Document for TOMMY THOMPSON KATHY THOMPSON V RICHIE RAY

Case Number: 24CMCV00412 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: A 24CMCV00412 Veronica Childs v. Erica Ortiz, et al. Tuesday, July 30, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER TAKING OFF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT Defendants filed their demurrer to the unlawful detainer complaint on April 5, 2024. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on July 9, 2024. The amended pleading supersedes the original complaint rendering the demurrer moot. ( Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1035 ["An amended pleading supplants (i.e., entirely replaces) the prior pleading and it, standing alone, contains all the plaintiff's allegations and requests for relief.].) Accordingly, the hearing on demurrer to the original complaint is taken off calendar.

Tentative not yet posted, please check again.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 22, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT KEN CHOU NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS COMPLAINT is continued to August 8, 2024 for the moving party to provide a courtesy copy of the moving papers no later than July 23, 2024 with a cover letter reflecting new hearing date. (Opposition and reply received). =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

CV-23-003803 – TELO, SAJMIR vs CABRAL, LEVI – Defendants’ Motion to Compel Appearance and Testimony at Deposition and Production of Documents – DENIED, in part; HEARING REQUIRED. Defendants have failed to establish the Court’s authority to order disclosure of the requested records and testimony pursuant to Plaintiff’s property (the Bluff Creek property), as the provisions of Rev. & Tax Code § 408(e)(3) only authorize the Court to issue such an order in the context of a proceeding by a taxpayer challenging the assessment.  Therefore, the motion is DENIED as to the request concerning the Bluff Creek property. With regard to Defendant’s property (the Gomes Road property), it appears that the County Assessor is amenable to disclosure of the requested information, but it is unclear whether all responsive materials have been produced or whether the Assessor’s office has any remaining objections to be resolved in that regard. In addition, it is unclear whether the Assessor opposes the request for testimony relative to the Gomes Road property.  Therefore, counsel shall appear at the hearing to discuss these issues. THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM IS DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to the court before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Upon receipt, the court will schedule a Zoom hearing.

TENTATIVE RULING NOTICE Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department and Case Number must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. To attend the remote hearing with Judge Kronlund in Dept. 10-D: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # and Pin # as follows: Bridge # 6940 Pin # 3782 Tentative Ruling Court on its own motion continues this matter to 8/27/2024, 9:00 a.m., Dept. 10-D. Court will post a tentative ruling the day prior, and Counsel must request argument according to the Court's Tentative Ruling procedures set forth in the Court's Local Rules, if argument is desired. The Court determines that there was not a sufficient meet and confer process, in that it was cut short too early. The Court expects the parties to engage in a robust, good-faith, reasonable meet and confer. See Obregon v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 CA4th 424. The Court believes the Defense demand for a written itemization or letter outlining the Plaintiff's complaints about the Defense discovery responses is reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiff must provide such written letter or outline of the discovery disputes to the Defense, as a preliminary matter. Then, this Court is ordering Counsel to meet in person, or via telephone or Zoom to conduct further meet and confer as set forth above. However, the Court notes that discovery requests to produce documents or in special interrogators may not contain sub-parts. See the Code. Also, Supplemental Response to RFPD No.8 appears on its face, to be only a partial response; it appears some part of the answer was just cut off or left out inadvertently. This RFPD should be completely answered with responsive documents produced. Barbara A Kronlund

