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Termochilca Sa Vs Sempra Energy

Case Last Refreshed: 2 years ago

Termochilca Sa, filed a(n) Breach of Contract - Commercial case represented by Berman, Joshua A; Simonsen, Catherine S; Weedman, Joshua D, against Luz Del Sur Saa, Sempra Energy, represented by Yacovelle, John Anthony, in the jurisdiction of San Diego County. This case was filed in San Diego County Superior Courts with Judith F. Hayes presiding.

Case Details for Termochilca Sa v. Luz Del Sur Saa , et al.

Judge

Judith F. Hayes

Filing Date

April 20, 2017

Category

Civil - Unlimited

Last Refreshed

May 16, 2022

Practice Area

Commercial

Filing Location

San Diego County, CA

Matter Type

Breach of Contract

Case Cycle Time

78 days

Parties for Termochilca Sa v. Luz Del Sur Saa , et al.

Plaintiffs

Termochilca Sa

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Berman, Joshua A; Simonsen, Catherine S; Weedman, Joshua D

Defendants

Luz Del Sur Saa

Sempra Energy

Attorneys for Defendants

Yacovelle, John Anthony

Case Documents for Termochilca Sa v. Luz Del Sur Saa , et al.

Objections filed by Sempra Energy.

Date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00

Case initiation form printed.

Date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00

Case Events for Termochilca Sa v. Luz Del Sur Saa , et al.

Type Description
Docket Event Civil Case Management Conference scheduled for 10/13/2017 at 09:30:00 AM at Central in C-68 Judith F. Hayes was vacated.
Docket Event Notice of Entry of Dismissal filed by Termochilca SA.
Docket Event Request for Dismissal without Prejudice - Entire Action filed by Termochilca SA.
Docket Event Complaint dismissed without prejudice as to Sempra Energy.
Docket Event Complaint dismissed without prejudice as to Termochilca SA.
Docket Event Request for Dismissal without Prejudice - Entire Action filed by Termochilca SA.
Docket Event Stipulation - Other - Fee Due (Stipulation and Order to Extend the time for Plaintiff to file and Serve Amended Complaint) filed by Termochilca SA; Sempra Energy.
Docket Event Notice of Entry of Dismissal as to Luz del Sur S.A.A.
Notice of Entry of Dismissal filed by Termochilca SA.
Docket Event Complaint dismissed without prejudice as to Luz Del Sur SAA.
Docket Event Request for Dismissal without Prejudice - Party filed by Termochilca SA. Refers to: Luz Del Sur SAA
See all events

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Ruling

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24CV00765 HATZIS, MORGAN RAE V. PRIETO, MARIA NERISSA ET AL EVENT: Defendants’ Demurrer to Complaint Defendants Maria Nerissa Prieto and Privilege Medical, Inc. have failed to comply with the notice requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §1005. The Proof of Service filed on June 11, 2024, the same day as the Demurrer, includes the wrong clients, wrong party names, wrong case number, wrong documents/motion, and is missing name and address of person/party served. As such, notice is insufficient, and the Demurrer is overruled on that basis.

