Shelter Mutual Insurance Company Et Al V Ray Moor -Non-Trial

Case Number: 22STCV31274 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Case Name: Hernandez v. Sams Club, et al. Case No.: 22STCV31274 Matter: Application for Pro Hac Vice Admission Moving Party: Defendant Sport Diversions, Inc. Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Application is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant Sport Diversions, Inc. seeks pro hac vice admission for Heath Sherman. The Application is granted because it meets all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 9.40. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 22STCV28415 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 52 Tentative Ruling: (1) Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Notice of Related Case; (2) Plaintiff Gail Wiggans Motion for Consolidation Notice of Related Case Defendants Safe-Guard International Products, LLC and American Credit Acceptance, LLC each filed a notice of related case for this action and Gail Wiggan v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, et al. , No. 22STCV28591. The cases are related. The two complaints are nearly identical. Plaintiff Gail Wiggan effectively filed the same action twice. Motion to Consolidate Plaintiff Gail Wiggan moves to consolidate this action with No. 22STCV28591. Moving papers must be served (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005) on all parties who have appeared in the action (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014). Plaintiff did not file proof of service of this motion on defendants. She only filed proof of service of the corresponding motion in No. 22STCV28591. The court will deny the motion without prejudice. Disposition The court finds this action is related to Gail Wiggan v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, et al. , No. 22STCV28591. The court hereby reassigns case No. 22STCV28591 to Department 52 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Plaintiff Gail Wiggans motion for consolidation is denied without prejudice . The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding consolidation of the actions within seven days.

Case Number: 23GDCV02253 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/11/2024 8:30am Case No. 23GDCV02253 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN v. KIRAKOSYAN MARKET INC., a California corporation TENTATIVE RULING MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Baydzar Keosheyan, filed a Complaint on 10/24/2023 against Defendant, Kirakosyan Market Inc., a California corporation. The Complaint is a form complaint and appears to allege two causes of action, one for general negligence and another for premises liability. Plaintiffs causes of action arise from an alleged incident when Plaintiff was shopping at Defendants market called Golden Market and while checking out at the register, another patron rode his scooter into the market and struck Plaintiff. On 6/25/2024, this Court signed the parties joint stipulation agreeing that the initial date of loss should reflect January 27, 2023, and not January 26, 2023. RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN will move for an Order that the jury trial in this case be granted a preference pursuant to sections 36(a) and (e) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. This motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN is eighty-five (85) years of age, is in ill health and the interests of justice will be served by granting the preference. In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN hereby respectfully requests the Court grant trial preference by setting trial for dates within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of the hearing of the motion. The motion will be based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration of Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN and such other oral and documentary evidence that may be submitted at the hearing. (Mot. p. 1-2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Baydzar Keosheyan Responding Party: No Opposition by Defendant Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Proposed Order; Opposition Papers: No Opposition Reply: Joint Stipulation for Trial Preference and Proposed Order 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): No- All moving papers and Reply papers (Joint Stipulation) were served via electronic mail to jane.kuppermann@farmersinsurance.com and la.legal@farmersinsurance.com. However, eCourt lists Defendants counsels email address as sandra.carter@farmersinsurance.com. The parties are to address this discrepancy at the hearing. LEGAL STANDARD MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE As stated in CCP § 36(a): A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole. (2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the partys interest in the litigation. (CCP § 36(a)(1)-(2).) An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party. The affidavit is not admissible for any purpose other than a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36.(CCP § 36.5.) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date and there shall be no continuance beyond 120 days from the granting of the motion for preference except for physical disability of a party or a partys attorney, or upon a showing of good cause stated in the record. Any continuance shall be for no more than 15 days and no more than one continuance for physical disability may be granted to any party. (CCP § 36(f).) ANALYSIS Movant explains that Plaintiff is 85 years of age. (See Keosheyan Decl. ¶ 6.) While Movant does not clearly explain how 36(a) is met, this requirement appears to be met because Plaintiff is 85 years of age and presumably has a substantial interest in the action as a whole since Movant is the Plaintiff. It appears that Movant is arguing that based on Plaintiffs age and injuries, Plaintiff cannot further delay in having her case heard. In Plaintiffs declaration, she states that as a result of the injury, she was hospitalized for 60 days. (See Keosheyan Decl. ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff states that her injuries included a fractured pelvic bone, lower back pain (required surgery), pain from arms to hands and from legs to feet, bruising and tenderness to entire body, and dizziness and headaches. (See Keosheyan Decl. ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff states: 4. All daily activities, hobbies and chores have been affected by my injuries sustained as a result of the incident. I am unable to entertain friends and family; I cannot visit friends and family and it is difficult for friends and family to visit me; cooking at home, doing dishes/laundry, and cleaning the house are limited and extremely difficult; and I am confined at home and can only walk to and from my balcony. If absolutely required, I leave the house once a week for necessities with the use of my walker and am usually accompanied by a friend and/or family member. 5. I am still affected to this day with being in immense pain, which is shown through my recent emergency room admission for lower back and abdominal pain which occurred on March 16, 2024. ( Exhibit A ). I do not recognize myself anymore. I have to move and take things extremely slow in order to avoid any other falls. 6. The incident happened nearly a year and a half ago, and the ongoing litigation since the date of the incident has continued to add to my significant anxiety, stress and trauma resulting from the incident. I am eighty-five (85) years old and cannot afford further delay in having my case heard. The entire experience caused by the incident that occurred at Defendant KIRAKOSYAN MARKETS, INC.s grocery market was nightmarish for me. Life is challenging enough for me in my eighties (80s) without having to deal with the addition of severe and life-threatening injuries. 7. I am in poor health and this ordeal has made my health much worse. My health is failing, and the stress of this unresolved matter is the main contributing factor right now. I suffer from much anxiety about this case and simply want it to be over and want to be reimbursed/compensated by the people responsible for it. (Keosheyan Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.) Movant also cites to CCP § 36(e) which states, Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference that is supported by a showing that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting this preference. (CCP § 36(e).) TENTATIVE RULING The parties are to address what is the proper electronic service address for Defendant. All moving papers and Reply papers (Joint Stipulation) were served via electronic mail to jane.kuppermann@farmersinsurance.com and la.legal@farmersinsurance.com. However, eCourt lists Defendants counsels email address as sandra.carter@farmersinsurance.com. While no Opposition was filed, a Joint Stipulation was filed. This Joint Stipulation for Trial Preference was signed by both Plaintiff and Defendants counsel. In relevant part of the Joint Stipulation, the parties agreed that: 3. On June 4, 2024, Defendant KIRAKOSYAN MARKETS, INC. took the remote deposition of Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN. Since then, Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYANs health has continued to deteriorate, and she is in immense pain. 4. In accordance with such, on June 5, 2024, Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYAN filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Preference for Party over 70 Years of Age and supporting documents (Motion for Preference). The Motion for Preference is set to be heard on July 11, 2024, at 8:30 AM. 5. Due to Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYANs deteriorating health, she intended to appear ex parte requesting that the Motion for Preference be heard by the Court at an earlier date and time. 6. On June 7, 2024, the parties attorneys of record met and conferred as to the filed Motion for Preference, and counsel for Defendant KIRAKOSYAN MARKETS, INC. confirmed that the Motion for Preference would not be opposed. 7. In an effort to save the Courts valuable resources, the parties through their attorneys of record have agreed to enter into this Joint Stipulation for Trial Preference and request that this Court set a jury trial within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the signing of an Order. The parties estimate five (5) to six (6) days for the jury trial. 8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties through their respective attorneys of record believe the foregoing may be accomplished with the setting of trial dates within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the signing of an Order. 9. By granting trial preference by way of this Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff BAYDZAR KEOSHEYANs Motion for Preference will become moot. 10. Accordingly, the parties hereto through their respective attorneys of record hereby stipulate (1) that this matter be granted trial preference; (2) that a 5-6 day jury trial be set within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the signing of an Order, or as soon thereafter as the Court deems fit; and (3) that the Court take the Motion for Preference currently set for July 11, 2024, off calendar on the grounds that it is moot. (Joint Stipulation filed 6/25/2024.) Therefore, the Court tentatively plans to GRANT Plaintiffs motion for trial preference. Movant appears to have met the requirements of CCP § 36(a)(1)-(2). Further, a joint stipulation was filed and signed by counsel for both parties. Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date and there shall be no continuance beyond 120 days from the granting of the motion for preference except for physical disability of a party or a partys attorney, or upon a showing of good cause stated in the record. Any continuance shall be for no more than 15 days and no more than one continuance for physical disability may be granted to any party. (CCP § 36(f).)

