Cavalry Spv I Llc Vs Thompson

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Motion for Summary Judgment on WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A vs CVPS2306119 Complaint for Collections by WELLS RAMORAN FARGO BANK, N.A. Tentative Ruling: The unopposed Motion of Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is GRANTED. There is no dispute of material fact and Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff is awarded principal of $5,157.82 plus costs of $800 pursuant to a Memorandum of Costs filed April 4, 2024.

Case Number: 23CHCV00539 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-16-24 Case #23CHCV00539, American Express National Bank vs. Anahit Khrimian, et al. Trial Date: 11-4-24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff American Express National Bank RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for Summary Judgment RULING : Motion is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) filed this action on February 27, 2023. Plaintiff alleged a cause of action of Common Counts for an open book account and an account stated against Defendants Anahit Khrimian and St. Jacob Hospice, Inc. (Defendants). This is a credit card collections case wherein Defendants opened an American Express credit card on June 25, 2015. (UMF 1.) In using the card, Defendants were bound by the terms of the cardmember agreement. (UMF 2, 4.) Defendants used the card to pay for goods and services. (UMF 5.) Plaintiff maintained an open book account for the card in the form of billing statements. (UMF 8.) Pursuant to the cardmember agreement and the most recent billing statement, a balance of $150,397.63 is now due on the account. (UMF 11; Touhidi Decl., Ex. B.) Based on the amount due on the account, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its complaint for an open book account and an account stated. Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2024. No opposition has been filed. ANALYSIS The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The pleadings frame the issues for motions, since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. ( Citation. ) ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472. ) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. ( Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. ( Ibid .) Account Stated Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on the Account Stated cause of action because Plaintiff issued and submitted monthly billing statements on the account to Defendants and there are no unresolved disputes on the account. An account stated is an agreement, based on prior transactions between the parties, that all items of the account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing from one party to the other. ( Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 68 Cal.2d 17, 25.) In order to establish an account stated, [i]t must appear that at the time of the statement an indebtedness from one party to other existed, that a balance was then struck and agreed to be the correct sum owing from the debtor to the creditor, and that the debtor expressly or impliedly promised to pay to the creditor the amount thus determined to be owing. ( H. Russell Taylors Fire Protection Service, Inc. v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 711, 726-727.) Assent may be expressly given or implied by the circumstances or the conduct of the debtor including failing to object. ( Trafton , supra , 68 Cal.2d at 25.) In addition, partial payment of a debt without objection and without otherwise indicating non-recognition of the validity of the debt is proof of the validity of the debt. ( Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 480.) Thus, if a statement is rendered and the debtor fails to object or reply within a reasonable time, the law implies an agreement that the account is correct as rendered. ( Maggio Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d at 752-753.) Plaintiff argues that it can establish an account stated because it mailed billing statements to Defendants every month, and Defendants did not dispute the balance on the statements. In this case, there is a cardmember agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants. (UMF 14.) The cardmember agreement indicated that Defendants were required to make regular monthly payments on the account. (UMF 18.) Each month, Plaintiff mailed an account statement to Defendants at the address that Defendants provided to Plaintiff, and the account statement accurately reflected the amount that Defendants owed on the account. (UMF 20.) Finally, the account is considered to be truly stated because there are no unresolved disputes on the account. (UMF 22; see Maggio Inc. , supra , 196 Cal.App.3d at 752-753 (finding that the law implies an agreement that an account is truly stated when there are no outstanding disputes on the account).) Based on the foregoing and the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for an account stated, and there are no triable issues of material fact for this cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff prevails as a matter of law on Plaintiffs claim for account stated. Plaintiffs motion is granted for this claim. Open Book Account Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on the Open Book Account cause of action because there is a book account as evidenced by detailed statements kept by Plaintiff. CCP § 337a(a) defines a book account as a detailed statement which constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between a debtor and creditor arising out of a contract ...and show the debits and credits in connection therewith, and against whom and in favor of whom entries are made, is entered in the regular course of business as conducted by such creditor ..., and is kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner and is (1) in a bound book, or (2) on a sheet or sheets fastened in a book or to a backing but detachable therefrom, or (3) on a card or cards of a permanent character, or is kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner. The California Supreme Court has explained it as follows: a book account is a detailed statement of debit/credit transactions kept by a creditor in the regular course of business, and in a reasonably permanent manner. ( Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579, fn. 5.) Courts construe CCP § 337a broadly and have adopted a liberal approach in defining the term book account. ( Costerisan v. DeLong (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 768, 770-771 (Adverting to the broad language of section 337a of the Code of Civil Procedure, kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner, it seems manifest that the Legislature intended to adopt the liberal approach&in defining the term book account.).) In Costerisan v. DeLong , the Court of Appeal found that ledger sheets kept in an office file cabinet constituted a book account under CCP § 337a. ( Id . at 771.) In that case, the Court of Appeal held that the critical determination was whether the sheets were permanent records and constitute[d] a system of bookkeeping as distinguished from mere private memoranda. ( Id . at 770; see also Fresno Credit Bureau v. Batteate (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 545, 547-548 (holding that one ledger entry was sufficient to support a judgment based on an open book account).) Plaintiffs business records are computerized, and Plaintiff maintained an account of all the credits and debits on Defendants account in the form of billing statements that were stored on its internal network. (UMF 8.) These billing statements constituted an electronic book account that was created and maintained on Plaintiffs secure network. (See Costerisan , supra , 251 Cal.App.2d at 770-771.) Every month Plaintiff mailed billing statements to Defendants (UMF 8), and Defendants had 60 days to submit a dispute for any charges (UMF 9). There are no unresolved disputes on Defendants account (UMF 10.) Because there are no disputes, this means that an open book account has been established. The evidence is undisputed that a book account was established between Plaintiff and Defendants. Accordingly, there are no triable issues of material fact, and Defendants are liable as a matter of law for the open book account under Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiffs motion is granted for this claim. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Damages are to be awarded in the amount of $150,397.63, and costs are to be requested via a memorandum of costs. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed judgment. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 24VECV01449 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Dept: T [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Plaintiff Ally Banks Application for Writ of Possession is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Introduction Plaintiff Ally Bank (Plaintiff) moved for a writ of possession against Defendant Antonio White (Defendant). An opposition was due on July 9, 2024 and none was filed. Discussion Plaintiff failed to file proofs of service on the Summons and Complaint, as well as the Notice of Application for Writ of Possession. Without proofs of service, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant. Without proofs of service, Defendant was not provided proper notice and opportunity to be heard on the application. Any orders issued without proper notice and opportunity to be heard are void. Plaintiffs application for writ of possession is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ALTERNATIVELY, IF PLAINTIFF FILES THE PROOFS OF SERVICE FOR THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION PRIOR TO THIS HEARING DATE, THEN&. [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Plaintiff Ally Banks Application for Writ of Possession is GRANTED. The Court waives an undertaking from Plaintiff Ally Bank. Plaintiffs proof of service showed that Defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint and properly notified of the hearing on the application. (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 512.010.) Plaintiff provided a declaration to show the probable validity of their claim and right to repossess the vehicle from Defendant because Plaintiff provided evidence showing: Defendants entry into the Written Lease Agreement (Lease) for the vehicle; Plaintiff assignors performance of delivery of the vehicle; Defendants breach in failing to pay; and Plaintiffs damages. (Code Civ. Proc sec. 512.040.) (James Singleton Decl. pars. 5-9.) Plaintiff further provided that the vehicle is in the custody and control of Defendant and located at Defendants residence. (Singleton Decl. par. 10.) (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 512.060.) With Defendants breach, Defendant no longer has rights to possess and further refused to surrender the vehicle. Plaintiff has shown their rights to possession. Plaintiff submitted the amount owed on the account and the value of the vehicle. (Singleton Decl. pars. 6-7.) The evidence showed that the account balance exceeds the value of the vehicle and no equity exists for the Defendant. The Court finds that the requirement to post an undertaking is waived. (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 515.010.) Plaintiffs application for writ of possession is GRANTED.

