Alexandria Cordova Vs Dorian Jose Vega,Karen Arlene Salazar Hernandez, And Jorge J. Garcia Carrasco

Case Number: 22STCV38178 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-18-24 a/f 8-26-24 Case: 2STCV38178 (related to 23STCV13772) Trial Date: 8-19-24 c/f 6-17-24 PITCHESS MOTION MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Richard Tipping, et al. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, City of Los Angeles, et al. RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for LAPD records SUMMARY OF ACTION Houston Tipping, son of Shirley Huffman and Richard Tipping, was a Los Angeles Police Department officer, suffered fatal head injury when a fellow officer conducted an exercise causing blunt force trauma to the head and neck of Officer Tipping during a training exercise purportedly to simulate a fall from a certain height. The training program was part of the Arrest and Control Bicycle Training Program. Officer Tipping was not provided any protective gear normally associated with such a training program, and other padding was not properly placed. Plaintiffs allege that at the time of the fatal injury, Officer Tipping was investigating a fellow officer allegedly responsible for sexually assaulting a person, thereby providing motivation to an officer to cause harm to Officer Tipping. On December 7, 2022, Shirley Huffman, Houston Tipping, and the Estate of Houston Tipping, filed a complaint for Battery, Whistleblower Retaliation, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles and Richard Tipping (nominal defendant). On June 14, 2023, Richard Tipping and the Estate of Houston Tipping filed a complaint for Assault, Battery, Violation of Civil Code section 52.1, Violation of Civil Rights 42 USC 1983, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles, and David Cuellar. On March 6, 2024, the court entered the stipulation of the parties to consolidate the actions. RULING : Denied in Part/Granted in Part. Plaintiffs move for the following records from the City of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD): 1. All WRITINGS related to the investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Administrative Bureau into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. The term WRITINGS as used throughout this motion has the meaning of writing as defined in California Evidence Code § 250 (i.e., tapes, recordings, transcripts of same, etc. are part of this request). 2. With respect to the LAPD Administrative Bureau investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, all WRITINGS related to the video/audio interview of Officer David Cueller conducted by the Administrative Bureau in connection with the investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, together with the handwritten notes taken concurrently by the interviewing officers during the interview. This interview is approximately one (1) hour in length. The Interview occurred in or around 2022. 3. All documents and recordings related to the investigation conducted by LAPD Internal Affairs into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. 4. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Officers Tipping and Ramos. 5. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Detective Stefani Valdes. This would include but is not limited to Reference No. 211710752. 6. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer David Cuellar. 7. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Marc Ferris. 8. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Robert Villegas. 9. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Mark Ferris personnel records concerning his voluntary demotion from Police Officer III to Police Officer II in or around November 2022. 10. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Robert Villegas personnel records concerning his retirement from the LAPD in or around 2022. 11. Produce all Body Worn Camera (BWC) and Body Worn Video (BWV) footage, videos, audio and photos showing L.K., any LAPD officer's interaction with L.K., and/or depicting her home at any point in the past five years, including without limitation: a. The BWC footage taken by Officer Tipping and/or his partner Officer Ramos at the Hospital on or about July 16, 2021, in connection with Incident No. 210716004284, Reference No. 211710752; b. The BWC footage taken by any Detectives or other Officers interviewing LK at any time. 12. All recorded interviews of L.K. by any LAPD officers in the last ten years, including without limitation concerning allegations of assault, sexual assault, and/or rape. Plaintiffs bring a Pitchess motion but also qualifies their request with a disclaimer that categories 4, 5, 11, and 12 are actually not within the purview of a Pitchess motion in that said records are not part of any personnel file. Plaintiffs move for said non-personnel records in regards to officers Marc Ferris and Robert Villegas based on a claim that said officers were likely going to be identified in a sexual assault report being compiled by Houston Tipping, and the officers sought to silence Tipping. City of Los Angeles in opposition cites to limitations in Pitchess motions in discovery and the impropriety of the subject Pitchess motion for admittedly non-personnel related material. City of Los Angeles also challenges categories 1-3 as not constituting personnel records or a complaint within the purview of the motion. Plaintiffs in reply maintains the motion establishes good cause for production of the records, and the sought after records are proper subject matter for a Pitchess motion. The court considers the standard as to all categories. The Pitchess statutes provide for two categories of confidential records: (1) personnel records, and (2) records of citizen complaints about individual officers, and reports or findings relating to investigation of such complaints. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 285.) A party seeking discovery of a peace officer's personnel records must follow a two-step process. (Citation.) First, the party must file a written motion describing the type of records sought, supported by [a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery. . ., setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. [Evid. Code § 1043(b)(3).] This initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard [ ]. (Citation.) Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (Citations.) [A] declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the materiality component of that section. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 10851086.) City of Los Angeles also emphasizes the lack of applicability on categories 1-5, and 11-12, under the guise of a Pitchess motion, and counters Plaintiffs should have brought a motion to compel. Plaintiffs represent in discovery that City of Los Angeles objected to production on grounds of a required Pitchess motion and now moves the argument saying proper procedure was a motion to compel under the discovery statutes. Penal Code section 832.7 states in part: (b)(1) Notwithstanding ... the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by a state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection ... (A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of any of the following: (i) An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer. (ii) An incident involving the use of force against a person by a peace officer or custodial officer that resulted in death or in great bodily injury. (iii) A sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges unreasonable or excessive force. (iv) A sustained finding that an officer failed to intervene against another officer using force that is clearly unreasonable or excessive. (B)(i) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public. (ii) As used in this subparagraph, sexual assault means the commission or attempted initiation of a sexual act with a member of the public by means of force, threat, coercion, extortion, offer of leniency or other official favor, or under the color of authority. For purposes of this definition, the propositioning for or commission of any sexual act while on duty is considered a sexual assault. (iii) As used in this subparagraph, member of the public means any person not employed by the officer's employing agency and includes any participant in a cadet, explorer, or other youth program affiliated with the agency. (C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency involving dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence, or perjury. (D) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status. ... (Pen. Code, § 832.7.) (a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records , as follows: (1) In a civil action, the written notice shall be given at the times prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ... (b) The motion shall include all of the following: (1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records or information sought. (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. (c) Upon receipt of a notice served pursuant to subdivision (a), the governmental agency shall immediately notify the individual whose records are sought. (d) No hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records. (Evid. Code, § 1043) The court agrees with Plaintiffs that to the extent the Pitchess statute encompasses records arising from a citizen complaint, the Pitchess procedures and protections apply. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 765; Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) The statutes however also specifically define the categories of applicable records. Plaintiffs concede the Pitchess categories 4, 5, 11 and 12 remain outside the scope of discovery guidelines (motion, 8:1-2) [ records requested in Request Numbers 4, 5, 11, and 12 should not require a Pitchess motion since they are not personnel records [ sic ]. ]. Plaintiffs in reply somewhat circle back to the argument with a broader interpretation based on production for impeachment purposes. ( Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 400 [However, once materiality has been shown, nothing in this procedure excuses the trial court from examining information that might reasonably lead to evidence relevant to the defense].) The key terms in the disputed items include WRITINGS and documents and recordings, recorded interviews, and body camera footage. While the report(s) remains categorically discoverable, information, including statements and general camera footage utilized as part of internal investigations appear to remain protected. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) The court additionally finds the broad nature of the request renders the request well outside the specific incident, and the pursuit of the motivation for the coverup of a potential sexual assault while allowable (see below), insufficiently supports the sought after broad based review of files for the last five years. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 764-765.) Thus, the court finds the expansive requests improperly lack a sufficient nexus to the exact incident or even a sufficient enough link to the alleged motivation for purposes of compelling the requested information beyond the reports. While public policy supports discovery for purposes of establishing motivation, accountability, liability, etc., the rules in no way provide for general discovery absent more specific connections. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291-292; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150.) The court also finds said items in no way constitute personnel records. To the extent the argument comes full circle as to the impropriety of bringing a Pitchess motion for non-covered items in the first place, the court also finds no support in the motion or reply for utilizing the Pitchess protocol for compelling review of said items under applicable statutory or case authority. The court also declines to grant the motion on grounds of estoppel. The court finds no basis to compel said records under the Pitchess statute regardless of the representation or objections from City of Los Angeles. Estoppel will not overcome a finding of insufficient authority. The court agrees with City of Los Angeles and DENIES the motion as to categories 1-5, and 11-12. The court finds no basis of authority to compel said documents within the purview of the instant motion and will not allow Plaintiffs to graft on such relief under the guise of a Pitchess motion since its now two months before trial and the discovery and law and motion windows are closing. As for items 6-10, the TEAMS reports and personnel records, City of Los Angeles offers no dispute as to the propriety of the motion to obtain said records, and instead challenges a lack of good cause and plausible factual foundation. The declaration of Mr. Gage seeks the records of Officer Cuellar, as the person responsible for performing the movement leading to the fatal injury. The files of Officers of Ferris and Villegas tie into the alleged cover-up scheme regarding the purported sexual assault. City of Los Angeles challenges the qualitative nature of the basis as not providing a special factual scenario. ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) While the death may very well have been unintentional, the deposition testimony of Cuellar specifically admits that a direct blunt force drop to the ground head first (a piledriver) was not an authorized move for an LAPD officer. Such an admission raises valid skepticism over the open use of the move during a training exercise. Cuellar also admitted to the fight club reputation of the bicycle unit. As for other circumstances, Officer Ferris in deposition confirms his presence, along with retired officer Vellegas, at the home of L.K., a person purportedly responsible for filing a sexual assault complaint. The court finds the scenario presented by Mr. Gage of a link between the admittedly improper fatal pile driver and report from citizen L.K. far more factually supported than the general claims rejected in the City of San Jose action notwithstanding the hyperbolic references to movies of police department corruption. The enforcement culture scenario whereby Cuellar effectively executed Tripping certainly lacks specific support of a direct admission or criminal conviction, but the court also appreciates the inability to gather additional information without the ability to seek potential review of the records. The court therefore finds Plaintiffs make a sufficient showing for review based on reasonable circumstantial inference. ( Garcia v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 70; Warrick v. Sup. Ct. , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1016; Zanone v. City of Whittier (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 174, 189; California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 10201021; City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11461147.) Given that moving party made a showing of good cause for category numbers 6-10, the court must engage in an in camera review. Second, if the trial court concludes the defendant has fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents potentially relevant to the defendant's motion. . . . The trial court shall examine the information in chambers [Evid. Code § 1045(b).], out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present.. . . Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations. . . the trial court should then disclose to the defendant such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. ( Id . at p. 1086.) The court will exclude all complaints more than five years old, conclusions of an officer investigating any complaint, and facts determined too remote of offer little or no practical effect. (Evid. Code, 1045, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 accord City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Any disclosure shall conform to names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants and witnesses. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84; Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 439, 442; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829.) The determination of admissibility of any alleged statements made during the course of the investigation will not prevent discovery into the information. A party is entitled to discovery of inadmissible evidence. Plaintiffs argument seeking to distinguish the noted limitations under Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045, and subsequent cited cases lack a direct factual or legal statement overruling the noted limitations. Plaintiffs are entitled to the witness information and limited contact information only. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court , supra , 117 Cal.App.4th 1089-1090.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to items 6-11. Discovery or disclosure is protected. The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).) The court is required to conform to the requirements of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e) regarding the dissemination of any and all protected information from public file disclosure. The parties are to submit a stipulated protective order. Moving party to give notice. Trial remains set for August 19, 2024. Plaintiffs to provide notice.