Case Number: 24STCV04504 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING REBEKA RODRIGUEZ , vs. FOUNTAIN9, INC. Case No.: 24STCV04504 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Defendant Fountain9, Inc.s demurrer to Plaintiff Rebeka Rodriguezs first amended complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant Fountain9, Inc.s motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs first amended complaint is denied as moot. Defendant Fountain9, Inc. (Fountain9) (Defendant) demurs to each cause of action in Plaintiff Rebeka Rodriguezs (Rodriguez) (Plaintiff) first amended complaint (FAC) on the grounds Plaintiffs purported cause of action for violation of Penal Code §638.51 fails to state a cause of action under settled principles of California law and on grounds that Plaintiffs consent to the acts complained of appears on the face of the complaint, where lack of consent is either an element of Plaintiffs cause of action or alternatively where consent is an affirmative defense. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §430.10(e).) Defendant also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs FAC. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-2.) Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiffs 6/25/24 request for judicial notice of (1) the Senate Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis of Apr. 12, 2010, for Senate Bill No. 1428 (2009-2010 Regular Session) (P-RJN, Exh. 1); and (2) Assembly Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis of June 21, 2010, for Senate Bill No. 1428 (2009-2010 Regular Session) (P-RJN, Exh. 2) is granted. Plaintiffs 6/25/24 request for judicial notice of (1) Minute Order filed on August 11, 2023, in Licea v. Jockey Intl, Inc. , No. 23STCV02906 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County Aug. 11, 2023) (Richardson, J.); (2) Minute Order filed on April 3, 2024, in Levings v. Choice Hotels Intl, Inc. , No. 23STCV28359, 2024 WL 1481189 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Apr. 3, 2024) (Nellon, J.); and (3) Minute Order filed on June 4, 2024, in Sanchez v. Weber-Stephen Products LLC , No. 24STCV00217 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. June 4, 2024) (Nellon, J.) is denied. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).) Defendants counsel failed to submit a meet and confer declaration in violation of under C.C.P. §430.41(a), despite noting in the notice of the demurrer that the declaration of Carver Farrow was attached. ( See Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2.) However, failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Therefore, the Court will consider Defendants demurrer. Background Plaintiff filed her initial complaint (Complaint) on February 22, 2024. Plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (FAC) on April 18, 2024, against Defendant alleging a single cause of action for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), Penal Code §638.51(a). Plaintiff alleges she is a consumer privacy advocate who works as a tester to ensure that companies abide by the privacy obligations imposed by California law. (FAC ¶4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant is a provider of inventory software to clients throughout California and in this County. (FAC ¶5.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant owns and operates www.fountain9.com (Website). (FAC ¶46.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant has incorporated the code of the PR/TT beacon into the code of its Website. (FAC ¶50.) Plaintiff alleges that when she visited the Website, the Website caused the PR/TT beacon to be installed on her and other users browsers. (FAC ¶50.) Plaintiff alleges upon installing the PR/TT on its Website, Defendant uses the PR/TT to collect the IP address of visitors to the Website, which is used by the PR/TT beacons developer to provide services to Defendant and its other clients, including targeted advertisements and website analytics. (FAC ¶52.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant and its partners use the PR/TT beacon to digitally fingerprint each visitor. (FAC ¶52.) Plaintiff alleges that at no time prior to the installation and use of the PR/TT beacon on Plaintiffs and other users browsers, or prior to the use of the PR/TT beacon, did Defendant procure Plaintiffs or other users consent for such conduct . (FAC ¶53.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant did not obtain a court order to install or use the PR/TT beacon. (FAC ¶53.) Plaintiff alleges the specific PR/TT spyware beacons detected on Defendants Website are identified in Exhibit 1. (FAC ¶54, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff alleges she has visited the Website within the applicable statute of limitations period via an Internet-connected computer. (FAC ¶59.) Plaintiff alleges that when she visited the Website, the Websites codeas programmed by Defendantcaused the PR/TT beacon to be installed on Plaintiffs browser. (FAC ¶60.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant and the PR/TT beacons developer then used the PR/TT beacon to collect Plaintiffs IP address. (FAC ¶60.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant and the PR/TT beacons developer used the information collected by the PR/TT beacon to analyze Website data and marketing campaigns, conduct targeted advertising, and ultimately boost Defendants and/or advertisers revenue. (FAC ¶61.) Plaintiff alleges she did not provide her prior consent to Defendant to install or use the PR/TT beacon on her browser. (FAC ¶62.