No Value: RACHEL MONIZ vs ADECCO USA, INC.

On April 18, 2017 a No Value was filed involving a dispute between Moniz, Rachel, and Adecco Usa, Inc., Does 1 To 50, Inclusive, Does 1 To 9, for Complex Civil Unlimited in the District Court of San Mateo County.

Preview
1 Mia Farber (State Bar No. 131467)
Adam Y. Siegel (State Bar No. 238568)
2 JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
3 Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: 213.689.0404
4 Facsimile: 213.689.0430
E-mail: Mia.Farber(&,iacksonlewis.com
5 Adam.SiegeWjacksonlewis.com

6 Dylan B. Carp (SBN 196846)
Scott P. Jang (State Bar No. 260191)
7 Mariko Mae Ashley (State Bar No. 311897)
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
8 50 California Street, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
9 Telephone: 415.394.9400
Facsimile: 415.394.9401
10 E-mail: Dylan.CarpRjacksonlewis.com
Scott.JangAjacksonlewis.com
11 Mariko.Ashlev iacksonlewis.com
12 Attorneys for Defendant
ADECCO USA INC.
13

14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

15 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

17 RACHEL MONIZ, on behalf of the State of Case No. 17CIV01736
California and aggrieved employees,
18 [Assigned to the Hon. Marie S. Weiner for
Plaintiff, All Purposes]
19
v. NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL
20 AUTHORITY
ADECCO USA, INC., and DOES 1-50,
21 inclusive, [Matter under submission]
22 Defendants. Date: June 7, 2022
Time: 2:00 p.m.
23 Place: Dept. 2 (All Purposes)
Judge: Hon. Marie S. Weiner
24
Complaint Filed: April 18, 2017
25 Trial Date: Vacated

NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY Case No. 17CIV01736
1 Defendant ADECCO USA, INC. ("Adecco") submits this Notice of Supplemental

2 Authority in support of Adecco's Opposition to Proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene,

3 Adecco's Response to Objections and Opposition of PAGA Representative Paola Correa to

4 Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Settlement Approval, and Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for

5 Settlement Approval. This Court heard oral argument on these matters and took them under

6 submission on June 14, 2022. The next day, on June 15, 2022, the United States Supreme Court

7 issued a decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, No. 20-1573. A true and correct copy

8 of the decision is attached as Exhibit 1.

10 Dated: June 16, 2022 JACKSON LEWIS P.C.

12 By:
Mia Farber
13 Adam Y. Siegel
Dylan B. Carp
14 Scott P. Jang
Attorneys for Defendant
15 ADECCO USA, INC.

16
4861-1724-6501, v. 1
17

28
2
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY Case No. 17CIV01736
1 PROOF OF SERVICE

2 I, Lauretta Adams, declare that I am employed with the law firm of Jackson Lewis P.C.,

3 whose address is 50 California Street, 9th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94111-4615; I am

4 over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not a party to this action.

5 On June 16, 2022, I served the following document(s):

6 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY (w/Exhibit 1)

7 Jahan C. Sagafi Attorneys for Paola Correa, Baker Curtis
Outten & Golden LLP & Schwartz, P.C., and Outten & Golden,
8 LLP
One California St., 12th Floor
9 San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 638 8800
10 jsagafi@outtengolden.com

11 Michael J. Scimone
Julio Sharp-Wasserman
12
Outten & Golden LLP
13 685 Third Ave., 25th Floor
New York, NY 10017
14 Tel: (212) 245 1000
mseimone@outtengolden.com
15 Jsharp-wasserman@outtengolden.com
16 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenors
Chris Baker Aggrieved Parties of Record
17 Deborah Schwartz Paola Correa, Baker Curtis & Schwartz,
Baker Curtis & Schwartz, P.C. P.C., and Outten & Golden LLP
18 One California St., Suite 1250
San Francisco, CA 94111
19 Tel: (415) 433 1064
cbaker@bakerlp.com
20
dsehwartz@bakerlp.com
21
Carolyn Cottrell
22 David C. Leimbach
Scott L. Gordon
23 Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky LLP
24 2000 Powell St., Suite 1400
Emeryville, CA 94608
25 ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
dleimbach@sehneiderwallace.com
26 agordon@schneiderwallace.com
27