Marshal v. Skyline PSC1901112 Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs Development Co LLC Tentative Ruling: This is a derivative action brought by certain homeowners in a planned community located in Palm Springs, California. On February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs Gemma Marshall, Lynn Leskera, Mark Matthews, Lori Matthews, Sandy Kaufman 4, and Dave Davidson, derivatively on behalf of Pinnacle Owners Association, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their original “Member Derivative Complaint” against Defendant Skyline Development Co. LLC (“Skyline”) for: (1) breach of governing documents and (2) breach of fiduciary duty. After multiple demurrers and motions, on January 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants Skyline Development Co., LLC, Jennifer Roberts, and David Gilbert (together 3 That motion was originally scheduled to be heard on July 10, 2024, but pursuant to an ex parte request by Plaintiff the matter was continued and is set to be heard on September 18, 2024. 4 At some point, Lawrence Lichter was substituted in as trustee of the Sanford Kaufman Living Trust. “Defendants”). The TAC asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of governing documents and violation of the Davis-Stirling Act (I); (2) breach of governing documents and violation of the Davis- Stirling Act (II); (3) breach of fiduciary duty of board director; (4) breach of fiduciary duty of controlling shareholder; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty (supplemental). Thereafter, a demurrer to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was sustained. On April 10, 2024, the parties attended a Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) with Judge Tam Nomoto Schumann (Ret.). At the MSC, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was conditioned on the signing of a formal written agreement, pursuant to which, among other things, the parties would be responsible for their own costs. Following the MSC, the parties exchanged drafts of a written agreement, but due to the introduction of additional terms, the settlement fell apart. On April 15, 2024, Lichter filed a request for dismissal of his claims against Defendants, and the dismissal was entered the same day. On April 24, 2024, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs seeking the recovery of $14,536.20. *** Lichter moves to strike the costs sought by Defendants. He argues that the parties reached a settlement agreement at the MSC, under which the parties would bear their own fees and costs. He relied on this agreement in dismissing his claims, and Defendants are acting in bad faith by seeking to recover costs. He also argues that Plaintiffs are the ones who realized their litigation goals in the settlement, so they should be deemed the prevailing party. Finally, he argues that costs should not be awarded against him because it is a derivative action and his claims are the same as those brought by the other Plaintiffs. In opposition, Defendants argue that at the MSC (which Lichter did not attend in violation of a court order 5), the parties reached a conditional settlement that would become final once formalized in writing. They argue that the written agreement never happened, so there is no settlement. Despite this, Lichter voluntarily dismissed his complaint as to all Defendants, making them the prevailing party. Finally, they argue that Lichter does not dispute the appropriateness of any of the costs sought, so the motion should be denied entirely. In reply, Lichter argues that Defendants are not the prevailing parties and it would be inequitable to award costs against him. Analysis Under C.C.P. §1032(b), unless otherwise provided, “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” C.C.P. §1032(a)(4) defines prevailing party as: (1) party with a net monetary recovery; (2) a defendant who is dismissed; (3) a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and (4) a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Ibid.) “If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Ibid.) The court has no discretion in awarding fees if the moving party falls into one of the four categories set forth in C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4). (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; see also, Vons Cos., Inc. v. Lyle Parks Jr., Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 823, 832 [“absent statutory authority, ‘the court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party’”][citation omitted].) Additionally, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a complaint, the defendant is the prevailing party. (Santisas 5 Lichter was, however, represented by counsel at the MSC. v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) “This is true … regardless of whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.” (Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.) In the present case, Lichter dismissed the action against Defendants. While he claims the parties agreed that each party would bear their own costs, any such agreement was never formalized. 6 Accordingly, Defendants are the prevailing parties as to Lichter and are entitled to their costs. Defendants seek to recover costs totaling $14,536.20. C.C.P. § 1033.5(a) contains a list of items specifically allowed as recoverable costs, and § 1033.5(b) contains a list of items that “are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law.” An item neither specifically allowable under subdivision (a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may be allowed or denied in the discretion of the court if certain requirements are satisfied. (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(4).) In particular, the item “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “shall be reasonable in amount.” (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(2) and (3).) Objection to any item or items on the cost memorandum may be made by filing and serving a noticed motion to tax cost. (C.C.P. § 1034; CRC 3.1700 (b)(1).) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) “A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety,” and the opposing party has the burden to demonstrate that they are not proper. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) A verified memorandum does not require copies of bills, invoices or other documentation to be attached. (Id. at 1267.) If the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 774.) Here, Defendants filed a verified memorandum of costs. The costs sought (for filing and motion fees, deposition costs, service of process, court reporter fees, and a discovery referee) appear to be proper charges, and Lichter has not challenged any specific cost. Accordingly, Defendants are awarded costs totaling $14,536.20. Ruling: Deny the motion. Award costs to Defendants in the amount of $14,536.20 to be paid by Lichter. 6 If Lichter contends the dismissal was erroneously filed, he can seek to vacate the dismissal.

