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Case Number: 23STCV12837 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 JACK MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. HEALTH NET LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and DOES 1-10 , inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV12837 Hearing Date: 7/9/24 Trial Date: 11/5/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Health Net Life Insurance Companys Motion to Seal I. Background On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff Jack Martin (Plaintiff) commenced this action by filing his Complaint against Defendant Health Net Life Insurance Company (Defendant) for (1) Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (2) Violation of Civil Code Section 3428; and (3) Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. Plaintiff is a former insured of Defendant, a health care insurer. On May 28, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to seal confidential and protected information in connection with its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed his opposition brief on June 25, 2024, and Defendant filed its reply brief on August 1, 2024. II. Motion to Seal : DENIED, other than as to redactions. A. Legal Standard Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to public review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c); see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 3(b)(1) [The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the peoples business].) The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d); see also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1).) B. Courts Determination The Court DENIES the motion, other than as indicated below. Defendant seeks to seal documents containing (1) Plaintiffs protected health information and (2) Defendants confidential proprietary information, lodged conditionally under seal by Defendant on May 28, 2024 in connection with Defendants motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant seeks to seal Exhibits 1-3,7-18, and 21-22 of Defendants Appendix of Evidence in support of motion for summary judgment which include: (i) medical records, including treatment records, for procedures Plaintiff received; (ii) an authorization request and customer service notes for the disputed procedures at issue in this case; (iii) letters from Defendant and/or its authorized representatives requesting additional medical records and information; (iv) secondary opinions issued by third-party organizations specializing in spinal surgeries related to the disputed procedures at issue in this case; and (v) letters from Defendant and TurningPoint Healthcare Solutions LLC denying Plaintiffs request for authorization for the medical procedures at issue in this case. Further, Defendant seeks to seal Exhibits 4-5 and 24-25 which includes confidential and proprietary clinical policies for the two procedures at issue in this case. Plaintiff contends that Defndants motion is a pretext to seal more than what is permitted and, therefore, only Plaintiffs protected information should be redacted, not entire exhibits. Also, as to Defendants proprietary information, Plaintiff contends there is no overriding interest that would require sealing the subject records because the clinical policies are not confidential since they are available to the public upon request. In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs arguments are misplaced because Defendant filed the exhibits under seal pursuant to its statutory obligation and because the clinical policies are provided to a medical provider and an insured upon request, which does not make them publicly available. Nevertheless, Defendant provides that it is amendable to publicly re-filing its May 28, 2024 Appendix of Evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment once Plaintiff confirms the specific protected health information he believes should be redacted from those exhibits. Also, as to the clinical policies, for the limited purpose of this case, Defendant does not oppose Plaintiffs request to unseal Exhibits 4-5 and 24-25. Because Defendant does not oppose Plaintiffs request to unseal Exhibits 4-5 and 24-25, the motion to seal as to these exhibits is denied as moot. The motion to seal is also denied as to exhibits 1-3, 7-18 and 21-22 provided that Plaintiff instructs Defendant as to the specific information within those exhibits that Plaintiff deems should be redacted. III. Conclusion The motion to seal as to these Exhibits 4-5 and 24-25 is denied as moot. The motion to seal is denied as to exhibits 1-3, 7-18 and 21-22 provided that Plaintiff instructs Defendant as to the specific information within those exhibits that Plaintiff deems should be redacted. Only the Plaintiffs identifying information as so indicated by Plaintiff should be redacted in the new filings.

