3D Land Surveying Inc Vs. Zipplr Llc

20CV-03476 Parkash Pabla, et al. v. Gursharn Pabla, et al. Motion by Defendant Dual Arch International. Inc. for Prevailing Party Attorneys Fees of $136,421.03 pursuant to CCP § 1717 on a breach of contract claim brought by Plaintiffs Parkash Oabla and Jaswinder Kaur against Dual Arch International, Inc. On June 6, 2024, this matter was Continued on the Court’s own motion to Thursday, July 11, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8. However, remittitur has not yet issued as of July 8, 2024, the last action occurring being the Denial of a Request for Publication issued May 16, 2024. Accordingly, this motion is further continued to July 25, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8. Defendant Dual Arch International, Inc. bases its CCP § 1717 claim for attorneys’ fees on (1) Plaintiff’s Oppositiion to Defendant Dual Arch International, Inc.’s Motion to Tax filed April 12, 2023; and (2) Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ Opening Brief in Appeal No. F086273 filed December 19, 2023. (See Request for Judicial Notice filed May 3, 2024, [containing non- file endorsed copies of above documents].) While this Motion was pending, the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellat District issued, May 14, 2024, an Opinion inc case F086273 affirming the cost order of the trial court. Remittitur has not yet issued in that matter, but, absent an appeal to the California Supreme Court, would be expected to issue June 13, 2024. Since the May 14, 2024 Appellate Opinion will not be final until a date on or after June 13, 2024, this motion was previously continued to July 11, 2024 and is now further continued to July 25, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8. While the above motion was pending, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Jaswinder Kaur and Parkash Pabla filed Cross-Defendants’ Request for Entry of Judgment after Appeal on Cross Complainant ECP, LP’s Special Motion to Strike seeking entry of judgment against Cross-Complainant ECP, LP in the amount of $6,500 attorneys’ fees and $1,040.40 costs, total judgment $7,540.40. All parties are ordered to appear on Thursday, July 11, 2024, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8 and show cause why this Court should not enter judgment in favor of Cross-Defendants Jaswinder Kaur and Parkash Pabla and against Cross Complainant ECP, LP in the amount of of $6,500 attorneys’ fees and $1,040.40 costs, total judgment $7,540.40. The Order to Show Cause if also continued from July 11, 2024, to July 25, 2024, at 8:14 A.M. in Courtroom 8.

For Plaintiffs Andrew Muray and Kerri Marshall: Richard I. Wideman For Defendants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas: James B. Devine RULING For the reasons set forth below, a preliminary injunction will issue pending final determination of this action or further order of the Court. Background This action commenced on May 29, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiffs Andrew Muray and Kerri Marshall against Defendants Karen Lantz and Andrew Farkas. The complaint is for injunction and damages for forcible entry and trespass, self-help, and quiet title based on adverse possession. As alleged in the complaint: Plaintiffs are the owners of real property known as 922 Roble Lane in Santa Barbara. Defendants are the owners of real property known as 916 Roble Lane in Santa Barbara, adjacent to Plaintiffs’ property. On May 20, 2024, while Plaintiffs were away from their property, Defendants used bulldozers and other heavy construction equipment to remove a portion of Plaintiffs’ property, claiming that that portion of Plaintiffs’ property trespassed on Defendants’ property. Defendants removed a portion of the balcony, fencing, and foundation footings that had been present for approximately 40 years. Sometime between 1979 and 1982, the prior owners of Plaintiffs’ property had made permitted additions to the property including the potions removed by Defendants. Defendants plan to construct improvements on the property including the area formerly occupied by the portions of Plaintiffs’ property that was removed by Defendants. On June 7, 2024, Plaintiffs were granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants from entering onto or constructing any improvements on property that Plaintiffs claim was formerly occupied by 922 Roble Lane prior to Defendants’ removal of the wall, portions of the balcony, and footings. At that time, the current order to show cause re: preliminary injunction was scheduled. Analysis As an initial matter, all of Defendants’ evidentiary objections are overruled. The Court notes that, other than the photographs, maps, and plans (which are sufficiently authenticated), none of the statements objected to have any bearing on the Court’s ruling. Also, Defendants themselves have submitted photographs, maps, and plans showing substantially similar conditions of the disputed property. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendants’ statements and evidence are overruled. “A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposing party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).) The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. (Casmalia Resources, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 827, 832.) The burden is on the Plaintiff to show that it is entitled to the relief sought. (Id. at p. 838.) A preliminary injunction requires “a complaint which states a sufficient cause of action for injunctive relief of the character embraced in the preliminary injunction.” (Handyspot Co. of Northern Cal. v. Buegeleisen (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 191, 194.) A cause of action is based on the invasion of a primary right. (Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 860–861.) The grant or denial of an injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in a controversy, and merely determines that the Court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, exercise of the right claimed by the Defendant should or should not be restrained. (Jamison v. Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 361.) In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial Court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the Plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the interim harm that the Plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied, as compared to the harm the Defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729,749.) The trial Court's determination must be guided by a mix of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the Plaintiffs’ showing on one, the less that must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a trial Court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the Plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Ibid.) “The likelihood of Plaintiffs’ ultimate success on the merits “ ‘does affect the showing necessary to a balancing-of-hardships analysis. That is, the more likely it is that Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue. This is especially true when the requested injunction maintains, rather than alters, the status quo. [Citation.] . . . [I]t is the mix of these factors that guides the trial Court in its exercise of discretion.’ ” [Citations.] The presence or absence of these interrelated factors “ ‘is usually a matter of degree, and if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial Court has discretion to issue the injunction notwithstanding that party's inability to show that the balance of harms tips in his favor. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 342.) Plaintiffs have provided legal argument and evidence in support of their claims that Defendants engaged in self-help, forcible entry, trespass, and adverse possession. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs are “unlikely to succeed on the merits.” (Opp., p. 13, ll. 8-13.) The Court has reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties, as well as considered the legal arguments made by the parties. The Court finds that there is a strong likelihood that Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on at least some of their causes of action. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence of imminent, irreparable harm. The Court disagrees. Photographs, survey maps, and plans have been submitted. The photographs show fairly extensive damage alleged to have been done to 922 Roble Lane by Defendants already. Defendants do not appear to dispute that they caused the removal of the wall and portions of the balcony. The plans appear to indicate that Defendants intend to make improvements to areas that were previously occupied by portions of 922 Roble Lane. If Defendants are not enjoined, and Plaintiffs ultimately prevail in the action, Plaintiffs will have been irreparably harmed by, among other things, being deprived of their use and enjoyment of the property, their personal property would potentially be destroyed or altered, and they would suffer continued trespass. Monetary, or other legal remedies are inadequate. Plaintiffs argue “Defendants are obviously planning to construct [a] portion of their development on the land that was occupied by the improvements to the Plaintiffs’ residence they removed. That must be stopped to prevent the need for tearing down portions of Defendants’ new residence and restoring Plaintiffs’ residence.” (Ex Parte Application for TRO, p. 8, ll. 5-10.) Finally, Defendants argue that because the fence has already been removed, there is no need for a preliminary injunction because the act has already taken place. (Opp., p. 11, l. 21.) This would imply that Defendants do not intend to do any more demolition, or construction, on the disputed portions of the property. If this is truly the case, Defendants should have absolutely no objection to a legal prohibition from doing so. Defendants are essentially conceding that they would suffer no harm if the preliminary injunction were issued. The Court finds that the status quo should be maintained pending the final determination of this action or further order of the Court. “On granting an injunction, the Court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Within five days after the service of the injunction, the person enjoined may object to the undertaking. If the Court determines that the applicant's undertaking is insufficient and a sufficient undertaking is not filed within the time required by statute, the order granting the injunction must be dissolved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).) “Notwithstanding rule 3.1312, whenever an application for a preliminary injunction is granted, a proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with an undertaking in the amount ordered, within one Court day after the granting of the application or within the time ordered. Unless otherwise ordered, any restraining order previously granted remains in effect during the time allowed for presentation for signature of the order of injunction and undertaking. If the proposed order and the undertaking required are not presented within the time allowed, the TRO may be vacated without notice. All bonds and undertakings must comply with rule 3.1130.