Preview
Filed: 5/12/2021 4:14 PM
JOHN D. KINARD - District Clerk
Galveston County, Texas
Envelope No. 53382975
By: Shailja Dixit
5/12/2021 4:31 PM
CAUSE NO.21-CV-0634
________________
RAY DEAN WHEELER, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff §
§
VS. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
§
DYLAN DWAYNE REED and §
CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI, §
Galveston County - 405th District Court
Defendants. § _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION
______________________________________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RAY DEAN WHEELER, complaining of DYLAN DWAYNE
REED AND CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI, Defendants, and for cause of action would
respectfully show the following:
I.
DISCOVERY LEVEL
1.1 Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery in this matter under Level 3 of Rule 190 of
the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
PARTIES
2.1 Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Texas.
2.2 Defendant, DYLAN DWAYNE REED, may be served with process at 4224 Q
Avenue, Galveston, Texas 77551. Issuance of Citation is requested at this time.
2.3 Defendant, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI may be served with process at
6617 Q Avenue Galveston, Texas 77551. Issuance of Citation is requested at this time.
III.
Status Conference - 08/12/2021
1
VENUE AND JURISDICTION
3.1 Venue is proper in GALVESTON County, Texas, pursuant to §15.002 et seq. of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
3.2 The amount of damages sustained by Plaintiff is in excess of the minimal
jurisdictional limits of the Court.
IV.
BACKGROUND FACTS
4.1 On April 25, 2020, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED was negligent in the
operation of a motor vehicle. DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s negligence proximately caused a
collision with the vehicle that Plaintiff RAY DEAN WHEELER was driving. Defendant
DYLAN DWAYNE REED was driving a vehicle owned by Defendant CHARLES BERNARD
GALLETTI. Defendant CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI was negligent in entrusting his
vehicle to an unlicensed, reckless or incompetent driver.
4.2 Nothing Plaintiff did, or failed to do, caused the accident in question. Rather, it
was the negligence of the Defendants, individually and collectively, named herein which
proximately caused the occurrence and Plaintiff’s resulting injuries and damages. Therefore,
Plaintiff brings suit on the following grounds.
V.
CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE
(DYLAN DWAYNE REED)
5.1 On or about April 25, 2020, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED breached a
legal duty of care owed to Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED was
negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle in the following manner:
a. Failing to change lanes only when safe to do so;
b. Failing to maintain a proper lookout;
2
c. Being inattentive and failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle;
d. Operating his vehicle in a reckless manner;
e. Failing to obey applicable traffic signals or signs;
f. Failing to yield right of way; and
g. Failing to maintain a proper lookout.
5.2 Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED's acts and/or omissions constitute a failure
to use care as described above. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s failure to use care was a
proximate and producing cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages as described more thoroughly
herein. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED is therefore liable to Plaintiff for his personal
injuries and damages, including property damages, sustained as a direct result of Defendants’
negligence.
VI.
CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE PER SE
(DYLAN DWAYNE REED)
6.1 Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s acts and omissions also constitute
negligence per se as that term is defined under Texas law. Specifically, DYLAN DWAYNE
REED’s acts or omissions violated the following statutory duties:
a. Duty to not drive with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property. Tex. Trans. Code. 545.401.
b. Duty to not turn his vehicle from a direct course or move right or left on a
roadway unless movement can be made safely. Tex. Trans. Code 545.103.
6.2 Plaintiff are within the class of persons meant to be protected by these statutes,
specifically, travelers on the roadway. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s violation of
these statutes was a proximate cause of the collision and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.
3
Defendant is therefore liable to the Plaintiff for his personal injuries and damages sustained as a
direct result of Defendant’s negligence.
VII.
CAUSE OF ACTION: GROSS NEGLIGENCE
(DYLAN DWAYNE REED AND CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI)
7.1 Plaintiff would show that Defendants’ acts and/or omissions when viewed
objectively from Defendants’ standpoint at the time of the accident made the basis of this suit,
involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential
harm to others, and of which Defendants were aware. Nevertheless, Defendants proceeded with
conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others; therefore, Plaintiff sues for
exemplary damages pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CHAP. 41.
VIII.
CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
(CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI )
8.1 Plaintiff would show that at the time of the incident made the basis of this suit
DYLAN DWAYNE REED was driving a motor vehicle owned by CHARLES BERNARD
GALLETTI. Defendant CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI permissively allowed DYLAN
DWAYNE REED to operate the motor vehicle in question for the purpose of operating the
vehicle on the public streets and highways of Texas, and thereafter, DYLAN DWAYNE REED
operated the vehicle with the knowledge, consent and permission of CHARLES BERNARD
GALLETTI.