Case Number: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 32 BOGHOS TOVMASSIAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HIPPO INSURANCE SERVICES, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for summary judgment BACKGROUND On May 5, 2023, Plaintiffs Boghos Tovmassian and Marguerite Tovmassian filed this action against Defendants Hippo Insurance Services (Hippo), Spinnaker Insurance Company (Spinnaker), and Patrick Hix, alleging (1) breach of insurance contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) elder abuse. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs own a home located in Tujunga, California (the Property). (Compl. ¶ 1.) The Property was insured by a homeowners insurance policy issued by Hippo, which is owned and underwritten by Spinnaker. ( Ibid. ) In December 2021, the Property suffered wind and water intrusion, leading Plaintiffs to make a claim. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to conduct a full and fair investigation, which resulted in an insufficient payout. ( Id. , ¶ 3.) On April 25, 2024, Hippo and Spinnaker filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) DISCUSSION I. Hippos Liability a. Plaintiffs Had No Contract with Hippo To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the contract existed, (2) the plaintiffs performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. ( Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) A plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of contract against one who is not a party to the contract. ( Tri-Continent Internat. Corp. v. Paris Savings & Loan Assn. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1359.) It is undisputed that the policy was issued by Spinnaker, with Hippo as the program administrator. (Def.s Undisputed Facts (UF) 1; Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The policy was signed by Spinnakers CEO. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, Hippo has satisfied its initial burden by showing that it was not a party to the policy with Plaintiffs. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Hippo is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law. b. Hippo Cannot be Liable for the Implied Covenant The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other partys right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-50.) In the absence of a contractual relationship, no implied covenant claims may be stated. ( Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 422, 430.) As discussed above, Hippo has established that it had no contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an implied covenant claim against Hippo. c. Hippo Cannot be Liable for Elder Abuse Financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) Hippo could not have wrongfully retained Plaintiffs property ( i.e. , the insurance proceeds) if it was not a party to the policy and did not have any obligation to pay Plaintiffs. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. II. Spinnakers Liability a. The Claims are Time-Barred Under California law parties may agree to a provision shortening the statute of limitations, qualified, however, by the requirement that the period fixed is not in itself unreasonable or is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. ( William L. Lyon & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1307, quoting Capehart v. Heady (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 386, 388.) [A] covenant shortening the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance contract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. ( Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 683.) One year was not an unfair period of limitation. ( Ibid. ; see also Ins. Code, § 2071(a) [imposing one-year limitations period for fire insurance claims].) The statute of limitations for actions on insurance claims is equitably tolled from the time the insured notifies the insurer of the claim until coverage is denied. ( Marselis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 122, 124.) The reason for the tolling rule is to avoid penalizing the insured for the time consumed by the insurer investigating the claim. ( Id. at p. 125.) The running of the limitations period resumes upon the insurers denial of a claim, and no further tolling occurs, even if the insurer reconsiders its denial. ( Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 142.) Here, the insurance policy provides that [n]o action can be brought against us unless . . . the action is started within one year after the date of loss. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The loss occurred on December 30, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs reported the loss to Spinnaker on January 8, 2022. (Carden Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Spinnaker issued notice of its coverage position on January 27, 2022, granting coverage on certain items and denying the rest. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Plaintiffs did not file this action until May 5, 2023, well past the one-year limitations period, even accounting for the tolling period between January 8, 2022 and January 27, 2022. Spinnakers reopening of the claim on May 17, 2022 based on Plaintiffs request for reconsideration (Carden Decl. ¶13) did not further toll the limitations period. Therefore, Spinnaker has met its initial burden by establishing that the claims are time-barred. [1] This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable as a matter of law. b. Spinnaker Did Not Breach the Policy There can be no breach of the insurance policy . . . [where] the undisputed evidence established that [the insurer] paid all amounts due under the policy. ( Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) Here, the policy covered direct physical loss to property. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) Spinnaker covered damage to the first-floor flooring, the only part of the Property directly damaged by the water intrusion. (Carden Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. F.) Spinnaker declined to cover the undamaged stairs and second-floor flooring. ( Ibid. ) Spinnaker issued payment for the covered portions. ( Id. , ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. C, D.) Spinnaker has met its initial burden by showing that it satisfied its obligations under the policy. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law for this independent reason. c. Spinnaker Could Not Have Breached the Implied Covenant [A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due. ( Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1153.) Spinnaker could not have acted in bad faith if it correctly denied policy coverage. Furthermore, as discussed above, the claim is time-barred. Therefore, the implied covenant claim fails as a matter of law. d. Spinnaker Could Not Have Committed Elder Abuse Likewise, Spinnaker could not have wrongfully retained insurance benefits if it correctly denied them, and the claim is time-barred in any case. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment filed by Hippo and Spinnaker is GRANTED. [1] This applies to all three causes of action, not just breach of contract, because the policy states that no action may be brought outside one year. The policy does not restrict the limitations period to claims on the policy itself. Furthermore, where the essence of [a] claim[] is an attempt to recover [d]amages for failure to provide benefits under subject contract of insurance, the claim is fundamentally a claim on the policy and is thus time barred under the limitations period stated in the policy. ( Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1063, quoting Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565, 575.)