Ruling

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Ruling

Omar Arroyo et al. vs American Honda Motor Co., Inc., a California Corporation
Jul 09, 2024 | STK-CV-UBC-2022-0007718
2022-7718 Mercado/Arroyo MTC Deposition of PMQ 7/10/2024 Plaintiffs Rocio Mercado and Omar Arroyo bring a Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance of Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”) and Request for Sanctions. Having read the moving papers, the opposition papers, and reply papers the court issues the following tentative ruling: On February 8, 2024, Plaintiffs properly noticed the deposition of Defendants PMK and Custodians of Records. On February 15, 2024, Plaintiffs followed up with Defendant regarding Plaintiffs’ Notice of Depositions and requested that deposition dates be provided in case Defendant’s PMK was not available on the date the deposition was scheduled. On March 2, 2024, Defendant served objections to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposition. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a meet and confer letter to defense counsel regarding defendant’s objections. In the transmittal email plaintiffs’ counsel states “WE are in receipt of your objections to the notice of deposition for AHMAC’s PMQ set for Monday, March 11, 2024 at 11:30 A.M.; however, no alternative dates were provided for the deponent. [¶] Please advise as to an alternative, mutually convenient date so we may be able to re-notice this PMQ depo accordingly. IN addition, please see the attached M&C Letter regarding categories of examination.” On March 11, 2024, at 10:47 A.M., plaintiffs’ counsel sent another email to Defense counsel. This email provided the ZOOM link for the scheduled 11:30 A.M. deposition and also the following language, “Again, if the notice date does not work for Honda or the deponent, please advise on alternate dates. [¶] In the event that your office does not provide alternative dates for t his deposition, to protect our clients’ rights we will proceed with the deposition to memorialize your failure to appear.” Neither Defense counsel nor the party deponent appeared at the properly notice deposition and a non-appearance was taken by plaintiffs’ counsel. At 5:51 P.M. on March 11, 2024, plaintiffs’ counsel sent defense counsel an email attempting to get deposition dates to obtain the deposition without court intervention. On March 15, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel again sought dates to obtain the deposition. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel again sent an email in an attempt to get dates to take the deposition. Finally on March 27, 2024 Defense counsel responded to plaintiffs’ counsel’s inquiry. However, defense counsel did not provide dates for the deposition. Rather defense counsel stated, “We have requested availability for a PMQ to be provided as soon as possible, and will notify you as soon as a date is received.” On April 2, 2024, plaintiffs’ counsel again inquired about deposition dates. As of the time the motion was filed, Defense counsel has failed to provide available deposition dates. Trial of this matter is set for August 19, 2024, 1:30 P.M., Dept. 11B. Oral depositions are an authorized method of discovery. (See CCP §2025.010 et seq.) Serving a deposition notice on a party is the method to obtain the party’s attendance at the oral deposition. (CCP §§2025.210-2025.240 / 2025.280.) If a party fails to attend the deposition as noticed the noticing party may bring a motion to compel attendance. If the party fails to attend or proceed with the noticed deposition the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that party, or the attorney for that party, or both, and in favor any party attending in person or by attorney, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2025.430.) In addition, failure to submit to authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process for which monetary sanctions shall be imposed. (CCP §2023.2023.010(d) /§ 2023.030.) The Motion is GRANTED. Defendant’s PMK is ordered to sit for an oral deposition within 15 days of service of the order on Defense counsel. Defendant is to produce responsive documents at the deposition. The parties are to meet and confer to find an agreeable date, time and location for the deposition within the 15 day window. The request for monetary sanctions is granted. The court finds the hourly rate requested for associate work of $295.00, is reasonable. The court finds the hourly rate requested for Mr. Kirnos of $495.00 is reasonable. The court finds it would take approximately 3 hours of associate time and 2 hours of Mr. Kirnos time write the motion, analyze the opposition, draft a reply and attend the hearing remotely. The court finds that the monetary sanction should include the $60.00 filing fee. Therefore, the court awards $1,935.00 as discovery sanctions against Defendant and Defense counsel. Discovery sanctions payable within 30 days of service of the order. The Mandatory Settlement Conference date of July 22, 2024, 1:30 P.M., Dept. 11B, and Trial Date of August 19, 2024, 1:30 P.M., Dept. 11B, are confirmed and remain as set. WATERS 7/9/2024 Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling: Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. To conduct a remote appearance, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept. 11B. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept. 11B: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6941 and Pin # 5564. The courtroom clerk will make announcements and the Judge will call the calendar. Please mute your phones when you are not speaking, and remember to unmute your phone when you are speaking. At this time, we are not able to provide information over the phone. To communicate with the Courtroom Clerk of Dept. 11B, please email questions to civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org, indicating in the title of the email the Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name. A Courtroom Clerk will return your email. 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Ruling

ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ, ET AL. VS EFREN LUNA, ET AL.
Aug 09, 2024 | 24PSCV00070
Case Number: 24PSCV00070 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: O Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs Application for Entry of Default Judgment re: Joseph Acosta is DENIED because cant hold individual officer/director liable for corporate acts . In the alternative, default judgment is CONTINUED because of bankruptcy proceedings. Background This case arises from a home renovation project. Plaintiffs ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ and KINDRA SANCHEZ [1] allege the following against Defendants EFREN LUNA (owner of Safari); JOSEPH ACOSTA (vice-president of Safari); and SAFARI LANDSCAPING & POOLS (Safari): In October 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a contract with Safari for installation of a pool and spa and remodel of their backyard. Though the parties agreed to a completion date of July 3, 2023 and though Plaintiffs have paid for 95% of the contract price in the amount of $231,395.00, the vast majority of the work has yet to be completed. On January 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit asserting the following causes of action (COAs): 1. Breach Of Contract 2. Breach Of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing 3. Common Count: Money Had And Received 4. Intentional Misrepresentation 5. False Promise 6. Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress 7. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress On January 23, 2024, Luna filed his answer. On May 22, 2024, default was entered against Joseph Acosta. On May 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant application for entry of default judgment as to Joseph Acosta. On June 17, 2024, Efren filed a Notice of Stay of Proceedings indicating that the case is stayed with regard to all parties. Discussion Plaintiffs seek entry of default judgment as to Acosta in the total amount of $133,829.00, which includes $132,764.00 in damages. The application is denied for the following two reasons. First, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 585, a party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment. Here, however, Plaintiffs have not filed an application for separate judgment as to Acosta. Second, Plaintiffs seek to hold Acosta (and Luna) individually liable. However, it is well-established that corporate officers and directors cannot ordinarily be held personally liable for the acts or obligations of their corporation. However, they may become liable if they directly authorize or actively participate in wrongful or tortious conduct. ( Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 503-504; see also Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 858.) Here, the complaint is premised upon breach of contract. Therefore, as there are no allegations of wrongful act(s) performed in the name of the corporation, the individual defendants shielded from liability. To the extent that Plaintiffs may rely upon their 4 th and 5 th COAs for intentional misrepresentation and false promise, respectively, those are not well pled. Effectively, guided by the instructions set forth in Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc . (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267 , absent a properly pled complaint, default judgment is improper. Should Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint, the application is denied with prejudice. Bankruptcy Notwithstanding, as soon as a bankruptcy case is filed, an automatic stay immediately goes into effect and generally prevents creditors (and other parties) from taking most actions against property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, and the debtor's property. Here, according to the CM-180 form filed by Luna on 6/17/24, a bankruptcy case has been filed (6:24-bk-11500-WJ) and the form mentions Safari. Therefore, until the bankruptcy court order lifts the stay has been entered or the stay has expired, taking any actions in this case is premature. Conclusion Based on the foregoing two defects, the application is denied (with or without prejudice TBD). Notwithstanding, the default judgment hearing will be continued pending the bankruptcy proceeding. [1] Though pro per, they are held to the same standards as attorneys. ( Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536.) To provide otherwise would be to give pro per litigants an unfair advantage. ( Ibid .)