LYKKEBERG VS. WILBURN, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202789 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. This matter was stayed by the Court’s Order dated January 23, 2024 pending conclusion of a FINRA arbitration between the parties. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

NOLAN VS. BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, INC. Case Number: 22CV-0199470 Tentative Ruling on Petition to Approve Minor Compromise: This matter is on calendar for further proceedings on a Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim for Minor Cordelia Nolan. The Petition was filed January 31, 2024, by Guardian Ad Litem/Father Ivan Case. The Court has since been informed that a replacement Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) must be appointed due to the unavailability of the current GAL. In the late afternoon of July 12, 2024, the Court received extensive pleadings, filed on July 12, 2024, which include an Amended Petion and Status Report. The Court has obviously not had time to review any of this material. This matter, and the 9:00 Review Hearing are continued to August 12, 2024 at 8:30 a.m and 9:00 a.m., respectively, in in Dept. 64. Petitioner is to serve notice of these continued hearings and file a proof of service of having done so no later than five days prior to the continued date. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Re: John Gonzales v. Ashley Global Retail, LLC Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03985 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: by Plaintiff John Gonzales for Orders Compelling Defendant Stoneledge Furniture, LLC to Provide Initial Verified Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; Demand for Production of Documents, Set One; Deeming Matters in Requests for Admissions Admitted, Set One; and Imposing Monetary Sanctions. Oral Argument, if timely requested, will be heard on Thursday, July 18, 2024 at 3:30 PM in Department 502. Tentative Ruling: To continue these motions to Wednesday, July 31, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 502. Plaintiff must file copies of the propounded discovery, proofs of service for the propounded discovery, and the unverified responses. Such documentation must be filed by Friday, July 19, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. Explanation: Unverified Responses Responses to initial discovery requests must be signed under oath by the party to whom the discovery was directed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.250 subd. (a), 2031.250 subd. (a), 2033.240 subd. (a).) Unsworn responses are tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) Where there are both responses and objections, both the party and the attorney must sign the response. If the responses consist entirely of objections, only the attorney’s signature is required. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.250 subd. (a), (c); 2031.250 subd. (a), (c); 2033.240 subd. (a), (c).) Here, defendant has not served plaintiff with verifications for the discovery responses. However, plaintiff has not claimed or demonstrated in his motions that the responses provided are not solely objections, which would render verifications unnecessary. It is not possible at this time to determine where a verification may be required and where it is not, since the responses to the propounded discovery were not attached to the motions. Lack of Proof of Properly Served Responses A propounding party may move for an order compelling response to its propounded interrogatories and/or demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) A propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Timely and verified responses are due from the party on which discovery is propounded within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260, 2031.260.) Failing to respond to discovery within the 30-day time limit waives objections to the discovery, including claims of privilege and work product protection. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290 subd. (a), 2031.300 subd. (a), 2033.280 subd. (a).) A motion to compel initial responses must show that the discovery was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905- 06, see Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. PacificHealthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404.) If the responses are ones that require verification (i.e. answers with or without objections), the lack thereof is tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 636.) Here, plaintiff argues that the unverified responses received on May 3, 2024 are equivalent to no responses received. Even should this prove to be correct and verifications are required, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the propounded discovery requests were properly served. Plaintiff has not attached the propounded discovery and no proof of service that shows the method and date of service of the discovery requests. Defendant has not filed opposition or otherwise appeared in a manner that would effectively waive insufficient notice. (See Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.) The court cannot yet rule on the merits of plaintiff’s motion because counsel’s declaration does not attach the propounded discovery (or defendant’s responses thereto) nor the proof of service of the discovery requests. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/15/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

VOGES VS. HOUSER Case Number: 22CV-0200010 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. At the last hearing on June 10, 2024, the Court was informed that Plaintiff was waiting on the final Medi-Cal lien. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 23SMCV05352 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: I The court already ruled on many of the issues presented herein. The court incorporates by reference and reaffirms its prior rulings and adopts them (as reflected in tentative decisions recited in the minutes of the prior hearing) to the extent not inconsistent with the following. The matter is here today because there was one open issue. The demurring defendant contends that even if the continuing violation doctrine applies to Kennedy William Gordy (Kennedy) such that there is no statute of limitations issue as to him (and that is not conceded more generally), the doctrine does not apply to Berry Gordy (Gordy). Gordy is Kennedys father. He is not accused of actual sexual assault on plaintiff Anita Thompson (Thompson or plaintiff). Instead, he is sued because he allegedly aided and abetted Kennedy in Kennedys conduct, including by making threats against plaintiff to stop her from reporting the violence. Among other things, Gordy is alleged to have moved Kennedy and Thompson to his guesthouse to