHERE: In accordance with the 9 Court’s Order Authorizing Electronic Service requiring all documents to be served upon 10 interested parties via the Case Anywhere System. 11 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 12 Executed on February 29, 2024, at San Francisco, California. 13 14 UV 15 Tran Le 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO CLAIMS FOR SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PRODUCT NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN ASSERTED IN PLAINTIFFS’ MASTER COMPLAINT AND IDENTIFIED SHORT-FORM COMPLAINTS