PROOF OF SERVICE 3 Case No. 17CIV01736
1 Judge Marie S. Weiner Department 2
County of San Mateo Superior Court
2
400 County Center
3 Department No. 2, Courtroom 2E
Redwood City, CA 94063
4 Tel: (650) 363 4711
complexcivil@sanmateocourtorg
5
State of California
6
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
7 Department of Industrial Relations
Attn: Michael L. Smith
8 1515 Clay St., Suite 2206
Oakland, CA 94612
9 MLSmith@dir.ca.gov
10

11 [ BY MAIL: United States Postal Service by placing a sealed envelope with the postage
thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary
12 business practices, in the United States mail at San Francisco, California. [( ) Courtesy
copy by email.]
13
[ BY HAND DELIVERY: I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the above
14 address.

15 [ BY GS0 OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I caused such envelope to be delivered to the
above address within 24 hours by overnight delivery service.
16
[X] BY DESIGNATED ELECTRONIC FILING SERVICE: I electronically e-served through
17 ASAP Legal and caused the document to be sent to the persons at the email addresses
designated on the Transaction Receipt located on the ASAP Legal website. To the best of
18 my knowledge, at the time of the transmission, the transmission was reported as complete
and without error. [(X) Courtesy copy by email.]
19
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above
20
is true and correct.
21
Executed on June 16, 2022, at San Francisco, California.
22

24
Lauretta Adams
25
4887-8711-5801, v. 1
26

PROOF OF SERVICE 4 Case No. 17CIV01736
EXHIBIT 1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1

Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 20-1573. Argued March 30, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022
The question for decision is whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U. S. C. §1 et seq., preempts a rule of California law that invalidates
contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under
California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal.
Lab. Code §2698 et seq. PAGA enlists employees as private attorneys
general to enforce California labor law. By its terms, PAGA authorizes
any "aggrieved employee" to initiate an action against a former em-
ployer "on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former em-
ployees" to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re-
covered only by the State in an enforcement action brought by
California's Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Cal-
ifornia precedent holds that a PAGA suit is a "'representative action"'
in which the employee plaintiff sues as an "'agent or proxy"' of the
State. Iskanian v. CLS Tramp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348,
380. California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what
is effectively a rule of claim joinder—allowing a party to unite multiple
claims against an opposing party in a single action. An employee with
PAGA standing may "seek any civil penalties the state can, including
penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA liti-
gant herself." ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185.
Respondent Angie Moriana filed a PAGA action against her former
employer Viking River Cruises, alleging a California Labor Code vio-
lation. She also asserted a wide array of other violations allegedly sus-
tained by other Viking employees. Moriana's employment contract
with Viking contained a mandatory arbitration agreement. Important
here, that agreement contained both a "Class Action Waiver"—provid-
ing that the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective,
or representative action under PAGA—and a severability clause—
2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus
specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would
presumptively be litigated in court. Under the severability clause, any
"portion" of the waiver that remained valid would be "enforced in arbi-
tration." Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana's individual
PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims. Applying Califor-
nia's Iskanian precedent, the California courts denied that motion,
holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to Cal-
ifornia policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable "in-
dividual" claims and nonarbitrable "representative" claims. This
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the Cal-
ifornia rule.
Held: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes di-
vision of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims
through an agreement to arbitrate. Pp. 7-21.
(a) Based on the principle that lalrbitration is strictly `a matter of
consent,'" Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court
has held that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so," Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684. Because class-action arbitration mandates
procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and
informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 347, class proce-
dures cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwilling
parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbi-
trate using such procedures and forgoing arbitration all together.
Viking contends that the Court's FAA precedents require enforcement
of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions be-
cause PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding. If this is
correct, Iskanian's prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with
an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class
procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. Moriana maintains that any
conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA cre-
ates nothing more than a substantive cause of action.
This Court disagrees with both characterizations of the statute. Mo-
riana's premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is
irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal
meaning of the word "claim." A PAGA action asserting multiple viola-
tions under California's Labor Code affecting a range of different em-
ployees does not constitute "a single claim" in even the broadest possi-
ble sense. Viking's position, on the other hand, elides important
structural differences between PAGA actions and class actions. A
class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she
Cite as: 596 U. S. (2022) 3

