Mayers/Johnson Llc #2 Vs Orchid Media Productions Llc

Case Number: 23AHCV00560 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT EBF HOLDINGS, LLC dba EVEREST BUSINESS FUNDING , Plaintiff(s), vs. CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV00560 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AN ORDER THAT THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND THE TRUTH OF MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION BE DEEMED ADMITTED, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC. Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2024 Plaintiff EBF Holdings, LLC dba Everest Business Funding (Plaintiff) moves for an order deeming admitted the genuineness of documents and truth of matters specified in its First Set of Requests for Admission served on defendant Corinthian Hospice, Inc. (Defendant) on October 16, 2023. The motion is unopposed. Where a party fails to timely respond to a request for admission, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Where a party fails to provide a timely response to requests for admission, [i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) The motion is unopposed and there is no dispute that Defendant failed to serve responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests. It also does not appear that Defendant has served substantially compliant proposed responses. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant in the reduced amount of $385, consisting of .5 hours at Plaintiffs counsels hourly rate and a $60 filing fee, payable within 20 days of the date of this Order. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 6. DEFENDANT ROBERT ELAM's Motion For Relief From Default. Continued to July 26, 2024, to be heard by Judge East. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: 22STCV32940 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 KERYN REDSTONE , Plaintiff, vs. ALEJANDRO HERRERA , et al. Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV32940 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO VACATE ENTRIES OF DEFAULT Background Plaintiff Keryn Redstone (Plaintiff) filed this action on October 6, 2022 against Defendants Alejandro Herrera, an individual; Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021; Herrera Clifton Hess, PC, and Herrera Law Partners. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) professional negligence, (3) fraud, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, (6) conversion, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (8) Civil Rico - 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) . On January 17, 2023, defaults were entered in this matter against Alejandro Herrera, an individual, Herrera Clifton Hess, PC, and Herrera Law Partners. On February 28, 2023, a default was entered against Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021. On August 1, 2023, the Court issued an Order that the default entered against Herrera Clifton Hess, PC on January 17, 2023 is set aside. Alejandro Herrera, an individual and as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021 and Herrera Law Partners (collectively, Defendants) now move for an order setting aside the defaults entered against them in this matter. Plaintiff opposes. Discussion Defendants first cite to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) in support of the motion. This provision provides that [t]he court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (( Id., § 473, subd. (d) .) As an initial matter, Defendants assert that the Court should set aside entry of defaults and default judgments entered as against the HERRERA Defendants as void for failure to properly serve summons. (Mot. at p. 12:1-2.) Defendants cite to Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444 , where the Court of Appeal noted that [a] motion to vacate a judgment on the ground that it is void is timely if made within a reasonable time, which has been determined to be any time within two years of the entry of the judgment. (Internal citations omitted.) However, the Court did not enter default judgments against the Defendants in this matter. Rather, as set forth above, defaults were entered against Defendants. Thus, there is no default judgment to be set aside. Defendants also assert that relief from entry of default is appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 . (Mot. at p. 14:3-4.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) , [w]hen service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (b) , [a] notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 , and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the partys lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (c) , [u]pon a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the action. In Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 , the Court of Appeal noted that [a]ctual notice in section 473.5 means genuine knowledge of the party litigant&[A]ctual knowledge has been strictly construed, with the aim of implementing the policy of liberally granting relief so that cases may be resolved on their merits. ( Internal quotations and citations omitted .) Defendants assert that [t]o date, the HERRERA Defendants still have not received written notification that default has been entered and the Court docket does not show the filing of any such notice. (Mot. at p. 14:13-14.) In the opposition, Plaintiff does not appear to provide any evidence that Defendants were served with written notice that the subject defaults had been entered. In his declaration in support of the motion, Alejandro Herrera states that I was never served with either the Summons or Complaint in this matter either on my own behalf, as trustee of the HCH HOLDINGS TRUST DATED AUGUST 1, 2021 or on behalf of HERRERA LAW PARTNERS. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 6.) [1] Alejandro Herrera states that [o]n or around January 27, 2022 [2] , through examining the Courts Register of Actions I became aware that Plaintiff had filed a complaint and requests for entry of default against me and several entities and non-entities. On about May 29, 2023 I pulled up the Proof of Service and learned that Plaintiff claims to have personally served me with the Complaint. Shocked, I discussed the issue with my wife and was surprised when she told me that on October 18, 2022 and again in January someone had come to the house, asked if she was Alex Herrera and had left some papers with her. My wifes name is Alexandra Herrera. She had forgotten to give the documents to me and was not sure where she placed them. