Pamela Oliver Vs. Fort Amarillo Rv Resort, Llc

23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Patrick McKinney The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Jeffrey Ochoa on 06/21/2024 is Granted in Part. Plaintiff Jeffrey Ochoa’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Compel defendant Kaiser Gypsum Company’s (“Defendant”) Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (“FROG”) is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART and CONTINUED IN PART, as set forth below. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement refers to FROG that contain apparently defined terms, and the Separate Statement does not contain the defined terms as propounded. Thus, the Moving Separate Statement is not full and complete in and of itself, and the Court could properly deny the Motion to Compel in its entirety on this grounds. Apparently, Plaintiff has taken umbrage with Defendant’s objection that the term “INCIDENT” is vague, ambiguous and overbroad. In asbestos torts litigation, the basic allegations of the Complaint are typically not difficult to understand although complaints rarely if ever allege a particular “incident”. Since the originally propounded definition of “INCIDENT” is not included in the moving Separate Statement, the Court cannot rule on the validity of the initial objections. Plaintiff asserts that he has subsequently propounded a more easy-to-understand definition of INCIDENT, which the Court observes assumes numerous facts not typically in evidence at the discovery stage. Thus, to clarify things with respect to any FROG for which the Court orders further responses below, the Court proposes the following definition for the term INCIDENT: “Plaintiff’s alleged exposures to allegedly asbestos-containing or asbestos-contaminated products, including talc, that form the basis for Plaintiff’s claims in this action.” It is unlikely that Defendant would have any knowledge regarding any other defendant’s allegedly asbestos-containing products or Plaintiff’s alleged exposures thereto. However, it is at least possible that Defendant could have, for example, inspected the automotive service station, if it still exists, where Plaintiff alleges he once worked and was exposed to asbestos-containing dust from automotive friction products. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for a Further Response to FROG No. 4.1, although for this FROG the Court further limits the term INCIDENT to Plaintiff’s alleged exposures to Defendant’s asbestos-containing products and not those of third parties. A further Response to FROG No. 4.1 must either list all insurers and insurance policies for the periods during which Plaintiff alleges he was exposed to Defendant’s allegedly asbestos-containing or contaminated products; or to the extent that the information is contained in documents already in Plaintiff’s SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 possession or equally available to Plaintiff, the Response must identify the specific documents in which Plaintiff may identify all insurers and insurance policies. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Further Response to FROG No. 4.2. Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion does not list FROG No. 4.2 as a request for which Plaintiff seeks to compel a further Response. Therefore, Plaintiff may not receive a further Response to FROG No. 4.2. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Further Responses to each of FROG Nos. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1 and 13.2. As the Court reads Defendant’s Responses, they clearly state that, notwithstanding Defendant’s objections, Defendant does not have any responsive information or documents. Nevertheless, to the extent Defendant does have any responsive documents, for example, reports, witness statements, etc., which Defendant asserts are subject to a legitimate attorney-client or attorney work product privilege, the Court ORDERS Defendant to serve Plaintiff with a privilege log containing sufficient factual information for Plaintiff to evaluate the merits of the claim of privilege no later than twenty (20) days after entry of the final Order on this Motion to Compel. (See CCP § 2031.240(c).) With respect to Plaintiff’s Request for a Further Response to FROG No. 15.1, the Court CONTINUES the hearing to Thursday, 8/1/2024 at 3:00 p.m. in Dept. 18 so that Plaintiff and Defendant may submit Separate Statements regarding FROG No. 15.1 and Defendant’s initial Response thereto in a form more conducive for the Court’s review. Specifically, the moving Separate Statement contains Defendant’s long, initial Response to No. 15.1 in a narrow column running more than 110 pages and more than 140 pages in Defendant’s Responsive Separate Statement. It is unduly burdensome for the Court to review such a long Response presented in this manner. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a revised Separate Statement as to FROG No. 15.1 no later than 12:00 noon on Monday, 7/22/2024 and to provide Defendant with a Word or other word processing format copy of the revised Separate Statement by the same deadline. Defendant shall file and serve a Revised Responsive Separate Statement no later than 12:00 noon on Monday, 7/29/2024. The parties shall deliver to the Dept. 18 drop box paper courtesy copies of the revised papers on the dates of filing, or the Court will not consider the revised Separate Statements. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for a Further Response to FROG No. 16.1. The Court OVERRULES all of Defendant’s objections except as to legitimate privileges, in which case the Court ORDERS Defendant to provide an appropriate privilege log as set forth above. Defendant’s non-privilege objections lack merit. Further, to the extent that Defendant contends that third parties, other than Plaintiff himself or the named defendants to this action, contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries, Defendant’s Further Response must specifically identify those third parties and provide the requested information or admit that Defendant cannot identify any such third parties. The Court ORDERS Defendant to serve Plaintiff with Verified Further Responses to the extent SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV047447: OCHOA vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Jeffrey Ochoa (Plaintiff) in Department 18 ordered above no later than twenty (20) days after the date on which the final Order on this Motion enters. The Court DENIES an award of monetary sanctions to any party in any amount. The Court was unable to locate paper courtesy copies of Defendant’s Opposition papers. (See Local Rule 3.30(c).) Therefore, the Court has not considered any portion of the 800+ page Woo Declaration. The Court requests that in the future parties filing discovery motions for which a Separate Statement is required, that the moving Separate Statement not be presented in the narrow column format used in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement. Plaintiff’s and thus also Defendant’s Responsive Separate Statement are difficult to read expeditiously in the current format, particularly where the Court has been unable to locate paper courtesy copies of Defendant’s Opposition papers. CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERS Notify the Court and all other parties no later than 4:00 pm the day before the scheduled hearing and identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal - https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select Search 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select Click to Contest this Ruling 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select Proceed.