Syllabus

represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by con-
trast, represents a single principal, the LWDA, that has a multitude
of claims. As a result, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the proce-
dural characteristics of class actions.
This Court's FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the pro-
totype of the individualized and informal form of arbitration protected
from undue state interference by the FAA. See, e.g., Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. . Viking posits that a proceeding is
"bilateral" only if it involves two and only two parties and "is conducted
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only." Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 348. Thus, Iskanian's prohibition
on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates
an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires
parties either to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration alto-
gether.
This Court disagrees. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical
rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on
behalf of absent principals. Non-class representative actions in which
a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal necessarily devi-
ate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute resolution posited by Vi-
king, but this Court has never held that the FAA imposes a duty on
States to render all forms of representative standing waivable by con-
tract or that such suits deviate from the norm of bilateral arbitration.
Unlike procedures distinctive to multiparty litigation, single-principal,
single-agent representative actions are "bilateral" in two registers:
They involve the rights of only the absent real party in interest and
the defendant, and litigation need only be conducted by the agent-
plaintiff and the defendant. Nothing in this Court's precedent sug-
gests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to require States to
reshape their agency law governing who can assert claims on behalf of
whom to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate disputes in a
proceeding that deviates from bilateral arbitration in the strictest
sense. Pp. 7-17.
(b) PAGA's built-in mechanism of claim joinder is in conflict with the
FAA. Iskanian's prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions
into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to
determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which
they will arbitrate," Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ,
and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "ar-
bitration is a matter of consent," Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684. For
that reason, state law cannot condition the enforceability of an agree-
ment to arbitrate on the availability of a procedural mechanism that
would permit a party to expand the scope of the anticipated arbitration
by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate.
4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus
A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the arbitral con-
text would defeat the ability of parties to control which claims are sub-
ject to arbitration by permitting parties to superadd new claims to the
proceeding, regardless of whether the agreement committed those
claims to arbitration. When made compulsory by way of Iskanian,
PAGA's joinder rule functions in exactly this way. The effect is to co-
erce parties into withholding PAGA claims from arbitration. Is-
kanian's indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judi-
cial forum rather than "forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate
review of the courts to realize the benefits of private dispute resolu-
tion." Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685. Pp. 17-19.
(c) Under this Courts holding, Iskanian's prohibition on wholesale
waivers of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA. But Iskanian's
rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-in-
dividual claims is preempted, so Viking was entitled to compel arbi-
tration of Moriana's individual claim. PAGA provides no mechanism
to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an
individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. And
under PAGA's standing requirement, a plaintiff has standing to main-
tain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also
maintaining an individual claim in that action. As a result, Moriana
would lack statutory standing to maintain her non-individual claims
in court, and the correct course was to dismiss her remaining claims.
Pp. 20-21.
Reversed and remanded.

AUTO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SO-
TOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
joined as to Parts I and III, and in which KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined as to Part III. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J, joined as to
all but the footnote. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 596 U. S. (2022) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.
Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 20-1573

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.
ANGIE MORIANA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.*
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.,
preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contrac-
tual waivers of the right to assert representative claims un-
der California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2698 et seq. (West 2022).
I
A
The California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Pri-
vate Attorneys General Act (PAGA) to address a perceived
deficit in the enforcement of the State's Labor Code. Cali-
fornia's Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA)
had the authority to bring enforcement actions to impose
civil penalties on employers for violations of many of the
code's provisions. But the legislature believed the LWDA
did not have sufficient resources to reach the appropriate
level of compliance, and budgetary constraints made it im-

*THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins Parts I and III of this opinion.
2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

possible to achieve an adequate level of financing. The leg-
islature thus decided to enlist employees as private attor-
neys general to enforce California labor law, with the un-
derstanding that labor-law enforcement agencies were to
retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.
By its terms, PAGA authorizes any "aggrieved employee"
to initiate an action against a former employer "on behalf of
himself or herself and other current or former employees"
to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re-
covered only by the State in an LWDA enforcement action.
Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(a). As the text of the statute
indicates, PAGA limits statutory standing to "aggrieved
employees"—a term defined to include "any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or
more of the alleged violations was committed." §2699(c). To
bring suit, however, an employee must also exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. That entails providing notice to the em-
ployer and the LWDA of the violations alleged and the sup-
porting facts and theories. §2699.3(a)(1)(A). If the LWDA
fails to respond or initiate an investigation within a speci-
fied timeframe, the employee may bring suit. §2699.3(a)(2).
In any successful PAGA action, the LWDA is entitled to 75
percent of the award. §2699(i). The remaining 25 percent
is distributed among the employees affected by the viola-
tions at issue. Ibid.
California law characterizes PAGA as creating a "type of
qui tam action,"' Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles,