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 2.) In his declaration, Alejandro Herrera states that [o]n about January 27, 2023, I reached out to Plaintiffs counsel Mr. Galperin and advised him of the facts I had learned regarding the attempted service and requests for entry of default. I asked counsel to set aside the defaults and default judgments to allow me file responsive documents, though they had not been entered at that time&Counsel later got back to me and advised he would not set the defaults aside because he believed service to be valid, but that he would consider a stipulation. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 4.) Alejandro Herrera states that [f]or several months after communicating with Plaintiffs counsel, I was dealing with the deaths of close relatives and illness of my minor child and wife, and eventually myself, and that around May 2023 I reported the matter to my insurance carrier and requested an attorney be retained to represent me in this matter. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 5.) Alejandro Herrera also states that I was not attempting to evade service of the Summons or Complaint in this matter at any time. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants assert that accordingly, they did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend. Defendants assert that [t]he HERRERA Defendants were not avoiding service at any time&Nor is there any inexcusable neglect on the part of the HERRERA Defendants that caused the default. Since all requirements for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 are satisfied, the Court should set aside entry of default and grant The HERRERA Defendants leave to defend the action. (Mot. at p. 15:16-20.) Defendants provide a copy of their proposed answer to the Complaint with the motion. (Kajo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff does not appear to assert that Defendants request for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 should be rejected as untimely. As set forth above, Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) provides in part that [t]he notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. Here, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that Defendants were not provided with written notice that the subject defaults had been entered against them. In addition, no default judgments have been entered against Defendants. The Court finds that Defendants have shown that their notice of motion was served and filed within a reasonable time. The Court also finds that Defendants have shown that their lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by [their] avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect& ( Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (c) .) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated grounds for the requested relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 . [3] Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion to set aside the defaults entered against them is granted. The January 17, 2023 defaults entered against Alejandro Herrera, an individual and Herrera Law Partners are ordered set aside. The February 28, 2023 default entered against Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021 is ordered set aside. The Status Conference Review of default judgment is vacated. Defendants are ordered to file and serve their proposed answer to the Complaint within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿¿ Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: July 10, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] Alejandro Herrera states that Herrera Law Partners is his business. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 1.) [2] It appears that the reference to January 27, 2022 is a typo. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 2.) In the motion, Defendants state that [t]he HERRERA Defendants were not aware that defaults had been entered until around January 27, 2023 . (Mot. at p. 15:14-15, emphasis added, citing Herrera Decl., ¶ 2.) In addition, Alejandro Herrera states that [o]n about January 27, 2023, [he] reached out to Plaintiffs counsel& (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 4.) [3] In light of the foregoing, the Court need not and does not address Defendants remaining arguments in the motion.

Matter on the Disocvery Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, line 4, 3 - PLAINTIFF JAIRO CANCHOLA'S, ANDREA RODRIGUEZ Motion To Compel Responses, Without Objections, To Plaintiffs' Form And Special Interrogatories (Set One) Continued to July 26, 2024. No JPT available. = (302/JPT)

CREEKSIDE LOGGING VS. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS Case Number: CVCV16-0185312 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with an update regarding the status of the injunction against litigation.

Case Number: 23PSCV01807 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 26 Yang v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, et al. MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS (CCP §§ 2030.300, 2023.010) TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Clubs (1) Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions; (2) Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, are GRANTED. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS TO SERVE VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS, WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY SANCTIONS OF $570.00 TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. ANALYSIS: On January 9, 2024, Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Defendant) served Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Special Interrogatories on Plaintiff Bin Yang (Plaintiff). ( Motions, Vallone Decl., Exh. 1.) Despite a meet and confer effort extending the deadline to serve verified responses without objections, Plaintiff has not served responses to the discovery. ( Id . at ¶¶5-7 and Exh. 2.) Defendant filed the instant (1) Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions; and (2) Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, on June 7, 2024. No oppositions have been filed to date. Discussion Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve initial responses to the discovery, the Motions to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, are granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.) There is no requirement for a prior meet and confer effort before a motion to compel initial responses can be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.) Furthermore, the motion can be brought at any time after the responding party fails to provide the responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.) Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an order compelling Plaintiff to serve verified responses to the interrogatories without objections. Plaintiffs failure to timely respond constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) Sanctions are appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 and have been properly noticed. However, the amount sought is excessive for simple and unopposed motions. Pursuant to a lodestar calculation, sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $570.00 based on two hours of attorney time billed at $225.00 per hour and costs of $60.00 per motion. (Motions, Vallone Decl., ¶¶10.) Conclusion Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Clubs (1) Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions; (2) Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, are GRANTED. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS TO SERVE VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS, WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY SANCTIONS OF $570.00 TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 22TRCV01468 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿ ¿¿ HEARING DATE: July 9, 2024 ¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01468 ¿¿ CASE NAME: Ronald Guritzky v. Herbert James Henry Jr. .¿¿ ¿ ¿ ¿ MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Herbert James Henry Jr. ¿¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Ronald Guritzky ¿¿ TRIAL DATE: July 29, 2024 ¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Dismiss Tentative Rulings: (1) DENIED I. BACKGROUND ¿¿ ¿¿ A. Factual ¿¿ ¿¿ On December 12, 2022, Plaintiff, Rondald Guritzky (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant, Herbert J. Henry, Jr. (Defendant), and DOES 1 through 10. On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Promissory Note; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Common Counts Open Book Account; and (4) Common Counts Account Stated. Previously, on October 3, 2023, this Court denied a defense motion that Mr. Henry labeled a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court denied that motion without prejudice to a properly supported and noticed motion in the future. Now, on May 28, 2024, Defendant has filed another motion entitled: Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, an illegal contract, fraud, and the Defendants lack of capacity. B. Procedural¿ ¿ ¿ On May 28, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On July 1, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. II. ANALYSIS ¿ Preliminarily, the Court notes that while this motion is entitled a Motion to Dismiss, it does not explain under which subsection of Code of Civil Procedure section 581, et seq. it is moving under. In fact, the moving papers do not cite to one section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although this alone is enough for this Court to deny the Defendants motion, this Court will analyze this case as Plaintiff does under the summary judgment standard. Judges are authorized to disregard the label or caption of a motion and instead treat it in accordance with the relief the motion requests. ( Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5 th 999, 1011.) A. Legal Analysis The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿ As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.¿ ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.¿¿¿ To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence that is admissible under the rules of evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) B. Discussion Procedural Deficiencies Viewed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants moving papers fail on numerous procedural grounds. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1350, a Motion for Summary Judgment must contain and be supported by the following documents: (1) Notice of Motion; (2) Separate Statement of undisputed material facts in support of the motion; (3) Memorandum in support of motion; (4) Evidence in support of motion; and (5) Request for judicial notice in support of motion. (Cal. Rules Ct., R. 3.1350(c)(1-5).) Procedurally, if the labeled motion to dismiss were treated under the standards applicable to dispositive motions, the instant motion was noticed and filed on May 28, 2024, forty-two (42) days before the hearing. However, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 437c, subsection (a)(2), notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed by the hearing. As such, Defendants motion is untimely and procedurally defective at its inception. Second, Defendant has failed to include a separate statement of undisputed fact as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 473c, subsection (b)(1). Third, the evidence provided by Defendant, including answers to discovery, is not admissible as it has not been verified via affidavit or declaration nor included as an exhibit. Instead, it is integrated into the motion itself without any way for the Court to authenticate the claimed discovery responses. Nor did Defendant request this Court to judicially notice any evidence as well. Based on the above, Defendants motion can be dismissed on procedural grounds alone. Even if the motion to dismiss were treated as a Section 581 motion to dismiss, those motions too must satisfy basic procedural requirements that the instant motion lacks. Rule of Court 3.1112 (a) requires that all motions consist of at least a notice of the hearing, the motion itself, and a memorandum or legal authorities and argument supporting the motion. Evidence is usually needed to establish the factual basis for the arguments made; evidence must be provided in admissible fashion, including affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury. A document attached to a motion or even to a declaration is not given under oath and thus does not fall within the hearsay exception for declarations given in support of or in opposition to a motion. (See Pajarao Valley Water Mgmt Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 Cal.App.4 th 1093, 1107.) Thus, as with motion for summary judgment, motions to dismiss that rely on exhibits, documents, discovery responses, contracts and the like must be authenticated by a sworn declaration or else they are subject to objection