Proof of Service: MEYERS -V- ARROWHEAD LAKE Print

MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF COTTONWOOD CANYON SETTLEMENT OF ENTIRE CASE HILLS COMMUNITY TEC1204451 FILED ON JUNE 2, 2020, BY ASSOCIATION VS COTTONWOOD CANYON HILLS ARMENTA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION Tentative Ruling: No tentative will be given, appearances are required. Counsel should be prepared to address why this matter should not be dismissed pursuant to the CCP 664.6 provision in the settlement agreement.

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER DOCUMENTS MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family welling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to request for production of documents, numbers 4, 9, and 12 from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of references to other items. Such responses constitute an improper, factually incomplete answer. Responding Party may not refer to prior discovery. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The unopposed motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210-2031.240 within 30 days of this order. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining scheduled motions to compel further responses scheduled through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice. Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 c/f 7-10-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Jada Gradney RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 6.4, 6.7, 7.1, 9.1, 9.2, 10.3, and 12.4 from Plaintiff Jada Gradney. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with minimal answers, refusal to answer except under condition of a protective order, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of phone number and address information. The responses are incomplete in that they fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Case Number: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B 330 north brand, inc. , Plaintiff, v. johnhart corp ., Defendant. Case No.: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (cont. from July 5, 2024) [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendant JohnHart Corp. (Defendant). The property at issue is located at 330 North Brand Blvd., Suite 130, Glendale, CA 91203. Plaintiff is the owner of the premises. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff as landlord and Defendant as tenant entered into a written Office Lease (as amended by a First Amendment to Office Lease dated January 3, 2017, a Second Amendment to Office Lease dated May 31, 2017, a Third Amendment to Office Lease dated February 15, 2018, and a Fourth Amendment to Office Lease dated August 18, 2020; hereinafter, Lease) whereby Defendant leased the premises. Plaintiff alleges that additional space within the building containing the premises was also leased by Defendant under the Lease, but possession of such space has been resolved and is not at issue in this matter. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and that all times thereafter, Defendant remained in possession pursuant to Article 15 of the Lease (the holdover provision), except that the parties agreed that Defendant would not pay 200% of the rent as (a) the time period was in the midst of Covid and (b) the parties were attempting to negotiate an extension of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and the Lease became a month-to-month holdover tenancy. Plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice To Terminate Tenancy (the Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding same according to the notice provisions of the Lease to Defendant at the Premises via FedEx. FedEx confirmed delivery as of October 11, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice and also set forth Plaintiff's election to declare a forfeiture of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice (the expiration of the 30-day period was November 10, 2023). On May 23, 2024, the default of all unnamed occupants in possession was entered. B. Motion on Calendar On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant in this case for possession of the premises and for damages in the amount of $61,090.70 (190 days at $321.53 per day for each day that Defendant remains at the premises from January 12, 2024 until judgment). Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication on the following issue: · Issue 1: The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to an order summarily adjudicating the cause of action for unlawful detainer and granting possession of the premises because Defendants occupancy of the premises has been month-to-month for years. Plaintiff has served a 30-day notice to terminate the lease and Defendant failed to vacate the property. On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. The Court held a hearing on the matter on July 5, 2024. The Court was informed that an opposition was filed and continued the hearing to July 10, 2024 in order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to file a reply brief by July 8, 2024. On July 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION CCP § 1161 defines unlawful detainer in relevant part as follows: 1. When the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property, or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the tenant; provided the expiration is of a nondefault nature however brought about without the permission of the landlord, or the successor in estate of the landlord, if applicable; including the case where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent, or licensee and the relation of master and servant, or employer and employee, or principal and agent, or licensor and licensee, has been lawfully terminated or the time fixed for occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired; but nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as preventing the removal of the occupant in any other lawful manner; but in case of a tenancy at will, it shall first be terminated by notice, as prescribed in the Civil Code. (CCP § 1161(1).) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant. In support of its motion, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Spencer Wilson, the Vice President of Transwestern, the agent and property manager for Plaintiff. (Wilson Decl., ¶1.) Mr. Wilson states that on December 19, 2011, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Office Lease for the premises, which was subsequently amended 4 times (Lease). ( Id. , ¶3, Ex. A [Lease].) He states that all relevant times, Plaintiff has owned the premises. ( Id. , ¶4.) He states that Defendant has been month-to-month since the Lease term expired on December 31, 2020 as shown in paragraph 4 of the last amendment to the Lease. ( Id. , ¶5.) He states that because the parties were unable to agree upon the terms of a new lease or for an extension of the Lease, Plaintiff sought to take back the space after entering into a new lease for the premises with a new tenant and that new lease provides for a rental amount of $9,796.00 per month. ( Id. , ¶6.) Mr. Wilson states that after letters were sent back and forth with Defendant concerning the need for the return of the premises, it became clear that Defendant was not going to vacate as requested. ( Id. , ¶7.) He states that on December 8, 2023, he served a 30-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy (Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding the same according to the notice provision of the Lease to Defendant at the premises via FedEx (delivery confirmed as of December 11, 2023). ( Id .) He states that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice. ( Id. , Ex. B [Notice with FedEx confirmation].) Mr. Wilson states that the action was not filed sooner than April 2024 because Plaintiff was trying to find a different space for the new tenant so that Defendant could possibly remain in the premises if the parties could reach an agreement on the terms; however, that did not happen. ( Id. , ¶8.) He states that while the parties have been negotiating an extension, they never reached an agreement on terms, there is no writing signed by the parties extending the Lease and no new lease between the parties for the premises. ( Id. , ¶10.) He states that Defendant has simply claimed to have some sort of agreement without any approval from Plaintiff. ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice and Plaintiff has not accepted any rent for the premises since the Notice was served. ( Id. , ¶9.) Mr. Wilson states that the rent called for in the new lease ($9,796.00 per month) is the reasonable rental value of the premises, as that is the most recent arms-length transaction for this exact space and based upon that monthly rent, the daily value of the premises is $322.06 (calculated by taking the monthly rent of $9,796.00 and multiplying it by 12 months and then dividing that by 365 days). ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states, however, because Plaintiff asked for $321.53 in the complaint, Plaintiff will use that lower amount. ( Id. ) Here, Plaintiff has established its burden establishing that Defendant has continued in possession of the premises after the Lease expired. Paragraph 4 of the Fourth Amendment of the Lease states that the term respecting Suite 130 shall expire on December 31, 2020. After the tenancy became a holdover month-to-month tenancy, Plaintiff served the Notice on December 8, 2023 (confirmed delivery by FedEx on December 11, 2023). However, as stated by Mr. Wilson in his declaration, Defendant did not vacate the premises within 30 days and the parties were unable to agree upon a Lease extension or a new lease. Thus, Plaintiff has established the elements of an unlawful detainer claim for the real property at issue. As such, the burden shifts to Defendant to raise a triable issue of material fact. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment solely because the Lease expired. Defendant argues that it has partially performed the terms of a fully negotiated and agreed-to Fifth Amendment. ( Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291, 295 [While the defendant was not entitled to a judgment in the present proceedings decreeing specific performance of the agreement to execute the lease, nevertheless the part performance of such an agreement can be interposed as an equitable defense to the plaintiff's attempt to wrest from him the possession of the premises by the summary proceedings in unlawful detainer.]; Pearsall v. Henry (1908) 153 Cal. 314, 318 [The question whether there has been a part performance of the oral agreement is necessarily one of fact to be determined by the trial court.].) [1] In support of the opposition, Defendant provides the declaration of Harout Keuroghlian, the owner of Defendant, and a copy of the unexecuted Fifth Amendment. Mr. Keuroghlian states that as of September 2021, Defendant was responsible for leasing: (a) Suite 130 (lease expired December 31, 2020), which was approximately 2,930 square feet; (b) Suite 660 (lease expired January 31, 2022), which was approximately 1,662 square feet; and (c) Suite 701 (lease to expire on August 31, 2023), which was approximately 2,241 square feet. (Keuroghlian Decl., ¶5.) He states that in September 2021, Anneke Greco, the Executive Vice President of Jones Lang LaSalle, the authorized agent of Plaintiff, proposed that Defendant surrender Suites 660 and 701 early as a part of negotiations for an extension of Suite 130. ( Id. , ¶6.) He states that in reliance on the terms being negotiated, Defendant voluntarily and prematurely surrendered possession of the Giveback Premises (Suites 660 and 701, set to expire 4 months and 2 years later, respectively) and Defendant ceased paying rent for those spaces. ( Id., ¶7.