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150 (f).) By way of their reply brief, Plaintiffs request that the bond be in the amount of $10,000.00. Defendants do not argue that it should be in a larger amount. As such, the undertaking will be in the amount of $10,000.00. Plaintiffs will be given two Court days, or July 12, 2024, to file a proposed order and undertaking. NOTICE: We may not have a court reporter for the trial of your case. We do have a court reporter for CMC and L&M Calendars. Check with the Court before you hire your own court reporter. If counsel wants to hire a court reporter, it will be your obligation to retain one for the trial. There can only be one official record of Court proceedings, and only a reporter appointed by the Court may report a Court proceeding. Only one reporter will be allowed to report a Court proceeding at any given time. If the parties cannot agree on a reporter, the Court will make the selection after you submit the name and address of the court reporter each counsel has engaged. Counsel will notify the Court 10 days in advance of the trial date if you are going to provide a court reporter. You may request that the electronic recording system that is already installed in the Courtroom be used. Information about that may be obtained from the Court’s website.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 10, 2024 line 5. PLAINTIFF SARAH LEWIS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is DENIED. There is no proof of service on file and motion is not supported by evidence. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23TRCV01708 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B SMBD INVESTMENTS, LP, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01708 vs. [Tentative] RULING COCOS RESTAURANTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Attorney Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP, attorney for defendants Responding Party: None Motions to Be Relieved as Counsel The Court considered the moving papers. RULING The motions are GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. BACKGROUND On May 30, 2023, plaintiff SMBD Investments, LP filed a complaint against Cocos Restaurants, LLC, Sharis Management Corporation, and Fri-M, LLC for breach of lease and account stated. On August 7, 2023, defendants filed an answer. LEGAL STANDARD The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 398. CRC Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). DISCUSSION Defendants attorneys, Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP seek to be relieved as counsel. Counsel Tarczy states in his declaration that defendants have not complied with their engagement agreement with Miller Nash LP by failing to pay outstanding attorneys fees and costs it has incurred. Starting in August 2023, counsel has made several requests that defendants become current on their outstanding fees and costs. Counsel also states that defendants have consented to Miller Nash LPs withdrawal as counsel but have not found new counsel. The Court finds that the attorney submitted a declaration establishing that the service requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362, have been satisfied. The Court also finds that the attorney has shown sufficient reason why the motion to be relieved as counsel should be granted. The motion is GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. Moving counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23SMCV05304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 CARL BARNEY , Plaintiff, v. SIENNA CHARLES, LLC, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 S M CV 0 5 304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND Th is is a breach of contract and fraud case . Defendants Sienna Charles LLC and Jaclyn Sienna India-Reinert (Ms. India) provide bespoke travel services for high-wealth individuals . (First Amended Complaint (FAC ) ¶8.) In mid-2021, Plaintiff Carl Barney desired to obtain the services of a high level, full service VIP travel agency to arrange all of the details f or his three-week trip to Europe. ( Id. ¶9.) He therefore spoke with Defendants about their services . ( Id. ¶10.) Ms. India assured Plaintiff that she knew how to get her clients access to exclusive experiences that would otherwise be unavailable to them . She claimed, in writing and orally, to be able to provide extraordinary private travel and the ability for Plaintiff to access top experts for his vacations. ( Id. ¶10.) Relying on these oral representations, Plaintiff paid $75,000 for the Europe trip and multiple additional trips he desired to have planned over a one year period (July 1 st Agreement) . H e describes the July 1 st A greement as a partially oral and partially written agreement to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Under the July 1 st Agreement, Defendants were to provide Plaintiff access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb[ ] the globe consistently procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living. ( Id. ¶20.) Plaintiff claims Defendants breached the July 1 st Agreement by their poor planning and lack of communication, an d Plaintiffs staff was forced to clean up their messes . ( Id. ¶13.) Specif i cally, Plaintiffs staff was forced to book VIP suites, arrange last minute flights that could have been scheduled weeks in advance and book other appointments for things such as