FRINK VS. MANKA Case Number: 23CV-0201842 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Amend Petition: Plaintiff Samuel E. Frink moves pursuant to CCP § 473 to file an Amended Verified Petition. Defendant Paul Manka filed an untimely opposition on July 10, 2024. The opposition was due nine court days prior to the hearing. CCP § 473(a)(1) permits any pleading to be amended in further of justice and on any terms as may be proper, after notice to the adverse party. The Court’s discretion in this regard will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment. Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 920, 939. “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530. The Court finds that the motion was timely made and that granting the motion would be in the furtherance of justice. Defendant’s untimely opposition, which the Court has considered, objects to motion based on alleged procedural defects. In the interests of justice, the Court will exercise its discretion to overlook the procedural defects in Plaintiff’s motion, as well as to overlook the procedural defect of the untimely opposition. Defendant’s opposition requests the Court continue the existing trial and mandatory settlement conference, if the motion is granted. That issue is not properly before the Court. Defendant can file the appropriate motion, if he feels it is appropriate. The motion is GRANTED. A proposed order was not lodged with the Court as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Plaintiff shall prepare the order. No copy of the proposed Amended Petition has been lodged with the Court for filing. Plaintiff shall submit a copy of the proposed Amended Petition for filing. Plaintiff is also required to immediately serve a copy of the filed Amended Petition on Defendant.

Case Number: 21STCV07431 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Wallach, et al., v. Providence Health System, et al. CASE NO.: 21STCV07431 MOTION: Approve Minors Compromise HEARING DATE: 7/19/202 4 Summary of Proposed Minors Compromise : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center under the following terms: Settlement to Minor: $1,143,136.11 Settlement to Others: David Wallach - $6,356,863.89 Injuries: Elizabeth Wallach died from a pulmonary embolism the day after giving birth to her daughter, Time Wallach. Time lost her mother's love, companionship, relationship, guidance and support as a result of her mother's wrongful death. Medical Expenses: None. Costs : Petitioner bears costs. Fees : $243,135.42. Counsel provides the retainer with a contingency fee. The terms provide that the Court will set the fee for representation of minor clients. (See ¶12.) The fee requested is approximately 21.26% of the recovery. The Court believes the fee request to be reasonable. Total Settlement $1,143,136.11 Less fees and costs -$243,135.42 Net Settlement $900,000.69 Petitioner proposes to dispose the funds as follows: i) $800,000.69 to be invested in a single-premium deferred annuity, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court; and ii) $100,000.00 be transferred to the trustee of a trust that is either created by or approved in the order approving the settlement or judgment for the minor. Petitioner supplies the terms of the proposed annuity at attachment 18b(3) and trust at attachment 18b(7). These methods are permitted by L.A. County Super. Ct. Rule 4.115. Order : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), has agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center in exchange for $1,143,136.11. The parties having appeared (CRC Rule 7.952(a)), and the Court having reviewed and heard the ¿Petition¿, the Court finds that the settlement is reasonable, and based thereon, approves and GRANTS the petition. (CRC Rule 7.950.) The Court intends to sign the proposed Orders (MC-351, MC-355). THE COURT SETS AN OSC RE COMPLIANCE/PROOF OF RECEIPT OF DEPOSIT ON September 24, 2024, at 8:30 AM. No appearance is required if the receipt is filed. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23PSCV01913 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: K 1. See below . 2. Plaintiff Claremont Stars Soccer Clubs Motion to Compel Defendant Carlos Morrell to Provide a Supplemental Response to Request Nos. 3, 16, 24-26, and 28 of the Request for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Morrell is ordered to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded against Morell in the reduced amount of $1,460.00 and are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 3. Defendant Brian Wiesners Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal for In Camera Review is DENIED. Background Plaintiff Claremont Stars Soccer Club (Club) alleges as follows: Club is a non-profit organization governed by a Board of Directors (Board). Brian Wiesner (Wiesner) and Carlos Morrell (Morell) formerly served as President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Club. Starting in approximately March 2022, Wiesner and Morrell decided to increase Club fees charged for each participant without providing any justification. On February 22, 2023, the Board elected to remove Weisner as Club President. Five of the Board members responsible for Weisners removal and notification of removal, were subsequently notified by an attorney, who had been hired by Wiesner and Morrell with Club funds, that they were expelled from the Club. On March 8, 2023, the Board held its meeting, voted to confirm their removal of Weisner and Morrell as President and Treasurer, respectively, and elected a new set of officers. Wiesner and Morrell opened a new Team Snap account to directly compete with the Clubs Team Snap account and create confusion among the parents as to who was actually running the Club. Wiesner and Morrell have refused to recognize the newly elected officers of the Club and have falsely represented to the community and parents that they are still officers of the Club. The Board has since found evidence that Wiesner and Morrell have stolen Club funds of over $250,000.00. On June 27, 2023, Club filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Wiesner, Morrell and Does 1-10 for: 1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 2. Conversion 3. Unjust Enrichment A Case Management Conference is set for September 4, 2024. 