as lacking foundation and/or inadmissible hearsay. A motion to dismiss that seeks the same relief as a motion for summary judgment requires admissible evidence or judicially noticed facts to justify such a remedy. Plaintiffs current motion lacks these things. Defendant Fails to Carry His Burden on Motion for Summary Judgment When bringing a Motion for Summary Judgment, the initial burden is on Defendant to demonstrate to the Court that there are no triable issues of material fact. Here, Defendant fails to do such. The crux of Defendants motion attempts to argue that Plaintiffs causes of action are based on an illegal contract made between the parties and thus, it is unenforceable. Defendant cites to Civil Code section 1596, which states that [t]he object of a contract must be lawful when the contract is made, and possible and ascertainable by the time the contract is to be performed. (Civ. Code, § 1596.) Although this is true, Defendants argument fails to illustrate to the Court and even more importantly, carry his burden in proving that there is no triable issue of fact as to the legality of the contract. Throughout Defendants memorandum, he refers to the unpublished case of Metsch v. Heinowitz (2020) 2020 WL 1933189 ( Metsch ). In Metsch , the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled on a case where plaintiffs sued defendant for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion arising out of a contractual and partnership relationship for the production and distribution of edible cannabis products. ( Metsch, supra, 2020 WL 1933189 at 1.) The Metsch Court discussed, the issue of illegality of contract in the context of applicable cannabis law. The Metsch Court held that defendants carried their burden that the contractual and partnership alleged in the FAC was illegal, when they presented legal authority showing both that cannabis was a Schedule I controlled substance and that the possession, cultivation, or processing of marijuana violated California law. ( Id. at 9.) The Metsch Court also found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their responsible burden of evidence involving qualified immunity and unclean hands. ( Id. at 10-11.) Thus, the Metsch Court affirmed the trial court ruling granting summary judgment in the defendants favor. ( Id. at 13.) This Court notes that unlike the defendants in Metsch , Defendant in the case at bar has failed to carry any burden of proving illegality. He argues that United States Code sections relating to probation such as 18 U.S.C., sections 3563 (Conditions of Probation), 3603 (Duties of Probation Officers), 3663 (Order of Restitution) 3664 (Procedure for Issuance and Enforcement of Order of Restitution), and alleges that the contract is illegal because Defendant had certain terms of his probation, that Plaintiff knew of such terms, and still entered the contract irrespective of Defendant abiding by such terms. Specifically, with 18 U.S.C. 3563(b)(22), which requires the defendant&satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose, Defendant argues that one of these conditions was allegedly that he was prohibited to enter into any credit contracts or agreements without prior approval of the U.S. Probation Department or a Modification of the defendants judgment and commitment as ordered by the presiding judge in the Defendants criminal trial. Again, there is no evidence before the Court of such a requirement, nor is such a condition of Defendants probation judicially noticed by this Court. However, even if it was, this Court makes clear, that the United States Code Annotated relied on by Defendant are conditions that are imposed on the Defendant not on the Plaintiff. The Code does not require Plaintiff to abide by Defendants probationary rules. Assuming such rules were imposed on the Defendant, the fact that Defendant entered into such a contract that purportedly fails to abide by these asserted probationary rules does not render the contract void but rather might make it voidable. Further, if Defendant entered into the subject credit contract and received the benefits of the contract, the Court might need to assess whether Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting an illegality defense or whether other equitable doctrines such as quantum meruit or quantum valebant might apply. The common count of quantum valebant [is] for the reasonable value of goods sold and delivered. ( Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 792; see Lake v. Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 366, 370 [ The existence of a contract implied in law under a quantum valebant count depends upon whether the defendant has used for its benefit any property of [plaintiff] in such manner and under such circumstances that the law will impose a duty of compensation therefor. ].) California law distinguishes between contracts which are malum in se , which would potentially make the claimed illegal contract void, and those which are merely malum prohibitum , which might make the claimed illegal contract voidable. (Russell City Energy Co., LLC v. City of Hayward (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 54, 7071 .) Malum in se means against good morals and in violation of the general law of public policy, immoral. ( Martin v. Wade (1869) 37 Cal. 168, 174.) Traditionally, parties to a contract malum in se , whether it be executory or executed, whether the action be brought on the contract or to recover the consideration, are denied all remedy by the Courts. ( Martin, at p. 174.) In contrast, contracts that are malum prohibitum means prohibited by statutemalum prohibitum contracts are illegal as contrary to a statute or regulation. Parties to malum prohibitum contracts may recover back money paid on [the] contract as the circumstances of the case may require. ( Smith v. Bach (1920) 183 Cal. 259, 263-264.) Before the Court could consider dismissing the case on the basis of a claimed illegal contract, the Court would need evidence bearing on the existence of the claimed conditions of parole or probation, whether Defendant did or did not receive the value of the contract or of goods and services, and similar information. None of that is presented in admissible fashion in the moving papers. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to carry his initial burden in bringing this motion as he has failed to show that no triable issue of material fact exists as to the illegality of the contract, that he fails to show whether the claimed illegal contract is one that is malum in se or malum prohibidum, and that he has failed to present sufficient evidence for the Court to dismiss the case or to grant summary judgment. . III. CONCLUSION¿ ¿ ¿¿¿ For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV20520 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Healing Hands Care, Inc., a California Corporation; Ara Tovmassian aka Ara Mesrop Tovmassian and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV20520 Hearing Date: 7/9/24 Trial Date: 12/6/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc.s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions (Attorney Fees and Costs) Against Defendant Ara Tovmassian in the Amount of $850.00 [Res ID # 0191]. I. Background On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff purportedly served Requests for Admission (RFAs), Set One, on Defendant Tovmassian. Responses to RFAs, Set One, were purportedly due on February 6, 2024, 35 days after purported service by mail on January 2, 2024. Defendant Tovmassian allegedly failed to serve responses to RFAs, Set One, by February 6, 2024. On March 20, 2024, based on Defendant Tovmassians alleged non-response to RFAs, Set One, Plaintiff filed a motion to deem the truth of RFAs, Set One, admitted as against Defendant Tovmassian. Plaintiffs motion also requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $850 against Defendant Tovmassian. Plaintiff served the motion on Defendant Tovmassian by mail that same day. Defendant Tovmassian has failed to oppose Plaintiffs motion despite service. Plaintiffs motion is now before the Court. II. Motion to Deem Truth of RFAs Admitted and Request for Sanctions A. Motion to Deem Truth of RFAs Admitted : GRANTED. 1. Legal Standard The discovering party can make a motion to deem as admitted any unanswered requests for admission or any requests answered in a late or unverified response. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240, subd. (a) [RFA responses must be signed by responding party under oath]; see Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 [unsworn response to RFAs is treated like no response].) These requests are not automatically deemed admitted; the discovery party must make the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) To establish this ground, a movant must show: (1) Proper service (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.070); (2) Expiration of the deadline for the initial response 30 days after service or on date agreed to by parties (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subds. (a), (b)); and (3) That (a) the responding party served no response (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b)), (b) the propounding party served a late response (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b)); or (3) the responding party served an unsworn response (see Appleton v. Superior Court , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 636 [unsworn response to RFAs is treated like no response]). A court must deny a motion to compel initial discovery where the discovery sought is outside the scope of discovery. (See CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19; see also Code. Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 [scope of discovery].) 2. Courts Determination The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff. The moving papers points and authorities contend that RFAs, Set One, was served on Defendant Tovmassian on January 2, 2024. (Mot., pp. 3 [service], 5 [signature, not sworn].) However, the points and authorities are unsworn and not entitled to evidentiary credence. ( In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413 [the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence]; South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 668, fn. 14 [unsworn arguments of counsel in a legal memorandum are not evidence].) The original Natalia A. Minassian counsel declaration filed on March 20, 2024 did not support service on January 2, 2024, as to RFAs, Set One. However, at the initial hearing on July 2, 2024, the Court pointed out what appeared to be an inadvertent failure to include substance in that declaration. The Court continued the hearing to July 9, 2024 to allow Plaintiffs counsel to address the error. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a notice of errata and a revised Declaration of Natalia Minassian. It included both averments by counsel as well as attaching the Requests for Admission, along with the Proof of Service, showing service by mail on the Defendant on January 2, 2024. For this reason, the Court finds that service has been shown. Moreover, the evidence supports the fact that the discovery was served on the date alleged in the motion, and thus the Court finds no prejudice from the initial failure to attach the proof of service to the motion. Second, Defendant has failed to oppose this motion, and did not appear at the initial hearing on July 2, 2024. The evidence in the moving papers sets forth that the Defendant did not respond, and this evidence is thus unrebutted. Third, the court finds that the 17 RFAs are relevant to the facts involved in this case and are otherwise appropriate, clear and unambiguous. Given these findings, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion. B. Request for Sanctions : GRANTED. 1. Legal Standard The Court must award sanctions when a partys response is untimely, and the discovering party makes a motion to deem the requests admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c); see Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31-32; see e.g., Appleton v. Superior Court , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 635-636 [sanctions are mandatory].) The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).) 2. Courts Determination The motion to deem admitted has been denied without prejudice, and Defendant has failed to respond or oppose this motion in any way. The requested sanctions of $850 for legal fees of $790 at an hourly rate of $395 and the $60 filing fee for the motion are eminently reasonable. Accordingly, the Court grants sanctions in the amount of $850. III. Conclusion Plaintiff Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc.s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions (Attorney Fees and Costs) Against Defendant Ara Tovmassian in the Amount of $850.00 [Res ID # 0191] is GRANTED. Sanctions in the amount of $850 are ordered to be paid to Hatkoff & Minassian within 30 days of this Order. Failure to do so could result in further sanctions as ordered by the Court.