'As we have explained, "qui tam" is the short form of the Latin phrase
"qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur"—mean-
ing "'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his
own."' Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-
vens, 529 U. S. 765, 768, n. 1(2000). Qui tam actions "appear to have
originated around the end of the 13th century, when private individuals
who had suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts on
both their own and the Crown's behalf" and became more of a rarity as
"royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits involving wholly pri-
vate wrongs." Id., at 774-775.
Cite as: 596 U. S. (2022) 3

Opinion of the Court

LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P. 3d 129, 148 (2014). Alt-
hough the statute's language suggests that an "aggrieved
employee" sues "on behalf of himself or herself and other
current or former employees," §2699(a), California prece-
dent holds that a PAGA suit is a "'representative action"
in which the employee plaintiff sues as an "'agent or proxy"
of the State. Id., at 380, 327 P. 3d, at 147 (quoting Arias v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986, 209 P. 3d 923, 933
(2009)).
As the California courts conceive of it, the State "is al-
ways the real party in interest in the suit." Iskanian, 59
Cal. 4th, at 382, 327 P. 3d, at 148.2 The primary function
of PAGA is to delegate a power to employees to assert "the
same legal right and interest as state law enforcement
agencies," Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. In
other words, the statute gives employees a right to assert

2 The extent to which PAGA plaintiffs truly act as agents of the State
rather than complete assignees is disputed. See Magadia v. Wal-Mart
Assocs., Inc., 999 F. 3d 668, 677 (CA9 2021) (holding that PAGA "lacks
the procedural controls necessary to ensure that California" retains "sub-
stantial authority over the case" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Agency requires control. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 713
(2013). But apart from the exhaustion process, the statute does not fea-
ture any explicit control mechanisms, such as provisions authorizing the
State to intervene or requiring its approval of settlements.
That said, California precedent strongly suggests that the State re-
tains inherent authority to manage PAGA actions. There is no other ob-
vious way to understand California precedent's description of the State
as the "real party in interest."See generally 1A Cal. Jur. 3d Actions §31
(real-party-in-interest status is based on ownership and control over the
cause of action). And a theory of total assignment appears inconsistent
with the fact that employees have no assignable interest in a PAGA
claim. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943
(2009) (Amalgamated Transit); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., 69 Cal.
App. 5th 955, 972, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 780 (2021) (The employee's
"ability to file PAGA claims on behalf of the state does not convert the
state's interest into their own or render them real parties in interest").
For purposes of this opinion, we assume that PAGA plaintiffs are agents.
4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

the State's claims for civil penalties on a representative ba-
sis, but it does not create any private rights or private
claims for relief. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 P. 3d, at
148; see also Amalgamated Transit, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002,
209 P. 3d 937, 943 (2009). The code provisions enforced
through the statute establish public duties that are owed to
the State, not private rights belonging to employees in their
"individual capacities." Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327
P. 3d, at 147. Other, distinct provisions of the code create
individual rights, and claims arising from violations of
those rights are actionable through separate private causes
of action for compensatory or statutory damages. Id., at
381-382, 327 P. 3d, at 147-148; see also Kim v. Reins Int'l
California, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 86, 459 P. 3d 1123, 1130
(2020) ("[C]ivil penalties recovered on the state's behalf are
intended to remediate present violations and deter future
ones, not to redress employees' injuries" (internal quotation
marks omitted; emphasis deleted)). And because PAGA ac-
tions are understood to involve the assertion of the govern-
ment's claims on a derivative basis, the judgment issued in
a PAGA action is binding on anyone "who would be bound
by a judgment in an action brought by the government."
Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933.
California precedent also interprets the statute to con-
tain what is effectively a rule of claim joinder. Rules of
claim joinder allow a party to unite multiple claims against
an opposing party in a single action. See 6A C. Wright, H.
Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §1582
(3d ed. 2016) (Wright & Miller). PAGA standing has the
same function. An employee with statutory standing may
"seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties
for violations involving employees other than the PAGA lit-
igant herself." ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175,
185, 448 P. 3d 239, 243-244 (2019). An employee who al-
leges he or she suffered a single violation is entitled to use
that violation as a gateway to assert a potentially limitless
Cite as: 596 U. S. (2022) 5