8.2 Further, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI knew or had reason to know in an
exercise of due care that DYLAN DWAYNE REED was an unlicensed, incompetent or reckless
driver, and would create an unreasonable risk of danger to persons and property in the public
streets and highways of Texas. By giving DYLAN DWAYNE REED permission to operate the
4
vehicle, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI negligently entrusted his motor vehicle to DYLAN
DWAYNE REED, and such entrustment proximately caused the occurrence made the basis of
this suit and the resulting injuries and damages to Plaintiff.
IX.
DAMAGES
9.1 Defendants’ wrongful acts, neglect, omissions, and carelessness are the proximate
and producing cause of Plaintiff’s damages. As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,
Plaintiff has incurred damages, in the past and future, including but not limited to property
damage, loss of use of motorcycle, diminution of value of motorcycle, property damage, physical
pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of earnings
capacity, and loss of enjoyment of life. In reasonable probability, Plaintiff will continue to suffer
physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, medical expenses, loss of earnings, and loss
of earnings capacity and loss of enjoyment of life in the future. Because of the nature and
severity of the injuries sustained, Plaintiff has required medical treatment in the past and, in
reasonable probability, will require other and additional treatment in the future. Charges for such
medical treatment that have been made in the past and those which will in reasonable probability
be made in the future have been and will be reasonable charges made necessary by the
occurrence in question.
9.2 Pursuant to Rule 47(c)(1), as amended, Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief over
$100,000 but not more than $200,000 including damages of any kind, penalties, costs, expenses,
pre-judgment interest, and attorney fees.
5
X.
PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
10.1 Plaintiff would additionally say and show that he is entitled to recovery of pre-
judgment interest in accordance with law and equity as part of his damages herein, and Plaintiff
here and now sues for recovery of pre-judgment interest as provided by law and equity, under the
applicable provision of the laws of the state of Texas.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to
appear and answer herein and that, upon final trial hereof, Plaintiff have judgment against
Defendants, that he recover damages in accordance with the evidence, that he recover costs of
Court herein expended, that he recover interest, both pre and post-judgment, to which he is
entitled under the law, and for such other and further relief, both general and special, legal and
equitable, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
FARRAR & BALL, LLP
/s/ David Romagosa
DAVID ROMAGOSA
State Bar No. 24047493
1117 Herkimer Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 221-8300
Facsimile: (713) 221-8301
Email: david@fbtrial.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
6
Preview
Filed: 5/12/2021 4:14 PM JOHN D. KINARD - District Clerk Galveston County, Texas Envelope No. 53382975 By: Shailja Dixit 5/12/2021 4:31 PM CAUSE NO.21-CV-0634 ________________ RAY DEAN WHEELER, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff § § VS. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § DYLAN DWAYNE REED and § CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI, § Galveston County - 405th District Court Defendants. § _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION ______________________________________________________________________________ TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RAY DEAN WHEELER, complaining of DYLAN DWAYNE REED AND CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI, Defendants, and for cause of action would respectfully show the following: I. DISCOVERY LEVEL 1.1 Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery in this matter under Level 3 of Rule 190 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II. PARTIES 2.1 Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Texas. 2.2 Defendant, DYLAN DWAYNE REED, may be served with process at 4224 Q Avenue, Galveston, Texas 77551. Issuance of Citation is requested at this time. 2.3 Defendant, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI may be served with process at 6617 Q Avenue Galveston, Texas 77551. Issuance of Citation is requested at this time. III. Status Conference - 08/12/2021 1 VENUE AND JURISDICTION 3.1 Venue is proper in GALVESTON County, Texas, pursuant to §15.002 et seq. of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 3.2 The amount of damages sustained by Plaintiff is in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of the Court. IV. BACKGROUND FACTS 4.1 On April 25, 2020, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED was negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle. DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s negligence proximately caused a collision with the vehicle that Plaintiff RAY DEAN WHEELER was driving. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED was driving a vehicle owned by Defendant CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI. Defendant CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI was negligent in entrusting his vehicle to an unlicensed, reckless or incompetent driver. 4.2 Nothing Plaintiff did, or failed to do, caused the accident in question. Rather, it was the negligence of the Defendants, individually and collectively, named herein which proximately caused the occurrence and Plaintiff’s resulting injuries and damages. Therefore, Plaintiff brings suit on the following grounds. V. CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE (DYLAN DWAYNE REED) 5.1 On or about April 25, 2020, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED breached a legal duty of care owed to Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED was negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle in the following manner: a. Failing to change lanes only when safe to do so; b. Failing to maintain a proper lookout; 2 c. Being inattentive and failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle; d. Operating his vehicle in a reckless manner; e. Failing to obey applicable traffic signals or signs; f. Failing to yield right of way; and g. Failing to maintain a proper lookout. 