Ruling

HYON YI, AS TRUSTEE OF THE YI FAMILY TRUST, ET AL. VS THE 400 CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, A CALIFORNIA NON-PROFIT MUTUAL BENEFIT - COMMON AREA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 24STCV00677
Case Number: 24STCV00677 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Case Name: Hyon Yi et al. v. The 400 Condominium Owners Association et al. Case No.: 24STCV00677 Motion: Demurrer / Motion to Strike (Initial Complaint) Moving Party: Defendants, The 400 Condominium Owners Association and Desiree Golembiewski Opposing Party: Plaintiffs, Hyon Yi and Jinny Yi Tentative Ruling: Defendant The 400 Condominium Owners Associations demurrer to Plaintiffs second cause of action is overruled. Defendant Desiree Golembiewskis demurrer to the entire complaint is sustained in its entirety, with thirty (30) days leave to amend. The motion to strike is granted with thirty (30) days leave to amend. Plaintiffs Hyon and Jinny Yi sued defendants The 400 Condominium Owners Association (the HOA), Desiree Golembiewski (Golembiewski), HOA Management Professionals, Inc., and Does 1-100 on January 10, 2024, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, (2) intentional interference with contractual relationship, (3) declaratory relief, (4) breach of fiduciary duties, (5) violation of the Davis-Stirling Act, and (6) negligence. As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for purposes of demurrer (with paragraph citations to the complaint): In 1995, Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, bought the property located at 400 S. Lafayette Park Place, Unit 109, Los Angeles 90057 (the Unit). (¶¶ 8-9.) The Unit is one of approximately fifty condominiums located in the same development (the Property), which is managed by the HOA. (¶ 10 and Exh. 1.) All units on the Property are bound by the same Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictiosn (CC&Rs). ( Id. , ¶¶ 12.) The HOA is administered according to written bylaws. (¶ 11 and Exh. 2.) Defendant Golembiewski was, at relevant times, the HOAs Board President. (¶ 26.) Around February 2021, Plaintiffs sought to rent out the Unit. (¶ 18.) Golembiewski recommended they rent to friends of hers, a Michelle Alvarez and Salvadore Zelaya (the Tenants). (¶ 19.) Plaintiffs took Golembiewskis advice and rented to them. (¶ 21.) About fourteen months after the Tenants executed their lease, Plaintiffs began receiving complaints about them from the HOA. (¶ 22.) One of the Tenants informed Plaintiffs they had personally fallen out with Golembiewski. (¶¶ 26-27.) The HOA began imposing increasing fines on Plaintiffs for their Tenants purported nuisance behavior. (¶¶ 28-40.) Eventually, the Board passed a resolution to fine Plaintiffs daily until the Tenants were evicted. ( Id. , ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs conferred with the Tenants, who agreed to vacate voluntarily and did so in October 2022. (¶¶ 45-46.) Throughout this dispute, Plaintiffs allege the HOA did not hold meetings or impose fines according to its bylaws. (¶¶ 16, 42-43.) Plaintiffs decided to sell their Unit because they expected the HOA, led by Golembiewski, would conduct themselves similarly toward other tenants. (¶¶ 50-51.) They hired a real estate agent in September 2023. (¶ 51.) Golembiewski then approached the real estate agent and falsely told the agent that Plaintiffs owe $20,000.00 in fees that will be deducted from escrow during the Units sale. (¶¶ 53-54.) The HOA has since provided a breakdown of the fees, several of which are fabricated (e.g., $8,500.00 for evicting nuisance tenant who left voluntarily; $4,500.00 in construction work never performed). (¶ 54.) Plaintiffs attempted to engage the HOA in informal dispute resolution procedures. The HOA failed to cooperate, so Plaintiffs sued. On June 4, 2024, Golembiewski and the HOA jointly demurred to the complaint and moved to strike certain portions from it. The HOA challenges only the second cause of action against it; Golembiewski challenges all of them. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. Neither the HOA nor Golembiewski replied. Request for Judicial Notice Defendants requests for judicial notice are denied. There is ... a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive formany matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2.) The issuance or non-issuance of restraining orders against the Tenants has no bearing on the sufficiency of Plaintiffs complaint. Demurrer A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. ( Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . .. ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) The HOAs Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action for Intentional Interference The HOA argues only that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against it for intentional interference with contractual relations. The elements of intentional interference are (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) defendants knowledge, (3) intentional acts designed to induce breach or disruption, (4) breach or disruption, and (5) damage. ( Seamans Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 765-766.) Here, Plaintiffs allege they had a valid lease with their Tenants, the HOA knew about it, and the HOA fabricated wrongdoing on the Tenants part to induce Plaintiffs to evict them, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of rental income. Plaintiffs have pled all the requisite elements of intentional interference. The HOAs argument relies on facts outside the four corners of the complaint, of which the Court declines to take judicial notice. The HOAs demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled. Golembiewskis Demurrer on the Basis of Uncertainty and Failure to State a Claim Golembiewski demurs, arguing that the complaint is uncertain or fails to state a claim because on its face it only alleges she acted in her capacity as HOA President. She relies on the rule that a corporate director may not be held liable for the corporations torts when the director did not personally participate in the torts. (See Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association (1986) 42 Cal.3d 409, 503-504.) Plaintiff argues the inverse: that Golembiewski did personally participate in the torts committed by the HOA, so she can be held liable even though she is also an HOA director. The Court agrees with Defendants. The complaint is at best unclear which actions were purportedly taken by Golembiewski in her individual capacity and which as HOA President. The Court is not persuaded that any of the actions in question permit individual liability to be imposed on Golembiewski, but will permit Plaintiffs to amend their pleading to provide more clarity. Golembiewskis demurrer is sustained in its entirety, with leave to amend. Motion to Strike Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and/or strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A motion to strike is the procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. ( Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) A complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. ( Clauson v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud and malice toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Ibid. ) Here, there are no specific factual allegations in the complaint that permit an inference of fraud, malice, or oppression. The complaint depicts a straightforward dispute over CC&Rs, perhaps improperly influenced by the personal biases of an HOA director. But that is not sufficient to satisfy Civil Code section 3294, which requires despicable conduct (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1)-(2)), intentional conduct intended to cause injury ( id. , subd. (c)(1)), or intentional fraud ( id. , subd. (c)(3)). The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Conclusion Defendant The 400 Condominium Owners Associations demurrer to Plaintiffs second cause of action is overruled. Defendant Desiree Golembiewskis demurrer to the entire complaint is sustained in its entirety, with thirty (30) days leave to amend. The motion to strike is granted with thirty (30) days leave to amend.