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant did not obtain a court order before installing or using the PR/TT beacon. (FAC ¶63.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant knowingly and intentionally deployed PR/TT spyware to (1) decode and record the routing, addressing, and signaling information transmitted by Plaintiffs electronic device communication; and (2) capture the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication as part of its identity resolution efforts. (FAC ¶65.) Plaintiff alleges this conduct constitutes illegal installation of PR/TT spyware in violation of California law. (FAC ¶65.) Defendant filed the instant demurrer and accompanying motion to strike on May 15, 2024. [1] Plaintiff filed her oppositions on June 25, 2024. [2] Defendant filed its replies on July 1, 2024. A. Demurrer Summary of Demurrer Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs FAC on the grounds that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant has invaded her privacy by improperly acquiring what she claims is her personal, private information ( e.g. , her marital status) or caused her any concrete, injury-in-fact. (Demurrer, pg. 4.) Defendant argues the alleged beacon or cookie that Plaintiff claims was installed on her browser is not a pen register as defined by Penal Code § 638.51 . ( Id. ) Defendant argues Plaintiff also does not claim that the beacon or cookie was installed on her browser by Defendant, but rather, Plaintiff claims that it was installed by Defendants software developer/server. ( Id. ) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim CIPA, Penal Code §638.51(a) (1st COA) CIPA §638.51(a) provides: Except as provided in subdivision (b), a person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53. (Pen. Code §638.51(a).) Plaintiff alleges she brings this cause of action individually against Defendant. (FAC ¶69.) Plaintiff alleges the PR/TT beacon is a pen register because it is a device or process that capture[d] the routing, addressing, or signaling informationthe IP addressfrom the electronic communications transmitted by Plaintiffs computer or smartphone. (FAC ¶72.) Plaintiff alleges at all relevant times, Defendant knowingly installed the PR/TT beaconwhich is a pen registeron Plaintiffs browser and used the PR/TT beacon to collect Plaintiffs IP address, and track Plaintiff. (FAC ¶73.) Plaintiff alleges the PR/TT beacon does not collect the content of Plaintiffs electronic communications with the Website. (FAC ¶74.) Plaintiff alleges she did not provide Plaintiffs prior consent to Defendants installation or use of the PR/TT beacon. (FAC ¶75.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant did not obtain a court order to install or use the PR/TT beacon. (FAC ¶76.) Plaintiff alleges pursuant to §637.2 of the California Penal Code, Plaintiff has been injured by Defendants violation of §638.51(a) of the California Penal Code and seeks statutory damages of $5,000 for Defendants violation of §638.51(a). (FAC ¶76.) Plaintiff fails to allege a concrete injury-in-fact. The only allegedly personal information that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected was her IP address. (FAC ¶¶41, 77.) Plaintiffs only allegation regarding injury is that Plaintiff has been injured by Defendants violation of section 638.51 (a) of the California Penal Code. (FAC ¶77.) The alleged injury is abstract and hypothetical because it is solely premised on statutory damages under CIPA. ( TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021) 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2199 [ No concrete harm, no standing.]; id. at pgs. 2209-2210 [holding that plaintiffs who alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) lacked standing because their inaccurate credit files were not disclosed to any potential creditor and therefore plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact]; see Limon v. Circle K Stores, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 671, 703 -707 [finding no standing on sole allegation of statutory damages under FCRA].) Further, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is tracing Plaintiffs activities or is creating a digital fingerprint of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Defendants non-party software developer, not Defendant, packages and sells the information alleged in the FAC to third parties for advertising and marketing purposes. (FAC ¶¶52, 57-58.) Accordingly, Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. B. Motion to Strike In light of the Courts ruling on Defendants demurrer, Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Conclusion Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs FAC is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court [1] The Court notes a demurrer and a motion to strike must be filed as two separate documents and not combined as a single omnibus filing (however, the documents can be filed simultaneously for a hearing on the same day). Defendant filed its demurrer and motion to strike as a single omnibus filing, which is improper. [2] The Court notes Plaintiffs two filed oppositions are improperly noted on the instant docket as Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The filings are not labeled as oppositions to Defendants respective motions. Plaintiff is advised to look into this filing error and make appropriate changes before filing new documents with the Court.