5.2 Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED's acts and/or omissions constitute a failure to use care as described above. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s failure to use care was a proximate and producing cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages as described more thoroughly herein. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED is therefore liable to Plaintiff for his personal injuries and damages, including property damages, sustained as a direct result of Defendants’ negligence. VI. CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE PER SE (DYLAN DWAYNE REED) 6.1 Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s acts and omissions also constitute negligence per se as that term is defined under Texas law. Specifically, DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s acts or omissions violated the following statutory duties: a. Duty to not drive with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Tex. Trans. Code. 545.401. b. Duty to not turn his vehicle from a direct course or move right or left on a roadway unless movement can be made safely. Tex. Trans. Code 545.103. 6.2 Plaintiff are within the class of persons meant to be protected by these statutes, specifically, travelers on the roadway. Defendant DYLAN DWAYNE REED’s violation of these statutes was a proximate cause of the collision and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. 3 Defendant is therefore liable to the Plaintiff for his personal injuries and damages sustained as a direct result of Defendant’s negligence. VII. CAUSE OF ACTION: GROSS NEGLIGENCE (DYLAN DWAYNE REED AND CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI) 7.1 Plaintiff would show that Defendants’ acts and/or omissions when viewed objectively from Defendants’ standpoint at the time of the accident made the basis of this suit, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others, and of which Defendants were aware. Nevertheless, Defendants proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others; therefore, Plaintiff sues for exemplary damages pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CHAP. 41. VIII. CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT (CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI ) 8.1 Plaintiff would show that at the time of the incident made the basis of this suit DYLAN DWAYNE REED was driving a motor vehicle owned by CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI. Defendant CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI permissively allowed DYLAN DWAYNE REED to operate the motor vehicle in question for the purpose of operating the vehicle on the public streets and highways of Texas, and thereafter, DYLAN DWAYNE REED operated the vehicle with the knowledge, consent and permission of CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI. 8.2 Further, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI knew or had reason to know in an exercise of due care that DYLAN DWAYNE REED was an unlicensed, incompetent or reckless driver, and would create an unreasonable risk of danger to persons and property in the public streets and highways of Texas. By giving DYLAN DWAYNE REED permission to operate the 4 vehicle, CHARLES BERNARD GALLETTI negligently entrusted his motor vehicle to DYLAN DWAYNE REED, and such entrustment proximately caused the occurrence made the basis of this suit and the resulting injuries and damages to Plaintiff. IX. DAMAGES 9.1 Defendants’ wrongful acts, neglect, omissions, and carelessness are the proximate and producing cause of Plaintiff’s damages. As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff has incurred damages, in the past and future, including but not limited to property damage, loss of use of motorcycle, diminution of value of motorcycle, property damage, physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of earnings capacity, and loss of enjoyment of life. In reasonable probability, Plaintiff will continue to suffer physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, medical expenses, loss of earnings, and loss of earnings capacity and loss of enjoyment of life in the future. Because of the nature and severity of the injuries sustained, Plaintiff has required medical treatment in the past and, in reasonable probability, will require other and additional treatment in the future. Charges for such medical treatment that have been made in the past and those which will in reasonable probability be made in the future have been and will be reasonable charges made necessary by the occurrence in question. 9.2 Pursuant to Rule 47(c)(1), as amended, Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief over $100,000 but not more than $200,000 including damages of any kind, penalties, costs, expenses, pre-judgment interest, and attorney fees. 5 X. PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST 10.1 Plaintiff would additionally say and show that he is entitled to recovery of pre- judgment interest in accordance with law and equity as part of his damages herein, and Plaintiff here and now sues for recovery of pre-judgment interest as provided by law and equity, under the applicable provision of the laws of the state of Texas. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein and that, upon final trial hereof, Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants, that he recover damages in accordance with the evidence, that he recover costs of Court herein expended, that he recover interest, both pre and post-judgment, to which he is entitled under the law, and for such other and further relief, both general and special, legal and equitable, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled. Respectfully submitted, FARRAR & BALL, LLP /s/ David Romagosa DAVID ROMAGOSA State Bar No. 24047493 1117 Herkimer Street Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 221-8300 Facsimile: (713) 221-8301 Email: david@fbtrial.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 6