isolate Thompson and facilitate the assaults; prevent Thompson from speaking to the police by, among other things, taking from her the officers card after the police were called to the scene; and pressuring her into not being candid with the police. Gordy also allegedly threatened Thompson regarding custody and child support issues concerning Thompson and Kennedys child. Eventually, though, Thompson left the property and left Kennedy. And, tragically, her son died. Some years later she re-entered Kennedys life at Kennedys request. Once she did that, Kennedys sexual assault and other physical assaults allegedly resumed or continued. And, eventually, she sued. Many of the allegations occurred before 2016, which is when Thompson left the property and her son passed. She returned to Kennedys life in 2020, and the most recent act of alleged abuse is well within the statutory time frame. Gordy, however, asserts that the last act alleged against him occurred in 2016, which is long before the complaint was filed in November 2023 or the cross-complaint (which is the operative pleading for this motion) was filed in April 2024. According to plaintiff, though, even if Gordys liability is in the nature of aiding and abetting, the statute of limitations for him as an aider and abettor is the same as the statute of limitations for Kennedy, and therefore the action is timely. That is true, Thompson asserts, even if Gordy personally did nothing after 2016. (She does not concede that he took no improper actions after that date, but she agrees that none is listed in the cross-complaint). Gordy, for his part, states that although Thompson correctly cites the general rule, it does not apply to this case. Rather, Gordy asserts, an aider and abetters liability ends when the last act of aiding and abetting took place. At the last hearing, the court noted that in the context of a conspiracy, a co-conspirators liability extends throughout the conspiracy until and unless the conspirator leaves the conspiracy, at which point the conspirator is not liable for things that come later. The court ultimately allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on this issue. All parties agree that the statute of limitations here is found in CCP section 340.15and that it is three years. There is no separate statute of limitations for aiding and abetting. Thus, at least to start, Gordys liability seems to be tied with the statute for the underlying tort, and that is well settled as a general matter. ( American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451.) It boils down, then, to the date of accrual. For Kennedy, it would be the last act of violence unless the break between 2016 and 2020 is too great to allow the continuing wrong doctrine to applya question not before the court at this time. That is because the statute expressly states that the date of accrual is three years from the last act of domestic violence by the defendant against the plaintiff. Gordy claims that as applied to him, though, this does not mean the last act of violence, but rather the last act of violence that he aided or abetted. In support of his view, Gordy cites to non-binding authority, including an unpublished Ninth Circuit case and out of state cases. While the Ninth Circuit case purports to apply California law, the court puts little weight on it. The Ninth Circuit very intentionally decides what cases to publish and what cases not to publish. Not only that, but unlike our California Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuits memo dispo process results in much thinner decisions for unpublished cases. While the court will not ignore the unpublished authority due to the 2001 rule change allowing such cases to be looked to for persuasive value, the court does not believe it is or was meant to be a definitive recitation of California law. The other cases might or might not reflect the common law view, but none of them purport to reflect California law, which has a special statute of limitations that supersedes the common law. Of course, we presume that the Legislature did not mean to supersede common law principles when it enacts statutes. ( Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809.) But ultimately, the statute will prevail. Because no one has cited any precedential case on point, and the court has found none, the court must assume that this is a matter of first impression. Given that, the court views the common lawwhich might support Gordyand the statute and general rulewhich support Thompson. The court also looks to conspiracy, where the law is at least plain. Turning to conspiracy, the doctrine would support Thompson. The law there is that once one is in a conspiracy, that party must take some sort of affirmative act to withdraw. Merely not doing anything more is not enough; there must be some affirmative and objective conduct. Thus, for example, if a conspiracy exists to defraud people of property, all members of the conspiracy will be liable for the fraud even if a particular conspirator did not participate with regard to a particular victim or stopped being active entirely. To end the liability, the co-conspirator must take an affirmative action, such as telling the remaining members that the conspirator will no longer be a part of the group. There is no allegation in the complaint that Gordy ever took such an action. But a conspiracy is not the same as aiding and abetting. The scope of liability is broader, but each co-conspirator must be able to commit the tort. A person with no fiduciary duty cannot conspire to breach a fiduciary duty, for example. Nor is aiding and abetting the same for purposes of public policy as conspiracy. Notwithstanding the courts prior musings, the court does not believe that to stop the liability for aiding and abetting an affirmative act is needed. But that hardly answers the question. The statute of limitations for this tort was deliberately enacted with the recognition that it is often difficult for victims of this kind of abuse to come forward and sue. The common law was abrogated by the statute for public policy reasons. Thus, the court tends to look at the question through the lens of recognizing that the Legislature intended to make it easier for the victim of such abuse to bring suits against those responsible and recognizing that victims of abuse are often psychologically unable to come forward. Moreover, the Legislature expressly recognized that issues of child custody and support often played into the psyche of a victim of abuse, making it harder to bring a suit. (California Bill Analysis, S.B. 924 Assem., 7/18/1995.) Those are precisely the mix of things at issue in this case. True, plaintiffs child died and after that issues of child custody and support were no longer in play, but it is fair to say, at least in the courts