VOGES VS. HOUSER Case Number: 22CV-0200010 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. At the last hearing on June 10, 2024, the Court was informed that Plaintiff was waiting on the final Medi-Cal lien. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

C23-02161 CASE NAME: VALERIE MCDUFFIE VS. AHMAD FAIZI *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FILED BY VALERIE MCDUFFIE FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Hearing required.

Re: Michelle Ritchie v. Yrulegui & Roberts Superior Court Case No. 22CECG02057 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: By Defendants for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Summary Adjudication Oral Argument, if timely requested, will be heard on Thursday, July 18, 2024 at 3:30 PM in Department 502. Tentative Ruling: To grant summary judgment in favor of defendants Joseph Yrulegui and Yrulegui & Roberts. Defendants are directed to submit to this court, within five days of service of the minute order, a proposed judgment consistent with the court’s summary judgment order. Explanation: Plaintiff was employed as an attorney by the law firm Yrulegui & Roberts. Plaintiff was satisfied with her employment until the night of December 10, 2021, when the firm held a Christmas party. Plaintiff and seven or so other employees ended the night at a strip club. Because plaintiff was uncomfortable with the strip club atmosphere, and the conduct of partner Joseph Yrulegui, plaintiff quit her job and then filed suit, asserting the following causes of action 1. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX AND/OR GENDER; 2. HARASSMENT ON THE BASIS OF SEX AND/OR GENDER; 3. FAILURE TO PREVENT, INVESTIGATE, AND REMEDY DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, OR RETALIATION; 4. AIDING, ABETTING, INCITING, COMPELLING, OR COERCING ACTS FORBIDDEN BY FEHA; 5. RETALIATION FOR OPPOSING PRACTICES FORBIDDEN BY FEHA; 6. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; 7. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. The evidence shows that plaintiff drank alcohol throughout the night and voluntarily, of her own free will and choice, went to the strip club and participated in the activities there. Plaintiff has filed no response or opposition to the motion, which the court intends to grant for the reasons stated in the moving papers, as follows. The first cause of action for gender discrimination fails because plaintiff did not suffer any adverse employment action, and the circumstances suggest no discriminatory motive. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "the plaintiff must provide that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought or was performing competently in the position he or she held; (3) she suffered an adverse action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstances suggest discriminatory motive." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) Plaintiff quit her employment with defendants, and was not terminated. “In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove … that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251.) Plaintiff’s contention that she was constructively discharged is not supported by the evidence. Plaintiff’s resignation was based on a single incident that plaintiff participated in by her own choice. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that there was any discriminatory or gender-based motive behind any actions that led to plaintiff’s resignation. The second cause of action is for sexual harassment. Plaintiff "must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex." (McCoy v. Pac. Mar. Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 283, 293.) Plaintiff testified that prior to the 2021 Christmas party, she had never gone to anyone at Yrulegui & Roberts to complain about Joseph Yrulegui and that she had no complaints about the way he treated her when she was working with him. (UMF 42.) Plaintiff really loved her job. (UMF 9.) Plaintiff even declined other job opportunities because “she had no complaints with the firm,” “liked the people [she] was working with,” “had a good workload,” and “was just happy to be there.” (UMF 6.) On the day of the Christmas Party, plaintiff voluntarily went to City Lights, which was strictly a social function. (UMF 43.) Mr. Yrulegui’s conduct at City Lights was not directed at plaintiff, who chose to be at the venue and participate in the strip club activities. The third cause of action for failure to prevent, investigate, and remedy discrimination, harassment, or retaliation fails because the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff was not subjected to harassment, discrimination, or retaliation. To prevail on this claim plaintiff must establish that (1) she was subjected to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (2) the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; and (3) the defendant's failure caused the plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss, or harm. (Finder v. Employment Development Department (E.D. Cal. 2017) 227 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1143.) If plaintiff has no claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, there is no claim for failure to prevent same. (See Featherszone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166; Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1314.) For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff is unable to show that she was subjected to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation by defendants, rendering the failure to prevent cause of action without merit. The fourth cause of action is for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing acts in violation of FEHA. (See Gov. Code, §12940, subd. (i).) Again, the cause of action requires that there first be discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation, which is not found here. Thus, there are no viable FEHA claims for Yrulegui & Roberts to have had knowledge about. The fifth cause of action alleges retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by FEHA. Plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer subjected plaintiff to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Here, plaintiff engaged in protected activity of making a report of what occurred at the strip club, but that report was made after plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against her by interfering with potential employment opportunities in the Fresno area. Regarding the one instance of interference alleged in the Complaint (see paragraph 43), the moving papers show that the firm could not hire plaintiff due to a conflict of interest because it was representing defendants. Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that this circumstance precluded the firm from hiring plaintiff. (See UMF 54-57.) There is no viable claim for retaliation. The sixth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff must establish the following elements, “(1) outrageous conduct by defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress." (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1376.) “[I]t is generally held that there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances." (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128.) Plaintiff alleges that “intentional infliction of emotional distress occurred when PLAINTIFF was provided excessive alcoholic drinks by the FIRM, was encouraged to engage with the strippers, defendant JOSEPH YRULEGUI encouraged employees to place money in the strippers’ lingerie while they were topless, and PLAINTIFF was required to submit to a lap dance with a stripper which was paid for by the FIRM.” (Complaint ¶ 87.) However, the undisputed material facts show that plaintiff voluntarily chose to consume alcoholic beverages throughout the night at each venue, where non-alcoholic beverages were available. (UMF 58-60.) When provided with money for the lap dance, plaintiff did not decline the lap dance, nor did she indicate that this was something she did not want to do. (UMF 29.) No one teased or said anything to plaintiff about waving off the lap dancer. (UMF 61.) Furthermore, plaintiff was not the only individual that was provided money for a lap dance – Joseph Yrulegui paid for two of a male coworker's lap dances. (UMF 62.) There was no pressure for plaintiff to stay at the strip club; she could have left at any time. The court finds there was no outrageous conduct on the part of defendants. The seventh cause of action is for negligent infliction of emotional distress. “The negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence.” (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) “The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply." (Levy v. Only Cremationsfor Pets, Inc. (2007) 57 Cal.App.5th 2013, 217.) Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to negligence. “To warrant the application of the doctrine (of assumption of risk) the evidence must show that the victim appreciated specific danger involved. He does not assume any risk he does not know or appreciate. ... Stated another way, before the doctrine is applicable, the victim must have not only general knowledge of a danger, but must have knowledge of the particular danger, that is, knowledge of the magnitude of the risk involved.” (Ewing v. CloverleafBowl (1978) 20 Cal.3d 389, 406.) The evidence shows that plaintiff understood and appreciated the risks of consuming alcohol and going to a strip club. Plaintiff had experience drinking previous to the Christmas party, and getting intoxicated with coworkers. (UMF 63, 64.) Yet plaintiff chose to order and drink alcoholic beverages throughout the night despite non- alcoholic beverages being available to her. (UMF 14, 19, 26.) Though this was plaintiff’s first time going to a strip club, plaintiff had a general understanding of what a stip club was and what went on there. (UMF 23, 24, 43.) Plaintiff knew that she could have left City Lights like two of her coworkers, but chose to stay until she noticed her father watching her from the bar area. (UMF 33.) Whatever risks were involved; they were assumed knowingly by plaintiff. The court finds that defendants have met their burden as the moving parties of showing that required elements of each cause of action cannot be established. Plaintiff has not met her burden, having failed to file any response to the motion. Accordingly, the court intends to grant the motion. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/15/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 18, 2024 line 7. PLAINTIFF FELIX WAI , AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR JOHN E. WAI, AN INDIVIDUAL Motion To Compel Disco And For Monetary Sanctions is DENIED, moot. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