1. Motion to Compel Furthers Re: Request for Production of Documents (i.e., as to Wiesner) Legal Standard [T]he demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that. . . (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[,] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive [and/or that] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) The moving party must demonstrate a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3).) A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) Notice of the motion must be provided within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310, subd. (c).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction. . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) Discussion Plaintiff moves the court for an order compelling Wiesner to provide further supplemental responses, without objections, and responsive documents to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set No. One (i.e., Nos. 25 and 26). Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Wiesner in the amount of $3,970.00. Plaintiffs counsel Greg K. Hafif (Hafif) represents as follows: On September 20, 2023, the subject discovery was served. (Hafif Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A.) On November 6, 2023, Wiesner served responses. ( Id. , ¶ 3, Exh. B.) On December 7, 2023, Hafif asked Weisners counsel Chris Hellmich (Hellmich), for a 4-week extension to file any needed motion to compel furthers, to which Hellmich agreed. ( Id. , ¶ 7, Exh. C.) On January 9, 2024, counsel agreed to another extension of the motion deadline, through January 31, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 3, Exh. D.) On January 29, 2024, counsel agreed to a third extension of the motion deadline, until the end of February 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 9, Exh. E). The court required that an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) be held before the instant motion could be filed. ( Id. , ¶ 13). On March 4, 2024, Morell provided supplemental responses to Requests Nos. 25 and 26, which did not cure the deficiencies noted in the original responses. ( Id. , ¶ 14, Exh. F) The IDC was held on March 25, 2023, but did not resolve the issues. ( Id. , ¶ 16). Request No. 25 asks for all emails and text messages between Wiesner and Morrell from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2023. Request No. 26 asks for all emails and texts between Wiesner and Jeff George (George). Wiesner initially objected to No. 25 on the basis of work product, burden, privacy, relevancy and overbreadth and to No. 26 on the basis of attorney-client communication, work product, burden, equally available, privacy and relevance. Both responses stated, [d]iscovery is continuing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and/or amend her response to this request at any time. Wiesners response to No. 26 further stated that Mr. George is the former attorney for the Club and, as such, all such documents are already within the Clubs possession. Wiesners supplemental response to No. 25 advised that he lacked the ability to comply with the request for emails because he no longer had access to the Club email account he would have used for official Club business. Wiesner advised, with respect to the request for texts, that he would make his personal cell phone available for inspection and copying of relevant text messages to Plaintiffs counsel at Plaintiffs counsels office pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220. Wiesners supplemental response to No. 26 advised that he lacked the ability to comply with the request because he no longer had access to the Club email account he would have used for official Club business. Wiesner also advised that Plaintiff had the ability to recover any responsive emails from George, inasmuch as George was counsel to Plaintiff. Hellmich, in his declaration accompanying Wiesners opposition, represents that Wiesner has since provided second supplemental responses. (Hellmich Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. 3.) Hellmich further represents that he and Wiesner have reviewed the texts contained in Weisners personal cell phone and identified approximately 700 text messages, which have since been exported to an Excel spreadsheet, that they are nearly all irrelevant because they are personal messages unrelated to the subject of the litigation, that the vast majority of the messages pertain to Defendants new soccer team and the minor girls on it and, as such, are irrelevant and implicate third party privacy rights, that 8 messages pertain to this lawsuit but are protected by the Defendants common interest agreement and that Wiesner has reserved a June 11, 2024 hearing regarding a motion for leave to file text messages under seal and to request an in camera review. ( Id. , ¶¶ 8-11). With respect to the issue of emails, Wiesner contends that any responsive communications would be contained in a Club account that he can no longer access and that Plaintiff has access to same. (Opp., 7:12-15). [1] The motion is granted as to Nos. 25 and 26 (i.e., as to the request for emails), to the extent that the court orders Wiesner to provide a further response furnishing his username and password for the Club email account Wiesner used for official Club business. Wiesner is also ordered to provide a further response clarifying his statement made in his second supplemental response as to text messages (i.e., that Subject to and without waiving Defendants prior objections, after a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with this Request, the Defendant lacks the ability to comply with the request because to the extent any responsive documents existed and were in the Defendants possession, he is no longer in the possession, custody or control of the items as he does not have possession, custody or control over any text messages with Mr. George. Indeed, Mr. Georges contact information does not even appear in the Defendants IPhone Contact list), Wiesner must provide a response compliant with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.230 (i.e., specifying the reason for the inability to comply). The motion is otherwise granted as to No. 25 (i.e., as to the request for text messages); however, the court believes that Wiesners objections regarding relevancy and overbreadth are well-taken and limit any further response and production to documents regarding Morrells and Wiesners communications regarding Club activities or business. The court determines that any third-party privacy concerns may be addressed via redaction. The court notes that Wiesner did, in fact, assert a work product objection in his initial response to No. 25; however, it is unclear to the court how communications between two co-defendants would implicate the attorney work product doctrine, defined as [a] writing that reflects an attorneys impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories. ( See Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030.). Although Wiesner claims that the aforesaid texts are protected by a common interest doctrine, a party seeking to rely on the common interest doctrine does not satisfy its burden to justify a claim of privilege simply by demonstrating that a confidential communication took place between parties who purportedly share a common interest. Rather, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine must first establish that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from disclosure by a claim of privilege. ( OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 890.) [T]he common interest doctrine cannot be invoked unless there is an underlying claim of privilege. ( Id. at 893). Wiesner has not satisfied his burden. Wiesner is ordered to provide further, Code-compliant responses, subject to the above limitations, within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions Again, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Weisner in the amount of $3,970.00 [calculated as follows: 0.5 hours reviewing motion, plus 0.5 hours reviewing opposition, plus 1 hour attending hearing at $425.00/hour, plus 5.2 hours preparing motion and 2 hours reviewing opposition and preparing reply at $425.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee]. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,110.00 (i.e., 3 hours at $350.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 2. Motion to Compel Furthers Re: Request for Production of Documents (i.e., as to Morrell) Legal Standard See Motion #1. Discussion Plaintiff moves the court for an order compelling Morrell to provide further supplemental responses, without objections, and responsive documents to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set No. One (i.e., Nos. 3, 16, 24-26 and 28). Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Morrell in the amount of $3,842.50. Hafif represents as follows: On September 20, 2023, the subject discovery was served. (Hafif Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A.) On February 2, 2024, Morrell provided responses. ( Id. , ¶ 3, Exh. B.) Hafif met and conferred with Morrells counsel Scott Doonan (Doonan), but Doonan did not agree to provide any further responses or to produce responsive documents. ( Id. , ¶ 23). The court required that an IDC be held before the instant motion could be filed. ( Id. , ¶ 25). The IDC was held on March 25, 2023, but did not resolve the issues. ( Id. , ¶ 26). Request No. 3 asks for all documents that show who Desiree Ashcrft (Ashcrft) is and why she received certain payments on 10/01/2021, 10/04/2021, 11/01/2021 and 11/03/2021. Morrells response to Request No. 3 was that, after a reasonable and diligent search, he was unable to comply with this request in whole, that he was not in possession, custody or control of any documents responsive to this request and believed Plaintiff was in possession, custody and/or control of responsive documents, that all entries to Ashcrft were for payments for the purchase of field lights and that Morrell believed that Ashcrft was previously contacted by a member of Plaintiff after the current administration of Plaintiff took over. Plaintiff is entitled to a further response to Request No. 3. Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.230 requires that a representation of inability to comply with a demand also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. Morrells inclusion of the phrase in whole is not problematic to the court for this instant response, since he provided substantive information identifying Ashcrft. Request No. 16 asks for all documents that show why Elite Group Investments, LLC (Elite Group) received certain identified payments between 09/01/2020 and 12/29/2022. Request No. 24 asks for all bank statements for Elite Group from January 1, 2020 to the present. Request No. 25 asks for all emails and text messages between Wiesner and Morrell from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2023. Request No. 26 asks for all emails and texts between Morrell and George. Request No. 28 asks for any documents that show the username, password and any other login credentials for the Club Quickbooks account. Morrells response to Requests Nos. 16, 24-26 and 28 was that, after a reasonable and diligent search, he was unable to comply with this request in whole, that he was not in possession, custody or control of any documents responsive to this request and believed Plaintiff was in possession, custody and/or control of responsive documents. Again, Plaintiff is entitled to further responses to Requests Nos. 16, 24-26 and 28, for the same reasons identified as to Request No. 3. Additionally, Morrells inclusion of the phrase in whole suggests that Morrell is at least able to comply in part with the request. The motion, then, is granted. Morrell is ordered to provide further, Code-compliant responses within 20 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions Morrells request for sanctions is summarily denied. Again, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Morrell in the amount of $3,842.50 [calculated as follows: 4.4 hours preparing motion, plus 2 hours reviewing opposition and preparing reply at $425/hour, plus 1 hour preparing part of separate statement and reviewing motion, plus 0.5 hours reviewing opposition and 1 hour attending hearing at $425/hour, plus $60 filing fee]. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,460.00 (i.e., 4 hours at $350.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 3. Motion to File Documents Under Seal Legal Standard California Rules of Court Rules 2.550 and 2.551 apply to records sealed or proposed to be sealed by court order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(1).) These rules do not apply to discovery motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings. However, the rules do apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3).) Discussion Wiesner moves the court for leave to file an Excel spreadsheet containing approximately 700 text communications between Morell and Wiesner (the Texts) under seal and for an in camera review. Evidentiary Objections The court rules on Plaintiffs objections to the Hellmich declaration as follows: Overruled. [2] Merits California Rules of Cout rules 2.550 and 2.551 are not applicable in the context of a discovery dispute. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3).) Wiesners motion is summarily denied on this basis. [1] Plaintiff, in turn, asserts that it does not have Weisners username and password for Weisners Club account. (Reply, 3:16-18). [2] Hellmich has attested, in his declaration supporting Wiesners opposition to Motion #1, that he and Wiesner reviewed the voluminous number of texts contained in Wiesners personal cell phone and identified approximately 700 text messages. (Hellmich Decl., ¶ 8). Hellmans supporting declaration states that he has personal knowledge of the facts set forth therein.

FARRARA, ET AL VS. AIRBNB, INC. Case Number: CVCV21-0198447 Tentative Ruling on Petition to Approve Minor Compromise: Brianna Farrara seeks an order approving the compromise of a claim on behalf of her minor son, Alexander Farrara. California Rules of Court, Rule 7.950 states that a petition for court approval of a minor’s compromise must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise. The Petition provides the required information. Considering the nature of the minor’s injuries and level of recovery and the uncertainty of liability, the Court is prepared to find that the settlement is in the best interest of the minor if the voir dire process is completed to the Court’s satisfaction. The Court notes this is not an expedited petition brought on Judicial Council Form MC-350EX. See CRC Rule 7.950.5. Hearing is thus needed on the Petition before it can be approved. The person seeking approval of the settlement on behalf of the minor and the minor are required to appear at the hearing, unless good cause is presented for their non-appearance. CRC Rule 7.952. The Petitioner and minor are required to appear. Counsel will voir dire the Petitioner about the terms of the settlement, any other potential sources to increase the settlement amount, whether the minor has fully recovered and whether the Petitioner understands that once approved, the settlement is final and binding on the minor. Once satisfied, the Court intends to grant the Petition and set this matter for review for confirmation of deposit of the funds into a court blocked account. An appearance by the Petitioner and minor is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 23BBCV02210 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B ascot underwriting ltd. , Plaintiffs, v. united aeronautical corporation , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23BBCV02210 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to be relieved as counsel Defense counsel, William D. Koehler, Esq. (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. (Defendant). Counsel filed this instant motion to be relieved as counsel on June 13, 2024. Counsel has filed the requisite forms pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1362. According to the declaration of Counsel, Counsel seeks to be relieved as counsel because Carlos Guzman, President of Norton Sales, Inc., requested that Counsel filed this motion and Mr. Guzman has consented to Counsel being relieved as counsel of record. (MC-052, §2.) Mr. Guzman also provides his declaration stating that there