Ruling

FLAGSTAR FINANCIAL & LEASING, LLC vs MANQUEROS
Jul 14, 2024 | CVSW2305608
FLAGSTAR FINANCIAL & HEARING ON RIGHT TO ATTACH CVSW2305608 LEASING, LLC VS ORDER MANQUEROS Tentative Ruling: Hearing Required.

Ruling

FISCUS vs. PATTERSON, et al.
Jul 12, 2024 | CVCV22-0199210
FISCUS VS. PATTERSON, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV22-0199210 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Continue Trial Date: This matter involves multiple parties and Cross- Complaints. Plaintiff is Paula Fiscus. Defendant/Cross-Defendants/Cross-Complainants Gregory G. Gonzales and Marcia J. Gonzales, Trustees of the Greg and Marcia Gonzales Family 2014 Revocable Trust will be referred to as the Gonzales Defendants. James Patterson and Patterson Landscape/Yard Manicurist Agency will be referred to as the Patterson Defendants. The Gonzales Defendants have filed a Motion to Continue the presently set August 20, 2024, trial date. The Patterson Defendants have joined the motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company has not filed anything related to the motion and did not attend the ex parte hearing on June 27, 2024, at which time was shortened to hear the motion today instead of July 22, 2024, as originally noticed. There is no evidence that the Gonzales Defendants provided notice of today’s hearing to Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company. Cross-Defendant Mark Behnke Construction has also not filed anything related to the motion but did attend the ex parte hearing and is therefore aware of today’s hearing. Merits. “To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain.” CRC 3.1332(a). “Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.” CRC 3.1332(c). Circumstances that may indicate good cause are: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. CRC 3.1332(c). When considering whether to grant a motion to continue, there are several factors that the Court must consider including: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. CRC 3.1332(d). The reasons presented by the Gonzales Defendants to continue the trial are that trial counsel has a conflicting trial schedule and because Marcia Gonzales’s son is getting married the week of trial. In the moving papers, the Gonzales Defendants note that the wedding date was set prior to the Court setting the Augst 20, 2024 trial date. The reasons for the Patterson Defendants joining the motion are because counsel has a conflicting trial schedule, counsel is moving homes in late August, and because the Pattersons have a prepaid vacation from August 26- September 6, 2024. It is not clear whether the Pattersons’ vacation was set and prepaid when the Court set the trial date of if the Pattersons planned it after the trial date was set. Plaintiff opposes the continuance on the grounds that Defendants have failed to show good cause for the continuance, and because Plaintiff will be prejudiced by a continuance. The prejudice alleged is that a later trial would not allow time for necessary remediation of the landscaping issues before the next rainy reason. These issues have resulted in significant erosion and flooding. Plaintiff also argues that the parties stipulated to the August 20, 2024, trial date and all agreed that no further continuances would be granted absent stipulation. While this agreement did not make it into the Court’s Order dated April 10, 2024 (which was submitted by the Patterson Defendants), it is clear from the Stipulation that the parties did reach such a stipulation. Conflicting trial schedules do not automatically create good cause to continue a trial. Trial counsel regularly have multiple trials set for the same week. Any attorney who practices in civil law is well aware that not every trial set actually goes forward as scheduled. No good cause has been presented in that regard. As to the wedding, it appears the counsel for the Gonzales Defendants did not check with their client prior to agreeing to a trial date. Had they checked, surely Ms. Gonzales would have pointed out that her son was getting married that week. The unavailability of Ms. Gonzales due to her son’s wedding may constitute an excusable circumstance under CRC 3.1332(c)(2). Similarly, the Patterson’s vacation could also be such a circumstance, depending on when it was scheduled. Regarding the CRC 3.1332(d) factors, the trial date is one month and twelve days away. Trial has been continued twice before. The first was by stipulation on October 13, 2022. The second was by stipulation on April 9, 2024, as discussed above. The Gonzales Defendants have requested a continuance to November of 2024 while the Patterson Defendants have requested 45-60 days. The only alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance would be potentially taking witnesses out of order at trial. Plaintiff may be prejudiced by the continuance. The matter is not entitled to preferential trial setting. Regarding the Court’s calendar, one of the two civil trial courts will be dark on the currently set date of August 20, 2024, which reduces the chance that this matter will be assigned to a courtroom for trial. Counsel is not currently engaged in another trial that causes a conflict and only provides evidence that there are other trials that might affect counsel’s availability. There is no stipulation for a continuance. The parties previously agreed that no further continuances would occur absent a stipulation. Regarding the interests of justice, the Court is in a position of having to weigh how much counsel’s failure to consult with their clients regarding their schedules should be permitted to affect their client on a personal level. It is clear that counsel should have done a better job to make sure that the agreed upon trial date worked for all parties, and not just counsel. This is particularly so when the parties explicitly stipulated that no further continuances would take place. However, the Court does not feel that it is in the interest of justice to punish Ms. Gonzales by potentially preventing her from participating in her son’s wedding based on counsel’s failure to communicate properly. As to the Patterson vacation, it is unclear whether this vacation was set at the time the trial was set or if the Pattersons scheduled their vacation later. However, the Court does understand the need for the Pattersons to be present for the trial to present their testimony. On balance, the Court finds that granting of a short continuance would be in the interest of justice. The Pattersons’ vacation lasts until September 6, 2024. Therefore, the Court intends to continue the trial to Tuesday, September 10, 2024. If this trial date does not work for Plaintiff, the Court will entertain the first available date for Plaintiff. Should the trial be continued, all discovery deadlines will flow from the new trial date. However, the Court notes that Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company was not provided with notice of today’s hearing. Absent an appearance by Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company, the Court will continue today’s hearing to July 22, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63 as that is the date that was originally noticed.