Case Number: 21SMCV01012 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 21SMCV01012 MOTION Motion to Vacate Judgment MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. OPPOSING PARTY none BACKGROUND On June 7, 2021, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Plaintiff) filed a complaint for damages against Defendant Inna Kostina (Defendant). Default was entered against Defendant on August 31, 2021, and default judgment was entered against Defendant on December 11, 2021. Plaintiff now moves to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without prejudice because Defendant has submitted a fraud claim under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 128. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD SECTION 473 RELIEF Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a court may relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . Code of Civil procedure section 473 includes a discretionary provision, which applies permissively, and a mandatory provision, which applies as of right. ( Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 (hereafter Minick ).) Section 473 is a remedial statute to be applied liberally in favor of relief if the opposing party will not suffer prejudice. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. Unless inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails. ( Minick, supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [cleaned up].) The mandatory provision of section 473, subd. (b) requires an attorneys sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect[.] Otherwise, relief under section 473 is discretionary. The party or the legal representative must seek such relief within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable]; People v. The North River Ins. Co . (2011) 200 Ca.App.4 th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months]). The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period. ( Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp . (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) However, in the case of a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding determining the ownership or right to possession of real or personal property, without extending the six-month period, when a notice in writing is personally served within the State of California both upon the party against whom the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding has been taken, and upon his or her attorney of record, if any, notifying that party and his or her attorney of record, if any, that the order, judgment, dismissal, or other proceeding was taken against him or her and that any rights the party has to apply for relief under the provisions of Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall expire 90 days after service of the notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) ANALYSIS With regard to timing, judgment was entered on December 11, 2021, yet Plaintiff did not move to vacate the judgment until May 30, 2024, long after the requisite six months in which Plaintiff may bring the motion. The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period. ( Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp . (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) Further, the motion is not supported by any declaration or affidavit of fault. Therefore, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff the requested relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Moreover, the Court does not find Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) to provide a legal basis to vacate the Judgment which was entered on the request of Plaintiff, especially when Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence in support of the motion. Conclusion Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment entered against Defendant on December 11, 2021. The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court ruling. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Matter on calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, Line 3, PLAINTIFF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK. N.A.'s Motion For Order That Matters In Request For Admission Of Truth Of Facts Be Deemed Admitted. The matter is continued to August 12, 2024, on the court's motion. =(302/JPT).

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.