required Covid-19 testing . ( Id. ) Pursuant to the July 1 st Agreement, Plaintiff then sought to use Defendants services for a three - week trip to the Middle East . ( Id. ¶14.) Plaintiff asked Defendants to prepare a proposed itinerary by September 7, 2021 . ( Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants ignored the re quest , instead providing a proposed agenda on September 14, 2021 which failed to include any specific dates (or even number of days) for visiting any of the countries and no details of available a ctivities that Defendants could curate . ( Id. ) This action ensued . The operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleges claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3) unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust and (4) unfair business practices . This hearing is on Defendants demurrer to and motion to strike the complaint . Defendant s demurrer is based on the grounds that (1) the FAC does not allege any actual contract or contractual terms; (2) Defendants alleged breach of contract doesnt equal fraud , and Plaintiff has not plead fraud with specificity ; (3) unjust enrichment is a mere remedy, not a valid cause of action; (4) the FAC doesnt identify any specific funds on which to impose a constructive trust, and (5) Plaintiff has no valid claim for unfair business practices . Defendants also move to strike (1) Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations because Plaintiffs fraud claim fails, and (2) any claim for money damages in connection with Plaintiffs claim for unfair business practices because under the unfair competition law, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief . LEGAL STANDARD [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) MEET AND CONFER Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).) Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(3) , 435.5(a)(3) .) Defendant s submit the Declaration of Kenneth Ruttenberg which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone on May 2 2 , 2024 , more than five days before the demurrer and motion to strike was filed (on May 28, 2024 ) . This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 and 435.5. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not complied with the meet and confer requirements . Plaintiff, however, fails to explain why that is so . In any event, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer or deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer . ( Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 (a)(4) and 435.5 (a)(4) . ) DISCUSSION Breach of Contract Defendant s demur to the breach of contract claim on the ground that the contract terms are so vague that no one could judge whether Defendants supposedly breach those terms . The Court agrees . The Complaint alleges that i n exchange for $75,000, Defendants were to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( FAC ¶ 22.) Defendants promised to provide access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb the globe consistently, procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living for Plaintiff for one year . ( Id. ¶ 22.) These terms are too vague to determine whether a breach has occurred . It is not clear what full service planning entails . And t here is no basis to judge whether the luxury travel Defendants provided were the most exclusive or constituted the best in ultra luxury living. These promises are not definite enough to determine the scope of Defendants obligations or the limits of their performance . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the breach of contract claim with leave to amend . Fraud Defendant s demur to Plaintiffs fraud claim as duplicative of the contract claim, as insufficiently plead and as failing to allege an intent not to perform . The Court agrees on the last ground . To allege promissory fraud, Plaintiff must plead Defendants made promises that they had no intention of performing . ( Lazar v. Super. Court (1996) 12 Cal.4 th 631, 638.) The fact that a promise was made and not fulfilled is insufficient to establish fraud by false promise . ( Tenzer v. Superscope (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 31.) Rather, something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendants intent not to perform his promise. ( Id. ) Making a promise with an honest but unreasonable intent to perform is wholly different from making one with no intent to perform and, therefore, does not constitute a false promise. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4 th 153, 159.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a showing that Defendants did not intend to perform on their promises at the time they made them . In fact, the FAC alleges partial performance by Defendants . (FAC ¶¶ 16, 18.) The fact that Defendants partially performed undercut s any claim they did not intend to perform at the time they made their promises . ( Castaic Vil lage Ctr . LLC v. Gymcheer USA, Inc. , 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 6377 at *5 (partial performance negate s an intent not to perform). ) Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs fraud claim withoug leave to amend . Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to the unjust enrichment claim on the ground it is a remedy and not a cause of action . Plaintiff argues it has not asserted an unjust enrichment claim . The caption to its complaint, however, characterizes its third cause of action as an unjust enrichment claim and imposition of constructive trust . This may have been a clerical error and a holdover from the prior complaint . A s Plaintiff maintains he is not asserting an unjust enrichment claim, the demurrer to the unjust enrichment claim is moot . Constructive Trust Defendant demurs to the constructive trust claim on the ground Plaintiff does not allege a specific identifiable property interest because money is fungible . The Court agrees . A prerequisite to the imposition of a constructive trust is the identification of a specific property belonging to the claimant . ( Korea Supply Co. V. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4 th 1134, 1150.) A constructive trust requires money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff [which can] clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant s possession. ( Id. ) A constructive trust is available where the specific res or funds can be identified and attached, but not where the plaintiff seeks to impose general personal liability as a remedy for the defendant s monetary obligations. ( Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of United Ass'n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster (9 th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 1234, 1238 . ) In other words, a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy for a claim that is essentially one for money damages , as is the case here . Further, constructive trust is not a cause of action per se, but an equitable remedy . ( Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82; see also Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1332 (constructive trust is an equitable remedy); PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398 (constructive trust is a remedy); Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 (constructive trust is a remedy). Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the constructive trust claim without leave to amend . Unfair Business Practices Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 (UCL) fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any law . The Court agrees . UCL prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. Here, t he FAC alleges that Defendants violated the UCL prohibition against engaging in an unlawful act or practice by the conduct described above. (FAC ¶ 41.) To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law . ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635; Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618.) Plaintiff has not identified any underlying law that was violated . In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants conduct also constituted unfair and fraudulent business practices . While Plaintiff did not allege this theory in his Complaint, the C ourt is not¿limited to plaintiff s theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their¿complain t against a¿demurrer, but instead must determine if the¿ factual ¿allegations of the complaint are¿adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (¿ Barquis¿ v. ¿Merchants Collection Assn . (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103 .)¿ Mistaken labels and confusion of legal theory are not fatal; if appellant s complaint states a cause of action on any theory, he is entitled to introduce evidence thereon. ( Porten¿ v. ¿University of San Francisco ¿(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 833 .) California courts have not uniformly settled on a single approach to defining 'unfair' business practices in a consumer action under the UCL . Prior to 1999, California courts applied what is known as the balancing test. Courts defined unfair business practices as those offend[ ing ] an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers, or where the utility of the defendant s conduct does not outweigh the gravity of the harm to the victim . ( Cel-Tech Commc ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 18 4 .) Under the balancing test, a determination of unfairness involves an examination of [the practice s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. ( McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473¿(internal citations omitted) .) In 1999, the California Supreme Court rejected that test and held that a finding of unfairness must instead be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. ¿ ( Cel-Tech , 20 Cal. 4th at 186-87 . ) The¿ Cel-Tech ¿court, however, expressly declined to extend this¿standard to consumer actions.¿ ( Id. ¿at 187 n.12 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a threatened impact on competition and has not alleged facts that would meet the balancing test . For example, Plaintiff does not allege that D efendants conduct was not motivated by legitimate business or economic need or that the harm and adverse impact of Defendants conduct outweighed these needs . Accordingly , P laintiff has not stated a UCL claim based on either test for unfairness . To state a claim under the fraudulent prong of the¿UCL, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be¿deceived.¿( Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct. (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267.) The determination as to whether a business practice is deceptive is based on the likely effect such [a] practice would have on a reasonable¿consumer. ( McKell, 142 Cal.App.4th at 1471 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that members of the public were likely to be deceived by Defendants conduct . Accordingly , Plaintiff has not met the fraudulent prong of the UCL. Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs UCL claim with leave to amend . Punitive Damages Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged fraud and therefore cannot seek punitive damages . As the Court concludes Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a fraud claim, punitive damages are unavailable . Money Damages for UCL Claim Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover damages for his UCL claim . The Court agrees. Under the UCL, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief; he may not recover damages . ( Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal.4 th at 1144.) Plaintiff seeks money damages for his UCL claim . ( FAC at p.10 lines 16-19.) Accordingly , the Court will strike the prayer for money damages as to the UCL claim . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Defendant s demurrer with 20 days leave to amend and DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART their motion to strike with out leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING CIRCA 1200, LLC, vs. FRANCISCO MEZA. Case No.: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Circa 1200, LLCs Request for Default Judgment Having considered all documents submitted in support of a default judgment, the Court rules as follows: Background On October 30, 2023, Circa 1200, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Francisco Meza (Defendant) for common count and breach of contract. On December 15, 2023, the clerk entered defaults against Defendant. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment to be heard on July 9, 2024. Partys Request Plaintiff requests the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Plaintiff damages in the amount of $113,760.75, prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% in the amount of $8,913.86, attorneys fees in the amount of $702.00, and costs in the amount of $498.00, for a total judgment of $123,874.61. Discussion Plaintiff submitted a completed default judgment packet, with all applicable attachments. The Court finds sufficient evidence to justify the requested award and grants Plaintiffs request in full. Conclusion The application for default judgment filed on June 18, 2024, is granted. Judgment in the amount of $123,874.61 is entered against Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

JENSEN VS. WELLS FARGO REALTY SERVICES INC Case Number: 22CV-0200623 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. Defendant has been defaulted in this case. A default prove-up hearing has not occurred. At the prior hearing on April 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel appeared to inform the Court she was speaking with a bond company and to request a continuance. The matter was continued to today but no status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of the case and, if appropriate, to re-set this mater for a default prove-up hearing.

Case Number: 23STCV17398 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Case Name: 7561 Melrose, LLC v. Wesley Scott Reardan , et al . Case No.: 23STCV17398 Motion: OSC re: Entry of Default Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Background This is an unlawful detainer action which arises from the alleged non-payment of rent. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a ComplaintUnlawful Detainer against Defendants Wesley Scott Reardan (Reardan), Tyler Steven Gonzalez (Gonzalez), and Does 1 to 10. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is seeking forfeiture of the lease, reasonable attorneys fees, and damages at the rate of $666.66 per day from July 13, 2023. (UD-100 at pp. 3-4.) On October 2, 2023, default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. (10/03/23 Minute Order.) On October 30, 2023, judgment by default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez for possession only. (10/30/23 Judgment.) On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment form (CIV-100) seeking default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez in the sum of $196,301.50. Also, on such date, Plaintiff filed a Proposed Judgment and Declaration of Parviz Sarshar (Sarshar) in Support of Default Judgment. Legal Standard California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 sets forth the requirements for default judgments. In pertinent part, the rule dictates that a party must use form CIV-100 and file the following documents with the clerk: (1) except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3)¿interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5)¿a declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8)¿exhibits as necessary; and (9)¿a request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1800(a)(1)-(9).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 in order to obtain entry of default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. Plaintiff has failed to: (1) provide interest computations as necessary; and (2) dismiss parties against whom judgment is not sought as the Doe defendants have not been dismissed. Plaintiffs have also failed to substantiate the requested damages as no ledger or documentation is attached to the declaration of Ms. Sarshar showing the amount of past due rent, late fees, or holdover damages. Additionally, although requesting attorneys fees, Plaintiff has not indicated whether the requested attorneys fees are allowed by statute or agreement of the parties. The declaration of Ms. Sarshar fails to set forth the basis for the requested attorneys fees. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs default judgment application is denied without prejudice.