Ruling

BRIAN WEINER, ET AL. VS ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
Jul 12, 2024 | 18STCV06807
Case Number: 18STCV06807 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 brian weiner, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. onyx tower group, llc , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 18STCV06807 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC FOR FPRODUCTION [sic] OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS Background Plaintiff Brian Weiner, individually and derivatively on behalf of Onyx Tower Management, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action on November 30, 2018, against a number of defendants. The operative Third Amended Complaint was filed on October 22, 2020, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, accounting, declaratory relief, constructive fraud, fraud, and appointment of receiver. On March 6, 2020, defendant Michael Hakim filed a Cross-Complaint against a number of cross-defendants, including Onyx Tower Management, LLC. On April 12, 2023, Michael Hakim filed a Cross-Complaint to the Third Amended Complaint. In addition, on January 19, 2021, a number of defendants filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff. Plaintiff now moves for an order compelling the production of documents within Onyx Tower Group, LLCs, Onyx Tower Holdings, LLCs, Onyx Tower Management, LLCs, and Onyx Tower, LLCs possession, custody, and control; and for further responses. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions in connection with each of the motions. Onyx Tower Holdings opposes each of the motions. [1] Evidentiary Objections The Court rules on Plaintiffs evidentiary objections as follows: [2] Objection No. 1, p. 1: sustained as to [t]he Documents that were identified, overruled as to the remainder. Objection No. 2, p. 2: overruled Objection No. 3, p. 2: sustained Objection No. 2, pp. 2-3: sustained Objection No. 3, p. 3: overruled Objection No. 4: overruled Objection No. 5: overruled Objection No. 6: sustained Objection No. 7: sustained as to provided testimony to the best of his recollection, overruled as to the remainder. Objection No. 8: overruled Objection No. 9: overruled Objection No. 10: overruled Objection No. 11: overruled Objection No. 12: overruled Objection No. 13: overruled Objection No. 14: overruled Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a) provides that [o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1)¿A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2)¿A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3)¿An objection in the response is without merit or too general. A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection must set forth specific facts showing good cause for the discovery sought and must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b) .)¿ Discussion The Court refers to Onyx Tower Group, LLC, Onyx Tower Holdings, LLC, Onyx Tower Management, LLC, and Onyx Tower, LLC collectively herein as the Onyx Entities. In his declaration in support of the instant motions, Plaintiffs counsel states that on April 28, 2023, Plaintiff properly served requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Defendants seeking documents related to the Subject Property. Attached to the Appendix of Exhibits as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Entities. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 8, Exs. 1.) Plaintiffs counsel states that [o]n May 28, 2023, Defendants served objections to Plaintiffs document requests only on the basis that written discovery is cut off pursuant to the Minute Orders dated February 17, 2022 and October 4, 2022. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 10, Exs. 3.) Thereafter, the parties met and conferred regarding this matter. (Saltz Decls., ¶¶ 11, 13.) Plaintiff notes that on September 27, 2023, an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) was held in this action. The Courts September 27, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , [t]he Informal Discovery Conference is held. According to the agreement by Counsel Dennis P. Wilson, Responses will be provided by October 30, 2023. (September 27, 2023 Minute Order at p. 8 .) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that the Onyx Entities production&was served two days late on November 1, 2023, and responses were served three days late on November 2, 2023, in violation of the Courts September 27, 2023 Minute Order& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs counsel states that [a]ttached to the Appendix of Exhibits as Exhibit 5 are true and correct copies of Defendants responses to Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Entities. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that [s]ubstantively, the Onyx Defendants responses were not compliant with the Code of Civil Procedure&By way of example, and not limitation, the Onyx Defendants provided the same response to each of the 23 requests in the 4 sets of document requests making it impossible for Plaintiff to know whether the Onyx Defendants are complying in whole or in part with any of the requests contained across the 4 sets, or whether the Onyx Defendants even conducted a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry to comply& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs counsel contends that [t]his singular response referencing the Onyx Defendants data dump of over four thousand pages of documents also renders it impossible to determine which documents are responsive to which request. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs counsel notes that on November 3, 2023, another IDC was held. The Courts November 3, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , [t]he Court suggests for the parties to meet and confer in order to be in compliance with prior court order(s) before the next hearing. After the meet and confer, the parties are to file a response statement 2-court days prior to the next hearing. On the Courts own motion, the Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) scheduled for 11/03/2023 is continued to 12/01/2023& Plaintiffs counsel states that on November 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Counsel sent a detailed letter asking the Onyx Defendants to supplement their responses, correct their production of documents, and to schedule a meet and confer by November 14, 2023. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7.) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that [o]n November 27, 2023, Mr. Wilson sent Plaintiffs Counsel a letter attempting to add untimely, improper, and previously waived objections to the Onyx Defendants responses&In said letter, the Onyx Defendants stood by their position of refusing to modify responses in any way, and thereby making any further attempt to meet and confer futile. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 30, Exs. 8.) On December 1, 2023, another IDC was held. The Courts December 1, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , that [i]n open court, the Informal Discovery Conference is held. The Court finds that further Informal Discovery Conferences will be unproductive. The Court permits plaintiff to file their Motions to Compel. In the motions, Plaintiff sates that Plaintiff moves to compel further responses from [the Onyx Entities] to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One and a full and complete production of documents because: (i) [the Onyx Entities] purported statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (ii) [the Onyx Entities] purported representation of its inability to comply because Plaintiff is allegedly in possession of most documents is inadequate, incomplete, and evasive, and (iii) [the Onyx Entities] attempt to preserve objections in its responses are without merit. (Mots. at p. 7:10-17.) As set forth above, the Onyx Entities served further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on November 2, 2023. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) It appears that the Onyx Entities further responses to each of Plaintiffs 23 requests for production all provide as follows: Subject to and without waiving Preliminary Statement above, Defendant assumes that the request seeks the production of documents related to this litigation, and - to the extent that any exist - will produce all non-privileged documents in Defendants possession custody and control responsive to this request that Defendant does not believe Plaintiffs already have in their possession, custody and control. Indeed, Plaintiffs have the vast majority of said documents currently in its possession, custody and control as they have the contracts, emails, invoices and cancelled checks in their own possession, custody and control, either through their own means or the accompanying document production bates stamped WTG00000l through WTG004371. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiff argues that [t]his singular, impermissibly confusing response by each of the Onyx Defendants does not comport with any of the prescribed responses according to the Discovery Act. (Mots. at p. 8:5-8.) Indeed, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a) , [t]he party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling. In the oppositions, Onyx Tower Holdings asserts that Defendants obviously cannot do so, but attempted to provide ALL DOCUMENTS and ALL COMMUNICATIONS in response to each request in the best attempt to comply. Defendant not only provided said documents in the order that they were kept, but specifically bates stamped each and every document page for ease of reference . (Oppns at p. 6:10-14, emphasis omitted.) However, the Court does not find that the Onyx Entities further responses clearly indicate whether they will comply with the particular demand for inspection, or whether they lack[] the ability to comply with the demand for inspection& ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subds . (a)(1)-(2).) Rather, as set forth above, the Onyx Entities further responses to the subject requests each appear to provide, inter alia , that &Defendant assumes that the request seeks the production of documents related to this litigation, and - to the extent that any exist - will produce all non-privileged documents in Defendants possession custody and control responsive to this request that Defendant does not believe Plaintiffs already have in their possession, custody and control . (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5, emphasis added.) Onyx Tower Holdings does not appear to cite legal authority demonstrating that such a response is adequate. Thus, the Court finds that the statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, and that the purported representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive . ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a) .) Plaintiff also cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) , which provides that [a]ny documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond. As set forth above, the Onyx Entities further responses to the subject requests each appear to reference the accompanying document production bates stamped WTG00000l through WTG004371. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants singular response referencing the same document bates range - WTG000001 through WTG004371 cannot possibly refer or apply to each Onyx entity, contain responsive documents to each request, or consist of the entire universe of documents within Defendants possession, custody, or control. (Mots. at p. 8:14-19.) Onyx Tower Holdings does not appear to specifically address this point. Plaintiffs counsel also asserts that Tanya Hakim&[testified] that there are at least 10,000 pages of documents in their possession, custody, or control relating to the Subject Property&Thus, significantly more documents exist than what the Onyx Defendants produced& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 26, Exs. 2.) Onyx Tower Holdings also does not appear to respond to this assertion. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the Court to compel the Onyx Entities to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One to the Onyx Entities. Request for Sanctions Plaintiff also asserts that terminating, issue, and/or monetary sanctions are appropriate against Defendant and its counsel. (Mots. at p. 12:15-19.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff states that he incorporates by reference Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions previously filed against Defendants&on September 21, 2023, and hereby supplements that request as a request for sanctions may properly be included in a motion to compel discovery. (Mots. at p. 12:16-22.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs attempt to incorporate by reference another motion is improper as it violates page limit rules. Pursuant to ¿ Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113, subd ¿ . (d) ¿ [e]xcept in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ¿ Plaintiffs instant motions are each 15 pages. Consequently, the Court declines to consider any arguments made outside of the moving papers filed by Plaintiff in connection with the instant motions. Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: & (g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g) .) There are a broad range of sanctions available against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030 .) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) ¿An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) ¿An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) ¿An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) ¿An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d) .) In addition, [t]he court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (b) .) In the motions, Plaintiff asserts that terminating sanctions are warranted given Defendants and its Counsels intentional, repeated, and willful refusal to produce responsive documents or code compliant responses over the course of more than six months in violation of this Courts numerous orders. (Mots. at pp. 14:25-15:2.) More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant and its Counsel still violated this Courts September 27, 2023 and November 3, 2023 orders by producing documents and responses late and in&non-compliance with the Discovery Act& (Mots. at p. 14:14-19.) As an initial matter, the Court notes that the November 3, 2023 minute order does not indicate that the Onyx Entities were ordered to produce documents. As set forth above, the November 3, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , that [t]he Court suggests for the parties to meet and confer in order to be in compliance with prior court order(s) before the next hearing. After the meet and confer, the parties are to file a response statement 2-court days prior to the next hearing. In addition, Plaintiffs argument that Defendant and its Counsel&violated this Courts September 27, 2023&order[] by producing documents and responses late (Mots. at p. 14:14-19) acknowledges that responses and documents were produced. Thus, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that terminating or issue sanctions are warranted at this time. The Court notes that in Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 , cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal noted that the courts have long recognized that the terminating sanction is a drastic penalty and should be used sparingly. A trial court must be cautious when imposing a terminating sanction because the sanction eliminates a partys fundamental right to a trial, thus implicating due process rights. (Internal citation omitted.) The discovery statutes&evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. ( Id. at pp. 604-605 [internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted.] .) Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against the Onyx Entities and their counsel. Plaintiff cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h) , which provides that [e]xcept as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010 ) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. As set forth above, on November 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Counsel sent a meet and confer Letter to the Onyx Entities counsel concerning Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7.) The November 10, 2023 meet and confer letter provides, inter alia , that this singular response referencing the same sequence of over four thousand pages of documents renders it basically impossible for Plaintiff to determine which documents are responsive to which request. This is a data dump in violation of Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.280(a), which requires that any documents produced be identified in conjunction with the specific request number to which the documents respond. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7, p. 2.) In addition, in the motions, Plaintiff asserts that Code of Civil Procedure Section 2031.280(a) requires that any documents produced be identified in conjunction with the specific request number to which the documents respond. Defendants singular response referencing the same document bates range - WTG000001 through WTG004371 cannot possibly refer or apply to each Onyx entity, contain responsive documents to each request, or consist of the entire universe of documents within Defendants possession, custody, or control. (Mots. at p. 8:12-19.) In the oppositions, Onyx Tower Holdings contends that [t]here is no requirement in the Code of Civil Procedure that a responding party identify in its response (with particularity or otherwise) the specific documents or things it intends to produce in response to a particular demand if it provides a statement of compliance. If the responding party does not object to the requests in their entirety, the responding party then must make the requested documents, things, or property available for inspection. Any documents produced in response to an inspection demand shall either be produced as they are kept in the usual course of business or be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand. (Oppns at p. 5:19-27, citing 2031.280, subd. (a).) In the replies, Plaintiff notes that he cited the correct Code section in the motion, and asserts that Onyx Tower Holdings improperly urges the Court to rely upon outdated law because the Code section language quoted and cited by Defendant is no longer accurate authority. (Replies at p. 3:17-18.) Indeed, as discussed, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) provides that [a]ny documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond. In light of the fact that Plaintiff cited to the current version of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) in the motion and in meet and confer correspondence (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7), the Court finds that Onyx Tower Holdingss reliance on an outdated version of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280 in the oppositions is without substantial justification. Thus, the Court finds that monetary sanctions are warranted under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h). Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against each of the Onyx Entities and their counsel, Law Office of Dennis Wilson and Dennis Wilson, in the amount of $55,260.00 (Mots. at p. 2:23-24.) Plaintiffs counsel Michael Saltz states that he spent a total of 17.5 hours&addressing Defendants discovery abuses or refusals to cooperate with Plaintiffs requests for production of documents following the September through December 2023 IDCs, seeking to meet and confer, and preparing the&Motion[s], that he anticipate[s] spending 1.5 hours reading and opposing papers to be filed by Defendants, and preparing a Reply, and that he anticipate[s] spending 2 hours preparing for and attending a hearing on [the] motion[s]. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 32.) For each motion, the total amount of Mr. Saltzs requested time is 21 hours at a requested $800 per hour, for a total of $16,800.00 (Saltz Decls., ¶ 33.) In addition, Plaintiffs counsel Simone E. Poyourow states that she spent a total of 116.2&hours addressing Defendants discovery abuses or refusals to cooperate with Plaintiffs requests for production of documents following the September through December 2023 IDCs, seeking to meet and confer, and preparing the&Motion[s], that she anticipate[s] spending 10 hours reading Defendants opposing papers, and preparing a Reply, and anticipate[s] spending 2 hours preparing for and attending a hearing on [the] motion[s]. (Poyourow Decls., ¶¶ 5-6.) For each motion, the total amount of Ms. Poyourows requested time is 128.2 hours at a requested $300 per hour, for a total of $38,460.00 (Poyourow Decls., ¶ 7.) The Court does not find that these requested amounts are reasonable. The Court finds that it is reasonable to award sanctions to Plaintiff for the four motios in the total amount of $12,400.00. This amount was calculated by awarding sanctions for 11 hours at Mr. Saltzs hourly rate of $800/hr for a total of $8,800; and 12 hours at Ms. Poyourows hourly rate of $300/hr for a total of $3,600.00. Lastly, the Court denies Onyx Tower Holdingss request for sanctions against Plaintiff. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motions for orders compelling the production of documents and further responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One to the Onyx Entities are granted. The Court orders the Onyx Entities to provide further verified responses and to produce documents responsive to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One , within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿¿¿ Plaintiffs motions for terminating and issue sanctions are denied. Plaintiffs motions for monetary sanctions are granted in part. As to each of the four motions, the Onyx Entities and their counsel, Law Office of Dennis Wilson and Dennis Wilson are ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $12,400.00 to Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of this Order. Onyx Tower Holdingss requests for monetary sanctions are denied. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: July 12, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] The Court notes that on June 18, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed and served via electronic mail untimely supplemental declarations in support of the motions. The Court notes that [u]nless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) .) Sixteen court days before the July 3, 2024 hearing is June 10, 2024. In addition, [a]ny period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days & ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) .) Plaintiff does not appear to show that he was authorized to file the supplemental declarations.¿Thus, the Court declines to consider the untimely supplemental declarations. [2] The Court notes that Plaintiffs evidentiary objections are misnumbered.

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