Case Number: 21STCV35189 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 21STCV35189 MOTIONS : Motion for Order Authorizing and Requiring Release of Cell Phone Records MOVING PARTY: Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. (Defendants) move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for Defendant Mickey Vasquezs cell phone records served on non-party T-Mobile USA, Inc. Plaintiff Elia Rosa Mercado Leiva (Plaintiff) has filed a notice of non-opposition. No other opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿ A deponent who disobeys a deposition subpoena may be punished for contempt without the necessity of a prior order of the court directing compliance by the witness.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.240.)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record, the date objections are served, or the date specified for production, and be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Anneke J. Shepard , Defendants counsel, does not describe a meet and confer effort. DISCUSSION On June 5, 2024, Defendants personally served a subpoena on T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) requesting cell phone records for Mickey Vasquez (Vasquez). Plaintiff alleges Vasquez was using his cell phone when the subject motor vehicle accident took place. Defendants dispute this theory. Therefore, both parties appear to seek the cell phone records to support their various positions. However, Defendants filed this motion before T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply. Defendants appear to bring this motion because Plaintiff previously subpoenaed the records in August 2023. (Shepard Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) However, at the time, T-Mobile objected that it would not produce the records absent a Court order. It does not appear that Plaintiff attempted to move to compel the subpoena at that time. The instant motion was filed on June 5, 2024. However, the production date specified on their subpoena is June 25, 2024. (Shepard Decl. Exh. F.) Defendants bring this motion anticipating that T-Mobile will also request a Court order before producing the documents. No opposition and no reply has been filed for this motion. Therefore, Defendants produce no evidence that T-Mobile objected or failed to comply with the subpoena. Defendants however attach declarations from Mickey Vasquez and Tania Vasquez, owners of the subject cell phone number, giving authorization for releasing their cell phone records. ( Id. ¶¶ 56, Exh. D, E.) A nonparty must comply (or not) with the subpoena on the date specified for production. If a party is not satisfied with the nonparty's compliance, the party has 60 days in which to meet and confer with the nonparty. These meet and confer efforts do not affect the mandatory 60-day deadline. The meet and confer process is part of the 60-day period in which to file a motion; it does not extend it. If the party is still unsatisfied with the nonparty's compliance with any portion of the subpoena at the end of this period (because, for example, the nonparty still has not produced the requested documents), the party may file a motion to compel. ( Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange County (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 103435.) Therefore, since there is no evidence that T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply, the motion to compel compliance is conditionally denied, subject to Defendant providing updated information at the hearing. The Court further notes that counsels failure to meet and confer further provides the Court with no information regarding T-Mobiles position as to this current motion.

KUHN, ET AL. VS. DIGNITY HEALTH, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203118 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 21, 2024 to Plaintiffs Natalie Kuhn and Carey Kuhn and counsel Kroeker Law Offices for failure timely serve all Defendants in compliance with CRC 3.110(b). A Substitution of Attorney has since been filed for both Plaintiffs who are now represented by The Zinn Law Firm. While Plaintiffs did not file a written response to the Order to Show Cause, the declarations filed in support of the substitution of attorney provide evidence that previous counsel, Dennis Kroeker, is deceased. It appears to the Court that the delay in service is not attributable to Plaintiffs or current counsel. The Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED. The clerk is directed to serve Plaintiffs’ new counsel with today’s minutes.

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SCV-265779, Bright v. Sutter Bay Hospitals The parties are ordered to appear. As noted in the Court’s June 20 order, Plaintiff’s counsel should be prepared to explain to the Court their intention regarding the use at trial of any evidence of Dr. Wager’s March and April examination of Plaintiff, including without restriction Dr. Wager’s testimony or reports. Both parties should be prepared to discuss limitations on the length and scope of the proposed independent medical examination. 6. 24CV00705, Anthony v. Whitmire The plaintiff called and informed the Court of a medical issue. The hearing on the Demurrer is CONTINUED to October 2, 2024, at 3:00 p.m.