MSC19-02639 CASE NAME: VEGA VS GAGNI HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: BAY AREA ESCROW DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S S.A.C FILED BY BAY AREA ESCROW SERVICES FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Introduction Before the Court is Defendant Bay Area Escrow Services (“Bay Area Escrow”)’ Demurrer. The Demurrer relates to Plaintiff Roman Vega (“Vega”)’s Complaint for five contract and fraud related causes of action. For the following reasons, the Demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff Roman Vega shall have until August 8, 2024 to amend. Meet and Confer Requirement On February 7, 2024, Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred over the telephone regarding Defendant’s intent to file a demurrer and Defendant’s counsel sent an email to SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Plaintiff’s counsel with a summary of their conversation. (Rood Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Mr. Rood requested more time to consider the issues and on February 20, 2024, Mr. Rood sent an email to Defendant’s counsel stating that he expects Defendant to file a demurrer. (Rood Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Thus, Defendant’s meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. The Second Amended Complaint Defendant Joly Gagni is a real estate investor who purchased 1341 Rosemary Lane in Concord (the Property) with the intent to remodel and sell it. (SAC ¶ 2.) Title to the Property was taken in the name of Sierra Capital Investments, LLC, which was owned and operated by Gagni. (¶ 2.) Gagni added plaintiff Roman Vega as an LLC member for the purchase of the Property and solicited funds from Vega for the down payment. (¶¶ 2-3.) Vega provided $80,000 as initial funds for the purchase of the Property. (¶ 4.) The parties agreed that Vega would be reimbursed this amount from the net proceeds of the sale of the Property, and the rest of the proceeds would be split evenly between them. (¶ 4.) Under the agreement, Gagni was required to supervise and fund the remodeling of the Property, which she failed to do. (¶ 5.) Vega was required to invest additional funds for the remodeling. (¶ 5.) As the property was being offered for sale, Gagni attempted to take all the net proceeds for herself. (¶ 6.) In response, Vega filed this action and recorded a lis pendens. (¶ 6.) The parties agreed the lis pendens would be withdrawn, allowing for the Property to be sold, while the sale proceeds remained in an escrow opened with Bay Area Escrow. (¶ 6.) Net proceeds in the amount of $76,579.04 were to be retained by Bay Area Escrow, pending a written agreement of the parties or a judgment. (¶ 6.) Vega alleges that Bay Area Escrow was required to retain the sale proceeds in escrow and could not act on any request to disburse the funds unless all parties agreed in writing. Vega alleges Bay Area Escrow breached its contract with the parties and committed negligence when it allowed Gagni to unilaterally withdraw the funds from escrow. (¶ 7.) Vega filed the original complaint naming Gagni and Sierra Capital Investments on December 18, 2019. Vega executed the subject escrow instructions on December 20, 2019. Vega amended his complaint to name Bay Area Escrow on August 15, 2023. The parties stipulated to the filing of the second amended complaint (SAC). Bay Area Escrow then filed this demurrer to SAC claiming that Vega’s causes of action for negligence and breach of contract are barred by a one-year limitations period in the escrow instructions. Vega filed a notice of non-opposition to the demurrer and requesting leave to amend. Bay Area Escrow filed a reply in which it objected to Vega’s request to amend, claiming Vega had not met his burden to show the defect in the statute of limitations could be cured by amendment. Legal Standard “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550), but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe at 551, fn. 5.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 242, 247.) Analysis The escrow instructions attached to the SAC provide for a one-year contractual limitations period from the close of escrow. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: the instructions contained in these general provisions and any supplemental instructions shall be construed and interpreted according to California law. NO ACTION SHALL LIE AGAINST ESCROW HOLDER FOR ANY CLAIMS, LOSSES, LIABILITY OR ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION OF ANY KIND OR NATURE WHATSOEVER, HOWEVER CAUSED OR OCCURRED IN THIS ESCROW TRANSACTION OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF THIS ESCROW TRANSACTION, UNLESS BROUGHT WITHIN TWELVE 12 MONTHS AFTER THE CLOSE OF ESCROW OR ANY CANCELLATION OR TERMINATION OF ESCROW FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER. (SAC Ex. D, ¶ 13.) Bay Area Escrow argues the escrow closed no later than June 8, 2021 because this is the date the new owners of the Property recorded their deed. As Vega did not file this lawsuit until August 15, 2023, Bay Area Escrow claims that all causes of action in the complaint are time-barred. "A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be [] raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred." (Guardian N. Bay, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4th 963.) Here, no defect in the statute of limitations appears on the face of the SAC or any judicially noticeable matter. Bay Area Escrow provides a Lexis Nexis printout purporting to show that escrow closed by June 8, 2021, which is the date the new owners of the Property recorded their deed. (See Def.’s RJN, Exh. 1.) This document is extrinsic to the SAC and not the proper subject of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d). As a result, the Court might have found that Bay Area Escrow was limited to making its objection by answer under CCP section 430.30(b). However, Vega has specifically requested leave to amend the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 SAC to address the issues raised in the demurrer. While Vega did not meet their burden by failing to show how the defects in the SAC can be cured (Reply at p. 2: 19-25), “[L]iberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1227.) When the Complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or there is a reasonable possibility that amendment could cure the defect, it is an abuse of discretion for a judge to deny leave to amend. (JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Ward (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 678, 684.) If Vega has not had an opportunity to amend the Complaint in response Demurrer, leave to amend should be liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the Complaint shows on its face that it cannot be amended. (City of Stockton v Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. App. 4th 730, 747; Align Technol. Inc. v Tran (2009) 27 Cal. App. 4th 197, 216.) Accordingly, Vega’s request to amend is granted.

CV-22-005039 – COUNTY OF STANISLAUS vs SHAIBI, YEHIA AHMED QASSEM – Plaintiff’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions and Monetary Sanctions Against Defendants Yehia Ahmed Qassem Shaibi, Trustee, and Fatima Kassim, Trustee, and/or their Counsel for Failure to Comply with Court Orders – MOOT, as settled by the parties. THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM MAY BE DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to civil.tentatives@stanct.org before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Please refer to the Stanislaus Superior Court website for call-in instructions for the hearing. If VCourt is unavailable the website will post Zoom Meeting credentials for Dept. 24. The hearing will proceed via Zoom if VCourt is still unavailable.