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on March 22, 2022, Ms. Greco sent Defendant a proposed Fifth Amendment to the Lease back dated to January 2022, honoring most of the mutually agreeable terms during the previous Suite 130 negotiations. ( Id. , ¶8.) On October 24, 2022, Ms. Greco sent a revised Fifth Amendment, which contained all of the terms needed for the Lease but had one mistake; Mr. Keuroghlian stated that he informed Ms. Greco that he was willing to execute the extension. ( Id. , ¶9, Ex. 1 [Fifth Amendment].) He states that in November and December 2022, Defendant continuously attempted to contact Plaintiff to finalize execution of the new Lease for Suite 130 and that Ms. Greco responded on December 21, 2022, stating that she needed an accounting reconciliation. ( Id. , ¶¶10-11.) He states that he attempted to contact Plaintiff until July 2023 and continued to pay monthly base rent which Plaintiff routinely accepted, believing that he was performing under the Fifth Amendment. ( Id. , ¶11.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on July 21, 2023 (nearly a year later), Ms. Grecos associate responded to Defendants July 28, 2022 correspondence regarding reconciliations. ( Id. , ¶12.) On July 25, 2023, Defendant sent correspondent to Ms. Greco requesting an update on the Lease execution. ( Id. , ¶13.) He states that Ms. Greco responded on July 26, 2023, stating that Plaintiff leased Suite 130 to another tenant who agreed to a longer-term period. ( Id. , ¶14.) On September 12, 2023, Defendant received a Notice of Termination; on November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint; and on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff issued the December 8, 2023 Notice. ( Id. , ¶¶15-17.) While Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because Defendant partially performed under the Fifth Amendment by surrendering the Give Back Space and paying rent, Defendant has failed to present evidence in support of its burden in opposition. At most, Defendant provides Mr. Keuroghlians declaration and the unsigned Fifth Amendment, but Defendant fails to provide any documentary evidence of the parties communications (emails, letters, etc.) and fails to state what amount of rent was paidwhether it was the rent under the last lease amendment or the Fifth Amendmentor provide documentary evidence through canceled checks or bank statements of the rental amounts paid. It is Defendants shifted burden to provide opposing evidence of a triable issue of material fact and Defendant has failed to do so here. In addition, as pointed out by Plaintiff in the reply brief, Defendant cannot rely on an oral modification, as the Lease at section 30.8 states that the terms cannot be modified orally. ( Conley v. Matthes (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465 [ Oral modifications of written agreements are precluded only if the written agreement provides for written modification.]; Mot., Ex. A [December 19, 2011 Office Lease at § 30.8].) [2] Plaintiff preemptively raised this in the motion papers on page 5 and again raised this in the reply brief, but Defendant did not address the integrated nature of the Lease (and its subsequent amendments) in the opposition brief. The cases cited by Defendant also fail to include a factually similar situation as this case. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has not raised a triable issue of material fact in its shifted burden on this motion for summary judgment. As such, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc.s motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to lodge with the Court and serve on Defendant a proposed judgment within ten (10) days and to provide notice of this order. Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 10, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court [1] Defendant cites to various cases regarding partial performance of unexecuted agreements or oral agreements to argue that it has sufficiently raised a triable issue of material fact. However, the cases cited are factually distinguishable. For example, Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291 involved an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to execute a written lease. Unlike this case, Schubert did not involve an underlying written and executed agreement that required all subsequent amendments and modifications to be in writing. [2] Section 30.8, entitled Entire Agreement; Merger; Severability states that no provision of the Lease may be modified, waived or discharged except by an instrument in writing signed by the party against which enforcement of such modification, waiver or discharge is sought.