RG21108692: Andrews VS Cyprus Amax Minerals Company 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OWL COMPANIES as Successor-In-Interest to OWL CONSTRUCTORS (Defendant) in Department 18 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Patrick McKinney The Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OWL COMPANIES as Successor-In- Interest to OWL CONSTRUCTORS (Defendant) scheduled for 04/09/2024 is continued to 07/30/2024 at 01:30 PM in Department 18 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . The Court CONTINUES the hearing on defendant Owl Companies' dispositive Motion to Tuesday, 7/30/2024 at 1:30 p.m. in Dept. 18. The Court will issue a Tentative Ruling in accordance with the continued 7/30/2024 hearing date.

21CV02434 KITCHEN, IVANELL ET AL V. WINDSOR CHICO CREEK CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC ET AL EVENT: Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents & Special Interrogatories As to the Special Interrogatories, Defendants state that “[o]n June 20, 2024, Defendant served its Verified Supplemental Response to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, set 7.” [See, Defendants’ Opposition at Pg. 2, Lines 3-5.] This is confirmed by Plaintiffs in the Reply. [See, Reply at Pg. 1, Lines 25-26.] As such, the Motion as to Special Interrogatories, Set 7, is moot is denied on that basis. As to Requests for Production of Documents, a foundational issue is raised by Plaintiffs that the responses to the Requests for Production, Set 7, are unverified. Plaintiffs argue correctly that the failure to provide verified responses is tantamount to no response at all, and Defendant has waived their objections. See, e.g., Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914; Appleton v. Super. Ct. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. As such, the Motion is granted on that basis as to the Requests for Production, Set 7. As to the specific Requests at issue, the Court further finds as follows: Request No. 82: Defendant indicates that it has obtained the requested audit logs pursuant to Plaintiffs’ RFP No. 82, “and will produce the audit logs with the supplemental responses to Plaintiffs’ request for production set 7, shortly.” As such, the Motion is deemed unopposed is granted as to Request No. 82. The Court does confirm that the relevant time period for the production of responsive documents for Request No. 82 is 6 months before and 6 months after the admission of Mrs. Kitchen. 2|Page Request Nos. 85-92: Defendant suggests that it has in its possession documents responsive to these requests and objects only on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to agree to a protective order. This is not a proper objection and absent a motion before the Court for such an order, the documents are to be produced. The Motion is granted as to Request Nos. 85-92. Request Nos. 94-96: Defendant indicates that the parties met and conferred, and following negotiations reached an agreeable search term list and “will run the agreed- upon search, sans “reimburse!”, and product the results of the search with the supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s request for production set 7, shortly.” As such, the Motion is deemed unopposed is granted as to Request Nos. 94-96. Request No. 98: Defendant indicates that it has obtained the requested Key Factor Reports and will produce them “with the supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s request for production set 7, shortly.” As such, the Motion is deemed unopposed is granted as to Request No. 98. Request Nos. 99-101: Defendant states that it has performed a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry to comply with the request for facility assessments but to date has not yet located the requested documents and will continue its diligent search and provide a further update in its supplemental responses. If there are no documents responsive to these Requests, Defendant shall provide Code compliant responses so indicating. Request Nos. 105-107: Defendant states that it has performed a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry to comply with these requests but is unable to comply because the document is no longer in the possession, custody, or control of Defendant, other than the photo of page one of the waiver that was produced to Plaintiff in Defendants’ initial response. Pursuant to CCP §2031.230, Defendant believes that the California Department of Public Health has possession, custody, or control of the entire staffing waiver requested by Plaintiffs. Defendant shall provide Code compliant responses so indicating. Defendant is ordered to provide further verified responses to Request for Production, Set 7, including production of all responsive documents without objection, within 20 days’ notice of this order. Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks.

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.