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 1. PLAINTIFF STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.'s HEARING ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION. The judgment debtor's claim of exemption is denied. The levying officer is directed to release all sums held to the judgment creditor for payment on the judgment. The levying officer shall withhold $220 per pay period ($440 per month) from debtor's earnings and pay that sum to the judgment creditor. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court will execute a judicial council form of order repeating the tentative if it adopts the tentative ruling. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: 24CHCV00588 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-10-24 Case #24CHCV00588 , Chinyere Valerie Ibe vs. Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc., et al. Trial Date: N/A DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to the Complaint · 4 th Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation · 5 th Cause of Action for Violation of California Business & Professional Code · 6 th Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment · 7 th Cause of Action for Defamation Motion to Strike · Page 24, Paragraph 111 entitled Prayer for Relief, Lines 23-25 [claim for punitive damages] RULING : Defendants demurrer is sustained. Defendants motion to strike is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Chinyere Valerie Ibe (Plaintiff) filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC), in pro per, on March 25, 2024. Plaintiffs complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (2) Bad Faith Denial of Insurance Claim; (3) Breach of the Contractual Duty to Pay a Covered Insurance Claim; (4) Intentional Misrepresentation; (5) Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et. seq.; (6) Unjust Enrichment; and (7) Defamation. The First through Third Causes of Action are only against Defendant Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc. The Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action are against all Defendants. Defendant 818 Restoration and Construction, LLC (818 Restoration) is the demurring Defendant in this instance. 818 Restoration demurs to the Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that the water heater in the garage of her home burst. This caused the garage to flood, damaging the drywall and items that were stored in the garage. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that on Marh 24, 2023, Defendant Bamboo Insurance sent out a leak detector from 818 Restoration to take pictures of the damaged drywall in the garage. (FAC, ¶ 21.) She also alleges that water was still trickling out of the water heater when the leak detector from 818 Restoration came out. (FAC, ¶ 25.) She also alleges that 818 Restoration was working with Bamboo to create a story that Plaintiff falsely reported that the water heater flooded the garage. (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff also alleges that Bamboo, using its contractors, including 818 Restoration, found ways to deny her claim. (FAC, ¶ 61.) The last allegations in Plaintiffs FAC related to 818 Restoration is that it made one or more defamatory statements about Plaintiff to a person other than Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There are no other specific allegations related to 818 Restoration. 818 Restoration filed its demurrer on May 28, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 26, 2024, with proof of service by mail. On July 1, 2024, 818 Restoration filed a notice of non-opposition to its demurrer, as it apparently had no knowledge of the opposition that was filed by Plaintiff with the Court and had not yet received the opposition in the mail. Plaintiffs opposition only argues that she was not validly served with the demurrer because she had not consented to service of the demurrer via email, which is how she claimed she received the demurrer. However, the proof of service filed with Defendants demurrer indicates that Plaintiff was served via U.S. Mail, so it is unknown why she did not receive the demurrer in the mail. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant did not meet and confer, but Defendants demurrer indicates that it attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not respond to attempts to meet and confer with her. Plaintiffs opposition contains no arguments regarding the merits of the demurrer and motion to strike. The Court will address the merits of the demurrer and the motion to strike. ANALYSIS A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law& ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation Defendant 818 Restoration demurs to Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation on the basis that it fails to plead any specific allegations against 818 Restoration. The elements of intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. ( Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245.) Notably, in California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Id .) There are no specific allegations against 818 Restoration under this cause of action. Instead, Plaintiff just alleges that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding what would be covered by Plaintiffs insurance policy. (FAC, ¶ 78.) 818 Restoration was not Plaintiffs insurance provider. It was simply an inspector hired by Plaintiffs provider, Bamboo Insurance. There are no allegations under this cause of action for any misrepresentations made specifically by 818 Restoration. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq. 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that there are insufficient facts against 818 Restoration to support this cause of action. Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. includes the California Unfair Competition Law and provides consumers with remedies when businesses engage in unfair or fraudulent practices. Plaintiffs FAC does not contain any allegations indicating that 818 Restoration violated the Business and Professions Code. The only specific allegation against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that Bamboo used it to find ways to deny Plaintiffs claims. This is not sufficient to indicate that 818 Restoration itself engaged any acts that would constitute a violation of the Business and Professions Code. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Sixth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against 818 Restoration. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit at the expense of another to either return the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched. ( Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 255 Cal.App. 4th 759.) Though Defendant does not raise this argument, the Court will note that there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California. ( Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 785, 793 (unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action under California law).) Unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs FAC contains no allegations indicating how 818 Restoration was unjustly enriched. Because unjust enrichment is not a valid cause of action, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Seventh Cause of Action for Defamation 818 Restoration demurs to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for defamation. Defamation is an intentional tort that requires proof that the defendant intended to publish the defamatory statement. ( Stellar v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App 4th 1498.) California law requires that any words constituting an alleged defamation must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. ( ZL Technologies, Inc. v Does 1 17 (2017) 13 Cal.App. 5th 603.) The only allegations that Plaintiff has against 818 Restoration under this cause of action is that it noted that a potential slab leak had occurred in the garage as the water did not reflect a failed water heater in the April 14, 2023, denial of benefits letter to Plaintiff, and that 818 Restoration made one or more of the states to a person other than Ms. Ibe. (FAC, ¶¶ 100, 103.) There is nothing in Plaintiffs FAC to indicate how 818 Restoration defamed Plaintiff, as the letter would have been issued by Plaintiffs insurance provider, nor does Plaintiff specifically identify the alleged defamation. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Motion to Strike Defendant had moved to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. This Court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, [a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. Under CCP § 436(a), [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civ. Code § 3294. ( Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Id . at 725.) Oppression is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).)¿ ¿ Plaintiff has requested punitive damages as part of her prayer for relief, but nowhere in her FAC does she allege that 818 Restoration acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. Because she has not alleged that it acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, she cannot maintain a claim for punitive damages against 818 Restoration. Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is granted for 818 Restoration only. It could still apply to other Defendants. CONCLUSION Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike is granted. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Case Number: 23SMCV03537 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED. Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New York to give notice. REASONING Counsel who are not active members of the California State Bar and have not been granted permission to appear pro hac vice are prohibited from representing a party in California courts. (Gentis v. Safeguard Bus. Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308.) Counsel licensed in another state may, in the courts discretion, be permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice if counsel is associated with an attorney of record who is an active member of the California bar. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).) Appearance pro hac vice is a privilege and not a right under the United States Constitution. (Leis v. Flynt (1979) 439 U.S. 438, 441.) An application to appear in California as counsel pro hac vice must state: (1) The applicants residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a member in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active member of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d).) Christian P. Jones represents that he is a member in good standing of all bars and with all courts in which he is admitted to practice, and while he has appeared in three other actions in California in the preceding two years, this is not a significantly high number so as to warrant denial of an application to appear pro hac vice here. He has met the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d), he appears qualified and ready to appear pro hac vice, and there are no other facts or circumstances to show that his appearance in this action would cause a significant disruption of orderly justice. Accordingly, Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New Yorks Application for Admission of Christian P. Jones for Homeland Insurance Company of New York as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED.