Case Number: 23NWCV03984 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C TEJEDA v. CHRISTOPHER LEE MAGDOSKU, ET AL. CASE NO.: 23NWCV03984 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 10:30 A.M. #10 TENTATIVE RULING I. Defendant Christopher Lee Magdoskus Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. The Answer and Cross-Complaint attached to the motion are not deemed filed as of this date. Defendant is ordered to file and serve their Answer and Cross-Complaint within 5 days. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is an action for quiet title based on adverse possession. On March 25, 2024, default was entered against defendant Christopher Lee Magdosku. Defendant seeks to set aside default based upon mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect under CCP § 473, subd. (b). No opposition has been filed as of July 8, 2024. Discussion Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) states: The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted , and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. The purpose of mandatory relief is to alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due to an inexcusable failure to act by their attorneys. ( Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 715, 723.) Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. [Citations.] In such situations very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default. [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. ( Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 695.) Here, default was entered on March 25, 2024, and Defendant filed the instant motion on April 19, 2024, within the six-month time specified in CCP § 473. Hence, the motion is timely. Defendants attorney states that he miscalculated the time to respond to the pleading. (Decl. Pena, ¶ 3.) This is inadvertence and excusable neglect. Defendant included a copy of the answer and cross-complaint. The Court will not adjudicate Defendants requests for judicial notice because they are not material to the determination of the instant motion. Hence, the Court GRANTS the motion. The Answer and Cross-Complaint attached to the motion is not deemed filed as of this date. Defendant is ordered to file and serve their Answer and Cross-Complaint within 5 days.

Case Number: 23SMCV05304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 CARL BARNEY , Plaintiff, v. SIENNA CHARLES, LLC, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 S M CV 0 5 304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND Th is is a breach of contract and fraud case . Defendants Sienna Charles LLC and Jaclyn Sienna India-Reinert (Ms. India) provide bespoke travel services for high-wealth individuals . (First Amended Complaint (FAC ) ¶8.) In mid-2021, Plaintiff Carl Barney desired to obtain the services of a high level, full service VIP travel agency to arrange all of the details f or his three-week trip to Europe. ( Id. ¶9.) He therefore spoke with Defendants about their services . ( Id. ¶10.) Ms. India assured Plaintiff that she knew how to get her clients access to exclusive experiences that would otherwise be unavailable to them . She claimed, in writing and orally, to be able to provide extraordinary private travel and the ability for Plaintiff to access top experts for his vacations. ( Id. ¶10.) Relying on these oral representations, Plaintiff paid $75,000 for the Europe trip and multiple additional trips he desired to have planned over a one year period (July 1 st Agreement) . H e describes the July 1 st A greement as a partially oral and partially written agreement to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Under the July 1 st Agreement, Defendants were to provide Plaintiff access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb[ ] the globe consistently procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living. ( Id. ¶20.) Plaintiff claims Defendants breached the July 1 st Agreement by their poor planning and lack of communication, an d Plaintiffs staff was forced to clean up their messes . ( Id. ¶13.) Specif i cally, Plaintiffs staff was forced to book VIP suites, arrange last minute flights that could have been scheduled weeks in advance and book other appointments for things such as required Covid-19 testing . ( Id. ) Pursuant to the July 1 st Agreement, Plaintiff then sought to use Defendants services for a three - week trip to the Middle East . ( Id. ¶14.) Plaintiff asked Defendants to prepare a proposed itinerary by September 7, 2021 . ( Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants ignored the re quest , instead providing a proposed agenda on September 14, 2021 which failed to include any specific dates (or even number of days) for visiting any of the countries and no details of available a ctivities that Defendants could curate . ( Id. ) This action ensued . The operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleges claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3) unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust and (4) unfair business practices . This hearing is on Defendants demurrer to and motion to strike the complaint . Defendant s demurrer is based on the grounds that (1) the FAC does not allege any actual contract or contractual terms; (2) Defendants alleged breach of contract doesnt equal fraud , and Plaintiff has not plead fraud with specificity ; (3) unjust enrichment is a mere remedy, not a valid cause of action; (4) the FAC doesnt identify any specific funds on which to impose a constructive trust, and (5) Plaintiff has no valid claim for unfair business practices . Defendants also move to strike (1) Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations because Plaintiffs fraud claim fails, and (2) any claim for money damages in connection with Plaintiffs claim for unfair business practices because under the unfair competition law, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief . LEGAL STANDARD [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) MEET AND CONFER Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).) Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(3) , 435.5(a)(3) .) Defendant s submit the Declaration of Kenneth Ruttenberg which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone on May 2 2 , 2024 , more than five days before the demurrer and motion to strike was filed (on May 28, 2024 ) . This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 and 435.5. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not complied with the meet and confer requirements . Plaintiff, however, fails to explain why that is so . In any event, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer or deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer . ( Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 (a)(4) and 435.5 (a)(4) . ) DISCUSSION Breach of Contract Defendant s demur to the breach of contract claim on the ground that the contract terms are so vague that no one could judge whether Defendants supposedly breach those terms . The Court agrees . The Complaint alleges that i n exchange for $75,000, Defendants were to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( FAC ¶ 22.) Defendants promised to provide access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb the globe consistently, procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living for Plaintiff for one year . ( Id. ¶ 22.) These terms are too vague to determine whether a breach has occurred . It is not clear what full service planning entails . And t here is no basis to judge whether the luxury travel Defendants provided were the most exclusive or constituted the best in ultra luxury living. These promises are not definite enough to determine the scope of Defendants obligations or the limits of their performance . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the breach of contract claim with leave to amend . Fraud Defendant s demur to Plaintiffs fraud claim as duplicative of the contract claim, as insufficiently plead and as failing to allege an intent not to perform . The Court agrees on the last ground . To allege promissory fraud, Plaintiff must plead Defendants made promises that they had no intention of performing . ( Lazar v. Super. Court (1996) 12 Cal.4 th 631, 638.) The fact that a promise was made and not fulfilled is insufficient to establish fraud by false promise . ( Tenzer v. Superscope (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 31.) Rather, something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendants intent not to perform his promise. ( Id. ) Making a promise with an honest but unreasonable intent to perform is wholly different from making one with no intent to perform and, therefore, does not constitute a false promise. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4 th 153, 159.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a showing that Defendants did not intend to perform on their promises at the time they made them . In fact, the FAC alleges partial performance by Defendants . (FAC ¶¶ 16, 18.) The fact that Defendants partially performed undercut s any claim they did not intend to perform at the time they made their promises . ( Castaic Vil lage Ctr . LLC v. Gymcheer USA, Inc. , 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 6377 at *5 (partial performance negate s an intent not to perform). ) Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs fraud claim withoug leave to amend . Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to the unjust enrichment claim on the ground it is a remedy and not a cause of action . Plaintiff argues it has not asserted an unjust enrichment claim . The caption to its complaint, however, characterizes its third cause of action as an unjust enrichment claim and imposition of constructive trust . This may have been a clerical error and a holdover from the prior complaint . A s Plaintiff maintains he is not asserting an unjust enrichment claim, the demurrer to the unjust enrichment claim is moot . Constructive Trust Defendant demurs to the constructive trust claim on the ground Plaintiff does not allege a specific identifiable property interest because money is fungible . The Court agrees . A prerequisite to the imposition of a constructive trust is the identification of a specific property belonging to the claimant . ( Korea Supply Co. V. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4 th 1134, 1150.) A constructive trust requires money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff [which can] clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant s possession. ( Id. ) A constructive trust is available where the specific res or funds can be identified and attached, but not where the plaintiff seeks to impose general personal liability as a remedy for the defendant s monetary obligations. ( Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of United Ass'n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster (9 th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 1234, 1238 . ) In other words, a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy for a claim that is essentially one for money damages , as is the case here . Further, constructive trust is not a cause of action per se, but an equitable remedy . ( Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82; see also Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1332 (constructive trust is an equitable remedy); PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398 (constructive trust is a remedy); Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 (constructive trust is a remedy). Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the constructive trust claim without leave to amend . Unfair Business Practices Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 (UCL) fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any law . The Court agrees . UCL prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. Here, t he FAC alleges that Defendants violated the UCL prohibition against engaging in an unlawful act or practice by the conduct described above. (FAC ¶ 41.) To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law . ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635; Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618.) Plaintiff has not identified any underlying law that was violated . In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants conduct also constituted unfair and fraudulent business practices . While Plaintiff did not allege this theory in his Complaint, the C ourt is not¿limited to plaintiff s theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their¿complain t against a¿demurrer, but instead must determine if the¿ factual ¿allegations of the complaint are¿adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (¿ Barquis¿ v. ¿Merchants Collection Assn . (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103 .)