are 3 pending actions stemming from a wrongful death lawsuit to which his company had minimal involvement and his company can no longer afford the financial burden or retaining Counsel. (Guzman Decl., ¶¶2-3.) He states his understanding that a corporation cannot represent itself. ( Id. , ¶4.) For these reasons, Counsel seeks to withdraw from representing Defendant in this action. Counsel properly served Defendant at its last known mailing address, which was confirmed by telephone and conversation within the past 30 days of filing the motion. As for future hearing dates, a Status Conference re: Private Mediation is set for September 12, 2024; a Final Status Conference is set for October 31, 2024; and the Jury Trial is set for November 12, 2024. Thus, there is sufficient time for Defendant to obtain substitute counsel. Accordingly, the motion to be relieved as counsel is granted. The order electronically lodged by Counsel will be signed at the hearing. The order will become effective upon the filing of a proof of service of a signed copy of the order on Defendant. In addition, as Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. is a corporate entity, it cannot represent itself in propria persona . (See Rogers v. Municipal Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1318.) Thus, the Court will set an Order to Show Cause re Status of Representation of Defendant Norton Sales, Inc. for September 12, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Notice to be provided by Counsel. DATED: July 19, 2024 ___________________________ John J. Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV02484 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff s Armenuhi Setaghyan, Mane Moradian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Armenuhi Setaghyan, and Evette Moradian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Armenuhi Setaghyan, filed this action against Defendants Kenneth Robert Storti (Defendant) and Does 1-10 for motor vehicle tort, general negligence, and negligence per se. On January 27, 2022, the Court appointed Armenuhi Setaghyan to serve as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Mane Moradian. On October 26, 2022, the Court appointed Armenuhi Setaghyan to serve as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Evette Moradian. On December 6, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. On November 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On July 11, 2024, Petitioner Armenuhi Setaghyan (Petitioner) filed a petition for expedited approval of the compromise of minor Plaintiff Evette Moradian s action. (Plaintiff Mane Moradian is no longer a minor.) PETITIONERS REQUESTS Petitioner asks the Court for expedited approval of the compromise of minor Plaintiff Evette Moradian's action. DISCUSSION The petition states that the gross settlement amount is $5,000.00. Of this amount, $1,250.00 is to be paid or reimbursed to a medical provider and $1,250.00 will be paid to Plaintiffs counsel as attorneys fees, leaving a net settlement amount of $2,500.00. The Court grants the petition. At Petitioners request, the net settlement amount of $2,500.00 will be deposited in an insured, blocked account at Wells Fargo N.A., Wilson/Glendale Branch, 611 E. Wilson Avenue, Glendale, California 91206, (818) 545-9289, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Evette Moradians action filed by Petitioner Armenuhi Setaghyan on July 11, 2024. The Court orders that the net settlement amount of $2,500.00 be deposited in an insured, blocked account at Wells Fargo N.A., Wilson/Glendale Branch, 611 E. Wilson Avenue, Glendale, California 91206, (818) 545-9289, for minor Plaintiff Evette Moradians benefit, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court. The Court sets an OSC Re: Distribution of Net Settlement on September 18, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 28 of the Spring Street Courthouse. The Court sets an OSC Re: Dismissal of Case (Settlement) on September 18, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 28 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 22STCV21184 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Rankie Anthony Villaescusa vs City of Bellflower, et al. Case No.: 22STCV21184 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m. #4 Tentative Ruling Defendant County of Los Angeles Motion for Judgment on the Pleading is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend. Defendant to give notice. Defendant County of Los Angeles moves for an order granting judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action for negligence and the third cause of action for negligent hiring, training, and supervision on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard in actions involving public entities under the Tort Claims Act. Background The operative Complaint by Plaintiff FRANKIE ANTHONY VILLAESCUSA (Plaintiff) was filed on June 29, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that [t]his Complaint concerns an officer and/or deputy-involved incident&. On or about May 25, 2021, Plaintiff& was approached, questioned, detained and escorted by Defendant JOHN DOE&. Defendant JOHN DOE negligently assessed the circumstances presented to him, and violently confronted and unjustifiably detained Plaintiff without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had committed a crime or would commit a crime. Without warning, the Defendant JOHN DOE detained and escorted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a direct and proximate result of being detained and/or escorted. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) Battery Civil Code §43; (2) Negligence Cal. Gov. Code §§850.2(a), 820(a); (3) Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision (Cal. Gov. Code §§815.2(a), 820(a); and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On February 23, 2023, this Court SUSTAINED a demurrer as to the first and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend. (See February 23, 2023 Minute Order.) Plaintiff did not amend the complaint within the time allowed and failed to provide an adequate explanation for the failure to do so; therefore, the first and fourth causes of action were dismissed on Defendants motion. (See November 9, 2023 Minute Order.) Legal Standard A defendant may bring a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (C.C.P. § 438(c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. ( Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Such motion may be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. ( Id .) In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) Public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of general negligence. ( Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities].) Therefore, liability against a public entity must be authorized by statute. ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [A public entity is not liable for an injury . . . except as otherwise provided by statute].) Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty. [Citation]. However, because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Thus, to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity. ( Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) provides that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Meet and Confer Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because Defendant failed to meet and confer before filing the motion as required by statute. (CCP § 439, subd. (a).) The Court will exercise its discretion to adjudicate the motion on the merits. Discussion The second and third causes of action suffer from the same infirmities as the first and fourth causes of action which have been dismissed. The conclusory allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to establish specific conduct by any County employees to meet the heightened pleading requirements that are required for claims against a public entity. The Complaint fails to allege what Defendant John Doe did to cause Plaintiffs injuries. The Complaint alleges Defendant JOHN DOE detained and escorted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a direct and proximate result of being detained and/or escorted. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Police detain many people each day throughout Los Angeles County. Plaintiff fails to allege why this particular detention should give rise to liability. As pled, the allegations are insufficient to impose liability against the County pursuant to Gov. Code §815.2. Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the second and third causes of action is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Case Number: 23STCV01756 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the documents submitted in support of the request for default judgment, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On January 26, 2023, Plaintiff Crusader Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Joshua Canales (Defendant) and Does 1-20 for motor vehicle tort. The complaint demanded $49,966.21. Also on January 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a statement of damages asserting $49,966.21 in property damages. On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing substituted service of the summons and complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on Defendant on February 20, 2023. On July 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a statement of damages asserting $49,966.21 in property damages. On July 9, 2024, the clerk entered Defendants default. On July 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for Court judgment to be heard on July 18, 2024. On July 11, 2024, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST Plaintiff Crusader Insurance Company asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant Joshua Canales and award Plaintiff $50,485.21, consisting of $49,966.21 as the demand of the complaint and $519.00 in costs. LEGAL STANDARD A. Default judgment [With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk: (1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) Interest computations as necessary; (4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) A proposed form of judgment; (7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) Exhibits as necessary; and (9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).) B. Damages On a request for default judgment, [w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages. (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56 (Cal. Practice Guide), citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].) The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness. ( Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co . (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in courta right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated. ( Id . at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. ( Id . at p. 494.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff has submitted a complete default judgment application with all required information. The Court grants the application. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Crusader Insurance Company s application for default judgment filed on July 9, 2024. The Court awards Plaintiff Crusader Insurance Company $50,485.21 against Defendant Joshua Canales. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.