S-CV-0052426 McIntyre, Patrick et al vs. Fire Insurance Exchange ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: Plaintiff has not paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 12/08/25 8 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/21/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 11/14/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

21CV01931 HERRERA, ADESS ET AL V. ANDERSON, ROB ET AL EVENT: Defendants Nationwide Insurance Company and Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication The Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract as Plaintiffs failed to oppose the Motion in this regard. See, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication at Pg. 1, Lines 4-5 [“Plaintiffs do not contend that payment of the drastically underinsured properties was bad faith...”]; and see, Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-4. As such, the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract. Without a breach of contract, there can be no bad faith liability. See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36 [the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is “based upon” the contract and has no existence independent of such contract]; Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 649, 663 [“Because there was no breach of contract, there was no breach of the implied covenant”; 823-24 [where homeowner claimed to be underinsured, but insurer paid full policy limits, there was no breach of contract and therefore no bad faith]; Vulk v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 263 [underinsured homeowner had no bad faith claim where he was paid all benefits due under policy]; and see, Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-4. Based upon the Court’s ruling as to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract, the First Cause of Action for Bad Faith likewise fails and the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the First Cause of Action for Bad Faith. The evidence presented leads the Court to conclude that there is no triable issue of material fact in regard to the application of an exception to the general rule that an insurance agent has no duty to advise an insured on types of coverages or policy limits. Fitzpatrick v. Hayes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 916, 927; Everett v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 649, 660; Vulk v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 254-255; see also Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 24-47. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Third Cause of Action for Negligence and Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation. Plaintiffs do not oppose the Motion as it relates to their punitive damages claim See, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication at Pg. 1, Line 3 [“Plaintiffs withdraw the request for punitive damages.”] As such, the Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. Counsel for the Defendants shall submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks. 1 ||2. 22CV01639 C D V. COUNTY OF BUTTE ET AL EVENT: Defendant County of Butte’s Motion to Seal Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication, and Attached Exhibits The Motion is unopposed and is granted. The Court will sign the form of order submitted by counsel.

Case Number: 23VECV02505 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Levi v Keyes 23VECV02505 Tentative rulings Defendants motion to strike First Amended Complaint-GRANT . The opposition was not considered because plaintiffs counsel was to provide a declaration from Saniel Sanft attaching a copy of the overnight mail receipt, and proof of delivery or status of delivery (he stated in his 5/10/2024 proof of service that it was served by overnight delivery.). He failed to do so, and defense denies receiving the opposition. By court order of 2/7/2024, the first amended complaint was to be served and filed no later than 20 days. Because notice was given by the court by mail, an additional 5 days were added, which would make the due date 3/4/2024. It was not served until 3/13/2024 and not filed until 3/14/2024 after the answer had been filed. Therefore, the First Amended Complaint was late, and it is disregarded. The ruling on the demurrer as to the original complaint stands: Defendants Hyundai Motor America and Van Nuys-H, Inc. dba Keyes Hyundai of Van Nuyss Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED as to the eighth cause of action; SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second cause of action; and SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth, fifth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action. The Answer to the Complaint filed on 3/13/2024 stands. Plaintiffs Demurrer to Answer: SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND THE ANSWER. Plaintiff may demur to an answer, particularly as to affirmative defenses. (Timberidge Enterps., Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879; see Hejmadi v. Amfac, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 525, 535 [proper vehicle to test the sufficiency of an answer].) The affirmative defenses must do more than set forth bare legal conclusion. Affirmative defenses must specify supporting facts. (FPI Devel., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) Allegations stating a legal conclusion (rather than pleading facts) are inadequate. (Berger v. California Ins. Guar. Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006; Jones v. Grewe (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 950, 954.) Here, the court finds that the demurrer is justified because there are no factual allegations supporting the bare legal conclusions. The demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. The Second Affirmative Defense at page 19, lines 3-6, is uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained what was the improper conduct of Plaintiff, and what applicable statutes required notice: Sustained as to lack of facts which is alleged to have been improper conduct. The Sixth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 19, line 26, it cannot be ascertained who are the persons or entities other than Defendants, nor can it be ascertained how, when, or in what manner such persons or entitles were reckless, careless and/or negligent: Sustained. No facts identified. The Twelfth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twelfth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 21, line 18, it cannot be ascertained what the statutory requirements were: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Fourteenth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Fourteenth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 21, lines 26-28, it cannot be ascertained how, when, or in what manner there was either a release or a settlement; Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twentieth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-First Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Twenty-Fifth Affirmative defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Second Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Third Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged. The Thirty Fourth Affirmative Defense is uncertain in that on page 25 lines 24- 25, it cannot be ascertained in what action or proceeding was there a prior class action settlement, nor can it be ascertained how, when or in what manner, Plaintiff was given notice so as to prevent his being opted out: Sustained. No facts alleged. 14. The Thirty Sixth Affirmative Defense fails to allege facts sufficient to state a defense: Sustained. No facts alleged.