¿ Mistaken labels and confusion of legal theory are not fatal; if appellant s complaint states a cause of action on any theory, he is entitled to introduce evidence thereon. ( Porten¿ v. ¿University of San Francisco ¿(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 833 .) California courts have not uniformly settled on a single approach to defining 'unfair' business practices in a consumer action under the UCL . Prior to 1999, California courts applied what is known as the balancing test. Courts defined unfair business practices as those offend[ ing ] an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers, or where the utility of the defendant s conduct does not outweigh the gravity of the harm to the victim . ( Cel-Tech Commc ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 18 4 .) Under the balancing test, a determination of unfairness involves an examination of [the practice s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. ( McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473¿(internal citations omitted) .) In 1999, the California Supreme Court rejected that test and held that a finding of unfairness must instead be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. ¿ ( Cel-Tech , 20 Cal. 4th at 186-87 . ) The¿ Cel-Tech ¿court, however, expressly declined to extend this¿standard to consumer actions.¿ ( Id. ¿at 187 n.12 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a threatened impact on competition and has not alleged facts that would meet the balancing test . For example, Plaintiff does not allege that D efendants conduct was not motivated by legitimate business or economic need or that the harm and adverse impact of Defendants conduct outweighed these needs . Accordingly , P laintiff has not stated a UCL claim based on either test for unfairness . To state a claim under the fraudulent prong of the¿UCL, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be¿deceived.¿( Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct. (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267.) The determination as to whether a business practice is deceptive is based on the likely effect such [a] practice would have on a reasonable¿consumer. ( McKell, 142 Cal.App.4th at 1471 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that members of the public were likely to be deceived by Defendants conduct . Accordingly , Plaintiff has not met the fraudulent prong of the UCL. Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs UCL claim with leave to amend . Punitive Damages Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged fraud and therefore cannot seek punitive damages . As the Court concludes Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a fraud claim, punitive damages are unavailable . Money Damages for UCL Claim Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover damages for his UCL claim . The Court agrees. Under the UCL, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief; he may not recover damages . ( Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal.4 th at 1144.) Plaintiff seeks money damages for his UCL claim . ( FAC at p.10 lines 16-19.) Accordingly , the Court will strike the prayer for money damages as to the UCL claim . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Defendant s demurrer with 20 days leave to amend and DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART their motion to strike with out leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

23CV-02027 Wayne Smith v. Laura Chavez Order to Show Cause re: Sanctions. Appearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remote appearance. Appear to address why Plaintiff failed to appear at the June 10, 2024, Case Management Conference and whether monetary sanctions should be ordered.

Case Number: 23AHCV00004 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 11, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Victoria Lynet v. Jamie Lynn Raymond et al. CASE NO.: 23AHCV00004 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants: (1) Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills (2) Paul Raymond RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Victoria Lynet SERVICE: OK / Unopposed OPPOSITION: OK / Unopposed REPLY: OK / Unopposed RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. BACKGROUND This is a tenant harassment and habitability case. Plaintiff Victoria Lynet sued defendants Jamie Lynn Raymond a/k/a Jamie Lynn Mills and Paul Raymond on January 3, 2023. Plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (FAC) as a matter of right on July 24, 2023, asserting causes of action for: 1. Unlawful Actions to Influence a Tenant to Vacate (Civ. Code, § 1940.2), 2. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, 3. Unfair Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), 4. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 5. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 6. General Negligence, 7. Gross Negligence, 8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 9. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability [duplicative]. (The Court adopts the causes of action as they are labeled in the body of the FAC, rather than the caption; for the fourth and ninth causes of action, the two lists do not match.) On September 14, 2023, Defendants each demurred separately to the FAC. On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On May 7, 2024, Defendants replied. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE N/A. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE N/A. LEGAL STANDARD Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) DISCUSSION 1. The FAC Fails to State Any Claim Plaintiffs FAC does not satisfy fact pleading standards. A complaint, with certain exceptions, need only contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1)) ... . ( Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn.3.) Notwithstanding that forgiving standard, [t]o survive demurrer, a plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) Here, the only factual allegations in the FAC appear in paragraphs sixteen (16) and seventeen (17). These paragraphs state the address of Plaintiffs unit and the date when Defendants tortious conduct allegedly began. Otherwise they only list several ways in which the unit is uninhabitable and accuse Defendants of [m]aking a false report to an animal humane society about Defendants dog, [r]epeatedly surveilling and intimidating Plaintiff, and [p]ressuring Plaintiff to vacate and serving notices to vacate that do not satisfy legal requirements. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Without further specifics, Defendants cannot prepare a defense to these allegations. The FAC is fatally uncertain and fails to state any claim. The FAC is sufficiently specific to persuade the Court that Plaintiff can supply more details upon amendment. The Court grants leave for Plaintiff to do so, as to all except her seventh and ninth causes of action, discussed below. 