Opinion of the Court

number of other violations as predicates for liability. This
mechanism radically expands the scope of PAGA actions.
The default penalties set by PAGA are $100 for each ag-
grieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and
$200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each
subsequent violation. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(f)(2). In-
dividually, these penalties are modest; but given PAGA's
additive dimension, low-value claims may easily be welded
together into high-value suits.
B
Petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. (Viking), is a com-
pany that offers ocean and river cruises around the world.
When respondent Angie Moriana was hired by Viking as a
sales representative, she executed an agreement to arbi-
trate any dispute arising out of her employment. The
agreement contained a "Class Action Waiver" providing
that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring
any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA
action. It also contained a severability clause specifying
that ifthe waiver was found invalid, any class, collective,
representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be lit-
igated in court. But under that severability clause, if any
"portion" of the waiver remained valid, it would be "en-
forced in arbitration."
After leaving her position with Viking, Moriana filed a
PAGA action against Viking in California court. Her com-
plaint contained a claim that Viking had failed to provide
her with her final wages within 72 hours, as required by
§§101-102 of the California Labor Code. But the complaint
also asserted a wide array of other code violations allegedly
sustained by other Viking employees, including violations
of provisions concerning the minimum wage, overtime,
meal periods, rest periods, timing of pay, and pay state-
ments. Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana's
"individual" PAGA claim—here mea

Case Info

Judge

Weiner, Marie S. Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

(Subscribe to View)

Document Filed Date

June 22, 2022

Case Filing Date

April 18, 2017

County

Parties

ADECCO USA, INC. Defendant
BAKER, CHRIS Attorney
Baker Curtis & Schwartz, P.C. Intervenor (participant)
CORREA, PAOLA Intervenor (participant)
COTTRELL, CAROLYN HUNT Attorney for the Plaintiff
DOES 1 TO 50, INCLUSIVE Defendant
DOES 1 TO 9 Defendant
MONIZ, RACHEL Plaintiff
SIEGEL, ADAM Attorney for the Defendant
David Leimbach Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Dylan Carp Attorneys for Defendants
Scott Jang Attorneys for Defendants
Mariko Ashley Attorneys for Defendants
Steven Blackburn Attorney
Deborah Schwartz Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Matthew Goodin Attorney
Linda Inscoe Attorneys for Defendants
Christopher Campbell Attorneys for Defendants
Christina Teeter Attorneys for Defendants
John Winer Attorney
Mia Farber Attorney
Aaron Chiu Attorneys for Defendants
Kyle Bates Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David Balter Attorney
Patricia Kelly Attorney
Michael Smith Attorney
Cameron Fox Attorneys for Defendants
Ankush Dhupar Attorneys for Defendants
Zachary Hutton Attorney
Christopher Baker Attorney
Philip Johnson Attorney
Vanessa Ho Attorney
Jahan Sagafi Attorney
David Chen Attorney
Robert Dolinko Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Keenan Klein Attorney
Adam Truong Attorneys for Defendants
Scott Gordon Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David Rotman Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Robert Yang Attorneys for Defendants
Rachel Dempsey Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Blake Bertagna Attorney
Kyla Gibboney Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Christopher Jagard Attorney
Dan Gildor Attorney
Molly Frandsen Attorney
Adam Yarian Attorney
Charles Jones Attorney
Kelly McInerney Attorney
Matthew Righetti Attorney
Mark Rudy Attorney
Paul Holton Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Felicia Davis Attorneys for Defendants
Zachary Perryman Attorneys for Defendants
Kyle Graham Attorney
Michael Curtis Attorney
Christopher DiPietro Attorney

For full print and download access, please subscribe at https://www.trellis.law/.

No Value: RACHEL MONIZ vs ADECCO USA, INC.

Preview

Related Topics

Case Info

Parties