view, that the mind of a person who has been abused does not work like a computer and does not have an on/off switch. The coercion allegedif it occurreddoes not go away immediately upon the childs death. In a nutshell, the rule Gordy proposes does not further the Legislatures goal; in fact, it thwarts it, for it forces the victim of abuse to come forward against an aider and abettor even when the victim cannotas a practical mattercome forward at all. The courts view is that it might well be that in some cases an aider and abettors conduct was so particular and fleeting such that the statute accrues on the last date of aiding and abetting. But not in all cases, or even most. To illustrate, one can imagine a case where there is a ring of car thieves. One day, a witness sees the theft. Upon approaching the thieves, they offer to cut the witness in for $200 if the witness deletes the cell phone footage of them stealing the car. The witness agrees and not only that, tells the police that the thieves went north when they really fled south. Plainly aiding and abetting. If the thieves go on to steal more cars in the coming months, it is far from clear to the court that the aider and abettor is liable for those other thefts. On the other hand, if the aider and abettor gives the cyberthieves the a list of passwords on day 1 in return for $1000 and thereafter does nothing else, and the thieves keep the list for 4 years, during which time they slowly drain various victims bank accounts, it is not at all clear to the court that the aider and abettor gets to walk due to the statute of limitations. Of course these analogies, like all analogies, break down. But they illustrate the point that the court does not believe that there is a one-size-fits-all answer to the question. The court believes that the better rule is to presume that the statute for aiding and abetting is co-extensive with the statute for the main tortfeasor. The court will not rule out the possibility that, under a particular set of facts, the aiding and abetting conduct may be so specific and relatively minor that the accrual will be earlier. But as a general rule, it runs with the regular statute and limits to the aider and abbettors liability are better dealt with when the jury apportions damages. This also furthers the public policy reflecting the difficulty of bringing a suit that motivated the Legislature to change the law. If one can presume that the psychological trauma of the conduct is such that the victim ought not be forced to sue until three years after the last act of abuse, it is somewhat of an anomaly to expect the victim to sue the aider and abettor earlier than that. After all, it is hard to imagine the victim suing the aider and abettor at a time when the victim is still psychologically unable to sue to major tortfeasor. While it might be that this tilts the pitch in favor of the victim and against the accused aider and abettor, that is a policy question for the Legislature to decide, and it has. At least absent some significant factual showing that the aider and abettors influence had completely dissipated and that it would not be odd to assume that the victim would sue the aider and abettor but not the main tortfeasor, the court believes that the statutes of limitations are co-extensive. While the court will not definitively rule out the possibility that such a showing can be made herealthough it would be difficultit certainly cannot be made on demurrer, which is a pleading motion. Because the court must read the complaint liberally and draw all reasonable inferences in the cross-complainants favor, the court believes that the pleadings pass muster. Of course, that is not to say that when evidence is considered, the gap in time will not be too large to bridge; indeed, the court knows that Kennedy will (at some point) so argue. But for now, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Because the demurrer is overruled on regular statute of limitations grounds, the court need not, and does not, address equitable estoppel. Gordy has 30 days to answer.

VALDEZ RODRIGUEZ vs Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for CVRI2304860 CONNER TRAVIS ARMAND CONNER Tentative Ruling: Grant motion to be relieved.

Case Number: 22STCV35033 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the documents submitted in support of a request for default judgment, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff Progressive Select Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Jonathan Castillo (Defendant) and Does 1-20 for motor vehicle tort. The complaint demanded $42,352.40. Also on November 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a statement of damages asserting property damage of $10,252.40 and uninsured motorist bodily injury payments of $32,100.00, for a total of $42,352.40. On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing substituted service on Defendant of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on November 20, 2022. On April 16, 2024, the clerk entered Defendants default. On April 22, 2024, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. Also on April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for default judgment. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Plaintiff $42,871.40, consisting of $42,352.40 as the demand of the complaint and $519.00 in costs. LEGAL STANDARD A. Default judgment [With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk: (1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) Interest computations as necessary; (4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) A proposed form of judgment; (7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) Exhibits as necessary; and (9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).) B. Damages On a request for default judgment, [w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages. (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56 (Cal. Practice Guide), citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].) The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness. ( Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co . (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in courta right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated. ( Id . at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. ( Id . at p. 494.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff has submitted a complete default judgment application with all required information. The Court grants the application. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Progressive Select Insurance Company s application for default judgment filed on April 22, 2024. The Court awards Plaintiff Progressive Select Insurance Company $42,871.40 against Defendant Jonathan Castillo. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.