2. Seventh Cause of Action for Gross Negligence Although gross negligence commonly has relevance in tort actions where defendants raise assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, it is not a standalone cause of action under California law. (See id. at pp. 779-780, citing Continental Ins. Co. v. American Protection Industries (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322; see also Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546, 552, fn.3 [California does not recognize a distinct common law cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence.].) Defendants demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. 3. Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Plaintiffs fifth and ninth causes of action are both described in the body of the FAC as claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (The FACs caption describes them as claims under the Los Angeles Municipal Code and a cause of action for punitive damages, but the body of the complaint makes no reference to the Municipal Code under the relevant heading, and punitive damages is not a cause of action.) Because the claims are plainly duplicative, the demurrer to the latter is sustained without leave to amend. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrers are sustained in their entirety, with leave to amend granted as to all except the seventh and ninth causes of action. Plaintiff is ordered to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this order. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 11, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Case Number: 24STCV09612 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 07/11/24 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding ROOSEVELT WHITE v. VANMAR CAPITAL LLC ( 24STCV11319 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Roosevelt White (Pro Per) Counsel for Defendants/moving party: Edward McCutchan (Sunderland McCutchan, LLP) demurrer to complaint ( filed on 5/10/24) TENTATIVE RULING The Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the Complaints third cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court overrules Defendants demurrer to the rest of the Complaint. I. BACKGROUND On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff Roosevelt White (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Vanmar Capital LLC. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: C/A 1: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2966 C/A 2: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924i C/A 3: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing C/A 4: Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage C/A 5: Violation of Business & Professional Code § 17200 The Complaint alleges the following. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff is the owner and occupant of the property located at 1226 W 66th Steet, Los Angeles, CA 90044 (the Property). Plaintiff resided with his mother on the Property for over 20 years. On May 22, 2020, Plaintiffs mother passed away. On or about April 22, 2021, Plaintiff recorded the Grant Deed to the Property. On or about March 23, 2022, Plaintiff took out a loan in the amount of $435,000.00 with Defendant. Plaintiff concurrently executed a Deed of Trust as security for the note. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants predatory " loan to own" practices and interference with contractual relations has resulted in Plaintiff potentially losing the Property. On May 10, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the Complaint . · Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs entire complaint arguing Plaintiff is not the real party in interest to pursue Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV09612 in light of his current and active Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Court action in the United States Bankruptcy Court of Californias Central Division in bankruptcy court Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. o The Court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading since Plaintiff is in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. o Defendant also argues in this Los Angeles County action, there is a misjoinder of the United States Bankruptcy Trustee given Plaintiffs current Chapter 13 bankruptcy where the assigned United States Trustee the real party in interest and has the authority and duty to pursue the causes of action as an asset of the bankruptcy estate in this state court action as a matter of law. · Defendant also demurs to Plaintiffs third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Defendant argues it cannot be ascertained whether the alleged contract supporting the Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Allegation is written, oral or implied by conduct as mandated by CCP section 430.10 (g). Plaintiff did not attach any contract to his Complaint. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants demurrer arguing: · Defendant's Demurrer is premised entirely on the basis that due to Plaintiffs prior Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, this Court has no jurisdiction for this matter. · However, Defendants argument is now moot as the bankruptcy has been dismissed. o Plaintiff does not dispute that at the time the Complaint in the instant matter was filed, a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 had been initiated in the Central District of California. However, no plan was ever confirmed, and Plaintiff's bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Trustee on May 21, 2024. (See Exhibits 1 and 2 to the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice.) o Defendant's claim that there is a defect or misjoinder of parties is likewise moot as the United States Bankruptcy Trustee, is no longer a real party in interest and has no authority to pursue the 18 present causes of action. · Plaintiffs third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is sufficiently pled o Plaintiff's implied covenant claim stems from allegations that Defendant frustrated and prevented Plaintiff's ability to complete renovations of his own property by demanding that he work on Defendant's two other properties first. Defendant further interfered with Plaintiffs ability to list and sell the subject Property by unreasonably refusing to agree to Plaintiff's prospective buyer in September 2023. There was no express contractual term that Defendant would not frustrate or prevent Plaintiff from renovating his Property or to unreasonably withhold consent to a sale, but doing so denied Plaintiff the benefit of his contract with Defendant, namely, to borrow money to renovate his Property in order to be able to sell it. On July 7, 2024, Defendant filed a reply: · Defendants reply does not address Plaintiffs assertion that the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Defendant incorporates its objections to Plaintiffs June 27, 2024 filed declaration and request for judicial notice in that the documents he has submitted are inadmissible hearsay and are not certified as being true and correct copies of the originals in the United States Bankruptcy Court. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in contextany defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Id .) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn , supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) B. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant requests judicial notice of the April 24, 2024 certified copy of plaintiff, Roosevelt Whites Chapter 13 plan in the United States Bankruptcy Court of California, Central Division, Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of: (1) The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California's Order of Dismissal filed in the matter entitled In re: White, Roosevelt, Case No. 2:23-bk-17860-VZ; and (2) Chapter 13 Standing Trustee's Final Report and Accounting, with financials redacted. The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) The Court grants Defendant and Plaintiffs requests for judicial notice. The Court notes, however, taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. ( Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) When judicial notice is taken of a document, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. (Ibid.) Judicial notice of a Court record is limited to the existence of the documents and is not the same as taking notice of the truth of any matters or facts stated therein. ( Ibid .) C. Objections to Plaintiffs Declaration Defendant objects to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Declaration arguing that the documents submitted for judicial notice are not certified. The Court overrules Defendants objections. As discussed above, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiffs submitted documents. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents, but does not take notice of the truth of any matters or facts stated therein. D. Meet and Confer Requirement Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) Here, counsel for Defendant submitted a declaration stating he sent correspondence to Plaintiffs counsel outlining the deficiencies of the Complaint on April 22, 2024 and April 24, 2024. (McCutchan Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) The Court finds the moving party satisfied its obligations to meet and confer and the Court proceeds on the merits. E. Demurrer to the Complaint Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs entire Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has a current Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Court action in the United States Bankruptcy Court of Californias Central Division in bankruptcy court Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. Defendant argues that due to Plaintiffs Chapter 13 bankruptcy action, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this state court action and the United States trustee is the real party in interest and has the authority and duty to pursue the causes of action as an asset of the bankruptcy estate in this action. In support, Defendant cites to two federal cases, which are non-binding authority on this Court. (See Reed v. City of Arlington (2011) 5th Cir. 650 F. 3d 571 and Copelan v. Techtronics Industries Co., Ltd . (2015) 95 F. Supp. 3d 1230.) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants argument is moot as Plaintiff's bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Trustee on May 21, 2024. (Plaintiffs RJN, Exhs. 1 and 2.) In support, Plaintiff attached the United States Bankruptcy Courts Order of Dismissal filed in the bankruptcy case. (Plaintiffs RJN, Ex. 1.) Defendant does not address this contention in its reply. Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the demurrer to the entire Complaint should be sustained on these grounds. Accordingly, Defendants demurrer to the entire Complaint is overruled on this basis. F. Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defendant demurs to the Complaints third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. A cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the following elements: (1) plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract; (2) plaintiff did all, or substantially all of the significant things that the contract required him to do or plaintiff was excused from having do to those things; (3) all conditions required for defendants performance had occurred or were excused; (4) defendant unfairly interfered with plaintiffs right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) plaintiff was harmed by defendants conduct. (CACI 325.) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law in every contract, and it acts as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other partys rights to the benefits of the contract. ( Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032.) The Complaint alleges that on March 23, 2022, Plaintiff took out a loan in the amount of $435,000.00 with Defendant. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff concurrently executed a Deed of Trust as security for the note. ( Ibid .) Plaintiff understood that under the agreement on the loan, he would owe the full amount to Defendant after one year. (Compl., ¶ 34) Plaintiff intended to renovate the home and resell it in order to pay off the loan. ( Ibid .) In Plaintiffs opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant prevented Plaintiff from renovating the Property which prevented Plaintiff from reselling the Property. (Compl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant further interfered with Plaintiffs ability to list and sell the subject Property by unreasonably refusing to agree to Plaintiff's prospective buyer in September 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff has not pled the terms of the contract or attached the contract to the Complaint. Plaintiff does not specify whether the contract is written, oral or implied by conduct. Accordingly, the Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the third cause of action with leave to amend. III. DISPOSITION The Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the Complaints third cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court overrules Defendants demurrer to the rest of the Complaint.